Armenia continues to take steps to reshape its position in the South Caucasus. After its defeat in the Second Karabakh War in 2020, Yerevan has been working to achieve stability and normalize relations with Azerbaijan and Türkiye. At the same time, Armenian authorities are pursuing closer ties with the European Union and the United States. Although these parallel processes have not yet produced concrete results, they hold the potential to create new opportunities for Armenia - changes that could impact not only the country itself but the entire South Caucasus region.

Today Yerevan is the most visited capital in the South Caucasus. It frequently hosts diplomatic visits, conferences, and working summits. Although many visitors still come from neighboring countries and regional stakeholders, a striking trend is the surge in delegations from Western nations, reflecting Armenia’s growing cooperation with the EU and the U.S.

Among the recent visitors was Kaja Kallas, the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. During her trip officials announced the completion of talks on a New Partnership Agenda - an important document designed not only to formalize deepening cooperation but also to broaden its scope.[1] Should conditions allow, this gradual strengthening of ties might pave the way for a new, elevated stage in Armenia–EU relations.

What exactly this new level will involve remains unclear. Armenia has ambitious goals. In autumn 2023 Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan told the European Parliament that Armenia is prepared to advance its rapprochement as far as the EU is willing to go.[2] Last year Yerevan and Brussels agreed on a new three-year program backed by €270 million to support critical areas of Armenia’s development.[3] This spring the Armenian parliament adopted a law officially declaring its aspiration to join the EU.[4]

The keys remain in Brussels, which - despite its openness to expanding cooperation - has yet to commit formally. Officially Armenia remains part of Russian-led defense and economic blocs - the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Union. While Yerevan has paused its participation in the CSTO, it is still reluctant to sever economic ties with Moscow, as Russian officials warn this could cause significant revenue losses.[5] Georgia’s U-turn on the EU integration path presents another obstacle for Armenia, slowing processes that might otherwise proceed more smoothly and swiftly.

Still if Armenia and the EU continue this path, it could prepare both sides for further steps. For now, the EU is reluctant to consider Armenia in the same category as Ukraine or Moldova, both official candidates for membership. The enlargement agenda itself faces challenges, with rising right-wing political forces across Europe and growing public concerns about migration and the cost of living.[6] Still these dynamics may shift over time, creating new openings in Armenia - EU relations.

Forced Acceleration

Armenia’s reevaluation of its relationship with the EU grew out of mounting frustration with Russia. After the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war Armenia was left with a weakened military and an economy battered by the covid pandemic. As Azerbaijan took control of much disputed territory, the Armenia–Azerbaijan border grew longer and rapidly transformed into a tense frontline. The 2021 parliamentary elections eased some Armenian domestic tensions, but the country remained vulnerable to renewed clashes.

Initially Armenia turned to Russia for help despite disappointment with Moscow’s decision not to intervene during the war - likely out of fear of confrontation with Türkiye and escalation with Azerbaijan. Russia was still Armenia’s natural partner, limiting Yerevan’s military options elsewhere due to CSTO membership. Russian peacekeepers were deployed to Nagorno-Karabakh - the process coordinated with the military base in Armenia’s town of Gyumri, - and Russian border guards took control of key sections along the Armenian border.[7]

But Armenia’s hope that Russia’s expanded presence would bring stability quickly faded. By spring 2021 Azerbaijani forces were advancing along the border. First serious clashes erupted in Nagorno-Karabakh by fall same year. Though Russia expressed concern, it failed to reverse the trend or ease tensions. By the end of 2021, Armenia had essentially given up on Moscow and accepted the EU’s invitation to start talks with Azerbaijan in Brussels.[8]

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine that started in February 2022 further sped up this shift. With Moscow distracted it lost control over the situation in the South Caucasus. Azerbaijan disregarded Russian peacekeepers and border guards. In late 2022 Azerbaijan launched a major attack inside Armenian territory seizing strategic positions that threaten to split Armenia in two parts in case of a new crisis.[9] This was followed by the blockade and eventual takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023, after the Armenian population fled the enclave.

Throughout this turbulent time the EU became Armenia’s primary external supporter. Right after the 2020 war Brussels launched aid projects in southern Armenia, vulnerable due to proximity to new front lines.[10] Following border attacks in 2023, the EU deployed a civilian observation mission - similar to the one established in Georgia after the 2008 war.[11] Thanks to the mission, while occasional incidents continue, serious escalations have been avoided and the situation is stabilizing.

At the same time Armenia began distancing itself from Russia. It stopped attending CSTO summits and ceased paying its dues. Although high-level meetings still happen and Prime Minister Pashinyan occasionally visits Moscow, no new joint programs or projects have been launched.

War with Bureaucracy

There is still a long way to go if Armenia wants to deepen relations with the EU. This partnership requires serious reforms across multiple sectors. Any setbacks could derail the whole process.

Here Armenia’s conservative bureaucracy poses a significant challenge. Local officials and experts often point to an oversized and underqualified staff as a key reason why some reforms introduced since Pashinyan’s 2018 peaceful revolution have failed. Lack of skilled personnel also hampers the execution of programs tied to the EU partnership. “Armenia’s low capacity to absorb these reforms is a major obstacle to thinking about new horizons,” said an EU official involved in the talks.[12]

One key and symbolic issue under discussion is visa liberalization - allowing Armenian citizens to travel visa-free to the EU for short periods. This process began officially in September last year and requires Armenia not only to upgrade its ID documents but also to implement complementary reforms.[13]

For example, Armenia must improve its healthcare system, potentially expanding universal insurance, to prevent people from using visa-free travel to seek medical treatment in Europe.[14] It also needs effective housing programs for refugees from Nagorno-Karabakh, to stop them from seeking asylum in the EU.[15]

Both are expensive undertakings, requiring qualified civil servants who can execute policies and communicate effectively with European counterparts. Armenia might find this a challenging task. “It’s even difficult to find enough English speakers in different ministries,” admitted an Armenian official working on cooperation programs.[16]

An Elusive Peace

Regional stability remains a decisive factor in the deepening of Armenia’s relationship with the European Union. Any new escalation - or worse, the outbreak of another war - would not only stall planned cooperation with Brussels but also deter potential European investment. Renewed conflict in the South Caucasus would likely reinforce security anxieties within parts of the EU, making member states more reluctant to consider formal steps toward closer alignment with Yerevan.

Against this backdrop Armenia has stepped up its diplomatic efforts in recent years. Following the 2020 war in Nagorno-Karabakh, Yerevan and Ankara initiated a direct dialogue through appointed special representatives, exploring the prospect of reopening their shared border and establishing trade links.[17] Despite intermittent clashes since the end of hostilities, Armenia and Azerbaijan have continued negotiating. The two sides have reached preliminary consensus on the text of a peace agreement, alongside progress on several ancillary issues.[18]

The formal signing of a peace deal would mark a major breakthrough - not only by reducing the immediate risk of renewed violence, but by unlocking long-term opportunities for regional trade and transport. A stable corridor across Armenia could enhance the South Caucasus’s role as a key transit route between Europe and Asia. Both the European Union and the United States have expressed their readiness to support such developments, offering not just political backing but potential financial investment in the region’s infrastructure. For instance, the current U.S. administration has put forward a proposal to engage a private company in facilitating transport operations along at least one route linking Azerbaijan with its Nakhchivan exclave via Armenia’s southern region.[19] Both Baku and Yerevan are currently reviewing the proposal.

Yet the success of this process also hinges on Moscow’s stance. For more than thirty years, Russia has positioned itself as the primary mediator and guarantor in Armenia’s regional conflicts. The Kremlin has long regarded the South Caucasus as a zone of strategic interest and remains deeply wary of any increase in Western influence within its post-Soviet periphery. Even amid its ongoing war in Ukraine, Russia continues to assert its claim to a central role in shaping the region’s transit future and, more broadly, in guiding Armenia’s foreign policy trajectory.

Russia’s objections have disrupted progress in the past. In 2013, under direct pressure from Moscow, Armenia abandoned a nearly finalized Association Agreement with the EU.[20] In its place, Yerevan signed a more limited Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA), which only came into full force in 2021. “We replaced European standards of development with those of the Eurasian Economic Union,” a former Armenian negotiator later recalled. “For over a decade, businesses - from manufacturing firms to neighborhood cafes - have operated within that framework. It has held us back by years.”[21]

Today, however, officials in Yerevan are adamant that there will be no repeat of that reversal. The New Partnership Agenda with the EU extends well beyond traditional sectors like trade, mobility, and culture. For the first time it includes provisions for joint engagement in foreign and security policy. In 2023 the EU provided Armenia with modest assistance under its European Peace Facility (EPF) framework - primarily geared toward non-lethal support and emergency preparedness. Though largely symbolic, that aid may lay the groundwork for broader cooperation. [22]  In June Armenia and the EU signed a new agreement expanding Yerevan’s role in EU civilian missions.[23]

Economic Chains

Armenia’s leadership remains concerned about its economic and infrastructure dependence on Russia.[24] The country still buys Russian natural gas at discounted rates, and key infrastructure firms are Russian-owned. Russia also remains Armenia’s main trading partner, a role that has grown since Western sanctions were imposed on Russia over its war in Ukraine. Those sanctions have rerouted significant trade flows through Armenia as a transit corridor.[25]

Reducing this dependence is a priority. For over two years, Armenia, EU and the U.S. have been negotiating plans to replace the Russian-dependent nuclear power plant.[26] Yerevan has started reviewing ownership of large companies held by Russian nationals. For instance, it increased its stake in the largest mining complex - Armenia’s top taxpayer - and nationalized the electricity distributor in Yerevan this July.[27]

How long it will take to reduce Russia’s economic hold is unclear. Progress could be faster if Armenia and Türkiye opened their borders and resumed direct trade - agreements stalled for three years due to the absence of a final peace deal with Azerbaijan. Analysts have predicted serious economic growth if these ties normalize.[28] Armenian officials have even suggested they might switch to buying gas from Baku if a deal can be reached.[29]

Difficult Elections

Next year’s parliamentary elections will be a critical test for Armenia’s current trajectory. Prime Minister Pashinyan aims for a strong win to continue pushing peace with neighbors and strengthen Western ties.

But concerns linger about possible Russian attempts to influence the vote. Reports indicate Sergey Kiriyenko, a deputy head of Russia’s presidential administration known for managing Russia’s elections, has taken charge of Kremlin affairs in Armenia.[30] Local observers have noted a rise in suspicious online outlets spreading disinformation. Some experts warn this could signal tougher challenges ahead for the government.[31]

Pashinyan’s team appears ready for a tough fight. After his approval ratings fell sharply last year, he stepped up regional visits, shaved off his signature beard, and increased his social media presence. He now regularly tours the regions, often accompanied by his wife, promoting his vision of moving away from nationalist policies embraced by his predecessors and opponents. While his ratings are recovering, they are not yet strong enough to guarantee a comfortable win.[32]

One likely pillar of Nikol Pashinyan’s campaign will be Armenia’s deepening ties with the European Union. Just ahead of next year’s elections, Armenia is set to become the first South Caucasus country to host a high-level summit of the European Political Community - a forum that draws leaders from across Europe and its partner states.[33] Public opinion polls already indicate growing support for European integration. Still, many Armenians remain wary, fearing that a westward shift could provoke Moscow and trigger economic repercussions.[34] These competing sentiments are reshaping the political landscape, prompting parties across the spectrum to recalibrate their platforms. As in Moldova, the campaign is increasingly taking on the contours of a geopolitical contest: West versus Russia.

The political battle also includes ongoing tensions with the Armenian Apostolic Church.[35] Since spring, Pashinyan has publicly called for the Catholicos’s resignation, citing rumors about violations of celibacy. In July, security services arrested several priests, politicians, and activists accused of plotting to overthrow the government. Though the conflict has sparked harsh rhetoric, it has not triggered mass protests or a movement capable of derailing the government’s agenda.

Looking Ahead

Officials in Brussels and Yerevan agree that ties have never been this close.[36] Indeed Armenia and the EU have developed deeper, more diverse relations in recent years, expanding beyond trade, education, and travel to include security cooperation. EU observer vehicles now patrol Armenia’s border regions, and for many villagers, these are their first encounters with Europeans.

Much will depend on how far Armenia can advance peace with Azerbaijan - and then Türkiye. Stability along the borders will not only prevent further territorial losses but also support more stable talks with Brussels on economic cooperation and investment. It will also reduce European concerns that closer ties might import new conflicts rather than enhancing regional security.

A more stable political environment in Georgia could also accelerate Armenia’s path toward closer cooperation with the European Union. In 2022, Armenian leaders - including the Prime Minister - toured European capitals to lobby in favor of Georgia’s EU candidacy. The thinking in Yerevan was straightforward: Georgia’s progress could help open doors for Armenia, given that many in Brussels still view enlargement through a regional lens. But when Georgia abruptly reversed course in 2024, Armenia had little choice but to accept the shift and maintain pragmatic ties with its only neighbor that offers overland access to both European and Russian markets. Armenian officials continue to visit Georgia, seeking to learn from its EU integration experience. But those efforts would likely be smoother - and perhaps more fruitful - had Georgia remained on the same pro-European track and could serve as a more active facilitator in bilateral cooperation.

Even if progress with the EU is slow, maintaining and nurturing relationship with Türkiye benefits Armenia. It keeps the country visible to the West and opens new avenues to develop institutions and governance in ways Russia-led integration blocs cannot offer.[37] Should Georgia’s EU integration remain stalled, deepening economic ties with Türkiye - already aligned with EU customs and product standards - could offer Armenia an alternative pathway to prepare for closer economic engagement with Europe.

Ultimately, the future of Armenia-EU relations hinges on the broader regional geopolitical balance. Yerevan is ready to deepen ties further. How far Brussels is willing to go depends on political developments in Europe - where skepticism is growing - and on Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine and its rejection of dialogue with the West.

For Armenia this situation presents a difficult balancing act. It finds itself engaged in risky partnerships without firm guarantees, while concrete progress in expanding Western cooperation remains limited. Still its core priorities - border stability and national development - cannot be assured without continued dialogue with Azerbaijan, Türkiye, the EU, and the United States. Therefore, it has no other choice but to continue making efforts. 

On the other hand, Armenia’s democratic course offers the South Caucasus a rare alternative to the region’s prevailing authoritarian drift. But for this to gain traction, Yerevan will need tangible support from the European Union - still the only credible counterweight in today’s polarized international order. The risks are substantial: Armenia is small, economically fragile, and exposed to security threats that bind it to Russia. Yet its progress could carry broader regional significance. Should Georgia one day reverse course and return to its European path, Armenia’s experience may serve as both a precedent and a partner in reanimating integration efforts across the region.