Introduction and Context

In May 2025, the Parliament of Georgia registered a draft law “On Amendments to the Organic Law of Georgia on the Prosecutor’s Office,” which was adopted by the Parliament in its third reading on June 24. As a result, from July 1, 2025, the Special Investigation Service was abolished, and the authority to investigate crimes committed by law enforcement officers was transferred to the Prosecutor’s Office of Georgia. [1]

The necessity of the proposed legislative amendments was justified by the authors on two main grounds. According to the explanatory note to the draft law, the first objective of the reform is to improve the quality of investigations, which is to be achieved by transferring the investigation of crimes under the jurisdiction of the Special Investigation Service to the Prosecutor’s Office. The second major argument indicated in the explanatory note concerns the model of state governance. According to the justification of the authors, the legal status of an independent body must be defined by the Constitution of Georgia. The only constitutionally defined, independent body with investigative powers is the Prosecutor’s Office of Georgia. [2]

It is noteworthy that prior to the establishment of the Special Investigation Service, crimes committed by police officers and representatives of law enforcement agencies were investigated by the Prosecutor’s Office of Georgia. [3]

The Special Investigation Service was established in March 2022 to ensure effective investigation of crimes committed by law enforcement officers and public officials. Its primary priority was to investigate cases of ill-treatment, including torture, inhuman and degrading treatment committed by law enforcement officers. The Special Investigation Service may be regarded as, in part, the legal successor of the State Inspector’s Service, which was founded in 2019 for the same purpose, but also functioned as the supervisory body for the protection of personal data. The State Inspector’s Service was abolished in December 2021 in an accelerated manner, without any prior communication with its head. The official reasoning provided was the broad mandate of the Service and the necessity of its institutional separation. [4] As a result, two separate agencies were created: The Special Investigation Service and the Personal Data Protection Service.

The accelerated abolition of the State Inspector’s Service was followed by criticism from subject-matter experts and human rights defenders. While the institutional separation of mandates may have been justified, the rushed process of abolishing the agency, without any prior communication with its leadership, was perceived as an alarming signal. According to human rights advocates, the State Inspector’s Service enjoyed a relatively high degree of institutional independence, which became the very reason for its abolition and the dismissal of the State Inspector. [5]

Concerns about the genuine independence of the Special Investigation Service further intensified in 2024–2025. In April and May 2024, during the adoption of the so-called “Russian Law,” and again in November and December, during mass protests sparked by the de facto suspension of the EU integration process, hundreds of cases of police violence against citizens were recorded. Numerous instances of torture and inhuman treatment were identified by the Public Defender of Georgia and civil society organizations. [6] Despite the documented, systemic violations of human rights by law enforcement officials, the Special Investigation Service failed to establish responsibility in a single case. The ineffectiveness of investigations into torture and ill-treatment once again drew the attention of the public and both local and international human rights organizations to the Special Investigation Service.

The abolition of the Special Investigation Service is particularly concerning in light of the fact that the agency was investigating criminal cases in which the European Court of Human Rights had established violations of the European Convention on Human Rights. [7] The dissolution of the agency is expected to negatively impact the enforcement of decisions issued by the European Court and to further restrict victims’ opportunities to obtain justice and access effective remedies.

Through the consecutive abolition of two institutions — the State Inspector’s Service and the Special Investigation Service — both of which enjoyed a certain level of institutional autonomy, the state is signaling that crimes committed by law enforcement officers will no longer be subject to a distinct standard of investigation. This clearly indicates, on the one hand, a deterioration in the standards of human rights protection, and on the other, the erosion of institutional guarantees and the quality of accountability for law enforcement officers.

Substantive Provisions and Justification of the Amendments

The mandate of the Special Investigation Service encompassed the investigation of crimes committed by representatives of law enforcement agencies, public officials, and persons equated to them, against human rights and freedoms. [8] Torture, threats of torture, and degrading or inhuman treatment fall into this category of crimes. The second group of crimes under the Service's jurisdiction included other serious offenses committed by representatives of law enforcement agencies, such as murder, crimes against bodily integrity, and sexual inviolability, which were not committed in the course of official duties.

At the end of 2022, as part of the expansion of the Service’s mandate, it was granted investigative powers over violations of the right to privacy, interference with journalistic activities, and certain election-related crimes. [9] Moreover, as previously noted, the Special Investigation Service was responsible for investigating cases in which the European Court of Human Rights had established violations of the European Convention on Human Rights. [10]

Under the enacted amendments, as of 1 July 2025, the Special Investigation Service was abolished, and the investigation of all the aforementioned categories of crimes was transferred to the jurisdiction of the Prosecutor’s Office. Additionally, under the amendments, employees of the Special Investigation Service were appointed, with their prior written consent, to equivalent positions in the Prosecutor’s Office by the Prosecutor General as of 1 July. [11]

As a rule, the explanatory note to a draft law must justify the necessity of its adoption. However, the explanatory note to the present draft law largely reiterates the content of the proposed legislative changes. The note states that it is the state’s obligation to improve the quality of investigations, and that one of the objectives of abolishing the Special Investigation Service is precisely to increase the effectiveness of investigations. Nevertheless, the initiators fail to specify what the current shortcomings in investigative quality are or how the change of the investigative body will lead to improved outcomes.

In practice, the Special Investigation Service employed investigators specifically trained and specialized in handling crimes committed by law enforcement officials and public servants. As such, their level of expertise was presumed to be higher. For instance, investigators and specialists involved in the investigative process had undergone multiple trainings related to their areas of competence. [12] The Service had also developed internal manuals and guidance documents for use during investigations. [13] The Service’s 2024 annual report makes no mention of any capacity-related needs. On the contrary, it identifies the main challenges in the investigative process as the refusal of other agencies to provide surveillance footage, the absence of a unified standard for the use of body cameras by police, and the lack of an obligation for officers of the Special Tasks Department to wear identifying insignia.

Furthermore, it remains unclear and unsubstantiated how investigative quality is expected to improve if the same investigators and professionals directly involved in the investigative process are transferred to the Prosecutor’s Office and some continue investigating the same category of cases from a different agency. The explanatory note does not provide any additional justification as to how the proposed changes will enhance investigative quality. Had there been a genuine interest in improving the effectiveness of investigations, the state would have prioritized addressing the challenges identified in the reports of the Special Investigation Service and the Public Defender by improving the legislative framework, refining the rules for the use of body cameras by law enforcement officers, and requiring the Special Tasks Department to wear identifiable insignia. [14]

The second justification provided by the one-party Georgian Dream-led Parliament for abolishing the Service relates to its legal status. According to the initiators, the country’s governance model should be exclusively regulated by the Constitution, and the status of an independent public institution must be defined therein. Based on this rationale, the initiators of the legislative package support the transfer of the Special Investigation Service’s mandate to the Prosecutor’s Office, whose legal status is constitutionally enshrined. [15]

This justification is unconvincing and appears to be an attempt to manufacture a legal basis for abolishing the Service. The operation of an independent public institution does not necessarily require constitutional regulation of its principles. A clear example is the continued functioning of the Personal Data Protection Service, which operates under the Law on Personal Data Protection and is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution.

When the State Inspector’s Service was established in 2018, the explanatory note to the draft law stated that the new agency was part of a broader reform aimed at combating ill-treatment and ensuring impartial and effective investigation of crimes committed by law enforcement officers and public servants against human rights and freedoms. According to the same note, consultations during the preparation of the draft included the Personal Data Protection Inspector, the Prosecutor’s Office, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia. The matter was also discussed at the meeting of the Interagency Coordination Council on Criminal Justice Reform. However, in none of these formats—nor during the committee or plenary hearings—was the issue of compatibility with constitutional principles raised. [16] Moreover, as previously mentioned, prior to the establishment of the Special Investigation Service, such crimes were investigated by the Prosecutor’s Office. The transfer of the investigative mandate from the Prosecutor’s Office to another agency did not raise constitutional concerns at the time, nor did the creation of a new institution.

The issue of compatibility with the constitutional model was never raised during the establishment of the Special Investigation Service in 2022 either. The only rationale cited then was the overly broad mandate of the State Inspector’s Office. Thus, just as in the case of the abolition of the State Inspector’s Service, Georgian Dream is now once again attempting to retroactively justify the dismantling of the institution by invoking superficial constitutional arguments.

The Role of the Special Investigation Service in the Process of Closer Alignment with the European Union and European Institutions

According to the explanatory note to the Law on the State Inspector, the creation of a new body, among other objectives, aimed to fulfill Georgia’s obligations under the 2017–2020 Association Agenda between Georgia and the European Union. [17] Under this framework, the state undertook the obligation to adopt all necessary measures to ensure the effective and independent investigation of alleged acts of torture and ill-treatment committed by law enforcement officials. The creation of a new, independent body was considered a necessary step toward aligning Georgian legislation with international standards. The reform was assessed as a significant step forward in the process of approximation with the European Union.

The establishment of the Special Investigation Service followed the same logic. As stated on the agency’s official website, under the Association Agreement with the European Union, Georgia undertook an obligation to implement effective reforms to combat ill-treatment through the proper fulfillment of its international commitments. According to the information published on the agency’s website, it was on this basis that the Office of the State Inspector was launched on 1 November 2019, followed by the establishment of an independent body — the Special Investigation Service — on 1 March 2022. [18]

Despite the above, during the discussion of the amendments to the Law on the Prosecutor’s Office, the core justification for the agency’s creation — the fulfillment of international human rights obligations — was not addressed at all. On the contrary, the explanatory note simply states that the draft law does not contradict any bilateral or multilateral treaties or agreements concluded by Georgia, with no mention whatsoever of the Association Agreement with the EU or the obligations stemming from it.

In the context of strengthening democratic institutions for the purpose of EU approximation, the Special Investigation Service and its mandate became a subject of active discussion in 2023–2024. On 18 December 2023, the Venice Commission published an opinion on the institutional independence of the Service, its mandate, as well as the composition and selection procedures of the candidate selection commission. The Commission further recommended that the agency’s primary focus be on crimes committed by law enforcement officials rather than private individuals and that the investigative mandate extend to crimes committed by high-level officials such as the Minister of Internal Affairs, the Head of the State Security Service, and the Prosecutor General. [19]

Ensuring the institutional independence of the Special Investigation Service, as recommended by the Venice Commission, was considered by the European Commission to be one of the essential priorities among the nine steps outlined for Georgia, further underscoring the significance of the Service’s special investigative mandate.[20] It is noteworthy that, although the Law on the Special Investigation Service was amended to introduce certain positive changes, the Parliament of Georgia failed to meaningfully implement the above recommendation and did not undertake substantive reforms to strengthen the institutional independence of the Service and its leadership.[21]

Despite the Service’s limited effectiveness, the very existence of an independent investigative body served an important declaratory function. The presence of such a body dedicated to the effective investigation of human rights violations committed by law enforcement officers — particularly torture and inhuman or degrading treatment — signaled the state's commitment to combatting official misconduct. This position was echoed by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, which, during its Human Rights Meeting held on 10–12 June 2025, although critical of the state’s ineffective and flawed investigations into cases of torture and ill-treatment committed by law enforcement, nonetheless emphasized the importance of the Special Investigation Service’s mandate. The Committee urged the Georgian authorities to refrain from abolishing the Service and instead to take measures to ensure the independence and effectiveness of the investigative body. [22] Unfortunately, the Parliament, controlled by the Georgian Dream party, ignored the Committee of Ministers' recommendations and supported the dissolution of the Service.

Accordingly, the Special Investigation Service was one of the few state institutions expected to serve as a core guarantor of human rights protection in Georgia’s EU integration process. The initial transfer of the mandate to investigate crimes committed by law enforcement officials from the Prosecutor’s Office to an independent body was seen as an enhancement of human rights safeguards. The abolition of the Special Investigation Service, in contrast, reflects a clear departure by Georgian Dream from the path of European integration, disregards the progress achieved so far, and neglects the recommendations issued by Council of Europe bodies regarding the strengthening and reform of national human rights protection mechanisms.

Failures Concerning the Political Independence of the Special Investigation Service

Due to the nature of its investigative mandate, the Special Investigation Service was expected to play a critical role during the spring and winter 2024 protests, particularly in the context of investigating large-scale crimes committed by law enforcement officers. During the demonstrations in April and May 2024, sparked by the adoption of the so-called "Russian Law," a systemic pattern emerged of the disproportionate use of force against peaceful protesters. According to the report of the Public Defender of Georgia, the failure to investigate the violent incidents that occurred during the spring protests, the failure to impose responsibility on law enforcement officials, and the fact that riot police officers were not equipped with identifying insignia, created the conditions for the more widespread use of disproportionate force and ill-treatment during the winter 2024 demonstrations. [23]

According to the Public Defender, during both the spring and winter 2024 protests, the Special Investigation Service misclassified incidents of ill-treatment against citizens as "exceeding official authority through violence," a qualification that failed to reflect the true nature, intensity, and scale of the violence directed at demonstrators. The Public Defender’s conclusion stated: “The methods and intensity of the violence, as well as the apparent objective of the actions, in almost all cases, point to inhuman, degrading, and humiliating treatment and, in certain episodes, even amount to acts of torture.”[24] According to the assessment, the investigation conducted by the Special Investigation Service was ineffective and failed to examine the events in a systemic manner. The agency did not adequately question those responsible for decisions and actions related to the use of force during the dispersal of protests. Furthermore, relevant video recordings were not obtained, and in some instances where the face of a police officer assaulting a protester was clearly visible, the Special Investigation Service failed to take appropriate steps to identify the perpetrator. [25]

In the context of the winter protests, the investigation conducted by the Special Investigation Service was also criticized in a joint report prepared by civil society organizations. According to the report, the agency deliberately refrained from making proper efforts to collect evidence. [26] The formal and ineffective nature of the investigation is further evidenced by the fact that the Service has not, to date, identified any perpetrators in relation to the documented incidents of ill-treatment during either the spring or the autumn protests. [27]

Nevertheless, the ineffectiveness of the investigation cannot be attributed to a lack of competence or insufficient training of the Service’s investigators — it has a clear political dimension. The fact that no charges were brought against any law enforcement official for the mass violations of human rights, including cases of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment, reinforces doubts regarding the institutional independence of the Service. For example, a pressing question remains as to why not even a single identifiable law enforcement officer — captured in publicly available footage — was held criminally liable. [28] The Special Investigation Service did not request a court warrant from the Prosecutor’s Office to conduct investigative actions necessary for the identification of the officer seen in the footage, nor did it submit a substantiated motion to initiate criminal proceedings against that individual. Taken together, this suggests that the Service refused to fulfill its mandate, possibly due to political pressure or external influence on the institution.

Notably, the failure to adequately fulfill official duties — particularly the failure to investigate systemic violations of human rights and the violent acts committed against peaceful protesters and journalists — was the stated reason for the sanctions imposed by the United Kingdom on the Prosecutor General of Georgia and the head of the Special Investigation Service. [29]

The loyalty of the leadership of the Special Investigation Service to officials of the ruling Georgian Dream party is apparent. For example, unlike his predecessor — the State Inspector — the current head of the Service, Karlo Katsitadze, did not even respond publicly to the agency’s abolition. He also did not participate in the parliamentary discussions of the draft law and failed to present his professional opinion on either the necessity of the Service’s work or the legislative structure of the institution.

Taking all of the above into consideration, it is evident that the abolition of the Special Investigation Service is part of a political process. It does not aim to improve the quality of investigations or align the structure of the Service with constitutional principles. Rather, the dissolution of the Service appears to serve the purpose of providing law enforcement officials with further guarantees of impunity and institutionalizing the absence of accountability for crimes committed by them.

Conclusion

The abolition of the Special Investigation Service must not be viewed in isolation; it should be understood in the broader context of aggressive autocratization. [30] Georgian Dream is systematically dismantling even formally independent institutions and subordinating them to the central axis of power. The dissolution of the Special Investigation Service reflects this effort — a move toward tighter consolidation of power.

It is evident that the current constitutional system of governance does not prevent the functioning of an independent investigative body. Therefore, the abolition of the Special Investigation Service is entirely politically motivated. This is directly linked to the sensitive nature of the criminal cases under the Service’s jurisdiction. Although the activities of the Special Investigation Service posed no formal obstacle to Georgian Dream, the existence of a body with even partial institutional independence — one that held a special mandate to investigate crimes committed by law enforcement officers — may have posed medium- and long-term risks to the ruling party. This is particularly true given its potential to act on mass human rights violations during the process of power consolidation.

As a result of the dissolution, the effectiveness of investigations into cases of ill-treatment of citizens by law enforcement officers is likely to deteriorate. There is an increased risk that victims and their legal representatives will face greater difficulty in accessing case materials, while investigative outcomes will become even more opaque. Following these legislative changes, the likelihood of holding accountable those responsible for torture and inhuman treatment of detained individuals during the spring and winter 2024 protests — including the organizers of repressive operations — is virtually nonexistent. On the contrary, it is now highly probable that monitoring the investigation of ill-treatment cases, or even conducting statistical analysis of such cases, will become significantly more difficult.

The abolition of the Special Investigation Service also sends a symbolic signal to European institutions and Georgia’s EU partners on the country’s path toward European integration. Dissolving an institution that was established specifically to fulfill the obligations arising from the EU-Georgia Association Agreement clearly indicates that the protection of human rights and the creation of corresponding guarantees is no longer a declared priority of the state. On one hand, Georgia’s adoption of legislation harmful to EU integration — in defiance of recommendations by the EU and Council of Europe — and on the other, the dismantling of progress already achieved in the EU approximation process, sends an unmistakable message: the country’s ruling elite has demonstratively turned away from the goal of European integration.

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