Introduction 

As the world is engulfed by conflict, instability and authoritarian tendencies, mass protests are once again becoming a common occurrence. Particularly, Eastern Europe today is a region, where wide protests movements have emerged, in countries like Georgia, Serbia and Slovakia, building on a legacy of earlier protest movements in the region. In this context, the experience of another country of the region, Armenia, can be interesting. Armenia experienced several waves of protests throughout the post-Soviet period, which culminated in the “Velvet Revolution” of 2018. This paper will look at Armenia’s experience of protests throughout the post-Soviet period.  It will outline the legacy of protests that pre-dated the events of 2018, and examine the protest dynamic that occurred during the Velvet Revolution. In particular, we shall address the interrelation between non-violent protests and violence, both from the side of the government and protesters, and the influence that use of violence has had on public mobilization, and, consequently, the outcome of the protests.

In 2018 Armenia,  a new term emerged: “poghoc pakel”, literally “to close the street” or “to seal off the street”. It referred to a certain method of protesting, during which protesters stand (or slowly walk) in the middle of the street, blocking the traffic. This was one of the main ways of protest during the events of 2018, which led to a change of government and, arguably, the whole political and social-economic system in Armenia. These events came to be known as “the Velvet Revolution”, a name which the protesters themselves chose, in order to stress the non-violent nature of the protest (Abrahamyan, Shagoyan 2018). And, indeed, the protests were remarkable for almost complete absence of violence on the part of the protesters, even though Armenia has had an experience of both non-violent and violent protest. The protests of 2018 brought Armenia to a standstill for several weeks, rendering the country ungovernable, and forcing the resignation of the government led by Republican party of Armenia of Serzh Sargsyan. For a couple of weeks, Armenia seemed to be the realization of the anarchist ideal, a country, where effectively the government had no control over the society. Of course, it did not last long: the opposition leader Nikol Pashinyan was elected the prime-minister and a new political system emerged. For years after these events, “closing the streets” remained one of the most common tactics, employed by groups that protested in order to advance a certain agenda, with varying outcomes. Finally, in 2022-2024, the same tactic was employed by the protesters that sought to restore the pre-revolutionary regime, with little success, demonstrating the limitations of this tactic: “closing the streets” works only when there is a wide societal mobilization, or, at least, when the government lacks democratic legitimacy.

Armenian experience suggests that the protests had been most successful during the Velvet Revolution of 2018, when non-violent, but aggressive methods were employed, such as closing the streets, blocking government buildings, strikes, etc. Protesters were careful not to engage in any violent behavior, however, they took the initiative in their hands and rendered the country ungovernable, forcing the resignation of the incumbent government. At the same time, those few cases of protests that involved violence, were unsuccessful, due to small numbers of protesters, as well as the fact that protesters’ violence compromised the protest in the eyes of the wider society, and helped justify the violence and repression by the government. In turn, government repression had mixed results, leading to a defeat of protest movement in some cases, and, to a wider public mobilization in others.  

Legacy of Protests in Armenia: 1965 and “Karabakh Movement”

Protest movements in Armenia have a long history. Like Georgia and some other republics of the Soviet Union, Armenia experienced protests even before the breakup of the Soviet Union (Suny 1993, pp.113-161, Panossian 2006, p. 266-290, Zolyan 2020). A large wave of protests took place in Armenia in April 1965: the protesters demanded acknowledgement and commemoration of the Armenian genocide of 1915 in Ottoman Turkey. The protests were inspired by the genocide recognition campaign waged by Diaspora Armenian groups in the countries of the Middle East, Western Europe and America. The government response was relatively soft. Of course, the protests were dispersed and their organizers detained. However, the protesters did not receive lengthy prison terms, and their demands were partly accommodated. April 24 became an unofficial day of genocide remembrance and the construction of a memorial to genocide victims started in Yerevan. This soft response was related to the fact that the protests were not aimed directly against Moscow, though the very fact of mass protest was, indeed, a challenge for the Soviet system. After the protests, the Soviet government employed a mixed strategy of accommodation and repression: Armenians were allowed to air their grievances against Turkey (it helped that Turkey was a NATO member), but activities aimed against the Soviet government were strictly punished (on the 1965 and its aftermath, see Panossian 2006, pp. 320-323; Suny 1993, p. 186; Dadrian 1977, pp. 246-247).

As in Georgia and the Baltic countries, a new phase of protest movements started in Armenia in the late 1980s, in the context of “Perestroika”. Contrary to common knowledge, the first large protest, which took place in Armenia in the late 1980s was an environmental protest, which took place in October 1987 and was not related to Nagorno-Karabakh issue (Suny 1993, p. 196). In February, huge protests started in Yerevan, which demanded the transfer of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region (NKAO) from Soviet Azerbaijan to Soviet Armenia. The movement, which began with these protests, became known as the Karabakh movement. First, its sole aim was the unification of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, “miatsum” in Armenian. However, as Moscow declined these demands the protests took an anti-Soviet and anti-Moscow turn, eventually leading to demands for independence. By summer 1990 the movement brought down the Communist party in Armenia: elections that took place in the summer of the 1990s brought to power the pro-independence politicians who had founded the party “Armenian National Movement”.

The Karabakh movement is well studied, as it became the subject of studies by various researchers (e.g. Malkhassian 1996, Marutyan 2009). From our point of view, it is important to note, that the Karabakh movement became a model and a reference point for protest movements in Armenia in the first post-Soviet decades. It is also important to note that the Karabakh movement positioned itself as non-violent. There were indeed some violent episodes, including the bloody clash between Soviet military and armed Armenian para-militaries that resulted in dozens of casualties on May 27, 1990. However, in most cases the protest movement stayed non-violent, even when the government used violence against it. There were, indeed, many cases of ethnic inter-community violence between Armenians and Azerbaijanis throughout this period, in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh. However, in this case, we are interested not in the ethnic inter-community violence, but violence between anti-government protesters and government agencies.

As Armenia became independent in 1991, which was followed by the first Nagorno-Karabakh war, the Karabakh issue became central to the identity of the newly independent state. Consequently, the Karabakh movement was also heavily romanticized and mythologized. However, as authoritarian regime consolidated in Armenia in the late 1990s and 2000s, the pro-democracy and anti-government aspects of the Karabakh movement were played down, and, on the contrary, its nationalist aspects were emphasized (Iskandarayan, Harutyunyan 1999).

Election-Protest-Repression Cycle in Armenian Politics 

In independent Armenia, mass protest became a common feature of political life. The political regime of post-Soviet Armenia has been characterized as hybrid, or a competitive authoritarian regime (Lucan and Way, 2010). In such regimes exists a certain level of democratic freedoms, which allows for a relatively strong opposition, able to compete in the elections. However, as a rule, the elections are won by the incumbent government, which employs “dirty” technologies: from outright electoral fraud to subtler techniques of “managed democracy”.  Often, in such regimes elections are contested by protest movements, which in certain cases leads to overthrow of government, as has been the case in various post-Socialist/post-Soviet countries since the late 1990s, including Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine[1]. Throughout most of the post-Soviet period Armenia was a vivid case of competitive authoritarianism, where the incumbent regularly won the elections, where elections were marred by accusations of fraud, and post-election protests were a regular phenomenon. Disputed elections were followed by protests and violent repression. The repression, in turn, was followed by a relative liberalization, when the opposition and protests were no longer considered dangerous for the incumbent government. This cycle had become a constant feature of Armenia’s political life since mid-1990s.

The first case of disputed elections, followed by protests and government crackdown took place in 1996. At the time, incumbent president, Levon Ter-Petrosyan was running for re-elections. The opposition joined forces, supporting Vazgen Manukyan, a former ally of Ter-Petrosyan. Elections on September 22, 1996 were marred by numerous reports of violations and fraud, but official results awarded victory to Ter-Petrosyan in the first round. Manukyan’s supporters refused to accept the results and went out to the streets in huge numbers. Initially, the protest was peaceful, but it turned violent on September 26, 1996. The protesters attacked the building of the National Assembly, where the Central Election Committee had been seated. Manukyan himself contributed to the violence: he had gone to the CEC to negotiate, however, before leaving, he had told the crowd “to follow him”, in case if he did not return in 20 minutes. Obviously, Manukyan did not return in 20 minutes, and some protesters stormed the building, beating up the Chairman of the Parliament and his Deputy in the process. At that point, riot police armed with riot gear and water cannons dispersed the crowd. Opposition leaders were arrested or went into hiding. Pro-opposition MPs were beaten up at the Parliament session the next day. Heavily armed police regiments patrolled the streets for a few days. Months later the government crackdown eased down. Ter-Petrosyan was sworn in and started his second term as president. However, the disputed election and the crackdown severely harmed his democratic legitimacy. Two years later, Ter-Petrosyan was removed by members of his own team, in what can be described as a soft coup d’etat. His removal was largely a result of his compromising stance on Nagorno-Karabakh issue, however, the events of 1996 also played a significant role (on these events see Astourian 2000, Zolyan 2010).

Contrary to hopes of some, removal of Ter-Petrosyan did not result in a return to democracy. On the contrary, while Ter-Petrosyan was a liberal democratic politician, who turned to election fraud and repression later in his career, Ter-Petrosyan’s heirs had little respect for democracy from the beginning. In the presidential election of 1998 the two frontrunners were Soviet Armenia’s former Communist leader Karen Demirchyan, and Robert Kocharyan, the former leader of Nagorno-Karabakh and one of the main engineers of Ter-Petrosyan’s removal. The elections took place in two rounds, and Kocharyan was declared the winner. Accusations of fraud were numerous, however, this time the opposition, led by Demirchyan decided not to contest the election. Instead a deal was made which brought together Demirchyan and Kocharyan’s ally, minister of Defense, Vazgen Sargsyan, the other person who was instrumental in removing Ter-Petrosyan. The new alliance lead by Demirchyan and Sargsyan scored a confident victory in the parliamentary election in May 1999, which was relatively clean: there simply was no need for violations, as the incumbent and the main opposition force had created an alliance. The allies shared power: Sargsyan became the prime-minister and Demirchyan became the chairman of the parliament. This victory could have been a beginning of a new democratic culture of deal-making and coalition politics in Armenia, but events took a darker turn. On October 27 1999 both Demirchyan and Sargsyan, as well as several other MPs, were murdered in the Armenian parliament. After this terrorist act, president Kocharyan consolidated power. Many Armenians are convinced that Kocharyan must have been behind the October 27 murders, however, no verifiable proof of this has been made public to this day.

Kocharyan, who was able to establish a friendly relationship with Russia’s new leader Vladimir Putin, was by no means a democrat. Under his rule authoritarian tendencies that emerged under Ter-Petrosyan consolidated. Elections and protests reflected these tendencies. In 2003 Kocharyan was running for 2^nd term, and his main opponent was Stepan Demirchyan, the son of Karen Demirchyan. Most opposition forces united around Demirchyan. As in 1998, the first round was inconclusive, and in the run-off Kocharyan was declared the winner. This time again accusations of fraud were abundant. Unlike, his father, Stepan Demirchyan refused to accept the election results and called on his supporters to take to the streets. Huge rallies took place in Yerevan, however, they did not lead to any significant outcomes and, with time, faded away. Neither the protesters, nor the government resorted to large-scale violence at the time, but the protesters were unable to suggest new, efficient ways of protest, thus making the incumbent’s task easier. Kocharyan simply took his time, waiting until the protests waned. The only result of the protests was the Constitutional Court’s decision, which upheld the election results, but also made a non-binding suggestion to hold a confidence referendum to the president, as the solution to the political crisis in the country. However, as we shall see further, this referendum was never held. So, in fact the Constitutional Court’s decision did not resolve the crisis, it just postponed the showdown between the opposition and the government.

The Rose revolution in Georgia in the end of 2003 did not go unnoticed in Armenia: Georgian opposition succeeded in doing what the Armenian opposition had failed to do. The Georgian example served as an inspiration for the Armenian opposition, which took to the streets once again in the spring of 2004. The protesters also had a demand, which was quite legitimate: to enact the decision of the Constitutional Court and hold a confidence referendum on the president. This time, however, the government response was different. On April 4, 2004, as the protesters camped near the building of the National Assembly, they were attacked by riot police. Unlike in 1996, when the protesters were the first ones to use violence, this time the police crackdown was unprovoked. Many protesters were arrested, pro-opposition media outlets and offices of opposition parties were raided by the police. The protest movement was crushed before it could become dangerous for the incumbent. No need to mention that the referendum of confidence was never held (on these events see Zolyan 2020).

The cycle elections-protests-repressions was repeated once again in 2008, this time in the most brutal fashion. This time the incumbent government’s candidate was Kocharyan’s ally, prime-minister and chairman of the ruling Republican Party of Armenia, Serzh Sargsyan. However, this time opposition was led by a political heavy-weight, Armenia’s first president Ter-Petrosyan. Though he had become unpopular by the end of his term, especially after the 1996 crackdown, in 2008 many Armenians saw him as the lesser evil, compared to the tandem of Kocharyan and Sargsyan. Once again, elections were marred by accusations of fraud, and once again the incumbent government’s candidate was declared the winner by the CEC, this time in the first round. This result was rejected as fraudulent by many Armenians, who went out to the street. Ter-Petrosyan’s supporters gathered in the Freedom Square in central Yerevan, where they demonstrated for days. The numbers of opposition supporters were growing day by day, and some of the allies of Kocharyan and Sargsyan started defecting to the opposition. The rupture within the elites, one of the features that are considered necessary for a successful revolution, was becoming obvious.

However, Kocharyan, who still remained the incumbent president, was not ready to let go of power easily. On February 29, 2008, he visited Moscow, where he had a meeting with Vladimir Putin. On the next day, in the morning of March 1, 2008, the police cracked down on the protesters’ camp in Yerevan’s central Freedom Square, beating up and arresting protesters. This act of unprovoked police brutality led to even bigger protests in part of central Yerevan and clashes with the police. The government forces used not only riot gear but also live ammunition, which led to injuries and deaths among protesters. Apart from riot police and special forces units, the government employed groups of armed men in balaclavas, who, as it turned out, were mostly bodyguards of large business-owners, so called “oligarchs”. In the bloody clashes that took throughout the day, 10 people were killed - 8 protesters and 2 policemen. Hundreds were injured and arrested. Unlike Georgia, which experienced civil strife in the early 1990s, Armenia had so far had no instances of such large-scale violence between supporters of different political camps. Therefore, the events of March 1, when the streets of central Yerevan became a real battlefield and blood was shed became a major shock for Armenian society (on these events see Human Rights Watch, 2009).

As in previous cycles, opposition politicians and activists were jailed once again. Ter-Petrosyan, who, as a former president, enjoyed immunity from persecution, was put under de facto house arrest, but his allies were arrested or had/forced to flee. However, in the course of the next two years, when it became obvious that the opposition was no more a real threat to the government, most of Ter-Petrosyan’s allies were released. Sargsyan managed to consolidate his power and was re-elected as president in 2013. As before, the elections were disputed by the opposition, and post-election protests took place. However, the protests of 2013 were weak, compared to the events of 2008, and the incumbent hardly faced a serious challenge. 

Searching for an Efficient Strategy: Protests in the Run-up to “the Velvet Revolution”

The protest of 2013 was the last case in the cycle of election-protest-repression. However, Armenian society was still ripe with protest potential. In the subsequent years the nature of the protest changed, leading to the “Velvet Revolution” of 2018. First of all, there were numerous small-scale protests, centered on specific issues related to environment, urban conservation or social welfare. In most cases, these protests involved relatively small, but active groups of protesters, including NGO members, feminists, environmental and/or urban activists, who were not affiliated with political forces.  Usually, these protests received a more scaled response of the government than in the case of post-election protests. This response combined the strategy of waiting until the protests wane with some low-level violence in some cases, as well as with concessions on specific issues. As a result, some of these protests achieved success, such as the protests related to Yerevan public transportation price increase, or the fight for conservation of Mashtots park in central Yerevan in 2013. However, also these protests did not lead to significant change in the political landscape, though, they, indeed, helped to mobilize new protesters (Zolyan 2020). Social welfare issues were relatively underrepresented in these protests, which might have been connected to the fact that the social agenda was not actively discussed in Armenian society. There was a common view that most problems in society, including social ones, stemmed from the corruption and authoritarianism that characterized the ruling elite. Hence, if these issues were resolved, it was believed that the basis for addressing social issues would also be created. However, as we shall see below, there was indeed a significant protest related to socio-economic issues—the Electric Yerevan protests in 2015.

Indeed, in the run-up to the “Velvet Revolution” there were two major protest events, which paved the way for the successful protests of 2018: peaceful “Electric Yerevan” protest in the summer of 2015, and the armed insurrection in the summer of 2016. "Electric Yerevan" was a large-scale protest, led by young activists, rather than political parties, sparked by a hike in electricity prices due to mismanagement at the Russian-owned "Armenian Electric Networks." While the movement's declared purpose was economic, its broader political implications were evident, with some participants viewing it as a challenge to government policies and others, especially in international media, framing it as a stand against Russian influence. Comparisons to Ukrainian Maidan surfaced in both Russian and Western coverage. The Russian-language media referred to it as “Electro-Maidan”, however, most protestors rejected these parallels.  

“Electric Yerevan” was marked by a vibrant and festive atmosphere, drawing many young people to activism, bridging the gap between experienced political activists and the youth. Unlike, post-election protests of the previous period, led by established political leaders, this time the protest did not have obvious leaders, and there were no lengthy speeches at the rallies, which would have articulated the political agenda of the protest. Instead, the protest's main tactic was blocking a key street in Yerevan, Baghramyan Avenue, causing significant disruption. The protest was completely peaceful, which helped to attract significant numbers of protesters and limited the government’s options for a crackdown. Indeed, police tried to clear the protests at an early point, using water cannons, however, this action had the opposite effect, leading to larger mobilization. After that the standoff between protesters and the police continued with relatively few cases of violence. However, the government successfully persuaded some activists to unblock Baghramyan street and to relocate to Freedom Square, limiting the impact. Thus, some protesters stayed in Baghramyan street, where they continued to block the road, but others moved to the nearby Freedom Square.This internal split, with some protesters opting for a less disruptive approach, ultimately weakened the movement. Also, the government promised to address some of the protestors’ demands regarding Armenia’s energy sector. When participation dwindled, authorities cleared the streets, effectively bringing the movement to an end. Electric Yerevan introduced strategies later seen in Armenia’s 2018 Velvet Revolution, but it lacked strong leadership and a coherent political agenda (On Electric Yerevan see Andreasyan, Derluguian 2015).

The other major episode of political protest preceding the Velvet Revolution, was markedly different from Electric Yerevan and the majority of other Armenian protest movements due to its violent nature (on these protests see de Waal, 2016). On July 17, 2016, a group of armed men, mostly veterans of the First Karabakh War and their younger relatives, armed with automatic rifles, attacked the building of a police regiment in the suburbs of Yerevan. In the initial attack, a senior police officer was killed, and several policemen were taken hostage. The group called itself “Sasna Tsrer”, “the Daredevils of Sasoun”. The name was taken from Armenian national epic, a literary monument, which has in Armenian culture a place comparable to the Knight in Panther’s Skin in Georgian context (Sassoun is the region in historical Armenia, currently part of Eastern Turkey). The militants barricaded themselves in the building and called for a popular uprising to topple what they considered an illegitimate government. They also opposed potential concessions on Nagorno-Karabakh, which, at the time, were reportedly being considered by Serzh Sargsyan’s government. This was particularly important, since the uprising took place several months after the “4 day war” in April of 2016 in Nagorno-Karabakh. According to rumors, which were later largely confirmed, the Armenian government was pressured by Russia to accept the so-called “Lavrov Plan”, which entailed significant concessions to Azerbaijan.

Apart from the armed group within the building, a few thousand protesters, mostly young men, were protesting near the building. The protests took a violent turn, and clashes between the police and protesters took place, though no deadly arms were used. However, the police used riot gear, including stun grenades, and numerous protesters and by-passers were injured, leading to accusations of police brutality. Supporters of opposition politician Nikol Pashinyan tried to join the protests, advocating a non-violent strategy. However, the leaders of the armed group rejected Pashinyan’s help, claiming that he was trying to appropriate the protest for his own political goals. Eventually, Sasna Tsrer members, isolated in the police compound, surrendered to authorities.

Deliberate use of violence is what distinguishes this episode from most protest movements in post-Soviet Armenia. Previous protest movements all described themselves as peaceful, and if violence was used, it was usually seen as a response to violence employed by the government. Numerous questions linger about these protests. For example, it is not clear how people with heavy weapons could penetrate a well-guarded police building, leading to emergence of various conspiracy theories, implying involvement of foreign powers or a provocation by the government itself. In any case, the use of violence proved counter-efficient, as many potential protesters were turned away by it. However, even though the government managed to contain the situation, the episode served as a warning of widespread dissatisfaction with Sargsyan’s rule. Many Armenians either supported the group’s actions or blamed the government for bringing the country to the brink of civil war. The situation also demonstrated to members of the police and other government agencies that defending the incumbent government was a dangerous task, which undermined their willingness to use violence in its interests in the future.

The Revolution that No One Expected

In the hindsight the “Velvet Revolution” of 2018 in Armenia looks almost inevitable, as the authoritarian regime had been weakened by corruption, lack of democratic legitimacy and external pressures (on the Velvet Revolution see Abrahamyan, Shagoyan 2018; Broers and Ohanian 2020). However, at the time the regime seemed invincible, having survived several waves of protest. In December 2015, a constitutional referendum was held in Armenia, which sanctioned transition to a parliamentary republic. It was widely believed that the aim of the reform was to provide an opportunity for incumbent president Serzh Sargsyan to stay in power in the capacity of prime-minister, after the end of his 2^nd term in 2018. In order to make that possible Sargsyan needed a parliamentary majority, which was secured in the parliamentary election of 2017. Unlike the presidential elections before, the 2017 elections were not followed by significant protests, though public trust in the elections remained quite low. Sargsyan himself, though, publicly denied that it was his intention to stay in power after the end of his 2^nd term.

These statements might have been one of Sargsyan’s grave mistakes. When, finally, it became obvious in 2018, that Sargsyan was indeed going to keep power, it led to a public outcry, as he was accused of blatantly lying to the public. In anticipation of the end of Sargsyan’s 2^nd presidential term protests started in Armenia. Initially, these were small protests, led by two groups: Nikol Pashinyan’s “Civic Contract” party and “Reject Serzh” civic initiative, which consisted mostly of civil society figures and non-partisan civic activists. On March 31, 2018, Pashinyan, at the time an opposition MP, with a few teammates, started a march to Yerevan with the aim of unseating Sargsyan. The slogan of the march was “Qayl ara” - “Make a step”. At the same time “Reject Serzh” held various protests in Yerevan, which mostly had a carnival sense to them: for example, once they collected coins in order to secure a pension for Sargsyan, implying he should resign. On his way to Yerevan, Pashinyan was joined by numerous activists, and when his group entered Yerevan, it merged with “Reject Serzh”. The amalgamation of the slogans of the two groups created the slogan of the protests – “Qayl ara, Merzhir Serzhin” i.e. “Make a Step, Reject Serzh”. The slogan, which soon could be heard on every street all over Armenia, proved to be an extremely efficient one, since it was easy to remember and to chant, contained a political demand and a call to action at the same time. Some of the footage of these events can be accessed here, here, here and here.

However, even though the protests were getting bigger, they seemed far from certain to achieve success. On April 17 Sargsyan was elected as prime-minister by the Armenian parliament. The day before protesters led by Pashinyan tried to approach the parliament building, under the pretext, that Pashinyan, as an MP, had the right to enter the building. The police used violence to stop the protesters, particularly stun grenades, which caused severe injuries to some protesters. Pashinyan himself injured his hand as he was trying to cut through the barb wire surrounding the parliament building. His hand in bandages became part of his “revolutionary” image.

If the police had crushed the protest at the early stages,  it might have been enough to stop the protest from spreading. However, at this point it had the opposite effect, radicalizing the protest, and leading to wider mobilization. However, the protesters, did not respond with violence. In fact, since the beginning of the protests, its leaders not only stressed its non-violent nature, but demanded and convinced their supporters to refrain from violence, even in case of being attacked by the police or pro-government goons. Moreover, one of the slogans of protestors was “Vostikany mern e” – “The policeman is ours”, which aimed to show that the protesters did not see the police as an enemy and encouraged the policemen to switch sides. However, while the protesters did not resort to violence, they used a tactic that proved even more efficient: decentralized civil disobedience campaign (Abrahamyan, Shagoyan 2018).

From the morning of April 17 protesters spread around Yerevan, blocking streets, stopping transportation, holding protests actions here and there. When the police arrived, the protesters dispersed and moved a couple of blocks away, where they blocked another street. As instructed by the leaders of the movement, they refrained from violence. However, while non-violent, the protest was not passive. The protesters sealed off streets, blocked government buildings, and in some cases attacked property, for example knocking down the door of the Public Radio building in the early stage of protests. Numerous activists were arrested, however some continued disobedience even in the police precincts. Thus, several activists, who were locked in a room in the police station, with no policemen around, took off the wall the photo of Serzh Sargsyan and threw it out the window. The video became viral, leading to more mobilization and similar actions elsewhere (Abrahamyan, Shagoyan 2018). The protests also often took the character of carnival, especially in the later days of the protests, when the police no longer attacked the protesters or tried to arrest them. Overall, the protest lasted about 40 days, from the beginning of April till May 8, when Pashinyan was elected prime-minister.

Within few days the protesters effectively rendered the country, or at least its capital, Yerevan, ungovernable. As streets were closed all over Yerevan the activities of government institutions came to a holt. During the day protesters closed streets around Yerevan and in the evening gathered in the Republic Square in the center of Yerevan. The gatherings in Republic Square were more similar to the usual rallies that took place before, with leaders of the movement having speeches. In the square Pashinyan and other leaders of the movement articulated the political agenda and the demands of the movement. Thus, the protests combined the anarchist, decentralized methods of civil disobedience with a more traditional form of protests, centered around specific leaders and political forces. This combination of two elements was probably one of the keys to the success of the movement.

The protesters also used Internet and particularly social networks efficiently. Not only was every protest action recorded and/or broadcast live, but social networks were used for coordinating protests. A certain dynamic emerged, in which protesters broadcast their actions, thus, inspiring more people to join the protests, who, in turn, broadcast their actions, inspiring even more people to join (Abrahamyan, Shagoyan 2018). Social networks were also used to expose the violence of police and pro-government thugs. Finally, the social networks were used to air the messages of the protests and to put psychological pressure on the government supporters.

Another aspect of the protest movement, which, probably, contributed to its success, was its ability to unite various social groups with various political orientations. The agenda of the protests was limited to the main goal of preventing Serzh Sargsyan from prolonging his reign. This was clear and understandable. Of course, removing Serzh Sargsyan was associated with a wider agenda, which can be summarized in three main goals – removing the authoritarian regime, putting an end to election fraud, and dismantling the system of centralized corruption, associated with the regime. Everything else about the future of Armenia would be decided, when the democratic mechanisms started working, particularly the institute of elections. While some criticized the movement for lacking a clear political program, this may have been one of the keys to its success. In an authoritarian system, it is easier to unite the public in opposition to authoritarianism than around a so-called 'positive' agenda. Instead, the movement mobilized people with very different perspectives on many issues - such as Armenia’s foreign policy, the Karabakh issue, and relations with Russia - but all agreed that Sargsyan’s regime had to go.

This referred also to the foreign political agenda of the protest movement. This aspect is probably the biggest difference between what the Velvet Revolution in Armenia and the revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine. Though under Kocharyan and Sargsyan Armenian government claimed to pursue a multi-vector foreign policy (in Armenian case it was called “complementarism”), in fact, since the late 1990s Armenia found itself in a neo-colonial dependence from Russia, due to the unresolved Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. As attempts to resolve the conflict failed, Armenia had to rely on Russian assistance in the field of security in order to counter-balance Azerbaijan and Turkey. Obviously, Russia was going to extract a heavy price for its perceived role as a security provider, leading to a situation, in which Armenia became heavily dependent on Russia in military, political, economic, information and cultural fields (Vardanyan, Zolyan 2024). Against this background, a pro-Western or anti-Russian movement would stand little chances to win. Opposition leaders did not forget that the violent crackdown of March 1 2008 came after Kocharyan’s visit to Moscow, where he did his best to paint the protests as “anti-Russian”. Hence in 2018, the protest leaders did their best to emphasize that the protests did not have a geopolitical agenda. They did not call for or expect significant help from the West. Russia was still suspicious of the protests, partly because Pashinyan and his allies were known to have criticized Russia in the past, partly because of involvement of civic activists from NGOs, but, most of all, due to Kremlin’s suspicious attitude to the very idea of a popular protest. But, in any case, for the time being Moscow preferred to believe the protest leaders, and chose not to meddle directly in the Armenian affairs in order to thwart the revolution[2].

By April 22 the movement had become so successful in paralyzing the government, that Serzh Sargsyan was forced to accept a televised session of negotiation/debate with Pashinyan. This debate, available on YouTube, is a must-watch for anybody interested in protest movements. Sargsyan, dressed smart-casual, is facing a bearded Pashinyan, who looks like he had just returned from a hiking trip in the mountains, wearing a backpack and khaki pants. The meeting lasts a few minutes, as Sargsyan stormed out. After that the meeting turns a press conference of Pashinyan, who answered the questions of the journalists, while his backpack rested on the vacant chair, evacuated by Sargsyan. The meeting, was probably seen live by almost every Armenian on the screens of their phones, laptops or TVs and became the visual representation of the defeat of the government.

Of course, there was one last attempt by the government to take situation under control: Pashinyan and other leaders of the movement were arrested that very evening. However, this was too little, too late. It led to a wider mobilization, as even more people came out to the streets in the evening of April 22. The next day, on April 23, the leaders of the protest were released, and a few hours later, Sargsyan announced his resignation from the post of prime-minister. It contained a phrase that instantly became a meme: “Pashinyan was right, I was wrong”. As the news spread, protests turned into a national celebration on the streets of Yerevan and other towns and villages.

Sargsyan’s resignation was not the end. Protests continued for about two weeks until the parliament, still dominated by Sargsyan’s party elected Pashinyan prime-minister and a new government was formed. However, it was on April 23, that the fate of the revolution was determined. After that the government system had virtually disintegrated, and the movement led by Pashinyan had effective control over the country. The last attempt to prevent Pashinyan from coming to power was the refusal of Sargsyan’s Republican Party, who had majority in the parliament, to elect him prime-minister on May 1. After that, Pashinyan called for a general strike, a call, which was heeded by virtually every institution and business in the country. After that the old elites realized that resistance was futile. In his turn, Pashinyan made it easier for the old government to surrender power, as he promised that there would be no “political vendettas”, in other words, there would be no persecution of old regime functionaries.

Why had the protest of 2018 been successful?

What was the secret of success of the protesters in 2018? Why did so many protest movements prior to that fail, and why did this one achieve such a triumph? As often in similar cases, conspiracy theories were abundant. Some pointed at various external actors, and, depending on the political tastes of the speaker, the possible culprit was not only the West (Soros, USA, NGOs, etc.), but also Russia. Another conspiracy theory, common in Armenia, maintains that Sargsyan and Pashinyan had acted in agreement. Proponents of this theory explain that Sargsyan was faced with grim prospects in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, where he either had to agree to significant concessions or face war, so, he was looking for a way to concede power. This theory seems to be substantiated by later events, particularly the disastrous war in Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020, in which it was Pashinyan who had to concede defeat. However, it is hard to take this explanation seriously, as it dismisses the societal dynamic, as well as the feelings, hopes and aspirations of millions of people who took part in these events. Emergence of such conspiracy theories can be explained by the psychological need to find simple explanations for complicated phenomena, as well as the influence of propaganda (particularly Russian propaganda in the Armenian case).

What, then, was the secret of the success? As usually, it was a combination of factors. Some of these were related to the nature of the regime, which had exhausted its resources, and was seen by the society as corrupt, inefficient and an obstacle for Armenia’s development. Another factor is Armenia’s political culture, which, though far from being a fully-fledged democratic political culture, is relatively intolerant to authoritarian methods of the government and political violence. The focus on internal politics helped to keep out and prevent foreign (primarily) Russian meddling and unite Armenians, irrespective of their geopolitical preferences. Besides, protesters had no expectations of help from abroad and had to rely on their own forces exclusively. Existence of clear political leadership, which assumed the role of coordinating and representing the movement, was instrumental in order to set clear and articulated political goals, acceptable for a wide majority of the society (removing the authoritarian regime, free and fair elections; fighting corruption);

Finally, throughout the preceding years Armenian protest movements had accumulated significant experience in the course of previous failed protests and developed new methods and technologies of protest. As a result, the protesters of 2018 employed a combination of methods, which proved extremely efficient in that specific context. Among these were:

• Decentralized horizontal protest actions, such as closing streets and blocking government buildings, which rendered the country ungovernable in the course of a few days;
• Non-violent methods of protests, which ensured wide public mobilization, and denied the government pretext for a violent crackdown;
• Efficient use of social networks
• A combination of strong political leadership and decentralized methods of struggle: the political leadership articulated the goals, the strategy and the methods of the movement, while tactical decisions about where and how to protest were left to a decentralized network of activists.

Epilogue: Technologies are not enough

Of course, protest movements are not Hollywood movies: there is no “happy end” in protest movements. Even when a protest is successful, there is still the morning after. The most complicated part of the revolution begins after the leaders of the protest succeed in removing the previous regime. In some cases, in spite of initial difficulties, democracy consolidated and society embarked on the path of democratic development, as in Portugal after the Carnations Revolution, or in Central-Eastern Europe after the revolutions of 1989 (in both cases EU support was a major factor). In other cases, events took a dark turn, leading to civil conflict or establishment of an even more repressive regime, as in Russia after 1917, Iran in the 1980s, some Arab countries after the Arab spring.

In this sense, Armenian case is somewhere in the middle. On the one hand, soon after the revolution the country experienced an existential crisis - the Covid-19 outbreak and Nagorno-Karabakh war in 2020, military clashes on the border with Azerbaijan in 2021-2022, the forced displacement of Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023, accompanied by severe internal instability. However, as of this moment, by early 2025, it seems that a new political system has successfully been formed after the revolution, which can be characterized as an imperfect democracy with free market economy. Moreover, after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, not only new challenges, but also new opportunities arose for Armenia, including economic growth, and an opportunity to reduce the dependence on Russia. So, in spite of the immense shock and suffering of the last few years, today Armenia is more prosperous and more independent than it had been before 2018. Of course, as the world and the region remain in flux, so it is still hard to tell what the future of Armenian democracy and of Armenian statehood would be (on Armenia’s post-revolution experience see (Gevorgyan and Antonyan 2024).

As it would be easy to imagine, protests of various scale and nature continued in Armenia after the revolution.  First of all, the revolution did not end on the day Pashinyan was elected prime-minister. Various elements of the previous regime still maintained control over the parliament, the municipality of Yerevan, courts and other government institutions. In many cases, the removal of these remnants of the ancient regime took place through mass mobilization, rallies, protests and other actions. However, even when the revolutionary government was in full control, protests did not stop.

One could distinguish two kinds of protest in post-revolution Armenia. One was protests of specific groups, with specific social, economic, political and other demands, who used protests as the most efficient way to make their demands heard. These protests differed in scale, in nature, in issues, and in their methods. Some of these, like, for example, protests against a planned gold mine in Amulsar, lasted for months, attracted society-wide attention, and rattled the government significantly. Others, attracted relatively little public attention, like “the protest rave”, was undertaken by activists protesting the closure of a techno club “Poligraf” after a police raid. Some of these protests were successful, others were not, others had a mixed result. In all these cases the protests did not target the government per se and demanded a solution to specific issues.

Another type of protests in post-revolution Armenia was purely political, and it was aimed at overthrowing the revolutionary government. While initially Pashinyan’s government was immensely popular, the disastrous defeat in the 2020 war dealt a heavy blow to its approval, and emboldened Armenia’s pre-revolution elites and their supporters. Protests demanding removal of Pashinyan started immediately after the ceasefire was signed and lasted until the snap election in summer 2021. Some of these protest actions were violent. Thus, on the very night of signing the ceasefire on November 9 2020, an angry mob attacked and ransacked the buildings of the Parliament and the Cabinet of ministers. Once again, as in 1990 and 1996, the chairperson of the parliament was severely beaten by protesters. There was virtually no resistance to these attacks, as government system seemed paralyzed by the military defeat. However, these protests did not seem to enjoy a wide backing of the population and did not have a clear goal. In a few days the government of Pashinyan regained control of the situation. However, the protests continued, and in order to resolve the political crisis a snap election was called. “Revolutionary” camp led by Pashinyan won the election, but the ancien regime forces also improved their standing, receiving a quarter of the votes. All sides accepted election results, and there were no more protests after the election. The political crisis, created by war and protests, was resolved through democratic means, through an election.

Protests against Pashinyan’s government continued throughout 2022-2024. Often protesters used the same methods and technologies that had been employed during the revolution of 2018, such as blocking the streets and squares, blocking of government buildings, use of social networks, etc. There were also frequent violent episodes during these protests, in which both the protesters and the police used violence. However, now situation was different, as Pashinyan’s government enjoyed democratic legitimacy. Even though there is widespread disillusion with Pashinyan’s government, the support for the opposition is even more limited, as it is associated with Armenia’s pre-revolutionary ancien regime. Besides, as the election of 2021 showed, there already exists a democratic mechanism for change of government, so for the majority of the voters “closing the street” is no longer necessary to make their voice heard.

From the point of view of understanding the relations between protests, violence and the nature of political regime, post-revolution Armenia shows that there is an immense difference in how protest movements work in countries with authoritarian regimes and in electoral democracies. The methods and technologies used by the protest movement in 2018 worked mostly due to two conditions: the protests enjoyed wide public support and the government did not have democratic legitimacy. After the revolution the same methods and technologies did not work, since the protests were aimed at a democratically elected government, and did not enjoy a wide public support.