Introduction

Throughout the post-Soviet period, Russian society remained polarized. In the 1990s, the primary factor dividing the population was their stance on the Soviet Union. This division was evident in election results until 1996 when one could still argue that the elections were free, though not necessarily fair. Gordon Hahn, in his analysis of the 1995 Duma (parliamentary) elections,[1] concluded that a multipolar political system was emerging in Russia, with extremist forces playing a significant role. Notably, in the 1995 elections, the Communist Party (CPRF) secured first place, while the nationalist LDPR had come first in the 1993 elections. The government’s repeated attempts to form a centrist bloc were unsuccessful.

In the 2000s, electoral political competition virtually disappeared.[2] By the early 2010s, polarization between the government and the opposition was marked, on one hand, by the state’s tight control over media, and on the other, by the rise of alternative, independent online media with their agendas. Researchers often attribute the protest activity of the “angry urbanites” in 2011 - 2012 to the emergence of new information sources and new tools for self-organization through the Internet.[3]

The term “angry urbanites” also points to the fact that the polarization of Russian society is closely tied to the country’s territorial structure. In 2011, economic expert and geographer Natalia Zubarevich introduced the concept of the “Four Russias” - “Russia No. 1”: the country of the capitals and major cities (with populations of 500 000 or more); “Russia No. 2”: medium-sized industrial cities (from 20 000 to 300 000 – 500 000 people); “Russia No. 3”: residents of small towns and rural areas; and “Russia No. 4”: the republics of the North Caucasus and South Siberia. These “four Russias” live in fundamentally different ways, with interests that rarely intersect and sometimes directly conflict.^[4]

Territorial differences, in turn, are closely linked to growing economic inequality. Together, they give rise to a range of social and political divides: “Conservative nationalism versus progressive social cosmopolitanism, the regime versus the opposition, and the rich versus the poor - these opposing forces sometimes diverge within Russia’s complex political landscape, and at other times, intersect”.^[5]

It can be assumed that the polarization present in Russian society since the collapse of the Soviet Union is part of a broader divide, influenced by various factors - most notably, the standard of living. As early as the 1990s, about half of Russians were dissatisfied with their lives and believed that “it would be better if everything had remained as it was before 1985”.[6] They feared the changes taking place in the country. By the 2010s, the same (or similar) people were trying to preserve the sense of stability that had emerged in the 2000s and found it difficult to accept new developments.

It is noteworthy that neither the government nor the opposition made efforts to reduce polarization; on the contrary, both sides used it to reinforce their camps. This became especially evident during the 2011 - 2012 protest movement and the annexation of Crimea in 2014. At that time, support for the government among the majority and dissatisfaction among the minority both reached their peak. Terms like “vatniks” (used to describe government supporters) and “fifth column” (used to label the opposition) gained popularity.^[7] Researchers highlight Alexei Navalny’s attempts to appeal to a segment of pro-government citizens - not only by exposing corruption but also by stressing that a change in leadership would benefit everyone, particularly the poorest.[8]

The Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, became another turning point that further deepened the polarization of Russian society. Attitudes toward the war emerged as a central factor in self-identification and a key marker for distinguishing between “us” and “them.” For some Russians, the war with a neighboring country became a “point of no return”, after which dialogue with those holding opposing views felt impossible. For others, it fostered a sense of threat from an “external enemy”, which helped to unite and smooth over previously existing divisions.^[9]

In addition, the outbreak of war was accompanied by events that became new sources of division in an already fragmented society. These included, notably: sanctions against Russia (some Russians who opposed the war still criticized the sanctions, believing they were unfairly affected by them); mobilization (some Russians who supported the war argued that only professional military personnel should be involved in the fighting); and emigration.

Emigration is particularly interesting to analyze in the context of polarization. On the one hand, it can be seen as the most extreme form of rejection of the government and its supporters. On the other hand, physical distance and the experience of living in another country can further widen the divide between Russians - especially if the emigrants who fled the war still plan to return or continue to see themselves as part of Russian society.

In this article, we explore the link between emigration and the polarization of Russian society, and how it affected specific individuals with different positions and life strategies after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

This text is based on the results of a survey conducted with both individuals living in Russia and Russian emigrants, as well as media publications and my interviews with Russians in emigration, recorded in 2023 and 2024.

How Many Russians Have Left Russia?

Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, a significant number of Russian citizens began leaving the country. Initially, among others, the primary reasons for emigration included fear of repression due to disagreements with the Russian government, economic difficulties stemming from sanctions, and the exit of major companies that closed their offices in Russia. Since the fall of 2022, emigration has been further driven by the onset of mass military mobilization and the conscription of citizens to the front.

According to calculations by journalists and researchers, 700 000 citizens left Russia over two and a half years and have not returned.^[10] This is a significant number in such a short period. The outflow of Russians following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine is referred to as the “fifth wave of emigration”.[11] This wave is the largest in the past 20 years and is often compared to the “fourth wave” of the 1990s-2000s when the Russian authorities were first unable to prevent the mass exodus. However, in terms of motivation, this new wave bears more resemblance to the emigration from the Soviet Union, as Seva Novgorodtsev, a notable emigrant from the third wave, once said: “They weren't just going somewhere, they were coming from somewhere.”  

The “post-war” emigration is characterized as an “escape from somewhere”, as reflected in the choice of destinations. This wave of emigration stands in stark contrast to the more planned and thoughtful migrations of previous years. The most popular destinations were countries where Russians could enter without a visa and sometimes even without a foreign passport (we will elaborate on this further below). According to a study by The Bell, the largest number of Russians relocated to Armenia (110 000 people), followed by Kazakhstan and Israel, each with 80 000 people. Georgia ranks fourth, with about 73 000 people, and the United States comes in fifth with 48 000 people. Russian citizens can enter Armenia and Kazakhstan without a foreign passport, and they do not require a visa for Georgia. Emigration to Israel is largely explained by the large number of repatriates - Russians with Jewish roots - for whom the legalization process has been simplified. Surprisingly, the United States appears on this list, but many Russians have entered the country illegally and applied for asylum at the border.

In these countries (except for the USA), the flow of Russian emigrants was noticeable, but it accounted for no more than 0.5% of the population. According to data published by Russian authorities, about the same number of Russians are at the front, directly participating in hostilities. Thus, the vast majority of Russians have not been directly impacted by either emigration or the war. However, both waves of “outflow” have been particularly noticeable among different segments of Russian society. People from the poorest regions and national republics were predominantly sent to the front. In contrast, emigration, especially in the spring of 2022, was largely made up of more affluent and educated individuals. This imbalance, on one hand, highlights the polarization discussed earlier, and on the other, it contributes to the intensification of this societal divide.

How Do Those Who “Left” Differ from Those Who “Remained”?

Before we examine how emigration has contributed to the fragmentation of Russian society, we must first consider whether the emigrants were already different from other Russians before leaving the country.

Obviously, not all Russian citizens had the willingness or the possibility to emigrate. Entering most countries from Russia requires a foreign passport, which, according to 2022 data from the Russian Public Opinion Research Center, only 30% of Russians possessed. In other words, just 30% of Russians intended not to move abroad permanently, but to travel (At the same time, many among those who did emigrate likely did not have a foreign passport. It is possible to enter two popular emigration destinations - Armenia and Kazakhstan - using only an internal Russian passport^[12]).  

According to sociologists, Russians are generally not characterized by high mobility. For instance, in 2022, only 2% of Russians held a Schengen visa, and only 23% had ever been abroad before that year. Just 22% of Russians speak foreign languages well.^[13] Since 2010, 80% of Russians have consistently said they do not wish to live abroad. After the war, such “isolationist” and “patriotic” sentiments have grown even stronger. In 2021, 42% of respondents believed that “a person should live in the country where they were born and educated”, while by 2024, this number had risen to 64% (possibly because, according to respondents, moving abroad has become dangerous).

Judging by these data, for the majority of Russians, the decision to emigrate did not seem natural, easy, or even feasible. This suggests that, even before the outbreak of the full-scale war, there were already differences between those who left and those who remained. Overall, Russians are not a mobile population, and relocating to another country is accessible only to a minority - whether due to objective or subjective circumstances.

After the war began, emigration came to be seen not merely as a personal life choice, but as a declaration of political stance. In the spring of 2022, it wasn’t just ordinary citizens who left Russia - many public figures also departed, openly stating that they were emigrating in opposition to the war and the actions of the Russian government. As a result, emigration was immediately perceived within Russia as a form of protest. This is precisely how many of those who remained interpreted the departures. For example, according to the Levada Center, in March 2024, 43% of respondents believed that those “leaving the country are traitors and betraying their homeland”; 40% thought that “those who do not believe in Russia’s future” were leaving, and 33% said[14] people were emigrating out of fear of being mobilized for the “special military operation”.^[15]

It is difficult to determine the extent to which the political views of those who left differ from those who remained. Existing studies suggest that emigrants and those who stayed in Russia generally hold opposing views on most issues. For instance, according to the Outrush study,^[16] 96% of emigrants do not trust the Russian government. In the Exodus22 study,[17] 70% of respondents indicated that they left Russia because of the “impossibility of living in a country at war” (data from Armenia and Georgia). However, it is important to note that surveys involving emigrants are, in most cases, not representative. Moreover, emigrants who support the Russian government often refuse to participate in surveys abroad or provide socially desirable answers. Therefore, the assumption that all Russians who left the country oppose the war is a generalization based on the available data.

However, the data from surveys of emigrants differ significantly from the results of polls conducted within Russia by domestic research institutions. For example, according to Levada Center surveys, 76% of Russians trust the Russian government and president, while VCIOM reports that 68% support Russia’s decision to conduct the special military operation in Ukraine.^[18]

At the same time, it is not possible to state unequivocally that the divide between those who left and those who remained - that is, between opponents and supporters of the current government - is limited solely to the issue of the war. Within Russia, the declared “support for the war” is complex and nuanced. The independent sociological project “Chronicles” seeks to distinguish genuine supporters of the war from those who express support out of fear of prosecution or social pressure. “Chronicles” asks respondents a series of questions about the actions of the Russian military in Ukraine to differentiate between “consistent supporters of the war” and “consistent opponents.” “Consistent supporters” not only endorse the war but also oppose withdrawing troops without achieving its stated goals and believe that military spending should be prioritized in the national budget. In 2024, they made up 17% of respondents. “Consistent opponents,” by contrast, do not support the war, agree that a withdrawal should be possible regardless of the outcome, and believe that social issues should take priority in the national budget. According to the researchers, 19% of surveyed Russians fall into this category. Additionally, the number of people arrested at protests,[19] along with the presence of anonymous street art, shows that there are still citizens within Russia who oppose the war.

It turns out that around 60% of Russians hold an intermediate position. For example, some may express support for the war while also being open to the idea of withdrawing troops “without achieving the goals.” Conversely, others may oppose the war in principle but believe that, since it has already begun, it should conclude with a Russian “victory.”

Thus, it is not possible to make definitive statements about the relationship between emigrants and those who remained, or about the attitudes of opponents versus supporters of the war, or supporters of the current government. Russian society is not homogeneous; it includes both pro-government groups, which might appear more prominent from the outside, and oppositionists who prefer to remain discreet due to the risk of criminal prosecution. At the same time, in surveys, the majority may express a contradictory stance, indicating that they are “neither for nor against,” a position that might shift in personal interactions. To some extent, there is likely also heterogeneity among emigrants, a group that is even more challenging to study.

Therefore, when discussing how emigration has influenced the polarization of Russian society both within Russia and abroad, it is important to consider at least three groups of Russians remaining in the country and their attitudes towards the war. These are the “supporters,” the “opponents,” and the majority, which we can conditionally refer to as the “conformists.”

But, in general, should emigrants be considered part of Russian society when discussing polarization?

Russian emigration after 2022 has several distinctive characteristics. Following the outbreak of full-scale war, many people left the country spontaneously, without specific goals in mind. Most emigrants believed they would return to Russia soon. Some also continued maintaining economic ties with the country, such as through passive income or remote work.^[20] These emigrants stay engaged with Russian affairs and, in some cases, participate in the life of the country by supporting Russian public organizations. Additionally, some emigrants visit Russia and effectively live between the two countries. As a result, their connections with Russian society remain fairly strong, even if they may not consider themselves part of it. According to the Outrush survey, when asked “Which society do you consider yourself a part of?” only 14% of respondents identified as “part of Russia”.^[21]

Thus, emigrants and those who remain in Russia are generally quite different from each other. However, Russian society within the country is also heterogeneous. Due to the unique nature of emigration, those who left still maintain relationships with citizens who remain in Russia, many of whom hold differing views on the war.

“Those Who Left” and “Those Who Stayed”  - a Debate in the Media

Before we begin discussing the relationship between emigrants and Russians who remained in the country, it is worth noting that this relationship has significantly influenced the ongoing discourse about emigration in the media. The phrase “those who left and those who stayed” has echoed repeatedly in the Russian language for nearly three years and typically refers to the ongoing - and often fruitless - debate between anti-war Russians living abroad and those still in Russia.

This debate is actively fueled and covered by the media - both by state propaganda and independent Russian-language outlets, most of which now operate from abroad. Russians on both sides of the country’s borders have likely read or heard about the discourse surrounding “those who left” and “those who stayed” far more often than they have taken part in such discussions themselves.

Propaganda media, as a rule, focus exclusively on “those who left”. Journalists condemn emigrants and echo the Russian government’s position that anyone who has left the country is a “traitor”. In addition to official statements, coverage of emigration often centers on the hardships faced by Russian emigrants - stories that are frequently fabricated or heavily exaggerated.

Independent media, on the other hand, publish articles about “those who remained”, exploring the roots of the divide between the two groups and how relationships can be rebuilt (among people who share the same stance on the most fundamental issue: the war^[22]).  

The tension between “those who left” and “those who stayed” is vividly captured in two articles by renowned Russian journalist and literary critic Anna Narinskaya. In July 2022, the project “Help Service” - founded by Russians to support the peaceful Ukrainian population - published Narinskaya’s article titled “It’s Embarrassing to Talk About Bucha in a Shrimp Line”. In this piece, Narinskaya portrays the luxurious, carefree life in Moscow, a city that “celebrates summer” and goes out of its way to ignore the war. She wrote the article for an audience that had left Russia, stating: “Moscow today is a city where a play about normal life is being staged”.

Two years later, Narinskaya - by then living permanently in Germany - published another article on the same topic, this time on the Deutsche Welle website, titled “50 Shades of Silence in Putin’s Russia.” She urges readers to remember those in Russia who exercise their right to remain silent: “In Russia, speaking out against the war is indeed dangerous, but it is still possible to remain silent. You can still do it - not to speak out. You can still do it - to be silent and to resist. I think it is important to listen to this silence”. This piece represents a clear attempt to ease tensions and bring opposing perspectives closer together. Narinskaya acknowledges that the illusion of “normal life” in Russia is not solely the result of indifference; it also stems from fear. Moreover, normal life also means a life where there is no overt support for the war - which in a country at war can also be an act of resistance.

Another example of media-driven polarization is the book “I Wish Ashes for My House” by Russian feminist and co-founder of the “Feminist Anti-War Resistance” Daria Serenko. The book quickly gained popularity abroad and among Russian emigrants, but within Russia, the stance implied by the title is unsettling - even for many who oppose the war. For instance, feminist and cultural sociologist Bella Rapoport has frequently criticized Serenko’s book. In her blog, Rapoport highlights what she sees as the indifference - and even cruelty - of the left toward fellow citizens who are not responsible for the war, do not support it, but either did not want to or could not emigrate for various reasons. In this discourse, the “people who left” are often portrayed as persons who were privileged even before emigration or who gained privileges abroad by publicly renouncing their Russian identity and past. As a result, they are increasingly disconnected from the experiences of those who remain. The attitudes of some in the “left” camp have become so extreme that Russia is derogatorily referred to as “Orcostan,” and those who stayed behind are labeled “orcs,” “those, who do not deserve sympathy”, etc.

The media tends to portray the relationship between the “left” and the “remainers” as conflicting. At its core, this is framed as a confrontation between Russians who are against the war and seek both normal life and certain privileges, yet find themselves in a position where they feel unable to speak openly about the war or Russia.

Disagreements and Relationship Maintenance Strategies

It is difficult to speak definitively about how emigrants and those who remain in Russia interact, or to what extent emigration exacerbates polarization in personal relationships. Over the past two years, I have been conducting interviews for my journalistic projects, and from time to time, the question of how Russians maintain relationships with relatives and friends who have opposing views on the war and Russia has come up. I have supplemented the collected material with short online interviews that I conducted using the “snowball” method.^[23] The opinions presented below cannot be considered representative or exhaustive, and it is important to note that positions can, and likely will, evolve over time.

1. Emigrants and War Supporters

As mentioned earlier, most Russians who left the country after the outbreak of full-scale war claim they did so because they opposed the war and the actions of the Russian government. However, pro-government emigrants may not always openly express their views or may choose not to participate in surveys about emigration. For instance, individuals who support the Russian government might claim they left the country temporarily for work, planning to return to Russia eventually, and thus might not consider themselves part of the emigration discourse. As a result, the primary challenge in maintaining relationships and connections often lies in their differing views on the war in Ukraine.

“I deleted a few acquaintances from the very beginning, closed accounts just in case, and started dividing them into my friends and others” (33-year-old male, United Arab Emirates - Moscow)

Different opinions about the war often serve as an indicator of a broader distance or gap in relationships. Sometimes, this may be perceived as a confrontation over the war, while other times it may indicate that things were not as they should have been with members of the opposite “camp” from the beginning. They were not “close” before either, their opinions differed on other issues as well, but the war became the “last straw”.

“I hardly communicate with my relatives, so it’s hard for me to say what their opinions are, but I still feel that they are pro-Putinist - although we don’t talk about it”. (29-year-old female, Georgia)

“To hell with those acquaintances and relatives I don’t like. I don’t want to waste my time on such people at all”. (28-year-old female, Georgia)

When interacting with “war supporters”, respondents may consider several options:

• Avoid discussing “difficult topics”, such as the war, political news, and sometimes even emigration;
• Attempt to change the other person’s stance;
• Cut off the relationship.

Respondents choose one strategy or another based on how close and important the relationship is to them and how much they want to preserve it.

Avoidance: When interacting with their closest individuals, they typically try to avoid discussing the war and Russian politics to prevent arguments and preserve the relationship. This approach is especially common with relatives, particularly the elderly.

“Sometimes we think that it is important for us to maintain relationships and try to understand each other, rather than quarreling over nothing”. (29-year-old female, Georgia)

“In principle, it is difficult to force yourself to even talk to your dear grandparents. That is why I rarely call them by video call. But it is important that they, despite completely different political opinions, support us, understand us, and feel for us”. (28-year-old female, Georgia)

“Of course, I maintain relationships with family members and relatives. Some things are more important than political positions. Will we have a different mother and a different father? We decided that we will simply not touch on these issues, because our opinions are opposite”. (46-year-old female, Italy)

“If we are talking about relatives who are already elderly, I would advise you not to destroy this purple world of “unicorns”. I think that people over 80 who believe in Putin can be killed by this. It seems to me that there is absolutely nothing we can do about it. When a person reaches that age, they just have to accepted as they are. Let them float in their vacuum bubble, as long as they live”. (45-year-old female, Turkey)

The decision to avoid discussing the war and politics can also be made by the other party. In such cases, respondents have found that they must either accept this situation or choose to end the relationship.

“Some people said: Well, how? Not everything is clear. Everyone is manipulating us, and you too have been turned into a zombie by European propaganda. Everything is clear. Come on, let's not touch this”. (46-year-old female, Italy)

Attempts to influence: Sometimes, the fact that a loved one supports the war can feel like a loss and a rupture in the relationship. For this reason, some respondents try to persuade relatives who support the war and “bring them over to their side”.  

“My sister [...] at the beginning of the war started talking about her perceptions using phrases she heard on TV. I told her: stop, you are repeating phrases from TV [...] I was lucky because she could listen and was ready to hear new opinions. I waged a war with TV for my sister for two months. I fought for two months to the last drop of my blood, because I realized deep down that I could not give in. I just could not give in. She is a very close, very important person to me. We talked for hours”. (45-year-old female, Turkey)

“Then we discussed these stories with several people (including relatives), it did not always go well, but we were on equal terms. Over time, positions slowly change and become closer. During the discussions, we tried to find common ground”. (33-year-old male, United Arab Emirates - Moscow)

“We often discuss issues we disagree on, and sometimes they change their minds”. (29-year-old female, Georgia)

Discordance: Sometimes, people choose to end a relationship entirely or significantly minimize contact. They justify this by saying the relationship was not close or meaningful to begin with, or that they can no longer communicate with someone they no longer understand. Emigration can serve as both a reason to sever ties and an opportunity to let go of uncomfortable or unnecessary relationships.

“I cut off contact with people who don’t share my views. It felt like those relationships were forced even when I lived in Russia - family friends, my father, whom I haven’t lived with in years, and my grandmother, whom I never really visited”. (28-year-old female, Serbia)

“I cut off or minimized contact [with those who supported this]”. (24-year-old female, Georgia)

“I drastically reduce my interactions with people who, in my opinion, don’t fundamentally share my views on the war and politics. Even in emigration, nothing has changed. The distance made it easier to avoid them”. (37-year-old male, Georgia)

“I still have some contact with my friend. I don’t understand how this is possible. It’s hard for me to interact with people who support the war - who are part of this, who are involved in these mass killings and everything else... It’s impossible to interact. Just impossible”. (45-year-old female, Turkey)

In some cases, respondents mention that they haven’t experienced any problems or difficulties because of their stance on the war. However, this tends to be the exception rather than the rule - a specific situation that requires further explanation.

“I didn’t judge these people from the beginning. The fact that our opinions differ doesn’t take away their humanity or make them evil or criminal. That’s why I treat them like I would treat anyone else”. (31-year-old male, Armenia)

“My Orthodox faith helps me treat everyone with respect - not just those who agree with me, but also those who don’t”. (31-year-old male, Armenia)

Thus, maintaining relationships between those who “left” and those who “remained” depends more on the closeness of the relationship than on differing views about the war. If respondents feel the relationship is important, they tend to preserve it - either by avoiding difficult topics and focusing on shared ground or by attempting to change the other person’s perspective. Relationships tend to end when it becomes clear that they were never especially meaningful, or are no longer seen as worth maintaining.

2. Emigrants and War Opponents

Emigrants generally do not face difficulties maintaining contact with those who also oppose the war. However, for both some of the “remainers” and the “leavers”, the act of emigration itself can become a sensitive issue. Staying behind may be seen as a choice to preserve one’s familiar lifestyle and comfort, to avoid taking risks, and, at the same time, to willingly accept the restrictions imposed by the Russian authorities. On the other hand, emigrants can be viewed as more privileged individuals who either give up their privileges or make what is perceived as a morally “correct” choice. This perceived sense of “moral superiority” can be frustrating not only to those who remain in Russia but even to some fellow emigrants.

“They [the friends who stayed] seem to share anti-war and other similar views, but they still emotionally distance themselves from those who left. In conversation, they often try - maybe for our sake, maybe for their own - to justify that staying was the right decision. [...] Their businesses are doing well, and maybe they’re trying to cover that up, but there's a certain aggression underneath. [...] It’s like they’re saying, “Look, we’re not doing badly here. Things are fine, life is good, there are cool people around”, and they try to convince us why staying is good - even though we’ve never claimed it’s bad. Of course, there are good things there too”. (28-year-old female, Serbia)

“The fact of leaving initially gave people a kind of unspoken indulgence. But those who left are very different from one another. It’s not the relocators in general who deserve more sympathy and understanding, but those who left in a rush faced real hardship and tried to adapt. For many, it was just an opportunity to try living abroad - these people were prepared, and their quality of life improved. But going back to the main point: everyone who left began to respect themselves for making that “move”, even though in many cases, it wasn’t particularly brave. More often, it was simply a choice for a better life”. (33-year-old male, United Arab Emirates – Moscow)

Emigrants, because of their radical stance, may be seen as unacceptable not only in personal interactions but also on social media.

“Some of my friends ended our relationship, which felt a bit strange to me because I’m not the kind of person who shares links of FBK (the Anti-Corruption Foundation) [24] or tries to persuade anyone. I always thought our friendship wasn’t based on politics - I never brought political discussions into it. But they must have read my social media, drawing their conclusions, and decided it was better to cut ties”. (46-year-old male, Italy)

“Those who stayed behind ended up earning more respect and sympathy. Whether they could leave or not didn’t matter - they chose to stay”. (33-year-old male, United Arab Emirates -Moscow)

“Some among the emigrants became fierce critics of everything connected to their homeland”. (31-year-old male, Armenia)

However, overall, respondents emphasized efforts to maintain relationships with like-minded individuals in Russia - there were no accounts in the interviews of people ending relationships because of someone’s decision to emigrate or actively trying to influence one another’s choices.

“[Relationships with people who share my views] haven’t changed - they were and still are close to me. I just really miss them”. (32-year-old male, United Arab Emirates).

“If you don’t put effort into maintaining relationships, they can grow distant. In emigration, it’s especially hard to form deep connections”. (28-year-old female, United Kingdom).

“I often try to show them support and understanding. For example, if they can’t leave Russia, I invite them to visit me, explaining that I can’t risk going back, even as a guest - it’s too dangerous”. (28-year-old female, Serbia).

In addition, natural factors related to the transition itself can hinder relationships with “opponents of the war” - shared interests and common concerns tend to diminish over time.  

“It has decreased because we no longer deal with the same issues. A new circle of acquaintances has formed”. (37-year-old male, Georgia)

“We still share more in common with those who left when it comes to migrant-related issues, whereas maintaining relationships with those who stayed has become genuinely difficult”. (28-year-old female, Serbia)

In some cases, maintaining relationships with emigrants who openly express their anti-war stance can pose a risk for those remaining in Russia.

“With the rest of us, who share my views, our relationship has either become closer or we no longer interact at all, to avoid putting people in danger. It depends on their courage”. (39-year-old female, Georgia)

It turns out that the relationship between emigrants and war opponents in Russia has also become complicated. First and foremost, the decision to either “leave or stay” has turned into a contentious issue, with both sides feeling the need to justify their choices. Additionally, while the decision to leave may seem like a privilege from the outside, those who have emigrated often present it as a sacrifice. Lastly, over time, relationships may cool due to differing experiences, as shared themes and interests diminish, and new social circles emerge.

Based on the results of the surveys I mentioned earlier, another group of Russians remaining in the country can be categorized as “conformists”. According to the “Chronicles” research, the majority in Russia are those who hold a conditionally neutral position.^[25] Despite this, I believe it is important to consider the relationship between emigrants and this group. However, it is noteworthy that almost no one mentioned the “conformists” in the interviews conducted for this research.

 “Some people have fallen into apathy - and it’s better not to raise this issue with them at all”. (33-year-old male, United Arab Emirates - Moscow)

Perhaps the respondents do not mention the “conformists” who remain in Russia because they are their relatives or acquaintances, and they decide, based on their interpretation of vague positions, which specific “camp” to place them in. In personal relationships, this position might not appear as compromising or vague as it does in these surveys. However, this aspect still warrants further careful study.

Resources for Maintaining Relationships in Emigration

How do emigrants and their relatives communicate in Russia? Connections between emigrants and those who remain in Russia are not lost thanks to the internet and social networks. However, as a result, the relationship can become more impersonal and “collective” (for example, instead of discussing life events, people post “stories” for friends or send photos and updates in group chats or channels).

“If we are not on social media, we will completely lose these social connections”. (28-year-old female, Georgia)

“News, social media, and checking in from time to time keep us connected. Also, being in a common context”. (33-year-old male, United Arab Emirates - Moscow)

“Personal meetings have been replaced by calls on Telegram and Zoom. We see my parents once a year - in 2023 I had to go to the Russian Federation for a short time, in 2024 we met in a third country. It is very difficult and scary to realize how little time we spend together”. (28-year-old female, Great Britain)

“In order not to tell everyone the same stories about my son, I created a channel for my relatives and share photos, videos, and stories there. There I write very briefly about what happened, where we were, etc. And this helps me a little because I can’t tell everyone in order. That way, everyone will see the video from one source, so everyone will somehow understand how we live and what I do”. (28-year-old female, Serbia)

However, respondents also note that these relationships are sometimes perceived as work, requiring effort and energy that they often lack. In addition, some have already observed that relationships with those who remain in Russia may not last long, as online communication cannot replace in-person meetings, which they no longer expect to have.

“It’s hard to stay connected with someone who doesn’t plan to leave. Maybe because emotional resources are already limited, and over time, people I’ll probably never see again are no longer a priority”. (28-year-old female, Georgia)

“I can’t even say that this is a relationship. It’s already a kind of conditionality”. (28-year-old female, Serbia)

All respondents to this study mentioned social networks as a means of maintaining relationships with people who remained in Russia. However, this is likely the necessary and technical aspect of the issue. The question of why these relationships should be maintained and what will unite Russians who remain on different sides of the border is a much more complex matter, requiring in-depth research and analysis. Moreover, a longer experience of emigration and separation might provide it even greater relevance over time.

Conclusion

Since Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, thousands of citizens have left the country. It can be assumed that the majority of these emigrants opposed the war and the current Russian government. The first to leave were members of the opposition minority, and emigration has become a clear reflection of the polarization already present within society.

It is possible to discuss whether emigration contributes to the polarization of Russian society only if we first address the question of whether emigrants should still be considered part of Russian society. Typically, Russians who leave the country do not sever all ties with their homeland. Most maintain relationships with relatives in Russia, some travel back occasionally, and many remain economically connected to the country. Emigrants continue to follow Russian news and often express their views about it on social media. Therefore, to some extent, emigration can still be seen as a part of Russian society, and emigrants themselves may perceive and be perceived as such within the country.

If we examine the relations between those who left and those who remained through the lens of media publications and social networks, it may seem that emigration has sparked significant controversy, even among Russians who share anti-war positions, both inside Russia and abroad.

However, not all emigrants feel a profound sense of alienation in their relationships with those who “remain” in Russia. Relationships are typically only severed when there wasn't a strong bond before emigration. In other cases, emigrants and residents of Russia try to maintain their relationship by either avoiding “difficult” topics or attempting to convince each other.

Maintaining relationships is becoming increasingly difficult, not only due to the polarization caused by the war but also because people find themselves on different sides of the border and in different contexts. As a result, common ground is lost, and new connections and interests emerge. Surveys of Russians in emigration indicate that, over time, they are distancing themselves from Russia - no longer seeing themselves as “part of Russia,” rarely visiting, and refusing to engage in work in Russia.^[26] Some participants also mention that those who remain in Russia are distancing themselves over time, maintaining contact only through social networks. Respondents describe their situation as “emigration” (except for those who visit Russia frequently and see their lifestyle as “semi-emigrant”), feeling separated from Russia but not identifying with their host country. This suggests that, over time, Russian emigration may further lose its connection with Russia and Russian society, making discussions of it in the context of polarization increasingly irrelevant.

It is difficult to predict how relationships will evolve in the future. Some argue that maintaining ties with those who remained in Russia seems “pointless” since they have no intention of returning. Others, however, believe that, with time, relationships will normalize and “enter a calmer phase”. Emigrants may be interested in both those who stayed but opposed the war, as well as those who supported it. However, plans are not clearly outlined in the emigrants’ narratives, as much depends on the outcome of the war and when it will end.