Introduction

In November 2024, the political confrontation between the de facto government and the opposition in Sokhumi reached its peak. Ultimately, this led to the resignation of Aslan Bzhania, and de facto early presidential elections were scheduled for February 15, 2025.

This text seeks to familiarize readers with key aspects essential for understanding the Abkhazian de facto presidential elections. It covers the current political landscape in Abkhazia, the candidates running for office, significant moments from their political backgrounds, their stances on crucial issues, and the overall pre-election environment. To achieve this, an analysis was conducted using Georgian, Russian, and Abkhazian online and social media sources, as well as television channels.

For the past two decades, power transitions in Abkhazia have been marked by protests and internal political tensions. This pattern first emerged in 2004, when Abkhazia’s first de facto President and a key political figure, Vladislav Ardzinba, was forced to retire due to deteriorating health. In the 2004 de facto elections, his administration was represented by Prime Minister Raul Khajimba, but in a surprising turn of events, Sergi Bagapsh, chairman of “Chernomorenergo”, won in the first round. The result was confirmed by the Central Election Commission, yet Khajimba’s supporters demanded a second round, bringing the situation to the brink of armed confrontation. Ultimately, under pressure and mediation from Russia, Bagapsh would run as the presidential candidate in the re-election scheduled for January 12, 2005, with Khajimba as his vice-presidential candidate. This temporarily eased tensions. In the 2009 elections, Bagapsh faced Khajimba again, securing a clear victory this time. An early election was called in August 2011 following Bagapsh’s death in May of that year. Three main candidates competed, but Alexander Ankvab defeated both Sergei Shamba and Raul Khajimba. In May 2014, another political crisis erupted, this time against Ankvab’s rule. The opposition sought to reduce presidential powers and transition to a more parliamentary system, as frustration had been growing over Ankvab’s centralized leadership. Following widespread protests, Ankvab resigned, and Raul Khajimba won the subsequent early elections.

Aslan Bzhania’s presidency in Abkhazia initially carried high hopes. The political crisis that erupted in the fall of 2019 over the results of the de facto presidential elections ultimately led to the resignation of de facto President Raul Khajimba. In the March 2020 de facto presidential elections, Bzhania decisively defeated his main rival, Adgur Ardzinba [a member of Khajimba’s team]. His position was further strengthened in the March 2022 de facto parliamentary elections, where he secured the full backing of the legislative body. Bzhania’s authority was built on alliances with several key political forces - most notably “Amtsakhara”[i] and former de facto President Alexander Ankvab,[ii] whom he appointed de facto Prime Minister, entrusting him with economic affairs. Additionally, Sergey Shamba[iii] lent political weight to Bzhania’s administration as the de facto Head of the Security Council. The previous administration under Raul Khajimba faced widespread criticism for inefficiency, corruption, and the region’s severe socio-economic problems. It was precisely on the promise of addressing these internal challenges that Bzhania came to power. However, as events unfolded, a new source of opposition emerged - not from internal governance failures, but from the growing process of Abkhazia’s integration with Russia.

The political crisis of 2024 stands apart from previous cases in a key way. The crises of 2004-2019 were rooted in internal Abkhazian politics. None of the leaders who emerged after Vladislav Ardzinba commanded the same level of authority, leading to the rise of multiple politicians with relatively equal influence on the Abkhazian political scene. Moreover, after 2008, no major national event occurred that could have rallied broad public support behind an incumbent leader. In this landscape, economic, social, and law enforcement issues became the dominant concerns. As history has shown, no leader or administration was able to effectively address these challenges. Corruption, inaction, mismanagement, and the region’s socio-economic decline were persistent problems across all de facto governments. Against this backdrop of an ongoing but latent crisis, even isolated incidents had the potential to trigger larger upheavals. A notable example of this dynamic was the 2019 crisis, which was not driven primarily by the de facto presidential election results but rather by a high-profile murder in Sokhumi in November of that year and allegations of involvement by individuals close to Raul Khajimba. The failure and inefficiency of law enforcement agencies in handling the case became the key catalyst for the escalation of protests, which aligned with the naturally existing opposition sentiment.

Abkhazia’s Political Crisis

In his first year as de facto President, Bzhania continued negotiations with Russia on agreements initiated during Khajimba’s tenure. In November 2020, during a meeting with Bzhania in Sochi, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed an action program aimed at establishing a unified social and economic space between Abkhazia and Russia. This initiative was based on the 2014 Russia-Abkhazia Agreement on Allied and Strategic Partnership. The strategic document, adopted in November 2014, is crucial for understanding subsequent developments, as it was the first to outline objectives such as the integration of social, economic, and military spheres. The harmonization action program adopted in November 2020 detailed specific steps in areas including the economy, finance, customs, energy, and social policy.

The first concerns regarding the details of the program emerged in September 2020, a month before the Putin-Bzhania meeting. In a document dated July 2020, de facto Prime Minister Ankvab wrote to Aleksey Filatov,[iv] noting that Russia’s proposed program required additional agreements on key issues. These included attracting foreign investment for the modernization of Abkhazia’s energy system, real estate management, and aligning Abkhazian legislation with Russian laws on non-profit organizations and foreign agents. Russia also issued specific recommendations. For instance, regarding the energy sector, the Russian Foreign Ministry suggested altering the legal status of Abkhazia’s energy infrastructure, as its privatization was not permitted under existing regulations. On private property, Russia recommended amending Abkhazian law to allow Russian citizens to purchase real estate. Additionally, Abkhazian legislation on non-profit organizations and foreign agents was advised to be brought in line with Russian regulations. These recommendations from the Russian side were fully incorporated into the program, which was signed and approved bilaterally in November. Later, these recommendations became the basis for the initiation of controversial draft laws, including those on apartments, civil society organizations, and foreign agents, among others, which triggered waves of protests in Abkhazia.

In August 2024, Russian Deputy Minister of Economic Development Dmitry Volvach and Abkhazia’s de facto Minister of Economy Kristina Ozgan announced that the majority of the harmonization program had been completed, with full implementation expected by 2025. Volvach also stated that, as of 2024, Russian investors were carrying out Russian investment projects in Abkhazia totaling 17 billion rubles [≈ 180 million USD].  

However, as of February 2025, three key agreements have yet to be implemented. These include the following draft laws:

Status of Apartments

The legislation governing real estate transactions in Abkhazia is specific. Following the 1992–93 war, tens of thousands of Georgians, Russians, and Greeks fled the region due to ethnic cleansing and hostilities. Much of their private property remains abandoned to this day, while some have been unlawfully occupied by private individuals without a proper legal basis. In the 1990s, Abkhazia’s Civil Code introduced a provision granting the right to own residential houses and apartments exclusively to Abkhazian citizens. This law was shaped by the region’s political realities, primarily aiming to block legal avenues for Georgians to return. However, with increasing integration into the Russian space, Russian citizens began pushing for the right to own property in Abkhazia. Meanwhile, foreign citizens face no restrictions on purchasing commercial property. A Russian citizen, for instance, can buy or construct a hotel, factory, office, or farm in Abkhazia. However, the land beneath these structures remains state property and cannot be transferred to a foreign owner.

For years, the lack of a cadastral database in Abkhazia has been a persistent issue. Work on its development began as early as 2012. By the end of 2024, the legislative process was nearly complete - on November 28, 2024, the de facto Parliament adopted the Law on the Cadastre of Real Estate. However, it remains unclear how long it will take to physically compile the cadastre. 

Discussions about the need for legislative changes in Abkhazia began in 2014 when the de facto President, Alexander Ankvab, raised the issue. The economic collapse, deteriorating infrastructure, and need for investment signaled to the de facto leadership at the time that legal reforms and the removal of certain restrictions were necessary. However, in May of that year, Ankvab was removed from office, and Raul Khajimba took over the presidency, leading to the postponement of discussions on private property rights. It was only after the return to power of the Bzhania-Ankvab administration that the debate and legislative process regarding the status of apartments were revived.

Under the new initiative, foreign investors were permitted to finance the construction of hotels in Abkhazia and sell individual rooms as non-residential premises under private ownership. Thus, the initiative is not about lifting the ban on property ownership for foreign citizens but rather about bypassing this law. In July 2023, Aslan Bzhania introduced a draft law in de facto Parliament aimed at regulating the legal status of apartments. The proposed legislation would have allowed foreign individuals to purchase apartments, eliminating the requirement for Abkhazian citizenship in such transactions. However, during parliamentary discussions, the draft law was rejected. The opposition, while not entirely dismissing the initiative, called for reducing the planned number of apartments from 30 000 to 21 000 and additionally suggested focusing construction efforts on specific regions of Abkhazia rather than limiting development to the tourist-heavy Sokhumi-Gagra area. Taking these concerns into account, Bzhania revised the proposal and resubmitted it under a new title: the Draft Law on Measures to Increase the Socio-Economic Development of Ochamchire, Tkvarcheli, and Gali Districts. This renewed effort triggered a major political backlash. Veterans, civil society representatives, activists, and opposition forces strongly opposed the bill. Amid growing protests, the formal initiators MPs [Rezo Zantaria, Germane Kacharava, Aslan Akaba, and Beslan Emurkhba] ultimately withdrew the proposal. To ease tensions, even the de facto Speaker of the Parliament issued a statement on the matter. Bzhania’s second attempt to pass the law failed. As it turned out, this was his last attempt on the matter.

Investment Agreement

Another source of internal political conflict in Abkhazia is the investment agreement between Abkhazia and Russia. This agreement is also part of the 2020 “Harmonization Program”, which initially set 2023 as the deadline for its adoption. However, the process was delayed until the fall of 2024. The finalized text of the agreement, drafted through consultations between both parties, was published on August 31, 2024. The main point of contention for the Abkhazian side was Article 5, which outlined Abkhazia’s obligations. According to the agreement, the investor [a legal entity] would receive ownership of both the land plot and any buildings constructed on it. Additionally, the investor was granted the authority to set workforce quotas independently, enjoy exemptions from customs duties on imported construction materials, and receive an eight-year exemption from property and profit taxes. Furthermore, the agreement allowed the investor to transfer ownership of both the property and the land to a third party. The agreement was signed on October 30, 2024, in Moscow by Russia’s Minister of Economic Development, Maxim Reshetnikov, and Abkhazia’s de facto Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Economy, Kristina Ozgan. However, its ratification required approval from Abkhazia’s de facto Parliament, sparking protests in Sokhumi.  

Before ratification, on November 11, 2024, Bzhania signed the Constitutional Law on Multifunctional Complexes, which had been approved by the de facto Parliament just a few hours earlier. The law clarified that a multifunctional complex is not classified as a residential building and may include facilities serving various purposes, such as offices, retail spaces, sports centers, exhibition halls, educational institutions, and other non-residential uses. Apartments and aparthotels were explicitly excluded from such complexes. Additionally, the law prohibited the conversion of multifunctional complexes into residential buildings, as well as the transformation of residential buildings into multifunctional complexes.

A parliamentary session was scheduled for November 15, 2024, to ratify the investment agreement. However, protests erupted outside the Parliament building as early as November 11. By the appointed day, November 15, demonstrators demanded the cancellation of the agreement. Amid escalating tensions, negotiations, and continued protests, Bzhania ultimately agreed to revoke the agreement. However, after demonstrators stormed and occupied both the Parliament and Government buildings, Bzhania was forced to leave Sokhumi and later resigned. On December 3, 2024, the de facto Parliament formally annulled the investment agreement with Moscow.

Law on Foreign Agents

The 2020 Harmonization Program with Russian legislation also included aligning the legal framework for non-profit organizations and foreign agents [Paragraph 37]. Between 2021 and 2024, the issue of foreign agents was overseen by de facto Minister of Foreign Affairs, Inal Ardzinba. He played a leading role in pushing for the adoption of the law, actively advocating for it while simultaneously making controversial and publicly critical statements about both international organizations and the local civil sector. Ardzinba frequently and demonstratively criticized international organizations, targeting USAID in particular. He also blocked the EU Special Representative for Georgia and the South Caucasus from entering Abkhazia.

On February 7, 2024, Bzhania submitted the draft law to the de facto Parliament. However, due to public protests and the ongoing political crisis on other issues, the draft law has not yet been adopted. It is worth noting that this legislation remains part of the 2020 Harmonization Program, and the Abkhaz authorities have extended the deadline for its implementation.

The November 2024 protests in Abkhazia were not solely a reaction to the proposed draft laws; rather, they reflected broader, longstanding frustrations within society. This was not the first instance of the de facto Government facing upheaval amid public unrest. Distrust toward political elites has been a persistent feature of Abkhazian society, largely due to their perceived inability to address internal social and economic issues effectively. This may stem from Abkhazia’s limited political resources too. Vladislav Ardzinba was the only leader whose legitimacy was not questioned - its roots lie in the 1992-93 war and its national-scale impact. Since Ardzinba’s rule, every transition of de facto leadership has been accompanied by internal tensions, a pattern that has endured for nearly two decades. Within this broader climate of skepticism and criticism, any unpopular decision further weakens the position of the de facto president. For Aslan Bzhania, the so-called Bichvinta country houses issue became a major point of contention. It was the first matter that sparked public outcry, with the younger generation at the forefront of the protests. However, beyond this specific issue, Abkhazian society is increasingly confronting the consequences of its struggle for “independence”. While it successfully distanced itself from Tbilisi’s influence, the cost has been deep integration into Russia’s sphere, making any attempt at reversing this trajectory seem nearly impossible. The degree of subordination to Russia frequently triggers waves of protest, as each new manifestation of this dependency reignites public discontent. Yet, given the ongoing political deadlock, they have little room for maneuver. With no clear alternatives, public frustration inevitably targets the local de facto government. Thus, while dissatisfaction with Bzhania was partially fueled by his actions, the underlying issue lies in the broader stagnation of Abkhazian politics.

In summary, the political crisis in Abkhazia has primarily revolved around the three proposed draft laws. As de facto presidential elections approach, candidates must prioritize addressing this issue. However, before examining their positions on the matter, it is essential to first review the candidates themselves, their political teams, and their past activities.

Candidates

The de facto Central Election Commission of Abkhazia has registered five candidates for the de facto presidential elections.

Badra Gunba and Beslan Bigvava

Gunba and Bigvava are considered the so-called government candidates, backed by “Amtsakhara”, Aslan Bzhania, Aleksander Ankvab, and “Aitaira”. This political bloc - particularly “Amtsakhara” and Ankvab - has been in opposition to the so-called Ardzinba clan for nearly two decades and is regarded as its main alternative. Gunba’s candidacy represents the last opportunity for these forces to retain power.

Badra Gunba was born in Sokhumi on August 14, 1981. He graduated from Saratov State University in 2003 with a degree in accounting and subsequently worked in the administrative service in Saratov from 2003 to 2007. His political career in Abkhazia began in 2007 when he was appointed as a referent on human rights issues for the de facto Abkhazian Government. From 2009 to 2011, Gunba served as Deputy Minister of Culture under Presidents Sergey Bagapsh and Alexander Ankvab, with Nugzar Logua as Minister of Culture. He later held the position of Minister of Culture from 2011 to 2014 during Ankvab’s presidency. Following Ankvab’s resignation, Gunba transitioned into business while also joining the political party “Aitaira” [Revival], which was co-founded by Ankvab in 2003.[v]

During the 2019–2020 crisis, “Aitaira” and “Amtsakhara” were in opposition to Raul Khajimba. In the 2019 presidential elections, the opposition candidate was Alkhas Kvitsinia, but Khajimba’s controversial victory and refusal to participate in a second round led to a political crisis, ultimately resulting in his resignation. For the elections scheduled in February 2020, the opposition united behind Aslan Bzhania as their joint candidate, while “Amtsakhara” and “Aitaira” nominated Badra Gunba, a member of Aitaira’s political council, as the vice-presidential candidate. As previously mentioned, “Aitaira” leader Alexander Ankvab was appointed de facto Prime Minister, assuming responsibility for economic affairs. During the 2024 crisis, Aslan Bzhania agreed to his and Ankvab’s resignation. Valeri Bganba was appointed Prime Minister, while Vice President Badra Gunba assumed the role of Acting President. Subsequently, Gunba was put forward as the government’s joint candidate for the 2024 elections.

The vice-presidential candidate in the current elections is Beslan Bigvava, who was born in Tkvarcheli in 1971. After completing his education at School No. 4 in Ochamchire, he pursued higher studies at the Ivanovo State Academy of Agriculture in Russia before transferring to the East Ukrainian National University in Luhansk, Ukraine. He graduated in 1998 with a degree in mechanical engineering. Since 1999, Bigvava has been involved in business in Moscow. In 2021, he was appointed Governor of the Ochamchire District. His tenure was marred by controversy, particularly an incident in Sokhumi on January 1, 2022, when he used his pistol during a conflict at the “Garuda Hotel”, injuring two people. As a result, he was temporarily suspended from his position but was later reinstated as Governor of Ochamchire. Bigvava has not been particularly politically active regarding key issues such as apartments and other local challenges. However, in July 2024, during a meeting with the administration of the de facto President, he spoke about the need for increased investment. He is also considered part of Aslan Bzhania’s political circle.

Adgur Ardzinba and Alkhas Jinjal [Jinjolia]

Adgur Ardzinba is a member of the prominent Ardzinba clan, which is linked to Abkhazia’s first de facto President, Vladislav Ardzinba. During the 2000s, internal conflicts within the clan led to a series of violent incidents, including assassinations and reprisals, significantly weakening its influence. However, by the late 2010s, the clan had undergone a process of reunification, with Adgur Ardzinba playing a key role in this reconciliation, which greatly enhanced his authority within the group. Ardzinba’s political support base includes the Forum for the National Unity of Abkhazia, the “Apsny” party, the veterans’ organization “Aruaa”, the organization “Our Capital”, as well as Kan Kvarchia [chairman of the “Aidgylara” organization] and businessman Levan Mikava.

Adgur Ardzinba was born in Gudauta in 1982. He graduated from Kabardino-Balkarian State University in 2007 and later from Volgograd State Technical University in 2009. An economist by profession, he holds a Candidate of Economic Sciences degree. In 2013, he furthered his expertise in economics at the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration. In 2019, he expanded his academic qualifications by specializing in the history of economics at the London School of Economics and Political Science.

From 2011 to 2013, Adgur Ardzinba served as an advisor on economic issues to the Chairman of the Abkhazian Customs Committee. Between 2013 and 2015, he was the Head of the Unit of Foreign Economic Relations at the Ministry of Economy of Abkhazia. In February - April 2015, he briefly held the position of Head of the Economic Unit within the Administration of the President of Abkhazia. From April 2015 to December 2019, Ardzinba served as the Minister of Economy. Additionally, from April 2015 to April 2020, he held the dual role of Minister of Economy and Vice Prime Minister.

In the early presidential elections of March 2020, which were held following Raul Khajimba’s resignation, Adgur Ardzinba represented the former government team. Despite losing to Aslan Bzhania, his performance was notable given the circumstances. Despite the unpopularity of Khajimba’s administration and his forced resignation, Ardzinba still secured a significant share of the vote, with Bzhania winning 56% and Ardzinba receiving 35%.

After the elections, Adgur Ardzinba founded a new opposition organization, the Abkhaz People’s Movement. Its primary objectives were twofold: to consolidate and lead the opposition wing while actively opposing Aslan Bzhania. In both respects, Ardzinba proved to be highly effective. He played a key role in the protests from 2021 to 2024, repeatedly calling for Bzhania’s resignation. Notably, his political strategy has been characterized by his ability to build alliances. Throughout his opposition activities, Ardzinba and his organization consistently operated within a broader network of public groups and political parties. Following the political crisis of the fall of 2024, Ardzinba successfully established himself as the undisputed leader of the opposition. As a result, he emerged as the main opposition candidate in the upcoming elections.

The vice-presidential candidate, Alkhas Jinjali [Jinjolia], was born in Sokhumi in 1974. He obtained a medical degree from Kabardino-Balkarian State University and has worked as a surgeon at the Sokhumi City Hospital. From 2018 to 2022, he served as a deputy in the 6^th term of the de facto Parliament of Abkhazia. He has been an active opponent of Aslan Bzhania’s administration, particularly voicing strong opposition to the investment agreement and the laws on apartments.

Oleg Bartsits and Adgur Kakoba

The candidacy of Oleg Bartsits presents an interesting development in the upcoming de facto parliamentary elections. He lacks significant political weight and influence in Abkhazian politics. Critics argue that Bartsits serves as a “backup” strategy for Alexander Ankvab. According to this view, Bartsits is
“tasked” with diverting votes from Ardzinba in the upcoming de facto elections, preventing the opposition candidate from securing a first-round victory and giving the government more time to prepare for a second round. However, these assumptions only emerge in anonymous discussions on social media.

Oleg Bartsits was born in Gudauta in 1967. He studied at Lomonosov Moscow State University and later graduated from the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation in 1996. In 2005, he was appointed Head of the Abkhazian Government Representation in Russia, where he oversaw Russian investment policy. From 2010 to 2020, he served as Abkhazia’s Trade Representative in Russia. During the 2019 presidential elections, Bartsits ran for vice-president alongside presidential candidate Oleg Arshba. Their candidacy was backed by Alexander Ankvab, which led to Arshba being considered part of Ankvab’s political circle. Bartsits has taken a critical stance on controversial draft laws, particularly regarding investments and apartments and argued that they should better reflect Abkhazia’s interests. In his view, the agreements should not be rejected but renegotiated with Russia to secure more favorable terms. Additionally, he emphasized the need for greater public engagement to build support for these laws within Abkhazian society.

Adgur Kakoba was born in 1965 in the village of Atara, Ochamchire District. A philologist by education, he graduated from Abkhazian State University. He participated in the 1992–93 war and is a recipient of the Order of Leon. Until 2014, Kakoba worked in the education sector. From 2014 to 2020, he served as the Minister of Education of Abkhazia. However, he has not been known for active political engagement.

Adgur Khurkhumal and Tengiz Kutelia

Adgur Khurkhumal and Tengiz Kutelia were both nominated by an initiative group. The specific political groups behind their nominations remain unclear, and their overall influence on Abkhazian politics appears to be minimal.

Born in 1982 in Tkvarcheli, Adgur Khurkhumal received his education at Maykop State Technological University. He began his career in the business sector in 2002 and eventually joined Abkhazia’s Chernomorskiy Bank of Development, where he was appointed head in 2019.

Tengiz Kutelia, the vice-presidential candidate, was born in 1971 in the village of Tamishi, Ochamchire District. An agronomist by education, he studied at Stavropol State University. He took part in the 1992–93 conflict. According to his biography, his detachment was among the first to engage Georgian forces at the Okhurei checkpoint in August 1992, during which Kutelia was captured. Primarily having a military background, he also participated in the 2008 conflict in the Kodori area. In recent years, he has not distinguished himself through political activity.

Robert Arshba and Daut Agrba

Both candidates are viewed as outsiders, with many considering their participation merely a formality. The Arshba/Agrba team is not seen as a serious political force, and the “price” of such candidates typically rises in the second round when voters must choose between the two main contenders.

Robert Arshba was born in 1974 in Tkvarcheli and earned a degree in finance from Abkhazian State University. He worked in state institutions within the financial sector and led the Control Chamber at Abkhazia’s State Audit Office from 2013 to 2023. Daut Agrba, born in 1978 in Gagra, received his financial education at Abkhazian State University, furthering his studies in law and finance at Moscow State Open University and the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration. In recent years, he has served as a member of the Abkhaz People’s Council.

All candidates hold dual citizenship in Abkhazia and Russia. Among the five presidential contenders, three—Badra Gunba, Adgur Ardzinba, and Adgur Khurkhumal[vi]—did not participate in the 1992–93 war, while among the vice-presidential candidates, only Daut Agrba was not a participant.

A generational shift is evident in Abkhazian politics, as the main candidates are young and their authority is not derived from wartime experience. Nonetheless, war veterans still wield considerable influence from behind the scenes. The two principal veterans’ associations, “Aruaa” and “Amtsakhara”, are actively backing their candidates, with Alexander Ankvab notably supporting Gunba. Consequently, these presidential elections continue to reflect a dynamic confrontation between the so-called Ardzinba clan and its opponents - a rivalry that dates back to 2004.

All candidates - and the forces supporting them - are deeply integrated into Russia’s political and economic sphere, while they have little to no engagement or experience - political or economic - with the Georgian side.

Abkhazian politics is largely contested by two longstanding political forces: the so-called Ardzinba clan and the team aligned with Sergei Bagapsh. This rivalry, which began during the 2004 de facto presidential elections, saw the Ardzinba clan sidelined for a decade despite strong backing from Vladislav Ardzinba and active Russian involvement. At that time, the two groups diverged noticeably: Ardzinba and his allies pushed for closer integration with Russia and the creation of a shared social and economic space, whereas Bagapsh, though officially pro-Russian, opposed the active incorporation of Abkhazia into Russia. Notably, during that period, Abkhazia was not recognized by the Kremlin, and negotiations with Tbilisi remained a possibility. The distinction between these two groups was not so much in their reliance on Russia, but rather in their stance towards Tbilisi. It can be said that the Ardzinba clan was more militant and radical in these processes, while the Bagapsh/Ankvab team was marked by greater moderation. Sergey Shamba, who briefly allied with the latter group, also focused on the return of the Muhajirs and advocated for an alternative foreign policy for Abkhazia. By 2020–2024, anti-Russian or even moderately pro-Russian positions had almost completely disappeared from Abkhazian politics, highlighting Russia’s dominant influence. Today, political groups in Abkhazia operate primarily within the framework of Russian-Abkhazian relations, where Russia remains the sole, unchallenged partner and defender. 

Candidates’ Programs and Visions

All five registered candidates emphasize nearly identical topics in their meetings and debates.

In discussions on domestic politics, the primary focus is on easing tensions and ensuring peace and stability. All candidates unanimously oppose continued confrontation, particularly in any armed form.

In relations with Russia, it is evident that all candidates view Russia as Abkhazia’s primary partner and the guarantor of its “statehood”. Consequently, they rely on negotiations with the Russian side and the hope of reaching a compromise agreement.

Regarding Georgia, the candidates adhere to a familiar stance, reiterating the long-standing formula: recognition first, then dialogue. Their primary goal remains securing Tbilisi’s recognition of Abkhazia’s independence. Additionally, they emphasize the Law on Occupation, arguing that it diminishes the prospects for dialogue or negotiations with Georgia. As per the traditional position, Abkhazia’s independence is considered “non-negotiable”.

In discussions on domestic political issues, all candidates emphasize the region’s socio-economic challenges, with a general consensus that investment is the only viable solution. However, differences emerge between the main contenders, Badra Gunba and Adgur Ardzinba, particularly regarding investment-related issues and relations with Russia.

Adgur Ardzinba’s main critique revolves around the 2020 program for legislative harmonization with Russia, which he argues constitutes a disadvantageous deal for Abkhazia. He contends that Bzhania’s de facto government should have done more to safeguard Abkhazia’s interests before agreeing to Russia’s proposals, ensuring terms that maintained the parity Abkhazia sought. According to Ardzinba, Bzhania and his team Ankvab and Gunba-prioritized narrow group interests and material gains over long-term risks for Abkhazia. He accuses Bzhania of either failing or deliberately refusing to protect Abkhazian interests and effectively negotiate with the Kremlin. Ardzinba also highlights concerns over Russian investments, particularly the controversial issue of apartments, arguing that the problem lies not in the proposed draft laws themselves but in the unfavorable terms attached to them. As evidence, he points to the absence of such agreements under Raul Khajimba’s administration, asserting that Khajimba’s team effectively defended Abkhazia’s interests. He cites the 2014 strategic cooperation agreement as an example of a deal where Abkhazia’s interests were fully preserved. Furthermore, Ardzinba attributes Russia’s imposition of unfavorable conditions not to Kremlin-driven political motives but to the economic interests of Russian oligarchic groups. He believes these groups seek to dominate the Abkhazian economy and alter the region’s demographic and social landscape to their advantage.

The views of other opposition candidates on the investment agreement and the so-called apartment issue largely align with Adgur Ardzinba’s stance. However, some, like Oleg Bartsits, take a more moderate approach in their criticism. While they share concerns over Bzhania’s team’s handling of negotiations with the Kremlin, they refrain from accusing them of acting out of personal or group interests.

The opposition is adopting a cautious political stance - placing full responsibility for the Kremlin-imposed legislation on Bzhania/Gunba, while carefully avoiding direct criticism of the Russian government and instead of challenging the Kremlin’s political motives, they frame their concerns around the influence of Russian oligarchic groups.

Badra Gunba and his team’s position is more fragile and politically risky. On the one hand, Bzhania’s government has already agreed on the legislative harmonization program with Russia, making it an undeniable fact rather than a matter of interpretation. Additionally, the investment agreement initiated by Russia, particularly the pressure to alter property ownership rights, was met with insufficient resistance from the de facto Abkhazian government. If elected, fulfilling these agreements - including passing the proposed draft laws - will be Gunba’s responsibility. In response to criticism, Gunba emphasizes the strategic importance of the Russian-Abkhazian partnership, the necessity of attracting investments, and the potential benefits for Abkhazia. However, his team has yet to provide a clear answer to the opposition’s concerns - whether they plan or are even capable of renegotiating the contentious details of the agreements with Russia to address Abkhazian fears. To mitigate these concerns, Gunba presents a hopeful narrative, suggesting that the Kremlin has acknowledged the Abkhazian public’s protests and will be more receptive to reviewing certain points in the agreements. His visits and meetings in Russia reinforce this position. Notably, during a meeting on February 6, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak signaled a willingness to reconsider the investment agreement. “We will return to its discussion and ensure a balance of interests for both sides, including the population and businesses of Abkhazia”, Novak stated.

Neither the opposition candidates nor Badra Gunba explicitly specified what changes they would implement if elected. The opposition, primarily Adgur Ardzinba, holds a more advantageous position in this regard. He has referred to proposed amendments to the investment agreement and the so-called draft law on apartments, which the opposition repeatedly raised during parliamentary debates months ago. Ardzinba’s strategy for future negotiations with Russia includes reducing the number of apartments to be built, allocating land in Eastern Abkhazia [Gali, Ochamchire, and Tkvarcheli districts] for hotel and apartment construction, revising or canceling customs and tax benefits for investors, increasing investor obligations, and ensuring employment guarantees for local workers. His promises are based on the assumption that his team [largely composed of figures from Raul Khajimba’s team] has more experience in negotiating with the Kremlin and securing agreements that better align with Abkhazia’s interests.

The programmatic speeches and proposed solutions to the crisis presented by the candidates ultimately follow a single paradigm. The political teams compete to convince the public that they are the ones best equipped to establish a dialogue with the Kremlin, negotiate certain concessions, and secure compromise agreements.

Russia’s Position

The Kremlin’s approach to Abkhazia’s internal politics, particularly its de facto presidential elections, follows two main strategies: openly supporting specific candidates or maintaining a stance of formal neutrality.

The most striking example of the failure of the first approach is the 2004 de facto presidential election. Russia’s open support for Raul Khajimba led to his perception as a “Russian man” within Abkhazian society, which ultimately worked against him. Even the backing of the so-called Ardzinba clan and Vladislav Ardzinba’s personal endorsement as his successor did not help his case. Russia’s overt involvement had a negative impact on Khajimba’s political prospects, and despite protests, pressure, and negotiations, he was only able to secure the vice presidency in 2005. He went on to lose the 2009 and 2011 de facto presidential elections, and it was only in 2014 - amid widespread protests and renewed Russian support - that he managed to force Ankvab out of office and assume the role of de facto President.

Since then, Russian policy has become more cautious and sophisticated. The Kremlin refrained from openly intervening during the 2019 protests and the 2020 de facto presidential elections. In recent years, its approach has largely shifted to the second strategy - maintaining formal, and at times, practical neutrality.

During the pre-election period, Russia’s neutrality was largely maintained. However, as Election Day drew closer, the use of so-called administrative resources increasingly appeared to favor Badra Gunba.

Officially, Badra Gunba is on leave from his position, as required by election legislation. In this context, his visit to Moscow on February 6 and meetings with high-ranking Russian officials appear unusual. Notably, he met with Sergey Kiriyenko, the First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration of Russia, who is informally regarded as the Kremlin’s curator of Abkhazian affairs. “Vladimir Putin personally raised the issue that relations between Russia and Abkhazia should not only be maintained but also effectively developed”, Kiriyenko told Gunba. This meeting followed Kiriyenko’s visit to Sokhumi just days earlier, where the primary focus was the rehabilitation of Sokhumi airport. During that visit, Kiriyenko met with Gunba and local de facto officials to discuss air traffic issues. The airport project itself is not a controversial topic in Abkhazian society; on the contrary, there is broad anticipation and support for its restoration and operation. However, the timing of Kiriyenko’s meeting with Gunba - who, at that moment, was not in an official capacity - raises questions about implicit support for his candidacy. Despite this, Kiriyenko maintained a formal stance, stating that Russia respects and welcomes any choice made by the Abkhaz people.

Badra Gunba’s meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov came as an unexpected development. Notably, even in official statements, Gunba was referred to as an Abkhazian political figure.

Gunba’s meeting with Russian Vice-Prime Minister Alexander Novak was also significant in terms of media coverage. During the meeting, it was announced that 100 million rubles would be allocated in 2025 for the Abkhazian Small and Medium Business Support Fund, an initiative spearheaded by Gunba.

Gunba’s visit also “coincided” with the Russian Ministry of Finance allocating 340 million rubles to Abkhazia.

In addition to direct support, the election issue may also be linked to Russia’s decision to revoke the Russian citizenship of two active opposition figures, Kan Kvartchia and Levan Mikava. However, it is worth noting that several Abkhazian Telegram channels had already reported on this decision as early as the summer of 2024. According to these reports, de facto President Bzhania, during a meeting with Dmitry Kozak, the Deputy Kremlin Chief of Staff, requested the revocation of Russian citizenship for deputies who had been critical of the draft law on apartments.

Another move that can be seen as an attempt to influence Abkhazian society was the sociological survey conducted in Abkhazia by two Russian research organizations, VCIOM and INSOMAR. According to both surveys, Badra Gunba holds a significant lead over his main competitor. However, the results also indicate that he is unlikely to secure a victory in the first round.

Through these steps, the Kremlin is subtly signaling its preferred candidate while maintaining a measured and indirect approach. The primary concern stems from Khajimba’s past experience, where overt Russian support ultimately harmed his candidacy. Gunba appears to be the more favorable choice for Moscow, likely because he represents Bzhania’s team, which had already agreed to the legislative harmonization action program with Russia in 2020 and is expected to implement it. In contrast, Adgur Ardzinba advocates for revising key aspects of this program. Additionally, during Bzhania’s de facto presidency, Russia effectively imposed de facto sanctions on Abkhazia as a response to the delays in ratifying investment agreements and passing the law on apartments. The financial restrictions, enforced for several weeks in September 2024, were less of a direct warning to Bzhania’s team and more of a signal to the opposition and Abkhazian society. However, the sanctions had a certain backlash in society—the protests surrounding the draft laws did not subside. Meanwhile, the opposition easily leveraged this pressure to discredit Bzhania, portraying him as an increasingly weak and unprincipled leader. Looking ahead, Russian sanctions could become an even more potent tool, especially with the summer tourist season of 2025 approaching, a period crucial for Abkhazia’s economy. Russia has the ability to negatively influence this process and always keeps this mechanism in reserve. Should domestic political protests persist against the newly elected de facto president concerning the above-mentioned draft laws, the Kremlin make these sanctions even more severe and prolonged.

It is also important to note that the Russian side’s repeated assertion that they will continue to work with any winning candidate reflects the political reality in Abkhazia. All major political groups, de facto presidential candidates, and their teams remain firmly committed to maintaining close relations with Russia. There are virtually no anti-Russian political forces in Abkhazia, nor do such groups participate in political processes. Moreover, given Russia’s effective military, economic, and political control over Abkhazia, the ability of Abkhaz leaders to maneuver independently remains highly constrained. Regardless of who wins the election, the next leader will inevitably be required to implement agreements already concluded with Russia, with the only potential difference being their ability to negotiate minor adjustments aimed at better protecting Abkhazia’s interests, hoping that certain terms of the agreements will better safeguard the interests of the Abkhazian side.

Relations with Georgia

The issue of relations with Tbilisi plays a minimal role in the upcoming presidential elections in Abkhazia, with candidates limiting their positions to formal statements. Their primary focus remains on the recognition of Abkhazia’s independence, though this topic does not take center stage in the ongoing political competition and is therefore not emphasized during the pre-election period. A longstanding position also persists - that Tbilisi must first repeal the Law on Occupation before any prospects for normalizing relations can be considered. These views are deeply entrenched, having been reiterated over the years by both Abkhazian and Russian foreign ministry officials.

The issue of candidates’ participation in the 1992-93 war, traditionally a key topic in Abkhazian elections, has been pushed to the background. This shift is due to an objective factor - neither of the main candidates participated in the war due to their age. As a result, the “narrative of desertion”, which was actively used against Bzhania during the 2020 elections, has been entirely absent in the current electoral discourse.

The issue of the Georgian population in Gali has been entirely absent from internal debates, including key topics such as passportization and education in their native language. Abkhaz society remains so focused on challenges related to integration with Russia that the concerns of the Gali population are largely ignored. Consequently, none of the candidates have put forward any plan or program addressing these issues. In the context of the current elections, they are simply irrelevant.

Attitude of Abkhazian Civil Society

The period of political and civic activism in Abkhazia is closely linked to Aslan Bzhania’s de facto presidency. Two key moments stand out in this regard: the controversy over the Bichvinta country houses issue and the debate surrounding the foreign agents’ draft law. In the first case, youth activists and part of civil society proactively opposed the transfer of the Bichvinta country houses to Russia. On the other hand, discussions around the foreign agents’ draft law were largely initiated by the Abkhaz de facto Government itself. The push for this draft law was closely tied to criticism of international organizations and the local civil society groups they fund, a stance spearheaded by former de facto Foreign Minister Inal Ardzinba. During the process of criticizing Western donors, interesting positions emerged within the de facto government itself. Inal Ardzinba’s vocal stance against Western donors created a politically advantageous environment for the Bzhania/Ankvab team. Bzhania, on the surface, refrained from interfering in the de facto Foreign Minister’s activities, while Ankvab remained focused on economic matters. As a result, most of the civil society’s criticism was directed specifically at Inal Ardzinba, rather than the government as a whole, as he was not directly associated with the Bzhania/Ankvab team. However, with the formal introduction of the draft law on the influence of foreign countries, the criticism has now shifted directly toward Bzhania. Despite government efforts, the bill has not yet been passed, marking a victory for civil society. While Abkhazian civil society is largely in opposition to Bzhania, this stance has not translated into support for Adgur Ardzinba or a rejection of the Gunba/Ankvab team. At this stage, it remains unclear whether civil society views Adgur Ardzinba as a viable alternative to the Gunba/Ankvab team - one who would withdraw the foreign agents’ bill and cease the criticism and pressure on international donors and local civil society organizations.

Pre-Election Environment

Although the de facto presidential elections were triggered by protests and the resignation of Aslan Bzhania and two politically opposing camps have emerged in the region, the pre-election campaign is unfolding in a relatively calm atmosphere. Candidates are actively holding meetings in districts and cities without facing interference in the process. Even opposition candidates [Robert Arshba and Daut Agrba] have been able to hold a meeting in Cherkessk.[vii] Various groups openly express their support for different candidates. In this context, Akhra Avidzba’s[viii] public endorsement of Badra Gunba stands out as a particularly significant moment in Abkhazia’s internal political dynamics.

Certain blackmail-driven PR campaigns are taking place on Abkhazian Telegram channels between opposing groups. However, it must be noted that this confrontation has not escalated into a serious conflict, nor has it spilled over into street protests or taken on criminal forms.

There was an attempt to exploit anti-Armenian sentiment during the campaign. Telegram channels resurfaced footage from several months ago, showing opposition leaders, including Adgur Ardzinba, engaging in a heated exchange with de facto MP - Galust Trabzonyan, during which they publicly demanded that he renounce the investment agreement.[ix] The aim was to portray Ardzinba as an anti-Armenian candidate to provoke dissatisfaction among Armenian voters. However, these attempts did not develop further. At the same time, while the risk of civil conflict is increasing, so is the awareness of its dangers within Abkhazian political circles. It should be noted that, so far, political actors have successfully managed to neutralize such topics.

There was also an attempt at an anti-Russian campaign against Adgur Ardzinba, specifically accusing him of having pro-Turkish sentiments. One of the key arguments used against him was his past education at the Turkish-run Başaran College in Gantiadi [also referred to as Tsandrypsh].[x] During the candidates’ debate on January 31, a journalist from Russia Today questioned Ardzinba about this issue. He openly acknowledged attending the college but clarified that it was located in Abkhazia, not Turkey and that he had left before completing his studies. Regarding the Turkish language, he stated that he barely remembers it today.  The day after the debate, the Turkish publication “Harici” published an article on the Abkhazian de facto elections, labeling Ardzinba as a pro-Turkish candidate. This was then picked up by various anonymous Telegram channels and media outlets in both Abkhazia and Russia to reinforce the narrative against him. However, the issue failed to gain significant traction or public interest. Some speculate that concerns over Ardzinba’s perceived support among Abkhazians living in Turkey[xi] influenced the Abkhazian Central Election Commission’s decision to close the Sakarya polling station. Officially, the closure was based on a letter from Abkhazia’s de facto representative in Turkey, Ibrahim Avidzba to the de facto Central Election Commission, who cited the “impossibility” of opening the polling station - though no specific reason was provided. Speculations surrounding this decision are based on doubts, making it difficult to prove anything.

There were attempts to initiate an anti-Russian campaign against Adgur Ardzinba, specifically accusing him of pro-Turkish leanings. One of the key pieces of "evidence" cited was that, years ago, Ardzinba had studied at a Turkish college, Başaran Koleji, in Gantiadi/Tsandripsh.[1] During the candidates' debate on January 31, a journalist from Russia Today raised this issue with Ardzinba. He did not deny attending the Turkish college but clarified that it was located in Abkhazia, not Turkey, and that he had left the college before completing his studies. Regarding the Turkish language, Ardzinba stated that he hardly remembers it today. The day following the debate, a Turkish publication, Harici, published an article about the d/f Abkhaz elections, labeling Ardzinba as a pro-Turkish candidate. Some Abkhaz and Russian anonymous Telegram channels and media outlets used this article to attack him. However, the issue did not generate widespread attention or public interest.

The suspicion that Adgur Ardzinba had greater support among the Abkhaz living in Turkey[2] may have been the reason behind the closure of the polling station in Sakarya by the d/f Central Election Commission of Abkhazia. The official justification for the decision was a letter from Ibrahim Avidzba, the d/f representative of the Abkhaz government in Turkey, addressed to the d/f Central Election Commission, stating that it was impossible to open the polling station. However, no further explanation was provided regarding why the station could not be opened. The speculations surrounding this decision are rooted in uncertainty, making it difficult to substantiate any claims.

Such accusations are not new in the d/f Abkhaz elections. Years ago, Alexander Ankvab was accused of being pro-Georgian because of his Georgian wife, and Aslan Bzhania’s main point of contention was his unclear participation in the 1992-93 war, with many of his opponents calling him a deserter.

Such accusations are not uncommon in Abkhazian elections. Years ago, Alexander Ankvab was accused of being pro-Georgian due to his Georgian wife, while Aslan Bzhania faced criticism for not participating in the 1992-93 war, with many opponents labeling him a deserter.

In terms of traditional media [television and online outlets], a relatively neutral landscape has emerged. Media outlets formally cover the activities of all candidates. A notable example is “Gal-Media”, which, while officially serving as the press service of the Gali District de facto administration, functions as a regional media platform. Despite the fact that the head of the Gali administration is a close relative of Bzhania and a member of his team, “Gal-Media” has provided equal coverage of the visits and election advertisements of all candidates.

Election administration

The local Central Election Commission is overseeing the de facto presidential elections in Abkhazia. According to Commission head - Dmitry Marshan, 152 polling stations have been opened across Abkhazia. Additionally, three polling stations have been set up outside the region - two in Russia, located in Moscow and Cherkessk [Karachay - Cherkess Republic], and one in Turkey, in the city of Adapazarı [Sakarya Province].

According to Dmitry Marshan, there are approximately 135 000 registered voters in Abkhazia. Meanwhile, data from the Abkhazian Statistics Service indicates that as of 2021, the region’s total population is more than 244 000. Official Abkhazian figures estimate the population of the Gali district at 30 273. However, during the 2020 de facto presidential elections, only about 1 200 voters were registered in Gali. The primary reason for this low number is longstanding documentation issues, which have become a persistent challenge in the region. Local Georgians face significant barriers to obtaining Abkhazian citizenship - one major obstacle being their Georgian citizenship. As a result, many residents of Gali are effectively deprived of fundamental civil rights, such as private property ownership and participation in elections. Given these circumstances, it is likely that the number of registered voters in Gali has remained largely unchanged, fluctuating around the same figures.

According to Abkhazia’s de facto electoral legislation, the president is elected for a five-year term. To secure victory in the first round, a candidate must receive more than 50% of the vote (50% + 1). If no candidate achieves this threshold, a second round is held. In the second round, the ballot includes an additional option - “against all”. To win, a candidate must receive more votes than both their opponent and the total number of votes cast for “against all”. Notably, the second round is not conducted outside Abkhazia’s borders. This has led some to speculate that the government-backed candidate has a greater interest in securing a first-round victory. The reasoning is that in the second round, the influence of both Russian and Abkhazian authorities over voters decreases.

The Speaker of the de facto Parliament estimates that the cost of holding the elections will range between 20-25 million rubles [approximately 210 000-250 000 USD].

Conclusion

Despite Aslan Bzhania’s resignation amid protests, his political team remains intact, and Badra Gunba still has a viable chance of winning the de facto presidential elections. The resilience of this political group is further evidenced by Russia’s use of administrative resources to indirectly promote Gunba, even as it officially maintains that it will cooperate with any elected candidate. Badra Gunba is hindered not only by the controversial legislative initiatives of recent years but also by the accumulated dissatisfaction and criticism directed at the ruling political circles over the past 30 years due to inaction, corruption, and inefficiency. His main competitor, Adgur Ardzinba, has successfully leveraged this criticism and public dissatisfaction over the past few years to establish himself as the leading opposition politician - and now, to position himself for power.

The qualitative difference between the main competitors is not significantly large. Regardless of who wins, the next president will need to reassess the details of the legislative harmonization program agreed upon with Russia in 2020 and seek new, compromise solutions. Ultimately, it is up to Abkhaz voters to determine which team they believe has the greater capacity to achieve these objectives.

The election will likely move to a second round.