Buknari – One more place of religious conflict

Introduction

The present document aims to provide a nuanced description of the dynamics and context of religious conflict in the village Buknari (Chokhatauri Municipality), analyze the causes of such conflicts in our political system, and share recommendations with relevant authorities.

The assessments presented in the document are based on our observation of the events of January 14 and 15 in the village Buknar and our recorded interviews with representatives of the Muslim and Christian communities.

Village Buknari – Description of General Social Context

The village of Buknari is 12 km away from the Chokhatauri municipal center. According to the 2014 census, there are 775 inhabitants in the village. Locals state that the village has a population of 500, where the ratio of Muslim to Christian community is almost equal. Part of them has to go abroad for work, mostly to Turkey. Muslim community first settled in Buknari 70-50 years ago. Majority of the Muslim community resettled from the nearby village, Zoti. The key reasons for their resettlement were large families and a shortage of land resources in their village. Muslim and Christian communities are mixed in the village and their geographical location is not sharply separated or segregated. However, the Christian community mentions various districts of the village as “Adjarians side”.

The Christian and Muslim population of the village notes that there were conspicuous practices of coexistence and sharing in the village before the conflict. Indeed, the population cannot recall the examples of mixed families, however, they remark that before the conflict there were frequent cases of collective celebration of holidays and feasts. Furthermore, village residents also talk about social support practices, which broke religious lines and created a sense of commonness.[1] Muslim and Christian communities state that several years ago when construction of the church commenced, a significant part of the Muslim community physically and materially assisted the Christian parish in construction work.

At one sight, there are no sharp differences between the economic and material conditions of Muslim and Christian communities. However, both groups consider one another as more privileged, or financially strong. According to the Muslim population’s feelings, Christians have larger lands and more opportunities, while Christians think that the Muslim community is stronger economically.

Although Christians and Muslims assert that they lived together in the village with mutual respect and peace before the conflict, some local Muslims recall that even before the conflict, "the prestige of Christians in the village was greater than that of Muslims." The Christian community also indirectly discusses the feelings of alienation. One Christian woman notes that Muslims in our village do not mourn their dead and do not want to arrange a cemetery in the village.

According to one local Muslim, both previous friendships and coexistence were built on acknowledging the superiority of Christians and the silence of Muslims. "If I was not your enemy before, why am I your enemy now?" He asks, claiming that he helped to build a village church and that Christians should not interfere if they did not help the Muslims to build their place of worship.

The need for a place to worship and attempts to organize

The public debate on the construction of a mosque in the village Buknari began in 2012. According to the Muslim community, although there are mosques in the nearby villages of Buknar (Zoti, Nasakirali), it would be more convenient for them to organize a Jami (shrine) in their village, given the road and additional financial costs. As community members explained, they addressed the Chokhatauri municipality to clarify this issue and also listened to the opinion of the local Orthodox community.  The orthodox community opposed the mosque construction idea straightaway arguing that Buknari was a “Christian Land” and it was not permitted to organize an Islamic worship place there. Local self-government authority did not take the concrete decision on the construction issue at that time and left the Muslim community without an official response. For this reason, Muslims at that time refused to construct a mosque and continued praying individually at their houses.

Since the performance of Friday Jumu'ah prayer is an important aspect of the Islamic faith and practice, and at the same time, local Muslims did not want to go against the wishes of their Orthodox neighbors, in 2020 the Muslim community decided to raise money and to purchase a house far from the village center. As they explain, to avoid the annoyance of neighbors they do not plan to construct a minaret or install sound amplifiers for the azan (prayer call) on the building.  To this end, about 10 months ago, they bought a private house from a Muslim neighbor who moved to Tsalka on the outskirts of a village where no neighboring house exists and arranged a place of worship. For 7 months before the conflict, Muslims regularly gathered in this space for Friday prayers. Muslims clarify that although they had not said anything about the house and praying to practice to their orthodox neighbors' collective praying practice should be noticeable for them. Muslims categorically deny the widespread belief that they bought the house with the support of Turkey. The elder in charge of this process shared in detail the process started by the Muslim families of this village in order to raise money and organize the Jami.

Conflict escalation and violent experiences

Talking to the locals, it is clarified that relations between the village residents got strained in December 2020, after information was spread on social networks that a Muslim community was planning to build a mosque in the village. Although the Muslim community denied the allegations and explained to the local Orthodox community that they only wanted to perform the Friday prayers collectively, this acknowledgment and promise did not resolve tensions between the neighbors.

The local population clarifies, that the situation got so tense on religious grounds that there have been several facts of verbal and physical abuse between the Muslim and Orthodox community members. Namely, community members note that in January, one Orthodox woman met with the Muslims gathered for Friday prayers in the praying house and verbally abused them. The woman shouted that her community would not allow the construction of a mosque in Buknar and threw stones in the direction of Muslim neighbors. The incident was witnessed by police officers mobilized near the shrine, who pulled the woman out of the place, and only then the Muslims got the opportunity to pray.

Following the incident, another case of violence was reported in the village on January 10, 2021. According to Muslim respondents, one of their orthodox neighbors started coming to Muslim homes and arguing with them in insulting language that it would be impossible to open a mosque in a Christian village. It was during a similar incident that one of the Muslims gave a physical response to verbal abuse and shaking hands of his neighbor. The incident is described differently by the Orthodox we interviewed. According to them, one of the Muslims in the village complained that a neighboring orthodox man did not greet him on the street and physically assaulted him.

The incident that took place on January 10, 2021, became known to the police, who launched an investigation on the same day and questioned the opposing persons at the police station. The forensic medical examination was also appointed in connection with the injuries. Police officers warned the opposing persons to refrain from the conflict and called for reconciliation. However, the situation soon escalated again on January 12, and it took the form of even more severe violence.

The incident on January 12, which was the culmination of the conflict dynamics, is described differently by members of the Muslim and Orthodox communities we interviewed. According to the Muslims, on January 12, there was another verbal confrontation between two members of the Muslim and Orthodox communities, due to which the family members and relatives of the Muslim community went to the Orthodox neighbors gathered in the center of the village to clarify the situation. Upon arrival, one of the Orthodox cursed them, which soon escalated into a physical confrontation. During the physical confrontation, the Orthodox G.S. stoned two Muslims in the head, including a minor on the spot. Both individuals received severe head injuries and their hospitalization became necessary.

The dynamics of the violence that took place on January 12 are described differently by Orthodox respondents. They said that on January 12, a provocative act was carried out by one person from the Muslim community, after which other Muslims came to the scene and physically assaulted the Orthodox on the spot. During the ousting of the opposing group, one of the Muslims physically touched an orthodox woman on the spot, which irritated G.S. He picked up the stone and turned it several times, injuring two young men.

The Muslim and Orthodox population of the village also notes[2] that one crew of police was present at the scene during the incident, who also tried to eject the opposing parties and were able to calm down the situation on time. Around the incident, an investigation has been launched into the crime under Article 126 of the Criminal Code of Georgia (violence) and G.S., who was sentenced to imprisonment as a restraining measure, has been arrested.[3] 

It should be noted that the situation in Buknari got tense on January 13[4], when Georgian Muslims from different regions (mainly from Adjara) arrived to show solidarity with the local Muslim community. Police officers did not allow them to enter the village and approach citizens gathered in the village center. However, groups of young people broke a police cordon and entered the village. This incident did not result in any kind of violence or verbal abuse between the communities.

Conversation with the population reveals that the concerns and positions of the parties to the conflict are built on their fears and dignity. The Christian population says it will not allow the construction of mosques on Georgian soil. From their point of view, this is an attempt to protect the history and dignity of Georgia. At the same time, they emphasize that after the conflict, on January 13, when other Muslims appeared to support local Muslims, they felt particularly afraid.

Local Muslims, on the other hand, declare that they saw the real face of their neighboring Christians when they attempted to kill a minor child and threw stones at the child and another person. Muslim women have openly expressed concern for the physical and emotional safety of their children. At the same time, the Muslim population says that they are tired of asserting their Georgianness. They are full-fledged Georgians, citizens of Georgia, and their religious affiliation should not be a reason for anyone to question their Georgianness. According to the community, prayer is a fundamental human right and should not be violated.

Police role and actions in the chain of violent incidents

According to Muslim respondents, the Ministry of Interior Affairs was actively responding to the conflict incidents between the Muslim and Orthodox communities in December and January in the village Buknari. In particular, the investigation was commenced on both cases of physical violence on January 10 and 12, 2021 and in one case the alleged perpetrator was arrested.

Beyond the proactive response from police officers, community members note that as early as December, when local authorities became aware of a possible conflict, patrol police officers began active patrolling of the village. One or two police crews moved around the village several times a day, while members of the Muslim community noted that on Friday, one crew of patrol police stood in the village center and the other near the shrine.

As locals remark, one police crew was also present in the center of the village at the time of the incident on January 12, 2021, and as the conflict escalated, about 10-15 police officers mobilized on the spot. Locals explained that although police officers were unable to prevent a physical confrontation, they were soon able to separate the opposing parties and defuse the situation.

The participation of the Ministry of Interior Affairs was later seen in the negotiation process. On January 13, the staff of the Guria Police and the Adjara A/R Police Department held a meeting with the local population and in the following days, they had active communication with the local population. A special mobilization of police officers was observed on January 15, when a meeting between Orthodox and Muslim communities was held in Buknari with the participation of high-ranking officials. At the outset of the meeting, the police officers blocked the main road to the village center (where the meeting was taking place) with two cordons, Muslim and Christian communities were separated from each other and only certain individuals and media organizations were given the opportunity to attend the meeting.

Alleged participation of school teachers in the conflict  

According to the data of the Ministry of Education of Georgia, 119 students study in the public school of the village Buknari. [5] Both Muslim and Christian students attend the school. According to locals, there is only one Muslim teacher in the school.

The Muslim community negatively assesses the role of school teachers in escalating the conflict. Muslims say that there were no facts of open indoctrination or deliberate proselytism in the school before the conflict. Nonetheless, they said, certain discriminatory attitudes towards the recognition of Muslim students' successes were still observed by some teachers in previous years. However, due to the recent events, part of the Muslim families have also thought about not sending their children to school in Buknar. Such attitude towards the school was provoked by the insulting posts on Muslims on social networks, which, according to the locals, were spread and/or supported by the teachers of Buknar Public School. The main content of these Facebook posts was the summons to protect the "Christian village" from Tatars/Tatarisation. Muslims believe that these demands appeared on social networks, arose after the opening of a shrine in the village. The term "Tatar" used in their direction was taken by Muslims as an insult and they also could not understand why the village needed to be protected from them. They could not receive an adequate response to these appeals from the teachers or the school principal. In a conversation with us, local Muslims stated that they did not know whether the respective guidance was given to those teachers who were involved in spreading hate speech.

After the reconciliation reached on January 15, the Muslim community no longer expressed an interest in discussing and responding to the issue, nor did it share evidence of problematic content shared by the teachers, that would allow us to analyze their content in detail.

Conflict mediation process

Information about the events in the village Buknari became known to the public on January 13, 2020. However, for almost a month before that, the negotiation process between the neighboring communities had already started with the participation of the local authorities. According to Chokhatauri Municipality Mayor Irakli Kuchava, the municipality held 7 meetings with the opposing parties before the January 12 incident.[6] According to the Muslim community, and as it turned out later, the negotiations organized by the municipality were not properly effective. During the negotiations at this stage, one of the proposals of the local government was to transfer the shrine space acquired by the Muslims to the elected leaders of the Muslim and Christian communities in common ownership, which was not acceptable to the Muslim community. [7]

After the aggravation of the situation, Guria Governor Zurab Nasaraia and Chokhatauri Mayor Irakli Kuchava arrived in Buknari on January 13 to hold talks.[8] Eventually, however, this negotiation also ended without results. Muslims interviewed by us at the Chokhatauri City Hall on January 14 declared that their real representatives were not present at the January 13 meeting and that the meeting could not guarantee security and peace in the village because neither the representatives of the conflict parties nor high-ranking state officials attended the meeting. At the same time, the language of the people gathered at the City Hall showed even deeper worries and frustrations and the need for a radical change of policy by the state.

On January 14, for some reason, only the representatives of the Ministry of Interior Affairs spoke the protesters gathered at the Chokhatauri City Hall all day long, and despite the demand of the gathered people, the political actors did not meet them until the evening. Only later and after strong criticism, the Mufti of Western Georgia arrived in Chokhatauri and promised to solve the problem. Despite this, the gathered people continued to protest. The same evening, Vasil Chigogidze (majoritarian in Guria) arrived on the spot and promised to organize a participatory reconciliation meeting next Friday.

The meeting took place in the village Buknari on Friday, January 15, after the Friday Juma prayers. Before the talks, there was excessive police mobilization in the village and separating cordons and high levels of security measures, which rather had an isolating impact on the people there.

Members of the Georgian Parliament: Vasil Chigogidze (Guria Majoritarian) and Nino Tsilosani, representatives of the Georgian Patriarchate and the Muslim Administration, other Muslim leaders, and 10-10 representatives from local religious communities took part in the negotiation process organized at the Buknari Cultural Center. After an emotional sharing of the experience of coexistence, the parties agreed that the conflict was over and the neighbors would continue to coexist peacefully.[9]

In parallel with the ongoing events, high-ranking state political officials, including the President of Georgia, the Prime Minister of Georgia made public statements calling on the parties to remain calm and emphasizing the value of religious freedom and equality in Georgia. [10]

Legal and Political Assessment of the Process

We consider it important that the goal of de-escalating and reconciling the conflict was achieved in the village Buknar with the readiness of the local Christian and Muslim communities and with the support of government agencies. However, we believe that it is essential for state agencies to study systemic legal, political, and social reasons of such religious repressions, persecution, conflicts, and alienation and respond with legislative and institutional, as well as with positive intervention in macro and micro social levels and reforms.

Religious harassment of the Georgian Muslim community in the village Buknari is not the first and single case. The chain of such religious conflicts was revealed in previous years in the villages of Tsikhisdziri (2013), the village of Nigvziani (2012), the village of Tsintskaro (2013), the village of Samtatskaro (2013)[11], the village of Chela (2013), Kobuleti (2014), the village of Mokhe (2014) and the village of Adigeni (2016). It must be said that all these conflicts had common social and cultural causes and contexts. The conflict took place in communities populated by eco-migrant families in multi-religious-ethnic communities, where neighboring communities have a weak common memory and tradition of coexistence. Furthermore, the conflicts were linked to the context of the key transition of government, or elections, and were associated with differing perceptions of new political realities and promises from local communities. In all cases, the rhetoric of the local Christian community was based on the paradigm of ethnoreligious nationalism and was based on Islamophobic/sometimes Turkophobic sentiments of not allowing Islamic shrines or other religious institutions on Georgian soil. As the history of conflicts shows, this rhetoric is even more severely revealed in relation to the Georgian Muslim community, which is ethnically Georgian, and that is why their Islamic self-identity becomes doubly unacceptable to the framework of prevailing ethnoreligious nationalism.

Unfortunately, government agencies have not a proper political and legal response to these conflicts. In some cases, the situation has been eased by the complete disregard for the religious rights and needs of the Muslim community (for example, in Samtatskaro, Jami could not be opened in a private house purchased by a local community. Kobuleti Boarding house is closed until today, Mokhe historic mosque could not gain such status regardless of the special commission created for this purposes). There has been no effective legal response to almost any of the incidents, and no one has been held legally accountable for religious persecution and violence, including apparent cases of police brutality against local Muslim peasants (for example, in the villages of Chela and Mokhe). Beyond the problem of responding to violations of human rights, in no case have government agencies studied the systemic causes of such conflicts and pursued long-term transformational policies that would create a solidary, equal, and multicultural social environment in conflict-affected communities.

It is essential that the state had a relatively active response to the religious harassment identified in Buknar. In contrast to previous experiences, supporting statements to freedom of religion and equality were made by senior state officials, mediation process although deficiently, but was still timely commenced and police also legally responded. However, given the problematic visions and sentiments within the dominant religious community, as well as the dominant ethnoreligious nationalism in our environment, we consider being fundamentally important that the state pursue long-term transformative politics in the Buknari community as well as in the communities with religious/ethnic conflict experiences.

The state must understand that ethnocentrism, chauvinism, Islamophobia is social constructs, it permeates all aspects of social life and ideologies based on it create risks for social cohesion. This ideology stands on "us" and "them" division and creates unjustified social hierarchies.[12] Religious conflicts and the chain of conflicts revealed in our reality are the most severe manifestations of this division and hierarchy. All these conflicts had a social character and it was not organized by specific groups and individuals, but the (dominant) community collectively, which reveals the severity and systematicity of the problem.[13] Such conflicts have a deep and cumulative social effect and affect non-dominant ethnic and religious groups and create a sense of alienation[14], exclusion[15], and feeling of secondaryness[16]. Such practices substantially damage the integrity and stability of society. That is why it is essential to confront this problem with state structural changes and not just one-time political and repressive approaches.

In our view, working on conflict transformation should me the study of systemic social and cultural causes of conflict in a particular community, and response to it should involve the implementation of an agreed and consistent positive intervention plan by the state in the field of education, culture, and social protection policy. Firstly, the working process must listen to the perspectives, life experiences, and grievances of victims of religious harassment and persecution and to well-understand the severe social and psychological traces that such experiences leave in minority communities. This work should also include a study of the material aspects of exclusion (lower access to services, resources, rights; fewer opportunities for development, social and economic exclusion, weak political participation, etc.) and changes planned in their response.

From our perspective, the above-mentioned conflict activities should include 1. Introduction of long-term multicultural programs and guidelines within the school, 2. Overcoming mistrust in the school space and establishing communication-based on building trust with parents and students; 3. Creation of infrastructure of cultural spaces in the rural area and introduction of multicultural content programs; 4. Planning the work of social workers with people with experience of discrimination and harassment. 5. Encouragement of community-based programs (including grant projects) for Muslim and Christian communities at the local government level; 6. Development of a secular and equality policy by local authorities based on addressing the concerns and needs of non-dominant religious groups and discussing them democratically with the community. All of these tasks and activities as a whole must be planned in a democratic consultation with community leaders.

In addition to positive, transformational work at the micro-social level, it is important to understand the shortcomings of state policy in the area of religious freedom and to initiate fundamental reforms.

The sharply ineffective role of the State Agency for Religious Affairs, an agency directly subordinated to the Prime Minister, and the dire consequences of its policies over the years in the context of this conflict should also be noted. Although the agency's competence is to facilitate the resolution of religious disputes, the agency had not been active in resolving the conflict in the village of Buknar and their involvement in the mediation process was not visible, which should be explained by the sharp criticism and distrust towards the agency. Moreover, the statements made by the head of the agency in the media[17] once again show that he openly ignores the real challenges and needs of religious communities.

Besides, special attention should be paid to the criticism voiced by the Muslim community towards the Administration of All Muslims of  Georgia during the ongoing negotiations on the conflict in the village Buknari, which directly derives from the policy based on the control of non-dominant religious organizations of the agency and more broadly of the government. [18]

Over the years, religious organizations, human rights actors, including the Public Defender, point to several systemic challenges to the freedom of religion[19] that exist at the level of legislation, administrative policy, and institutional arrangements, as well as at the micro-social / community level. These challenges are related to discriminatory provisions in the legislation (for example, discriminatory provisions in the rule on the funding of religious organizations, the State Property Law, the Forest Code), years of neglect, and omission of the needs and rights of religious minorities (e.g. the absence of law and policy on the restitution of property confiscated during the Soviet Union, the problem of protection and preservation of historical heritage sites) non-secular and anti-equality content expressed in political language, discriminatory administrative practices (eg, obstacles to the construction of religious buildings, religious indoctrination, discrimination and proselytism in public schools), ineffective respond and prevention of crimes motivated by religious intolerance.

Since the establishment of the State Agency in Religious Affairs in 2014, none of these important issues have been resolved. [20] In opposite, we have consistently seen sharply regressive and anti-human rights initiatives by the Agency.

Although there is a human rights action plan at the national level[21], as well as the dynamics of positive reforms in the systems of the Ministry of Interior Affairs and the Prosecutor's Office, as well as the Ministry of Education, fundamental problems in the area of religious freedom remain unresolved.

In our observation, the process of change is substantially hampered by the problematic perspective of the government towards the field of religious freedom and its institutional arrangement, where the State Agency in Religious Affairs is considered as an exclusive actor of the government in this field. In the presence of this agency and its policies, a positive policy change in the field of freedom of religion and the necessary democratic communication with government agencies becomes impossible, because agency 1. has the problematic mandate and vague competences, which enables its arbitrariness and non-democratic/non-transparent work[22]; 2. has the policy visions largely based on security and hierarchies[23]; 3. has more experience on working anti-human rights initiatives, rather than working in the benefit of human rights. 4. has low trust among religious and public organizations and human rights actors. 5. Ultimately, the agency is also ineffective, as it is invisible during the important conflicts and disputes related to religious freedom or further damages the process. It is noteworthy that international organizations have also expressed their sharp criticism towards this agency.

Council of Europe Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention on National Minorities indicate that in conversation, religious minorities expressed low trust towards the State Agency in Religious Affairs and at the same time showed higher trust towards the Religious Council existing at Public Defender’s Office, which unites 33 religious organizations and creates a horizontal and independent framework for organizing.[24]

According to the assessment of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), its recommendation to the Government of Georgia to strengthen communication between the State Agency for Religious Affairs and the Public Defender was not implemented and the Agency did not take any serious steps to cooperate with the Council. The Commission emphasizes that, instead of co-operation, tensions are observed between these two bodies and there is a clear misunderstanding between their positions on freedom of religion. This was revealed in the process of drafting constitutional amendments in 2017 when there was an initiative to restrict freedom of religion for national security purposes. The State Agency for Religious Affairs did not oppose the initiative, which was an important signal for religious groups and human rights organizations to consider the agency as a tool designed to control religious organizations.[25]

According to the Oslo Coalition for Freedom of Belief and Religion, an interview recorded with the State Agency for Religious Affairs confirmed the important concerns they had before their meeting: its mandate is not clear; its responsibilities and powers are vague; it does not have procedural guidelines for carrying out important activities; It has no mechanisms for transparency and accountability. Thus, it seems that the agency, which is a government agency, sees its essential mission not to protect the freedom of religion for all citizens, but to protect the financial and material interests of the Orthodox Church.[26]

The report of an international expert Maggie Nicholson, on the implementation of Georgia's National Human Rights Strategy 2014-2020, states that the Agency was established in 2014 as the main body responsible for religious freedom issues, however, the agency has little confidence. The expert notes that instead of being perceived as an agency for the protection of religious freedom, it is discussed as a controlling mechanism for religious organizations, which has been repeatedly mentioned by various actors.[27]

In our assessment, the existence of this agency from its very first years substantially hinders the dialogue needed for change in the field of religious freedom, as it has created a field of mistrust and conflict for a large number of religious organizations and human rights actors. Because the State Agency for Religious Affairs has repeatedly launched or lobbied for anti-human rights, regressive initiatives, expectations that this agency has the resources to play a positive role in the implementation of the necessary reform process are extremely low. It can be said, that resolving the issue of the existence and mandate of this agency is a direct measure of the will and readiness of the government for change.

Recommendations

Given the above, we would like to present our recommendations to the Government of Georgia, the Parliament, and other relevant state bodies.

Government of Georgia

• Develop a coherent plan for religious freedom policy reform based on the recommendations of local and international actors, as well as of Religious Council at Public Defender’s Office[28] and democratic consultations organized with human rights actors.  
• Abolish State Agency in Religious Affairs and work on the new models of communication and policy coordination between state and religious and public organizations, which will be based on the critical analysis of existing negative experiences and democratic consultations with relevant actors.
• Develop and implement long-term social change work in the village of Buknari and communities with experienced or at risk of religious conflict, with the joint participation of various agencies and the use of interdisciplinary knowledge and tools.

Parliament of Georgia

• Conduct special supervision on government’s policy in the field of religious freedom.
• In the light of the recommendations of the Council of Religions under the Public Defender, and local and international human rights actors, legislative changes should be initiated to promote a more equal environment for religious minorities.

Ministry of Education, Science, Culture, and Sport of Georgia

• Study the grounds of alienation created in the Buknari Public School and take all necessary measures for their eradication.
• Elaborate special guidelines and programs to create a multicultural and equal environment in public schools and first of all, introduce these programs in the schools of conflict-experienced communities.

Ministry of Interior Affairs

• Develop and implement guidelines for the identification, prevention, and appropriate response to religious and ethnic conflicts based on the best practices of other states and human rights standards.
• Further, enhance effective investigation of crimes motivated by religious hatred and internal oversight of them.

Prosecutor’s Office of Georgia

• Strengthen oversight of the investigation of crimes of religious intolerance and provide a fair and adequate legal response.

Chokhatauri Municipality Mayor and City Hall

• Develop equality advocacy programs in multi-religious and multi-ethnic villages within its competency, and in particular strengthen the introduction of multicultural approaches in local cultural policy;
• Strengthen its staff’s knowledge on freedom of religion, equality, conflict transformation, and management.

This report  was made possible by the generous support of the American People through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The contents of this report are the sole responsibility of  Human Rights Education and Monitoring Center (EMC ) and do not necessarily reflect the views of East West Management Institute, USAID or the United States Government