Introduction
In recent months, Georgian Dream has adopted a number of legislative amendments in the area of drug policy, aimed at strengthening repressive and control-oriented instruments. Through the amendments adopted in the spring of this year, [1] refusal to undergo compulsory drug testing became punishable under administrative law, and the Criminal Code was amended to introduce mandatory treatment as a form of punishment, applicable for up to two years to a “person suffering from drug addiction.”[2]

In early July, further changes were introduced to the Criminal Code and other normative acts, tightening sanctions for a number of actions, while significantly weakening access to treatment programs available to drug users. The amendments also restricted the identification of persons involved in operational-search activities and covert investigative actions.

As is typical, the justification for a punitive and strict policy is based on claims of worsening drug-related conditions and growing harm caused by drug use. However, none of the draft laws were accompanied by research or specific evidence demonstrating a real need for these changes.

At the same time, research on drug policy [3] shows that drug use, and the broader phenomenon of drug use, is directly connected to the existing societal and socio-economic context. Among other factors, motivations for drug use may include economic or psychological pressure. Accordingly, an effective drug policy must be multidimensional and adequately respond to the real root causes of the problem.

Of course, illegal drug trafficking is a global problem, [4] and Georgia is no exception. Especially in the context of modern technological development and the constant emergence of new psychoactive substances, tackling the issue requires serious effort from states. Yet in this context it becomes even clearer that punitive mechanisms alone are ineffective, and scientific consensus increasingly calls for demand-reduction measures — which begin with prevention, followed by the development of robust medical and social support systems.

Instead, we are seeing intensified punitive rhetoric from political figures, which is then reflected in legislation. As a result, the real problems in the area of drug policy — including the absence of a prevention system, insufficient and inaccessible healthcare services, and expensive rehabilitation programs — are once again overshadowed by promises of a tough-on-drugs approach. Such punitive populism serves two goals: on the one hand, it creates the illusion for the public that there is a real fight against the problem; on the other, the tightened legislation gives police expanded opportunities to carry out repressive, control-oriented actions.

Strict, punishment-based drug policy is not new to Georgia, and similar experiences have already taken place in the recent past — including the widespread practice of “street drug testing,” which could target any citizen. For example, between 2013 and 2015, nearly 150,000 individuals were forcibly tested, and in more than two-thirds of cases, test results were negative. Furthermore, punishment-oriented policy has proven ineffective, as the number of problematic drug users in the country has continued to rise, and the state still lacks a complete picture of the scale of drug-related harm, including fatal overdoses.

This document analyzes the legislative amendments adopted in early July of this year in the area of drug policy.

“Street Drug Testing” and the Increased Risk of Police Abuse

Legislative amendments related to so-called street drug testing were adopted in April of this year, [5] making refusal to undergo testing punishable under administrative law. The initial version of the draft law also envisaged criminal liability in cases of repeated refusal, but the final version limited liability to an administrative sanction. The increased administrative penalties — a fine ranging from 500 to 2,000 GEL or up to 60 days of administrative detention [6] — reach the severity of criminal punishment. In addition, individuals found liable under this provision are automatically stripped, for a term of three years, of the right to drive a vehicle; for five years, of the right to work in educational institutions, the public service, or as a teacher; and of the right to acquire, keep, or carry a weapon. Furthermore, by court decision, a person may be deprived for up to five years of the right to engage in medical-pharmaceutical or legal practice, and of the passive right to vote. [7]

Notably, the amendments made punishable a practice used by citizens who had been arbitrarily subjected to forced testing and refused to provide biological samples to the forensic service. As a result, the police now possess an effectively unchecked tool that allows them, on the one hand, to require any citizen to undergo drug testing, and on the other, to treat refusal as a separate legal offense. The only option available to a citizen in such a situation is to refuse transportation by police to the drug testing facility and instead present themselves at the forensic institution within four hours for testing purposes. [8]

The April amendments also introduced a new provision into the Code of Administrative Offenses, establishing liability for drivers who refuse to undergo testing to determine drug intoxication while operating a vehicle. [9] The penalty for this offense is set at a 1,000 GEL fine and suspension of the driving license for one year.

Parliament reviewed the legislative changes under an accelerated procedure, citing the need to maintain public order, fight drug addiction, and immediately suppress illegal drug trafficking. However, the draft law was not accompanied by any research or situational analysis, nor was it preceded by a consultation process with field experts, community organizations, or other stakeholders. The adoption of the draft law under such an expedited procedure, without real deliberation, once again reveals that its purpose was not to meaningfully address existing problems, but rather to strengthen mechanisms of control over citizens. It is also notable that, for several months after April, no bylaw was adopted to regulate in detail the grounds and procedures for transferring persons for testing. As a result, the changes adopted under the accelerated procedure remained effectively inoperative for several months.

On July 2, a joint order by the Ministers of Internal Affairs and Health [10] approved the rule for determining whether a person is under the influence of or has used narcotic, psychotropic, and/or new psychoactive substances. As expected, the order did not clarify the specific circumstances or grounds under which the police may require an individual to undergo drug testing. The order essentially repeats the wording of the law and states that, if there is a fact and/or information providing a reasonable basis to assume that a person has used a narcotic substance and/or a new psychoactive substance without a doctor’s prescription, the police officer is authorized to ensure the person's testing. Accordingly, law enforcement officers may in practice direct such requests to any citizen. It is also problematic that the order does not require police to clearly explain to the individual the grounds and justification for being subjected to testing.

Such mechanisms in practice further increase the risks of arbitrary police actions and the unfounded or selective restriction of citizens’ rights. In the context of vague legal grounds for compulsory testing, this mechanism could be used against individuals who create political or other types of discomfort for law enforcement bodies or political authorities. This trend is reflected in the post-July 2 testing practices, in which members of opposition political parties and civil society activists [11] have reported being subjected to testing without legitimate grounds. It is also noteworthy that, for years, compulsory drug testing has been associated with police abuse, violence against citizens, and coercive practices. [12] Therefore, the discussed legislative amendments also raise concerns in this regard, as they significantly expand the scope of police control over citizens.

Tougher Sentences for Marijuana and the Undermining of Constitutional Oversight

The legislative amendments adopted on 2 July also tightened criminal sanctions related to marijuana. One of the new provisions reintroduced imprisonment as a form of punishment for the acquisition, possession, and cultivation of marijuana for personal use.

In recent years, Georgia’s Constitutional Court had gradually mitigated the severity of sanctions for such conduct. For example, in a 2015 decision, [13] the Court declared that imprisonment for the acquisition and possession of up to 70 grams of marijuana for personal use was unconstitutional. While the ruling did not decriminalize the act entirely, and criminal liability remained, the Court emphasized that imprisonment for this particular offense constituted a "manifestly disproportionate punishment."

According to the Constitutional Court, the use of marijuana or the acquisition and possession of it for personal use (in the absence of evidence of intent to distribute) posed no real threat to third parties. The Court thus reasoned that imposing imprisonment solely to serve the aim of general prevention turned the individual into an object of state power, rather than responding to any direct danger posed by their conduct. Such punishment, lacking constitutional proportionality, violated the dignity of the individual by using them as a mere tool of state policy. [15]

In a similar 2017 decision, [16] the Court also held that imprisonment for the illegal planting, growing, or cultivating of up to 151 grams of cannabis for personal use was unconstitutional. The same ruling acknowledged that imprisonment might be permissible for growing up to 264 grams of cannabis, but not for the duration mandated at the time (six to twelve years of imprisonment).

The 2 July amendments effectively reversed these rulings. Parliament disregarded the constitutional standards and principles articulated by the Constitutional Court. The justification for harsher penalties was based on the claim that “in recent years, hybrid strains of cannabis with high THC content have become more popular among users and have more harmful effects on the human body than natural or endemic varieties. For this reason, users of hybrid marijuana face a higher risk of addiction."

It is worth noting that this trend is not new and was already known when the Constitutional Court delivered its 2017 ruling. Furthermore, the draft legislation was not accompanied by any research or evidence specific to the Georgian context that analyzed the types of cannabis currently prevalent in the country. Additionally, under Georgian criminal law, both the cultivation and selection of cannabis plants or psychoactive fungi are already criminalized. Cultivation includes actions aimed at developing new strains or hybrids.

Thus, if the problem identified in the explanatory note of the bill is indeed pressing in Georgia, the legislative goal could have been achieved by targeting cultivation more specifically, rather than broadly tightening penalties for marijuana-related conduct.

Beyond its punitive nature, this legislation severely undermines constitutional oversight in the country. It reduces the role of the Constitutional Court to a formality and disregards its function as a safeguard of human rights and a check on political power. The legislature has ignored binding constitutional standards shaped through consistent case law developed over years.

These changes are even more troubling considering that law enforcement already had tools to address cannabis-related offenses. Such acts were already criminalized, and authorities had existing legal mechanisms, including punitive ones. The only effect of harsher penalties is to signal that the government views exemplary punishment as an effective solution to the issue.

Expansion of State Control over Treatment Programs and Artificial Barriers to Medical Services

Another regressive and rights-infringing move in Georgia's drug policy was the restriction of opioid substitution therapy (OST). Amendments to the Law of Georgia on Narcotic Drugs, Psychotropic Substances, Precursors and Medical care and services related to substance use disorders, adopted on 2 July, stipulate that only state-established or state-run legal entities are authorized to provide OST. As a result, private medical institutions were stripped of their right to offer this service.[18]

The explanatory note of the bill justified the change by stating that “the need emerged for the state to assume full responsibility for OST through its institutions, ensuring a unified standard and eliminating deviations from the rules and regulations."

OST is already classified as a high-risk medical activity under current legislation and is subject to strict regulation. All providers—state and private alike—have long been required to meet the conditions laid out in the technical regulations and other legal acts. Oversight and monitoring of these facilities are the responsibility of the Ministry of Health.

Furthermore, the Ministry of Health determines the national quota of narcotic and psychotropic substances used for therapeutic purposes. The Ministry of Internal Affairs may also be involved in this process.[20] Thus, the amount of such substances imported into Georgia for medical or scientific use is already tightly regulated by the state. Private institutions have never had a role in setting these quotas.

In other words, the state already had a wide range of tools to oversee and ensure the safety and quality of OST services. If there were any failures in the system, these are likely attributable to weaknesses in the existing regulatory and oversight mechanisms, not the legal nature of private institutions.

Notably, private medical institutions increase accessibility and quality of services and play a critical role in building trust—an essential component of treatment adherence. Many patients preferred private providers despite the higher costs, because they felt more comfortable and trusted them more.

Interestingly, the initial draft of the bill proposed that the changes would enter into force on 1 March 2026, giving patients and clinics time to adjust. However, during the fast-tracked review, this deadline was changed without justification, and the amendments will now take effect on 15 August 2024.[21]

In parallel, it was announced that OST clinics would be relocated from densely populated city centers to suburban areas. This was justified by public dissatisfaction with the clinics' current locations.[22] This change creates an additional barrier to access, particularly for patients who must visit clinics daily. Many OST beneficiaries are not permitted to drive, and suburban travel entails more time and cost, creating new challenges for patients, including in the workplace.

It is essential to remember that the beneficiaries of OST and related medical services often belong to marginalized and vulnerable groups. For example, a 2021 study showed that 53.5% of those convicted of drug-related offenses said their families had to save or borrow money for food and clothing before trial. About 44.3% were unemployed, and 38.9% were informally employed.[23]

Importantly, the number of patients in OST programs has already declined in recent years—from 17,646 in 2022 to 15,437 in 2024.[24] It is unknown whether this decline is due to structural factors or whether some patients have shifted from legal treatment to illegal markets. Reduced access and increased stigma may push more people to exit the program. Without medical or social support, these individuals are at greater risk of returning to illicit drug use—a development that carries public health risks and provides the state with new grounds to deploy repressive measures against them.

Covert Surveillance and Increased Secrecy

The legislative package adopted on July 2 also introduced amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code and the Law of Georgia on Operative-Investigative Activities. Under these amendments, prosecutors were granted broad discretion during the course of criminal proceedings to withhold the identity or other identifying information of individuals involved in covert investigative actions or in operative activities that yielded evidence relevant to the criminal case. These legislative changes open the possibility for interpretation that the provision applies both to one-time informants and to regular collaborators engaged in operative or covert investigative activities.

Such regulation increases the risk of abuse by law enforcement in any criminal case, but the threat is particularly acute in drug-related cases, where operative information is frequently relied upon by authorities. The reliability and authenticity of such information directly impact the right to a fair trial and the defendant’s ability to examine and challenge the evidence presented against them.

Drug-related cases are also plagued by the issue of so-called "planting," where defendants allege that narcotics found in their possession were not theirs. In such cases, the context of the search—including who conducted it and under what circumstances—is of critical importance to determine whether the drugs were indeed seized during the search or planted. Under the new changes, verifying the integrity of such searches becomes more difficult, leaving courts to rely solely on official search records, which may not reflect misconduct or manipulation.

These amendments further increase the risk of unchecked police power, as they weaken judicial oversight and adversarial procedural safeguards in an area already marked by doubts about law enforcement integrity.

Conclusion

The accelerated adoption of repressive legislation without evidentiary support has become routine practice for Georgia’s Parliament. Within this pattern, the recent tightening of drug policy appears consistent—yet in this case, it also introduces a distinct set of additional risks.

Beyond expanding state control and police discretion, these policies erode the rights, health protections, and social standing of people who use drugs. Instead of addressing the real roots of the issue, the state narrows its responsibility to punitive measures alone.

The result of such policies is a society where stigma intensifies, individuals are pushed away from essential health services, and people disappear further into the shadows due to fear of criminalization and severe penalties. Drug policy’s punitive populism fuels the expansion of the repressive state apparatus—one that any citizen could fall victim to. Meanwhile, the worsening of the national drug situation will deepen the social, economic, and legal vulnerability of communities affected by substance use.

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