"I am responding to your hidden shot from a machine gun, from the newspaper "Literary Georgia", on May 26, 1989, your machine gun shrapnel shook me a little.

I call your newspaper a machine gun, because it is a long-range shooter, its scope reaches the whole of our republic, and I shoot you with a small-caliber one (regional newspaper "Bzif"), but note that it shoots hard, it hits directly in the eye, not on the eyebrow.

Dear colleague, Guram Panjikidze! Transparency for transparency's sake, but we must write the truth!" [1]

The author of this statement is Anatoly Vozba, a member of the Union of Writers and Journalists of Abkhazia. With this text, he responds to the article of the Georgian writer and publicist, Guram Panjikidze, in which Panjikidze responds to the letter of the leader of the South Ossetian separatist movement, Alan Chochiev, in which he supported his Abkhaz colleagues. In an extensive article, the author went beyond the issue of South Ossetia and reached Abkhazia as well, including criticizing the article previously published by Anatoly Vozba in the "Bzif" newspaper. It can be said that Vozba's letter quoted above is a response to a response of a response.

"Literary Georgia" newspaper was the official printing body of the Union of Writers of Georgia. Along with the review and printing of artistic works, the newspaper also printed interconected historical and political letters. "Literary Georgia" made a great contribution to the advancement of the national theme in the society and the actualization of the topics related to it.

The newspaper, which used to be apolitical in nature and engaged in the promotion of art, at the end of the 1980s found itself in the vanguard of producers of Georgian national or nationalist discourse. Compared to 1988, in 1990, the circulation quadrupled. It was subscribed to every sixth-seventh family of the Republic of Georgia (including every fifth ethnically Georgian). In 1989-1990, the number of subscribers doubled in those areas of the republic where ethnic tensions were observed - such as Abkhazia, Shida Kartli and Kvemo Kartli. On the contrary, there were almost no subscribers in non-Georgian regions, for example, in Gudauta, Java and Javakheti.^[2]

A similar role in the Abkhazian society was played by the Gudauta district newspaper "Bzif", which was published in Russian and Abkhazian languages. Unlike "Literary Georgia" (or any other high-circulation Georgian newspapers), the circulation of "Bzif" was much lower, although it was quite sufficient to meet (or produce) the demands of the Abkhazian population living in Abkhazia.

The role of newspapers (probably TV-radio broadcasting as well) in the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict becomes especially important after the tragedy of April 9, 1989. Every day, in different newspapers (both Georgian and Abkhazian), articles full of mutual accusations were written one after the other.

It all started with Likhni's letter, when, on March 18, 1989, tens of thousands of Abkhazians, gathered in Gudauti region, sent a common letter to Moscow. Based on various historical accusations against Georgians, they presented Georgian-Abkhazian relations as a relationship of aggressor and victim, and based on this logic, they demanded to raise the political status of Abkhazia to the soviet socialist republic (which both sides perceived as the separation of Abkhazia from Georgia). We read in the letter: "To ask the Supreme Council of the USSR and the Council of Ministers of the USSR to restore the status of Abkhazia SSR in the form it was presented during the era of V. Lenin in 1921".

The Georgian reaction did not delay - soon, Georgian protests began in Abkhazia. On April 4, in order to show the solidarity of the Georgians living in Abkhazia, actions organized by the "Ilia Chavchavadze Society" started in Tbilisi.[3] Demonstrators demanded the punishment of the signatories of Likhni's letter, they also talked about the harassment of Georgians in Abkhazia and the discriminatory personnel policy of Sokhumi against Georgians. In the days of April, stencils with many contents were visible at the actions: "Stop terror against Georgians in Georgia!" [4], "Stop Russification of Abkhazia", ​​"Stop falsification of history".[5] There were also anti-Abkhaz calls, according to which the Abkhazians were "guest people", therefore they should not have any claim to territorial or other privileges[6]. In a few days, the main demand of the demonstrations changed and the restoration of Georgia's independence came to the fore.

On April 9, 1989, Moscow violently suppressed the demonstration and regained control of the city. Their victory turned out to be short-lived, in fact, Moscow completely lost its legitimacy in the eyes of the Georgian public - it even got to the point that even the Communist Party of Georgia began to separate itself from the center at the level of rhetoric. The situation in Tbilisi gradually calmed down, while the power passed into the hands of the national movement. Censorship on the news media was dramatically weakened^[7], thus, in public, the Georgian-Abkhazian discussions reached a completely different scale.

As already mentioned, after April 9, the situation calmed down in Tbilisi, although it continued with all its intensity in Abkhazia. The ethnically Georgian population in different regions (Ochamchire, Sukhumi, Gagra) periodically organized rallies and demanded the punishment of the signatories of Likhni's letter. The context of the tragedy in Tbilisi was an extra challenge. In particular, the Georgian demonstrators hinted that the April actions in Tbilisi started because of the Abkhazians. The situation was aggravated by the Abkhazian position after the tragedy, in which they directly repeated Moscow's propaganda - the Abkhazians blamed the demonstrators for the tragedy, they were referred as the fools of radicals, and the cause of death of demonstrators was framed as stampede.

After the 9^th of April 1989, the tragedy in Tbilisi, University of Abkhazia became the center of protest in Sukhumi. The students of the striking Georgian sector demanded that the teachers who signed Likhni's letter withdraw their signatures - and this concerned the rector of the university, Aleko Gvaramia, the most. As subsequent events have shown, the creation of the University of Abkhazia and its subsequent existence greatly contributed to the deepening of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict. In fact, for almost an entire decade, it was first a silent and then an open space for dispute. The present article was created through content analysis - in particular, Georgian, Russian and Abkhaz periodicals were processed. The archival documentation kept in the Central Archive of Georgia was processed[8], the existing scientific and non-scientific literature was analyzed, including Internet sources, and finally oral histories were recorded.

Abkhazia in the late 1970s

The Georgian-Abkhazian conflict is almost more than a century old. Nevertheless, it can be said that initially it did not have an ethnic face, it was a conflict arising on socio-political grounds. With the passage of time, it also acquired an ethnic dimension, which absorbed the conflict completely. Although the Soviet Union was declared to be a carrier of social-class ideology, in practice, the "national" line was much stronger and more comprehensive than the class one. Soviet national policy defined not only territories and republics, but also classes. The empire was divided into developed and underdeveloped nations with corresponding access to economic and political privileges. As a result of the Soviet national policy, the Abkhazians were considered the titular nation in the territory of Abkhazia^[9]. Therefore, Abkhazians were artificially promoted to party or other bureaucratic positions. And when the conflict took an overt form, a very strange situation arose in the government of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia. In fact, two national "clans" emerged in the government (as well as in lower bureaucratic positions), which had chosen two different visions and goals for arranging the state.

Nevertheless, the Abkhazians, in terms of economic and social development, were lagging behind the Georgians living in Abkhazia. One of the reasons for this was access to higher education.

By 1979, there were only 3 scientific and educational institutes in Abkhazia: Dimitri Gulia Institute of Humanitarian Studies of Abkhazia, Maxim Gorki Pedagogical Institute of Sukhumi and Institute of Subtropical Farming of Georgia. The first one was a research institute and did not have a teaching department. The seond was indeed an educational istitute, but with severely limited resources, while the Institute of Subtropical Farming was natural science, and, for some reason, only ethnic Georgians studied there (despite the fact that there was a Russian sector as well).

According to the data of 1979, only 1.4% of Abkhazians knew the Georgian language, while in the republic, most humanitarian programs were taught in Georgian. In the 1960s, about 1/3 of Abkhazian students received education outside the republic, in the case of Georgian students, this figure was only 8%. In the 1960s, the number of Abkhazian students enrolled in various universities[10] increased from year to year (it reached its peak in 1967-68 - 2,500 students), and in the 1970s, it began to decrease. The percentage of teaching at the second level of the university (in today's language, master's) was even lower and it was only 34%.^[11]

As a result, in 1979, there were only 259 Abkhazian scientists and researchers. Access to education was partly reflected in the class structure of the Abkhazian society - throughout the Soviet Union, Abkhazians occupied one of the leading positions in agriculture.^[12]

In 1977-78, in parallel with the creation and adoption of the new constitution of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia, part of the Abkhaz intelligentsia and party workers sent a letter to Moscow on December 17, 1977. The twelve-page letter is full of various historical accusations against Georgia. These accusations concern: "Forcible overthrow of Abkhazian Soviets in 1918 by the Democratic Republic of Georgia; decrease in territorial status; [13] "Beriavshchina" - i.e. the violent implementation of the pro-Georgian personnel policy in Abkhazia; closing Abkhazian schools; lowering the status of the Abkhazian language and transferring it to the Georgian alphabet; Georgian demographic "expansion"; Representation of Abkhazia in Georgian political and social space by Georgian historiography. In addition to historical accusations, attention is also focused on the social aspect - a lot of space is devoted to the issue of oppression of Abkhazians, again and again by Georgians. Based on these arguments, they demanded from Moscow the opening of an Abkhaz TV-radio broadcasting, a printing press and a university, and, most importantly, the unification of Abkhazia with Russia. [14]

The Communist Party of Georgia resorted to radical measures - some of the signatories of the letter were removed from their positions and even expelled from the party. In May 1978, due to the ongoing crisis in Abkhazia, Ivan Kapitanov, the secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in matters of personnel and organizational work, visited Sukhumi. He shared the worries of the Abkhazians, addressed a number of demands (including the university), reinstated the signatories to their positions, but categorically refused to change the status of Abkhazia. [15] This did not ease the tension in Sukhum and other cities, it lasted for almost a whole year. Abkhazians massively and illegally changed the Georgian toponymy, insulted the monuments of various outstanding Georgians, physical confrontations also took place. [16]

The Georgian population, intelligentsia and dissidents, perceived the retreat of the Communist Party of Georgia as a failure. Especially when the party avoided talking about the issue of Abkhazia in both open and closed meetings.[17] Based on the combination of these reasons, various social and intellectual groups have strengthened the argument that Abkhazians were supported and encouraged by Moscow, while Tbilisi could not protect Georgian interests in Abkhazia.

Like the Abkhazians, demographic issues were also relevant in the Georgian population, especially in dissident circles. It was not clear to them why the ethnic minority (Abkhazians) occupied disproportionately more positions in Abkhazia compared to the ethnic majority (Georgians) and why the central government met their various "illegitimate" demands. [18] The agenda included the issue of Russification and the fact that the Russian language was dominant in Abkhazia. [19] This topic became especially relevant in the 1980s and 1990s and became the subject of many opinions and polemics. The Georgian idea of ​​ethno-territorialism and the historical vision, in which Abkhazia was considered exclusively Georgian land, and Abkhazia as a "settled" group - as a "guest" - became more and more popular among the intelligentsia.^[20]

In 1979, the University of Abkhazia was established on the basis of the Sukhumi Pedagogical Institute in the background of such political tension. The establishment of the university was followed by intense controversy even before its opening. They argued about what the university should be called - the Abkhazians demanded to give it the name "Abkhazia", ​​and as an argument they used the practice of the North Caucasus, where the name of the autonomous republic is used everywhere. The Georgians demanded that the word "Sokhumi" be assigned to it, indicating that the Abkhazians wanted to symbolically distance themselves from Georgia by using the word "Abkhazia" in the name of the institution.^[21]

The University of Abkhazia was divided into three language sectors - Russian (40%), Georgian (30%) and Abkhazian (30%). Other local ethnic groups could speak neither Georgian nor Abkhazian languages, therefore, these two had an ethnic dimension, and everyone could get to the Russian sector, because the majority of the population of Abkhazia spoke Russian. In addition, with Tbilisi's support, universities in Russia had to admit Abkhazian students without an exam, and Tbilisi State University was allocated a quota of 500 places for Abkhazia (how much this meant only ethnically Abkhaz is unknown).^[22]

The University of Abkhazia was designed not only for the people living in Abkhazia, but also for Western Georgia. Moreover, those who could not get enrolled in Tbilisi were applying to the University of Abkhazia. Not only because of the relatively low competition, but also because it was easy to "get accepted” with bribing. The corruption in the University of Abkhazia was known to the public, especially the Russian and Georgian sectors “left a lot of income”. It cost 10,000-15,000 rubles to get accepted to the Law School^{[23]  [24]}. It is also worth mentioning the fact that classes were held in the same building for all three sectors, often even the academic staff was the same, including in the Abkhazian sector, where, as a rule, teaching had to be conducted in the Abkhazian language, but in practice it was conducted in Russian.

It can be said that in the 1980s, the access of Abkhazians and the people living in Abkhazia to higher education, compared to the previous decades, increased significantly.

Silence and Uncertainty

1989 was a difficult year for Georgia. On the one hand, the April 9 tragedy completely changed society and the state, and on the other hand, the year was full of ethnic tensions and human tragedies. On April 19, a landslide occurred in the village of Tshablana in mountainous Adjara and 23 people died. At the same time, beyond the borders of Georgia, the Karabakh conflict entered an active phase, which was directly reflected in Kvemo Kartli, where the risks of possible confrontation between Armenians and Azerbaijanis were critically increased. In South Ossetia, the separatist movement of "Adamon Nikhas" was gaining strength, and in Abkhazia, the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict was moving to a completely new phase.

The more time passed since the days of April, the stronger the Georgian national movement became, which with nationalist visions, slogans and statements made the situation even worse. The Communist Party of Georgia did not have a proper vision to regulate the situation in Abkhazia, its only strategy was to hide the problem. On the other hand, in the government cencored press, for the first time, the incomprehensible silence of the government was publicly criticized: "The question is, to whom we are lying?" This news started on April 2. Ten days passed as if nothing had happened, no response. The complete refusal of the students was followed by the fact that professors joined them. After that, it's true that the dialogue started, but it had a dishonest and sometimes humiliating form." ^[25] - writes Shota Lashkhia, head of the Department of Geography, University of Abkhazia, professor.

A similar opinion was expressed on April 14, 1989, at a meeting held in the Abkhazia District Committee: "Unfortunately, party organizations in our country are no longer able to engage in the dynamics of public processes and as a result - it can be said directly - they lost control of the situation, faced a completely unmanageable, even difficult to take into account situation. This became a factor that led to the tragedy that happened in Tbilisi." [26]

The students' protest (both professors and schoolchildren joined in), which started on April 3 near the Sokhumi Cathedral, did not stop. The protests were getting bigger and bigger - and the demand was very simple: the withdrawal of the signature of the head of University of Abkhazia, Gvaramia. The state was generally silent on this issue, as well as on all the facts and events that indicated ethnic tension in Abkhazia.

For instance, the attacked on a bus full of Georgians coming from the protest, on April 1 in Leselidze district, did not went public. The press talks about 14 injured people^[27], but the documents confirm that 21 people were injured, 7 of them had gunshot wounds, and two different buses were attacked[28], not once, but twice^[29]. Despite the concealment, the information spread throughout Georgia, and a large-scale rally was announced in Sokhumi the very next day. Despite the fact that the party bodies were actively discussing the ongoing processes at the university, official representatives were meeting with the protesters, comprehensive information was not publicly provided to the population. The local press worked under the strict monitoring of the authorities, at the same time, as a result of operational work, all students and academic staff who led the protests were identified.^[30]

No one talked about the causes and motives of the strike, not to mention the process itself and coverage of current events. On April 25, the students of the Institute of Subtropical Agriculture of Georgia joined the strike. If the government press is to be believed^[31], their demand was to punish the perpetrators of the April 1 event^[32]. Persons from Tbilisi (including the Minister of Education Guram Enukidze) urged the students to stop the strike and return to the auditoriums, but no one listened to them. On the other hand, the Abkhazians did not compromise either - the situation reached a dead end.

Myriads of rumors and provocations were spread in the city, as well as in the entire republic, among them, the biggest response was in Sokhumi, in Russian lanugage, with proclamations containing strongly chauvinistic content, which was so serious that all formal and informal groups operating in Abkhazia condemned and distanced themselves from it. [33]

In the first half of May, the protest spread even more. The strikers moved to the building of the Konstantine Gamsakhurdia Theater. The employees of the theater expressed their solidarity, at the same time, the informal organization "Ilia Chavchavadze Society" got involved in the process and the organizing headquarters of the protests was created[34]. The strikers expressed their protest in this way, and eventually it spread to the Georgian population of Abkhazia. For several days, the tobacco factory in Sukhumi went on strike; "Shokhum Khelsatskho"; Confectionery factory and other enterprises.^[35]  The situation was critical - on the one hand, the daily order of the republic was violated, and on the other hand, the protest of the demonstrators took on a clearly national character. This made the situation even more difficult for Tbilisi and strained the already tense political atmosphere, and finally - the academic year was on the verge of collapse.

On May 14, 1989, about 40 demonstrators were sent from Sukhumi to Tbilisi by the headquarters and met with Givi Gumbaridze, the secretary of the new Tseka of the Republic of Georgia. After several hours of negotiations, he satisfied the demands of the strikers, and by decree No. 343 of May 14, the University of Abkhazia was separated from the Georgian sector, which, in turn, turned into a branch of the Tbilisi State University.^[36]

The Abkhazians were clearly opposed to the idea of ​​dividing the university, and explained their positions with the logic of "Soviet internationalism", although this can hardly be considered a reality. [37] On the other hand, as Zurab Papaskiri recalls in his autobiographical book, the idea of ​​division had many opponents - among them was Akaki Bakradze, who, according to him, urged students to continue the struggle within the university and thus fight for the University of Abkhazia[38]. The protest movement in Abkhazia, which started on April 2, 1989, ended on May 14 with the division of the University of Abkhazia. Observing the events reveals that the authorities did not have a vision of how to regulate the conflict arising on ethnic grounds. Their reaction was disproportionate to the dangers that the strike posed.^[39]

Covering the events in the print media further aggravated the situation and created an atmosphere of uncertainty that encouraged the spread of various rumors and more importantly alienated the state from the public.

The Georgian demonstrators did not retreat, their goal was simple - to punish the signatories of the Georgian-phobic letter. At the same time, the Abkhazian side was not going to compromise either. As a result, the University of Abkhazia was divided (later the theater, football club and other organizations and unions were also divided), but it did not lead to a de-escalation of the situation, on the contrary, it intensified, which led to the bloody conflict of July 1989.

Changes at the Center and Peripheries of the Empire

In 1989, the third year of perestroika had begun in the Soviet Union. In such a short period of time, for Moscow, nothing was going according to plan: the economy was falling, the shortage of products was growing more and more; ethno-conflicts were intensifying; The USSR was ceding geopolitical positions; The bureaucratic system was breaking down. On the other hand, the conflict was brewing in Moscow, and two political centers were already intersecting: the radical communists, who could not adapt to such a weakening of the empire, and Mikhail Gorbachev with his own team and the idea of ​​"transformation".

Gorbachev started reforming the highest representative and executive bodies. Its goal was to reduce the single-party political influence of the Communist Party. This, on the one hand, was supposed to make the country more democratic, and on the other hand, it was a step taken against political opponents, because in this way he would get rid of the so-called Radicals, the elite of the Communist Party, who could not adapt to such a weakening of the Soviet Union and were increasingly dissatisfied with the rule of Mikhail Gorbachev.

It was an unwieldy two-leveled structure consisting of a Congress of People's Deputies—a sort of permanent constitutional convention—and a smaller "working parliament," a supreme council elected from the Congress. It is important that the candidate nominated by the chairman of the Congress (Gorbachev) for the post of Prime Minister needed to be confirmed by voting, after which he would present the nominees for other government positions before the deputies. The heads of the Ministry of Defense and the KGB, Yazov and Kryuchkov, also had to appear and answer questions as part of the confirmation process.^[40] The new body would include 2225 deputies who were elected from territorial, national-territorial and public organizations. During March 11-24, 1989, elections were held throughout the Soviet Union and a new parliament was formed. Along with various candidates from Georgia, Vladislav Ardzinbat was elected from Gudauti region, who was the chairman of the Inter-ethnic and International Education Council of the Abkhazian autonomous SSR. The first session of the Congress of People's Deputies was scheduled for May 25.

The Congress of People's Deputies became not only a formal body, but also had the function of a real parliament, in which the deputies would talk about the problems existing in their territorial bodies. In fact, for the first time in the entire Soviet Union, speakers were given the opportunity to address an audience of 286 million. Abkhazians, as a result of the political changes taking place in the center, were hopeful that the political status of Abkhazia would be revised, specially when Ardzinba was appointed as a member of the Council of Nationalities in the Supreme Council of the USSR.

Information about the division of the University of Abkhazia was very limited in the newspapers. Especially the Georgian press was silent, more precisely, the press managed by the government, which was facing the ethno-conflict that was gaining strength and was beyond their control.

On May 15, Abkhazians held a demonstration in Sukhumi. As "Bzif" newspaper reports, people came to the rally with pictures of Lenin and Gorbachev and demanded to "follow Lenin's national policy - the principles of common friendship and equality"^[41]. They built their argumentation on "Leninist" principles and the idea of ​​"perestroika". Moreover, one of the reasons against the division of the university was its economic unprofitability, which, according to them, was against the policy of "Khozraschioti"^{[42] [43]}. It can be said that Abkhazians, at the level of rhetoric, remained patriots of "perestroika".

The Communist Party of Georgia could not keep up with the current events in Abkhazia. In the eyes of the population, the party could not protect the rights of the Georgian population living in Abkhazia, on the other hand, the national movement took over the function of protection, whose nationalist discourse was more like adding fuel to fire. Abkhazians were afraid to give up their political positions in the autonomous republic - in particular, as mentioned above, among the Georgian population (as well as in the national movement) even the selection of candidates on ethnic grounds (more precisely, its disproportionality) by the minority was perceived as discrimination by the majority. This issue was written openly and publicly for the first time in the newspaper "People's Education" on May 31, and it received a great response in Abkhazia.^[44]

On the other hand, it is obvious that the party could not manage the situation and had no vision to de-escalate the situation. It is particularly interesting to compare the newspapers of the District Committee of Abkhazia, which were published in three languages: Georgian - "Soviet Abkhazia"; in Russian - "Советская Абхазия"; Abkhazian - "Апсны Капш"^[45]. From the second half of May, in the Russian version, Abkhazian nationalist rhetoric appears and becomes more frequent, while the Georgian-language newspaper remained silent and avoided mentioning national issues in any form (except for the statements of official bodies).

In May 1989, parallel to the extreme strengthening of the Georgian national movement, even the Communist Party of Georgia, in order to preserve the electorate, was forced to adopt the national discourse. If the Abkhazians were basing their actions on the processes in Moscow, Tbilisi was starting to distance itself from it. It was decided that with the government's permission, the Independence Day of Georgia - May 26 - would be celebrated throughout Georgia.

Articles of anti-Soviet content were written in the press almost without censorship, even by the printing bodies of the ministries. All topics that were previously forbidden to talk about have been activated^[46]. Among these topics was the conquest of Georgia by Russia in 1921 and the dispelling of the myths that the Soviet regime was creating against the First Republic of Georgia in order to rewrite history.

On May 15, at the Abkhazian rally held in Sukhumi, the issue of celebrating May 26 in Abkhazia was raised, on which the first secretary of the Abkhazia District Committee, Vladimir Khishba, explained to the people that there was no plan to celebrate Georgia's Independence Day[47]. In Tbilisi, May 26 was perceived as the commemoration of the day of independence, which should be returned to the Georgian people. In Abkhazia, he combined the anti-Abkhazian discourse - the national celebration of Georgians, a demonstration of unity and strength against the separatists. Abkhazians, both publicly and at official meetings, demanded that events not be held in Abkhazia, saying - "we must take into account the specific historical situation, the establishment of the Soviet government in Abkhazia in 1918, the birth and temporary failure of the Abkhaz commune, the Soviet government in Gudauta, Gagra and Samurzakhano".^[48]

Abkhazian historiography, then and now, considered the period of the First Republic of Georgia to be the years of occupation, therefore, May 26 did not have the same value for them as for Georgians, and the burgundy flag was perceived as "negative", especially in an already tense context, such as in May 1989.

Despite the opposition of the Abkhazians and Vladimir Khishba's statement, May 26, 1989, the day of Georgia's declaration of independence, was still celebrated in Abkhazia. It was celebrated with burgundy flags, processions and various anti-Soviet or national-nationalist slogans[49]. But in those days, the eyes of Soviet citizens were directed to televisions, where the first Congress of People's Deputies was broadcast live. For the first time, speakers were not censored and spoke what they wanted.

The speech of the Georgian representatives started on May 29. Professor Tamaz Gamkrelidze, in his short speech, recalled the independence of Georgia gained in 1918 and its loss by force. In his speech, he declared the Soviet government, in fact, the occupier: "The radical restructuring of the social and economic life of the USSR depends on significant changes in the overall political structure of the country. Based on the situation with the Georgian SSR, the following fundamental issues arise, namely, the condemnation of the annexation of the independent, democratic Republic of Georgia in February 1921 - as a gross violation of the May Agreement. On May 7, 1920, approved by Vladimir Lenin, the agreement concluded between equal sovereign states: Democratic Georgia and Soviet Russia. Recognition of the fundamental principles of this agreement in legally valid and modern conditions as a guarantee of ensuring the real and complete sovereignty of the Soviet Republic of Georgia".[50]

On May 30, he spoke again, this time devoting the entire session to April 9. During the days of the congress, Jumber Patiashvili, Givi Gumbaridze, Shalva Amonashvili and others also gave speeches. However, none of them touched the ongoing events in Abkhazia in depth.

On June 1, Vladislav Ardzinba also made a speech. Until now, Abkhazians had to write letters to Moscow in order to raise their demands - in the new reality, they were given a tribune that covered the entire Soviet Union (and not only). Ardzinba actually repeated what was written in Likhni's address. Historical and political accusations against Georgia, which ultimately led to the main demand - to restore the status of the Abkhazia SSR: "All these, taken together, became the reason to organize a sanctioned rally on March 18, 1989 in the village of Likhni, in the historical square, where issues important to the fate of the people have been decided since ancient times [...] The appeal was signed by about 32 thousand people, including heads of a number of higher party and Soviet bodies, all Abkhazian deputies. The appeal was also signed by more than 5 thousand Russians, Armenians, Greeks, Georgians and representatives of other peoples [...] The request is made to restore the status of the Soviet Socialist Republic, which Abkhazia had in 1921, during the life of V.I. Lenin".[51]

The political changes taking place in the Soviet Union had a direct impact on the political process taking place in Georgia. Abkhazians saw their future within the Soviet Union, which promised privileges based on ethnicity, therefore their political rhetoric matched that of Moscow and tried to prove their loyalty to the center.

Georgian society was motivated by the desire for independence, especially after the events of April 9. The Georgian deputation of Abkhazia of the SSR found itself in a difficult situation. On the one hand, they had to account for the "national awakening" coming from Tbilisi, and on the other hand, they had to stay within the logic of the Soviet political system, because it still existed, worked and had a great influence on the region. Abkhazians remained open supporters of perestroika and used the new opportunities it created. In such a contradictory situation, in Abkhazia, the Georgian political elite was caught in the middle of two fires and was unable to respond adequately to the current processes, which would at least ease the situation.

The first Congress of People's Deputies is a logical and open confirmation of what the two political centers in Georgia, Tbilisi and Gudauta, were striving for. Both of them, directly or indirectly, throughout the Soviet Union voiced the desire to change the territorial status. It is true that the main purpose of the speech of the Georgian deputies was related to the issues surrounding April 9, but we should not consider this issue beyond the struggle for independence.

Instead of Conclusion

On May 14, 1989, with the permission of the Ministry of Public Education of Georgia, the University of Abkhazia was divided into two. Later, the Ministry of Public Education of the Soviet Union considered this decision inadvisable, and reminded Tbilisi that the center was taking decisions on higher education institutions^[52]. This position of Moscow was not considered by anyone.

The division of the University of Abkhazia was structurally and bureaucratically not easy. As mentioned above, until now the academic staff was employed in both (all three) sectors. And after the division, many free hours remained, which demanded a teacher. In the Georgian sector, this was especially true for technical and foreign language subjects. [53]

Nevertheless, formally, 17 chairs were established in the Sokhumi branch of TSU. As of July 1, 1989, 2057 students transferred from the University of Abkhazia, half of them were scholarship holders, and they decided to accept 315 students for the 1989-90 semester.^[54]

The university was divided due to political motives, in which the consequences of the education system in Abkhazia were not even discussed in depth. On the other hand, we should not consider the university only as a place of higher education. In the Soviet national policy, great importance was attached to the creation and strengthening of national cultures and intelligentsia, which could not happen without higher institutions where new scientists were to be "produced".

In the Georgian-Abkhazian context, in order to strengthen their identity, the Abkhazians definitely needed to establish a local university, thereby perfecting the Abkhazian nation. In 1979, the opening of the University of Abkhazia (and not only) not only met the demands of the Abkhazians, but also increased it in the long term. The university and the knowledge produced in it further strengthened the self-identification of Abkhazians, which, in turn, strengthened local nationalism.

It should also be noted that the university in isolation could not be the problem - instead, Soviet national politics, which produced a primordial understanding of the nation, created a conflicting understanding of history in which history was turned into a weapon. In fact, for decades, in the University of Abkhazia, there was a constant scientific debate about who "belonged" to the land of Abkhazia (therefore, who should have privileges) - Georgian or Abkhazian. In fact, the university became a space in which two national historiographies confronted each other.

It is worth noting the fact that in the 1980s, none of the various political movements taking place on the territory of Georgia started from the working class of society - on the contrary, both the Abkhaz and Georgian movements were led by people with higher humanitarian education. On the other hand, the universities played a big role in the protests, it was the case in 1956, when in Georgia, in order to protect the name of Stalin, the students demonstrated, and it was the case in 1978, the so-called day of Georgian language protection.

In 1989, the Communist Party of Georgia was in a difficult situation. The Party had no experience in managing ethnic conflicts that started in the republic. At first, it only reaction was to hide the facts from the public - just as they used to do in any crisis. Different from the protests of 1978, when almost no information was provided to the public by the mass media, in 1989 the context was completely changed. During this period, Georgian and Abkhazian national movements were gaining strength; Nationalist rhetoric was already seeping into the press, and social grivances was brewing throughout the republic.

The April 9 tragedy caused complete radicalization of the Georgian society, which eliminated the space for compromise. The party could not respond to the increased demands of the Georgian society, although they slowly began to adopt the national rhetoric, but it was obvious that it was more like self-destruction - moreover, they were not even able to respond adequately against the Abkhazians. The Communist Party of Georgia, on the one hand, had to respond to the national demands of the society, confront Moscow, and in Abkhazia, stop the Abkhazian separatist movement, and on the other hand, it had to stand up for the ongoing changes in the center (Moscow).

Unlike the Georgian communists, the Abkhazians were in a much better situation - their nationalist rhetoric meshed well with the changes taking place at the center. Moscow, although during the existence of the USSR, did not reconsider the status of Abkhazia, however, the future development of the events it became obvious with whom Moscow took sides. 

In the end, Tbilisi met the demands of Georgian students and divided the university on ethnic grounds, thereby making a critical mistake for the Georgian Communist Party. This decision further worsened the situation in Abkhazia. This time, the Abkhazians started demonstrations. On July 15-16, it all turned into a bloody confrontation. During the two-day clashes, 22 people were killed and about 500 were injured in the entire territory of Abkhazia - the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict began to count its first victims.