The recent negotiations between the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan, held in the United Arab Emirates, have been a subject of active discussion for several weeks. Official information regarding the agenda and the substance of the meeting remained limited. Initial reports about the expected meeting between Nikol Pashinyan and Ilham Aliyev did not come from the leaders' official representatives or their foreign ministries, but instead emerged from Turkish journalists. Official sources refrained from commenting on the meeting in advance, merely promising timely dissemination of relevant information.

The talks lasted nearly five hours and were conducted in various formats — both one-on-one between the heads of state and in the presence of foreign ministers and advisors. The negotiations gained new momentum amid growing tensions between Baku and Moscow, as well as strong support for swift reconciliation from Turkey and the United States. Russia appeared sidelined from the process.

On one hand, the meeting fits within the broader context of Armenia-Azerbaijan normalization, particularly because it was conducted without the mediation of external actors. Initially, negotiations took place under the so-called “Russian format,” during which four trilateral statements were signed at the highest level. Later, the parties engaged in parallel talks facilitated by Brussels (since December 2021) and Washington (since late 2022). The chosen format now confirms that Yerevan and Baku increasingly prefer direct bilateral engagement — a process that began at the BRICS summit in Kazan in October 2024 and continued at the European Political Community meeting in Tirana in May 2025.

Simultaneously, Armenia continues efforts to normalize relations with Turkey. On June 20, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan paid a working visit to his western neighbor and held talks with the Turkish leadership. According to the official readout, the parties “discussed contacts between Armenia and Turkey, the dialogue process launched to achieve lasting peace in the South Caucasus, and current developments.” President Erdoğan, in turn, emphasized the “importance of reaching consensus in the ongoing negotiations between Azerbaijan and Armenia.”

The high-level meeting in the Emirates was soon followed by talks between Armenia’s and Turkey’s ministers of infrastructure, transport, and energy. This indicates that the Aliyev–Pashinyan summit should be viewed not only within the framework of bilateral Armenia–Azerbaijan normalization, but also in a broader regional context that includes the Turkish dimension.

Pro-government media outlets in both Armenia and Azerbaijan have described the meeting as a historic turning point for the region, while also pointing to so-called “destructive forces” allegedly attempting to derail the peace process — a thinly veiled reference to Moscow.

Although Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has officially expressed support for reconciliation between the two countries, direct normalization of relations between the conflict parties is increasingly perceived as a reduction of Russian influence in the South Caucasus.

The Premises of the Negotiation Phase

The normalization of Armenia–Turkey relations is part of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s new political strategy. This policy has taken shape in the wake of Armenia’s loss of the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Following the collapse of the so-called “Karabakh consensus,” the Armenian government openly declared the former unrecognized republic a burden and an obstacle to implementing the Armenian ethno-national project. Pashinyan has since begun a search for new legitimacy for what he calls a “real” Armenia—set in contrast to a mythical one. This includes renouncing territorial claims, adopting a strategy of geopolitical minimalism, eliminating the miatsum (unification) ideology, strengthening the exclusive role of the Armenian state, and reducing the influence of the diaspora. A central part of this shift is moving away from Russia as Armenia’s sole security guarantor and curbing Moscow’s influence over Armenia’s political, economic, and cultural life. At a recent press conference, Pashinyan stated that Armenia would likely withdraw from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), having suspended its membership a year earlier and ceased its financial contributions as of March 2025. Armenia is now entering dialogue with Ankara under the idea of achieving peace in exchange for abandoning its claims to Karabakh.

In parallel, relations between Azerbaijan and Russia have sharply deteriorated—for the second time this year.

At first glance, the triggers of the two crises in bilateral relations appear unconnected. The first incident was the shooting down of an Azerbaijan Airlines passenger plane by a Russian air defense system on December 25, 2024. The second was a law enforcement raid by Russian security forces targeting ethnic Azerbaijanis in Yekaterinburg. However, these two incidents share several points of intersection.

In both cases, Azerbaijani authorities took an uncompromising position from the outset and questioned the impartiality of Russia’s law enforcement and judicial institutions. Instead of relying on behind-the-scenes diplomatic mechanisms to resolve the disputes, Baku launched harsh public criticism. Even after Vladimir Putin personally called and apologized for the plane incident, President Ilham Aliyev continued to blame Russia. In February 2025, Azerbaijan closed the Russian cultural center “Russkiy Dom” in Baku. Despite previous assurances, Aliyev also declined to attend the traditional Victory Day parade in Moscow on May 9.

The official reason given was the scheduling of events in honor of the birthday of Aliyev’s father, former President Heydar Aliyev. However, yet another incident occurred during that period: on May 5, Azerbaijani MP Azer Badamov was denied entry into Russia. He had been placed on a blacklist after making offensive comments about State Duma Deputy Nikolai Valuyev. Other Azerbaijani lawmakers backed Badamov, and one of them—Rasim Musabekov—publicly declared, “Russia is not a superpower.”

The Yekaterinburg raid ultimately cost the lives of two ethnic Azerbaijanis. In response, Baku canceled state visits and cultural events, arrested Russian citizens on Azerbaijani soil, and staged a demonstrative “showoff” of the detainees. Azerbaijan’s main state news agency, Azertag—originally established in 1920 during the First Republic—went so far as to compare Russia to the Third Reich. According to Kommersant, Russian-Azerbaijani relations have now entered “the deepest crisis in post-Soviet history.”

It is clear that following the completion of internal political consolidation and the symbolic “liberation of Karabakh” as the foundation of Azerbaijan’s renewed statehood, Baku is now focused on minimizing foreign influence. One key component of this effort is resisting the involvement of international actors. Azerbaijan has repeatedly criticized France and the European Union, accusing their missions along the Armenia–Azerbaijan border of favoring Yerevan. Between 2023 and 2025, Aliyev has accused the Biden administration multiple times of applying “double standards” and adopting an excessively harsh stance toward Azerbaijan. Meanwhile, Baku considers the OSCE Minsk Group an outdated and ineffective mechanism, and has practically made its dissolution a precondition for any peace agreement with Armenia.

In this context, Russia also occupies a special place in Azerbaijan’s strategic calculations. Having “found the key” to Karabakh—largely thanks to unprecedented Turkish support—Azerbaijan has begun distancing itself from Moscow’s influence. The return of Karabakh, increased military and strategic cooperation with Turkey and Israel, moderately positive engagement from the West, and the resolution of certain tensions with Iran have all elevated Azerbaijan’s regional standing. Increased dependence on Moscow no longer aligns with Azerbaijan’s national interests.

Three Key Issues on the Negotiation Table

There are three topics currently on the agenda of the negotiations: the signing of a peace treaty, the delimitation/demarcation of the border, and the opening of transport communications. On the peace agreement, the parties already made substantial progress in March 2025, when Armenia agreed to fulfill the last two conditions demanded by Azerbaijan. These involved withdrawing complaints from international courts and rejecting the presence of third-party actors on the border (including the EU monitoring mission in Armenia). These steps can be seen as Armenia’s further concessions in exchange for the swift signing of the agreement: whereas earlier Yerevan had offered to jointly submit a request to the OSCE to dissolve the Minsk Group, to withdraw international complaints, and to sign the agreement, it has now abandoned that position and moved toward unilateral concessions. The final version of the peace treaty was agreed on March 13, 2025.

Nevertheless, the preconditions put forward by Azerbaijan for signing the treaty remain in place: Armenia must amend its constitution and remove references in the preamble to the 1990 Declaration of Independence. According to Baku, these references express territorial claims toward Azerbaijan. Armenia has denied the existence of such claims in the current document. Moreover, Yerevan has officially recognized Azerbaijan’s territory as covering 86,600 square kilometers. In January 2024, Armenia’s Prime Minister spoke about the need for a new constitution, and the Minister of Justice stated that the draft would be ready in early 2026. The constitutional referendum is expected to be held after the parliamentary elections, scheduled for June 2026. As a result, the question of signing the treaty has reached an impasse: Yerevan emphasizes the need to agree on the date and location of the signing in view of the above-mentioned preconditions. Baku insists that the treaty can only be signed after constitutional changes. This position was reiterated two days before the UAE summit. Accordingly, progress in this direction is currently not expected. It can only happen if Azerbaijan agrees to concessions — something that has not occurred so far.

As for border delimitation and demarcation, no significant progress has been observed recently. The matter is complicated by the length of the border — more than 1,000 kilometers — and difficult terrain, including mountainous areas. An additional problem remains Azerbaijan’s occupation of 200 square kilometers of Armenian territory, where fortification works are actively underway. This clearly signals Baku’s desire to strengthen its dominant positions gained in November 2021 and September 2022. Nevertheless, in 2024 the parties managed to delimit a 12.7-kilometer section of the border, where military forces were replaced with border guards. In August of last year, the parties also agreed on a regulation for the joint border delimitation commission. The bilateral commission on delimitation and demarcation continues to work, and held its 11th session in early 2025. During the current meeting, the delimitation route was outlined — from the Georgian border in the north to the Iranian border in the south.

The topic of reopening transport communications first appeared in the trilateral statement of November 2020. According to point nine, all economic and transport links in the region were to be reopened, and Armenia would take responsibility for ensuring the safety of transport between Azerbaijan’s western regions and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic. According to the statement, control over the transport corridor was to be exercised by Russia’s FSB border service.

Azerbaijan is demanding that this route be granted extraterritorial status: the establishment of the so-called “Zangezur Corridor.” Under this approach, no control authorities should be present on the route. Armenia, on the other hand, agrees that all communications should be reopened under a unified operational principle. In October 2023, Yerevan presented the project “Crossroads of Peace.”

Prior to the meeting between Aliyev and Pashinyan, Armenian Deputy Foreign Minister Mnatsakan Safaryan stated that Yerevan was reviewing a U.S. proposal concerning the oversight of the road linking to Nakhchivan, under the condition of “protecting Armenia’s sovereignty, jurisdiction, and territorial integrity.” The proposal refers to an American private company that would be granted the authority to monitor the movement of people and goods along the corridor. According to a Middle East Eye, the idea of involving a private company — one acceptable to both Armenia and Azerbaijan — was originally proposed by Turkey. As of today, both the route and the modalities of these communications remain the subject of negotiations. Baku declares that it expects concessions from Armenia on this matter.

Strategic Takeaways from the Latest Round

Although the details of the five-hour meeting remain vague based on the brief official statements from the Armenian and Azerbaijani sides, certain conclusions can still be drawn.

First of all, both states are interested in continuing the negotiations in a bilateral format, without the involvement of third-party mediators. Presumably, Baku views direct talks as more favorable since the Azerbaijani side maintains an advantage and can impose its own perspective on Armenia. For Yerevan, direct negotiations are seen as the shortest path to reaching an agreement. Moreover, the absence of negotiations increases the risk of escalation. Therefore, if the Azerbaijani side insists on bilateral talks only, it is desirable to preserve this format.

Secondly, given that the press releases are nearly identical, it can be assumed that the parties spent time agreeing on the final text. The statements noted that all three blocks of topics were discussed — the peace agreement, the border, and communications.

As for the peace agreement, as expected, no progress is visible. However, it is noteworthy that the Azerbaijani side is spreading information about the possible initialing of the document. This could accelerate progress in other areas, such as the opening of communications, and increase the interest of new actors in the process. At the same time, the Armenian government is interested in demonstrating positive results on the path to peace ahead of the parliamentary elections scheduled for June 2026.

It is significant that the issue of U.S. involvement in the reopening of communications is under discussion. The Secretary of State of the United States Marco Rubio has also confirmed interest in the normalization of Armenia–Azerbaijan relations, expressing hope for the swift signing of the peace agreement. Regarding the opening of communications, the Armenian side stated that different options are under consideration, all of which take into account three principles — sovereignty, territorial integrity, and jurisdiction. Azerbaijan continues to speak about the extraterritorial principle, recognizes Armenia’s jurisdiction over the so-called Zangezur Corridor, but opposes any kind of border or customs control. Some of these functions may be transferred to international organizations or private companies. Neither the Armenian nor the Azerbaijani side now refers to point nine of the trilateral statement of November 2020, which provided for the deployment of Russian border guards.

Interestingly, some topics did not make it onto the agenda of the presidential meeting. Most importantly, only the opening of the Syunik route (the so-called Zangezur Corridor) was discussed. For Yerevan, communications from Nakhchivan to Iran, opening the border with Turkey, and activating rail and road links to Russia via Azerbaijan are also of no less importance. The meeting did not address the fate of Armenian detainees — including both prisoners of war and members of the former military-political leadership of Nagorno-Karabakh. Presumably, these topics will be raised gradually on the agenda.

South Caucasus Transformation

Today, the problems of the South Caucasus are on the periphery of the news agenda due to the ongoing war in Ukraine and developments in the Middle East. However, the significance of geopolitical transformations in this region cannot be ignored. It remains one of the most turbulent spaces in the post-Soviet area.

Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the United States, the European Union (particularly France), and NATO shifted from a policy of “competitive cooperation” with Moscow to one of “containment,” including in the South Caucasus region. The positions of the West and Russia on the international agenda have become holistic, leaving little room for nuance. At first glance, both the West and Russia are putting forward largely the same formula for peace with regard to Armenia and Azerbaijan — border delimitation and demarcation, reopening regional transport links, and the signing of a peace agreement between Yerevan and Baku. At the same time, each side sees itself as the exclusive moderator of the process and perceives the resolution of the ethno-political conflict in the Caucasus as an opportunity to strengthen its own position and minimize the influence of its geopolitical rival.

Clearly, after the invasion of Ukraine and the start of large-scale confrontation with the West, the importance of the Caucasus direction has diminished for Russia. This has led to the increased activity of the U.S., the EU, NATO, and specific member states of these organizations in the South Caucasus. The range of activities is wide — from France increasing its supply of military arms to Armenia, to Yerevan’s attempts to join the European Union and Brussels’ support for this aspiration. In the same context, the U.S. effort to restore transport links between Azerbaijan and Armenia can also be seen.

The confrontation between the West and Russia is one of the key issues of Caucasian geopolitics, but the regional mosaic is much more complex. The developments around Nagorno-Karabakh have clearly demonstrated the capabilities and resources of so-called ‘mid-sized powers’ — countries with clear goals, political will, and the courage to pursue their national interests. The best example of this is Turkey.

Before the “Autumn War” of 2020, no state outside the former Soviet Union had so openly intervened in a post-Soviet ethno-political conflict. Turkey broke this taboo and militarily intervened in a region of particular importance to Moscow. Today, Ankara has become a key player in the post-Soviet Caucasus and is also seeking to benefit from weakening Russia’s positions in the South Caucasus. Turkey’s ultimate goal is also to establish peace in the region — a peace that bears its name.

Accordingly, the regional security system of the South Caucasus is undergoing a reset. Existing formats and models of relations, which until recently appeared solid, are now being transformed and reassessed. Alongside the traditional players active in the region, new actors are emerging with their own ambitions and visions of an ideal Caucasus.

What challenges does Georgia face under these conditions?

First and foremost, in discussions about the ongoing peace negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Georgia’s transit potential is being considered. If railway connections between Azerbaijan and Armenia are restored — and perhaps more importantly, if the Julfa railway branch between Armenia and Iran is fully activated — Georgia’s transit turnover will be significantly reduced.

In that case, for container owners shipping from China to the South Caucasus, it will be economically more attractive to use ports in southern Iran instead of Georgian ports, and then transport goods by rail through Armenia and Nakhchivan directly to Turkish ports on the Mediterranean. Armenia’s export goods will also benefit from newly opened alternative routes.

Clearly, the reconciliation between Armenia and Azerbaijan and the formation of a new security architecture in the region will also create new opportunities for the South Caucasus. The region’s role is increasing, and it has great potential as a link between the European Union and China. A window is opening for normal, peaceful development — a prerequisite for economic prosperity.

Georgia has every precondition to become a key part of the Middle Corridor — the route connecting the EU and China. However, the country’s isolationist policy threatens it with the loss of strategic relevance.

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The meeting in the United Arab Emirates was the first direct negotiation between Aliyev and Pashinyan — until now, the two leaders had only met in the presence of mediators or within the framework of international summits. This meeting is the culmination of several years of work. The peace agreement — which has already been drafted but not yet signed — was prepared by the foreign ministries of both countries; the working groups on border delimitation are led by the deputy prime ministers; and a direct communication channel also exists between the leaders' advisors — Armen Grigoryan and Hikmet Hajiyev.

However, the meeting demonstrated that the desire to exit Russia’s sphere of influence alone is not enough to overcome decades of hostility between the two states and the mutual distrust between the two leaders. Despite a narrowing of positions, there was no breakthrough on any specific topic — no date or location was announced for the signing of the peace agreement, and there is still no concrete information about the opening of communications.

Still, the direct talks in Abu Dhabi send a message: in an environment of uncertainty and ongoing global conflicts, the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan are maintaining contact and discussing issues of importance for both countries. Today, many believe that uncertainty and chaos create opportunities for creative action. But in the South Caucasus, chaos has reigned for a long time — and it has brought no positive outcomes for anyone.