A Difficult Kickoff

The new ruling elite, ascending to power as a result of the 2012 parliamentary elections, not only reaffirmed its commitment to Georgia's strategic choice, but took further by setting the goal of elevating the country's democratic development to a qualitatively different level and securing its place in the coveted European family. It is noteworthy that yet another transfer of power, which formally occurred as a result of elections, did not end there. The "experiments" conducted on Georgia's constitution in preceding years created a rather unusual political situation immediately aftermath the elections. Although the ruling party admitted to the defeat, and President Mikheil Saakashvili promised a smooth transition of power to the victorious coalition of Georgian Dream, the coexistence of the two political forces continued with competitive tension, carried forward by inertia until the next presidential elections.

The election campaign was so fiercely contested that no one was surprised when the post-election process, dubbed "cohabitation," began to bog down. For example, during the pre-election race, the former ruling party, under the leadership of the then President of Georgia, would routinely resort to the utilization of all state resources, frequently violating the law, to demonize its competitors. It is safe to assume that they partially succeeded in this goal. Specifically, they managed to convince parts of the Western political establishment and the media that the Georgian Dream together with its leader, was a pro-Russian political force that would veer off the pro-Western course upon coming to power. This impression was so strong that for a long time, members of the establishment could not understand why Georgian voters had replaced the government of the country considered the "beacon of democracy," and called the elections themselves "surprise elections."

As a result, just two weeks after the start of "cohabitation," the need arose to replace "politically biased" ambassadors in leading Western countries. The new government needed its own loyal embassies to pursue its foreign policy interests in important partner states. Otherwise, it would struggle to rid itself of the damning label of being a "Russian project," which had been attached to it by its main competitor, the United National Movement, in the lead-up of the election. Meanwhile, however, President Saakashvili delayed as long as possible the official approval of the ambassadors nominated by the Georgian Dream coalition.

At the same time, the Georgian Dream coalition sought to fulfill one of its key pre-election promises—restoring justice—which involved holding former government officials accountable for their violations of the law. Although there were no doubts about the appropriateness of prosecuting former officials among the wider public in Georgia, the president and leaders of the United National Movement skillfully manipulated public relations techniques and utilized their remaining connections to easily politicize the process. They also succeeded in convincing a significant part of the international community of this narrative. It should be noted that the Georgian Dream coalition itself, along with its subordinate judiciary, contributed to this perception by violating indictment procedures and improperly using pre-trial detention norms. Each manifestation of such flawed practices, which were perceived as a continuation of the country’s historically entrenched tradition of political vendetta, became a source of sharp criticism from Western partners. An attempt of one of the influential US congrassmen  to include a provision in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, stating that cooperation with Georgia should continue depending on "whether political persecution was halted and political prisoners were released”, drew particular attention.[1] For understandable reasons, the establishment was also particularly sensitive to cases involving the initiation of criminal proceedings or charges against the former president, Mikheil Saakashvili. Several high-profile cases even appeared in the U.S. State Department's annual human rights reports. As a result, unlike Saakashvili’s team during the Rose Revolution era, the new government did not initially enjoy the same level of trust from Western partners, which was crucial for a new, partly inexperienced administration. By this time, the personal, friendly relationships with Western leaders and other high-ranking officials, which had been a key asset, had practically ended.[2] Moreover, these relationships at the highest levels had been reduced to little more than exchange of written greetings on ceremonial occasions.

The Georgian Dream coalition faced a very difficult dilemma—on the one hand, it had to fulfill its pre-election promise to restore justice in the country, and on the other, it had to adhere to the Western development trajectory that had been established as far back as the 1990s and was strongly supported by the vast majority of the Georgian public. Achieving the first goal helped solidify the coalition's legitimacy domestically, but it raised questions about its international standing. However, a positive foreign reputation was crucial for achieving the second goal—further integration with European and Euro-Atlantic structures, which was not only a demand from within the country but had become a traditional expectation.

The responsibility for fulfilling the second goal was entrusted to the pro-Western political forces within the coalition (the Republican Party, Free Democrats) and Georgia's embassies in Western capitals. Diplomatic and lobbying efforts in Washington and Brussels took on particular importance, as these were the key battlegrounds in the confrontation between Georgian Dream and the United National Movement. The latter continued to undermine the reputation of the new government quite effectively, but events began to slowly but methodically develop in favor of the Georgian Dream.

Removing the "pro-Russian" label

The successful conduct of the 2013 presidential elections and the subsequent end of the infamous "cohabitation" period prompted the first positive reactions in Washington and Brussels toward the new government. Equally important was the launch of deep reforms in the justice sector. However, the key factor was the strong commitment of Georgia's new leadership to realizing its European and Euro-Atlantic aspirations and continuing its active participation in the NATO-led operation in Afghanistan.

The Georgian Dream government not only upheld every obligation previously made to NATO, the United States, or any Western government but also expressed even greater enthusiasm and readiness to deepen bilateral cooperation and pursue integration into NATO and the European Union. The culmination of these efforts was Georgia’s signing of the Association Agreement with the European Union on 27 June 2014, and the approval of the Substantial NATO-Georgia Package at the NATO summit that same year. The most important component of this package was the creation of a new NATO-Georgia cooperation mechanism—the Joint Training and Evaluation Center (JTEC).

At the summit, NATO member states recognized Georgia as the most interoperable partner among the aspiring countries and invited it to join the Enhanced Opportunity Partners Group alongside Sweden, Finland, Australia, and Jordan. All of this was achieved with the active support of the United States and other leading NATO member states. This progress effectively silenced any "doubting Thomases" who had questioned the new government’s commitment to European and Euro-Atlantic values.

Between 2014 and 2016, three plenary sessions and more than ten meetings of working groups were held within the framework of the U.S.-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership, covering various areas of cooperation. A clear trend emerged of successful dialogue within the working groups transforming into specific programs and projects. This laid the foundation for what became the most thematically diverse cooperation agenda that the U.S. had with any country in the region. Through USAID alone, approximately 40 programs are implemented annually in Georgia, with a total value of about $400 million and an annual budget exceeding $70 million.[3]

Notably, in 2015 and 2016, Georgia hosted the unprecedentedly large-scale military exercises Noble Partner twice in a row. These exercises involved 500 Georgian, 150 British, and 650 American soldiers, along with U.S. armored vehicles. These drills were a clear demonstration of the close and trustful relationship between the two countries.

By 2016, it can be said that the Georgian Dream coalition had largely succeeded in stabilizing relations with Western partners. Relations with the U.S. had reached a strategic level in many respects, serving as a model for the region. A significant event during this period was the visit of the U.S. Secretary of State to Georgia, which took place ahead of the NATO Warsaw Summit and reaffirmed U.S. support for Georgia’s aspirations to join the alliance. However, its most important outcome was the signing of a memorandum on deepening defense and security cooperation between the U.S. and Georgia. This was the most significant programmatic document signed since the Charter on Strategic Partnership. The memorandum reaffirmed and expanded long-term and effective cooperation between the U.S. and Georgia in areas such as enhancing defense capabilities, military and security cooperation, and information sharing. Based on this memorandum, the Georgia Readiness Program was soon launched, marking the beginning of a qualitatively different process of training and equipping Georgian military to strengthen its defense capabilities. As outlined in the memorandum, Georgia would also be able to procure defence  weaponry.

The driving force behind all of this was the growing alignment of values and strategic interests between Georgia and its Western partners. This same trend became evident in relations with the European Union, ultimately paving the way to the historic decision on visa liberalization in 2017. Before that, the Georgian Dream party, having grown stronger within the coalition, ran independently in the 2016 parliamentary elections and secured a constitutional majority. By this time, the "Russian project" label, which the United National Movement had attached to Georgian Dream, had effectively been shed. Even though several controversial figures from the previous government, including Mikheil Saakashvili, had already been prosecuted or had gone into exile, by this point, the public's fervor for "restoring justice" had significantly diminished. However, for many supporters of the new government, there was still a sense that "the job wasn't fully done." However, it was widely understood that this was the price the Georgian Dream coalition had to pay to "normalize relations" with Western partners.[4]

Pro-Western Course Amid Political Polarization

During the time Georgian Dream coalition was in power (2012-2016), the confrontation with the United National Movement (UNM) was not as intense. The government was composed of a coalition of several parties, which gave the political scene a more pluralistic democratic character. However, before the 2016 elections, these parties broke away from the Georgian Dream and did not make it into the next parliament. In this new situation, politics once again became binary, with increasing tension between the two main parties. The situation intensified further in 2018 when Mikheil Saakashvili, who was active in Ukraine, was convicted in absentia for abuse of power and sentenced to imprisonment. Nevertheless, the Georgian Dream continued to make significant strides toward European and Euro-Atlantic integration. For instance, the first action taken by the 2016 parliament, where the Georgian Dream held 115 seats, was to reaffirm the country’s commitment to its European and Euro-Atlantic course through a special resolution. It is also noteworthy that Georgia became a forerunner in the Eastern Partnership initiative of the European Union due to its reform efforts, even taking the lead within the Associated Trio format. Importantly, in 2018, at the initiative of the Georgian Dream, Georgia's European and Euro-Atlantic aspirations were enshrined in the constitution (Article 78), obligating all state institutions to work toward this goal with maximum effort.

This trend was undoubtedly supported by Western partners and close cooperation with them. Concurrently, Georgia continued its legal battles against Russia in international courts, submitting its fourth lawsuit in 2018.[5] It also continued to present annual resolutions at the United Nations General Assembly, which carried a distinctly anti-Russian spirit.[6]

However, all of this was happening against the backdrop of increasing political polarization within the country. The competition between the main parties was no longer a simple contest. The confrontation became increasingly harsh and bitter. It was evident that the struggle for power had been renewed with new vigor. In this confrontation, both parties’ motivations were apparent: each sought to present the fight as if there were no alternatives, forcing voters to choose between them. The Georgian Dream did not welcome the emergence of another political force that could gain the public's trust, while the United National Movement aimed to retain its exclusive right to form the next government and remain the sole alternative to the Georgian Dream. This status would ensure the preservation of its social base and the stability of its financial resources.

The sharp escalation of confrontation between the main political parties began in June 2019, during the events of the so-called Gavrilov Night.^[7] According to local and international non-governmental organizations, disproportionate police force was used against the civil protests. During the dispersal of the protest, 240 citizens were taken to hospitals, including 80 law enforcement officers. Two of the injured lost their eyes, which caused widespread public outrage. As a result of the protest wave, the Speaker of the Georgian Parliament, Irakli Kobakhidze, resigned, and the Georgian Parliament member who initiated the assembly in Georgia gave up his mandate. In an attempt to calm the situation, on 24 June 2019, Bidzina Ivanishvili, the chairman of the Georgian Dream, announced at a special briefing that the 2020 parliamentary elections would be held using a fully proportional electoral system with a zero-threshold barrier. The opposition who had long demanded such an arrangement, welcomed the announcement. However, despite this promise, the Georgian Dream did not pass the necessary constitutional amendments. Following this breach of promise by the Georgian Dream, protests and the picketing of the Parliament began, which were repeatedly dispersed by special troops. The phenomenon of political polarization became a widespread topic of discussion, as the opposing political forces were unable to reach a compromise. After several weeks of protests, the diplomatic corps stepped in the negotiations. On 8 March 2020, after prolonged discussions, the opposition and the ruling party reached an agreement on a new electoral model, which stipulated that 120 members of the Parlaiment would be elected through proportional lists and 30 through a majoritarian system.

Despite the agreement on the electoral model, the elections themselves were highly contentious. Nine political groups that surpassed the threshold to gain representation in the legislature rejected the official results, accusing the Georgian Dream of buying votes, intimidation, and fraud. The situation was further dramatized by the incorrect results of the parallel counting conducted by the non-governmental organization International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy.[8] Amidst the public outcry, international observers reported that despite numerous violations, including the misuse of administrative resources by the ruling party, the overall election results were free and competitive. Nevertheless, the opposition, led by the United National Movement, continued its protests. They refused to take their parliamentary seats and entered a boycott mode, raising concerns about the paralysis of parliamentary activities.

Waning Transformative Power of the Pro-Western Vector

In several instances, Georgia's European aspirations allowed the European Union and the United States to use the country's pro-European geopolitical vector as leverage and play a mediating role in alleviating Georgia's internal political crises. The peaceful transfer of power during the 2003 Rose Revolution and Mikheil Saakashvili's decision to peacefully acknowledge defeat in 2012 are examples of such instances. However, recently, this leverage has weakened, as evidenced by the government's public rejection of counsel from Brussels and Washington.

In 2021, with the assistance of the United States, the European Union attempted to play a mediating role amid an escalating political crisis surrounding parliamentary elections. As a result of the significant diplomatic efforts of Charles Michel, the President of the European Council, representatives of the parties signed an agreement that ended the opposition's boycott and paved the way for further electoral and judicial reforms. However, the agreement soon fell victim to political polarization. The United National Movement did not join the agreement, after which the Georgian Dream party refused to comply with its terms, arguing that it lacked support from its main opponent. Some believe that the absence of the United National Movement's signature on the agreement was effectively used as an excuse by the Georgian Dream, which did not want to take on the commitment to implement the judicial reforms outlined in the agreement, thus risking the control over the judiciary.[9]

The mediation experience provided by the President of the European Council clearly demonstrated that Georgia's integration programs into European and Euro-Atlantic structures were already lacking sufficient transformative power. Another example of this was the unprecedented case when the government turned down a loan in the amount of 75 million EUR after the European Union had threatened the Georgian authorities to cease its financial support should the latter fail to implement the refom of the judiciary. Although Georgia has always needed and still needs, loans from the European Union, the Georgian Dream government prioritized its own interests and continued the process of appointing judges the way it deemed politically advantageous.

Another serious incident occurred on 12-13 September 2021, when thousands of covert recordings of conversations involving clergy, Georgian journalists, opposition politicians, foreign diplomats, and public officials were disseminated on the Internet. The files contained details of conversations between the EU ambassador, Karl Hartzell, American diplomats, the Israeli ambassador, and other diplomats. Ambassador Hartzell asserted that Georgia’s alleged surveillance on diplomats “is questionable from the point of view of Vienna Convention and we would not see it as natural that a close friend and partner like Georgia would be engaged in the activity like that against us.”[10] The Georgian government turned a blind eye to the diplomatic corps's concerns and not only failed to investigate the incident but also disregarded Ambassador Hartzell, who had not even been properly bid farewell upon completing his mission in Georgia.

By the end of 2021, the already precarious political situation in Georgia was further exacerbated by the arrest of Mikheil Saakashvili who had secretly and illegally crossed the country’s border. This incident strained relations with Ukraine, as well as with influential politicians in Europe and the United States, who were generally skeptical about the Georgian Dream party. Once a reliable partner, Georgia appeared oddly positioned in the eyes of its international partners, to put it mildly.

War in Ukraine, European Perspective, and the Trilemma of the Georgian Dream

In February 2022, Russia's full-scale military aggression in Ukraine significantly altered Georgia's relations with the outside world. First and foremost, this affected the already strained relations with Ukraine. On one hand, Georgia provided humanitarian aid to Ukraine, and the Georgian people warmly welcomed Ukrainian migrants. Additionally, Georgia supported pro-Ukrainian resolutions on international platforms everywhere. On the other hand, the Georgian government has refused to send Georgian volunteers to fight in Ukraine in an organized manner, as has also rejected calls from some Ukrainian officials to take advantage of the situation and open a "second front"[11] against Russia with the aim of reclaiming Abkhazia and South Ossetia/Tskhinvali region. The Ukrainian leadership was outraged by the positions of the Georgian Dream government and stepped up efforts to compromise the Georgian government and specifically Bidzina Ivanishvili on the international stage, including demands to sanction him. Ukraine recalled its ambassador from Georgia and expelled the Georgian ambassador. It is noteworthy that the Ukrainian side in its campaign against the Georgian government has used and continues to use as a key argument the allegedly illegal imprisonment of its citizen Mikheil Saakashvili and his inhumane treatment. It can be said that today official relations between Georgia and Ukraine have reached their lowest point, which is an anomaly considering the long history of Georgian-Ukrainian friendship, including the post-Soviet period.

In addition to Ukraine, relations with Western partners have also changed, although at first these relationships improved. The fact is that the geopolitical situation caused by the war led to the European Union opening up prospects for membership for the countries of the Associated Trio, and even on an accelerated basis. Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia were invited to submit applications for membership. The proposal was met with great enthusiasm by the Georgian public.[12] The Georgian government, under the supervision of the Prime Minister, promptly prepared and submitted the application.[13] On 17 June 17, the European Commission prepared a decision that was approved by the European Council on 23, stating that Georgia would be granted European perspective instead of candidate status for EU membership.[14] This decision took into account the rejection of the in-depth democratic reforms demonstrated by the Georgian Dream government in recent times, as well as the rigidity while ignoring the advice and calls from Western partners in their efforts to help the country overcome  political polarization. Therefore, Georgia received recommendations and guidelines regarding priority reforms. Twelve priorities were defined as necessary preconditions for obtaining candidate status for EU membership. The Georgian government could not hide its dissatisfaction, emphasizing that in all respects it was ahead of the other two countries in the Associated Trio, which had received candidate status as a reward for "participation in the war." By "in all respects," the government referred to obligations fulfilled in accordance with the Association Agenda, which were mainly of a technical nature, including aspects of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA). In this regard, Georgia was indeed at the forefront of the Associated Trio. However, this circumstance was not sufficient for the EU to grant candidate status. This grievance, of course, damaged the relations between Georgia and the EU. In the meantime, however, a new problem emerged in these relations that proved to be fundamental. The aforementioned twelve priorities involved deep reforms in sensitive areas such as the electoral environment, judiciary, prosecution, anti-corruption service, oligarchic governance, and others. It is these areas that form the foundation on which the Georgian Dream government stands. The issue of maintaining firm grip over power is existentially significant for a political force seeking a fourth term in office. Logically, a dilemma arose—pro-European reforms or the preservation of power? This dilemma, however, naturally adds a third task: maintaining peace against the backdrop of the ongoing war in Ukraine.  Thus, a meta task emerged, a kind of trilemma, which can be formulated as follows: maximize the utilization of the opportunities for realizing the European perspective while ensuring that the pursuit of this path does not weaken the ability to control power and, simultaneously, avoid the projection of Russian aggression onto Georgia in the context of the ongoing military confrontation in Ukraine.

Global War Party and Candidate Status

Within the Georgian Dream party and its leader, Bidzina Ivanishvili, a fear seems to have taken hold that the United National Movement, with the assistance of external forces and through internal destabilization, could return to power. Considering that the Georgian Dream failed to fulfill its promises of social and economic well-being made before the 2012 elections, and slogans like "Misha will come" and "the bloody 9 years will return" will lose their impact over time, it has become evident that, unlike in previous years, holding on to power will no longer be so easy. The first alarm bell rang during the 2018 presidential elections when the candidate supported by the Georgian Dream, Salome Zourabichvili, barely won. In light of this fear, the demands and assessments from European and American partners regarding the implementation of the 12-point program were increasingly perceived as hostile by the Georgian Dream. To neutralize Western criticism, the Power of the People party was quickly created. It consisted of MPs freshly out of the Georgian Dream, and tasked with “parrying” criticism from representatives of the US and European institutions through direct (non-diplomatic) rhetoric. The primary targets of this new rhetoric became US Ambassador Kelly Degnan and the European Parliament, where several active members initiated the adoption of a series of critical resolutions. Often, these resolutions urged the government to free the imprisoned Mikheil Saakashvili. One of the main “pieces of evidence" that the Power of the People operated in response was the alleged demand from the members of the conspiracy against Georgia to open a "second front." This is how the Global War Party appeared in its rhetoric, which later became established also in the Georgian Dream vocabulary. In addition to countering external criticism, Power of the People was tasked with testing legal measures to neutralize criticism from the civil sector. One such legal measure was the draft Foreign Agents Law, which the parliament attempted to pass in March 2023. A similar law enacted in Russia a decade earlier had become increasingly stringent over the years and eventually evolved into a powerful repressive tool against free civil society and critical media. For this reason, the law was labeled "Russian" by the Georgian public, mainly by young people, and was heavily protested in the streets. Due to public pressure, the ruling party dropped the bill and stated that it would no longer revisit the issue.[15]

In the meantime, tensions were escalating between the President of Georgia and the government. The Georgian Dream did not like the emergence of Salome Zourabichvili, whom they had once supported, as an independent political actor increasingly critical of the government. Furthermore, the President's growing diplomatic resources became evident as she successfully began to establish connections with high-ranking European leaders. These efforts were primarily aimed at raising awareness among Europeans regarding Georgia and its people's European aspirations. Of course, the Georgian Dream disapproved of the President's role since likely saw her as a potential strong political competitor. Consequently, they obstructed her foreign visits by denying her prior approval.

Despite this, the President managed to undertake several high-level visits to leading European capitals. The Georgian Dream seized upon this situation, and a representative of the parliamentary majority submitted a motion for the impeachment of the President to the Constitutional Court, which was signed by 80 members of parliament. Although the Constitutional Court stated that the President did not have the right to undertake foreign visits without the government's consent, the impeachment did not proceed, as the ruling party failed to gather the necessary votes in the Georgian Parliament due to the efforts of the MPs from opposition parties.

At the same time, amid public outcry, working process continued on the implementation of the 12-point reform program. The opposition, along with Western observers and politicians, continued to criticize the government for its inadequate commitment to carrying out the reforms. The government, on its part, sought to justify itself. All of this occurred against a backdrop of acute political polarization. Ultimately, the European Commission determined that the Georgian government had managed to address only three out of twelve priority issues, raising concerns that the country might not receive candidate status. At the same time, the government actively disseminated the message about the alleged injustice of the decision at the time, which affected only Georgia, and not the other members of the Associated Trio, who had been granted the status. Interestingly, a significant portion of society shared this sentiment, although they believed that all twelve points should eventually be fulfilled. Ultimately, taking into account the geopolitical context and the strong pro-European sentiments of the Georgian public, the European Council granted Georgia the status of a candidate country for EU membership,[16] leading to widespread public joy. The government made every effort to present this decision by the European Council as its own achievement, although European politicians and commentators noted that the decisive factor was the desire and expectation of the Georgian society.[17] Additionally, emphasis was placed on the role of the President and her personal efforts in lobbying for the candidate status for Georgia.

Nevertheless, it was evident that the Georgian Dream would attempt to exploit the historic achievement of obtaining candidate status for its own benefit ahead of the elections. It is also noteworthy that the health condition of Mikhail Saakashvili, a privileged prisoner who had previously been a constant topic of speculation for the government’s internal and external opponents, significantly improved, and this issue was unexpectedly removed from the agenda. Soon after, the European Court of Human Rights ruled in the case of "Saakashvili v. Georgia" that there was no basis for doubting the fairness of the criminal proceedings against the former president of Georgia.[18] Amid all this, the United National Movement grew weaker as a competing force due to an internal crisis, leading to its split.  Considering all of this, many believed that the Georgian Dream was guaranteed victory in the upcoming parliamentary elections scheduled in 2024. The ruling party’s representatives did not hide their intention to regain a constitutional majority as a result of the elections. However, at the end of 2023, unexpectedly, Bidzina Ivanishvili, the leader of the Georgian Dream, decided to emerge from the shadows and return to active politics once again. The stated reason of the comeback was the need to draw more attention to the party’s political team, which, under weak opposition, might succumb to temptations of corruption and/or risks of internal conflicts. This would jeopardize the party's aforementioned goal of obtaining the necessary votes for a constitutional majority in the upcoming elections.

Indeed, about a month later, Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili, who had been associated with several corruption scandals, was replaced, which seemingly heralded the beginning of a crackdown on elite corruption. However, subsequent events showed that processes did not move in this direction. As a result, the true motive behind Ivanishvili’s third comeback to politics remained inexplicable.

Ivanishvili’s Dream

It seems that Bidzina Ivanishvili has fully realized the aforementioned trilemma (retaining power – securing peace – European integration) and deemed it impossible to simultaneously fulfill all three tasks without damaging his own interests. Therefore, he opted to reshape this overarching task in a way that would allow for realizing his (personal) interests, which are primarily related to his own well-being and guaranteed security. Ivanishvili believes he has made invaluable contributions to the country and society, not only through his multi-billion philanthropic endeavors but also by liberating Georgia from "Saakashvili's tyranny" and ensuring the longest period of peace in the nation’s modern history. Consequently, he feels he is entitled to remain in Georgia indefinitely, to be held in perpetual esteem, and to engage in activities that bring him joy—such as continuing direct or indirect business operations in sectors like finance, construction, real estate, restaurant networks, agriculture, and pharmacy. Moreover, it is widely known that he has a passion for collecting works of art, as well as exotic animals and plants. It should also be noted that Ivanishvili has never shown an inclination to enjoy luxurious properties (villas, yachts, private jets) abroad. He has always exhibited a strong emotional bond with Georgia—particularly with Tbilisi, Chorvila, Ureki, and Abastumani—where he feels completely at home. This combination of desires and passions could be referred to as the "Ivanishvili Dream."[19] Importantly, Ivanishvili believes he has many like-minded supporters, which legitimizes his aspirations and desires. However, he is also aware of the forces and circumstances that could obstruct the realization of the "Ivanishvili Dream." For instance, the United National Movement still looms large. Despite the party's weakening, the "collective National Movement" and its leader, Mikhail Saakashvili, remain active. Additionally, international supporters of this party remain active in politics. Most significantly, the tradition of "political vendetta" has not disappeared from the country,  which was contributed by Georgian Dream itself. As a result, the subconscious fear of retaliation from a future government is deeply ingrained in Ivanishvili and the political team of the Georgian Dream. There seems to be no reliable guarantee against such retaliation should they transition into the opposition. Therefore, the foremost priority, emerging from the aforementioned trilemma, is the maintenance of power at all costs, which can be said to have existential significance. Moreover, the goal of retaining power is an indefinite one, at least extending into the period following the 2028 elections.

Previously, Ivanishvili cited the most important future dream as the period when "Georgian Dream" would have to transition to the opposition, which he described as "one of the most interesting periods for the further development of democracy in the country."[20] However, it seems that, in his view, this time will not arrive any time soon.

To realize the "Ivanishvili Dream," merely holding onto power is insufficient. Considering the ongoing war in Ukraine,[21] Russia's imperial behavior poses a significant threat to Georgia, and by extension, to the "Ivanishvili Dream." Reducing the risk of military escalation necessitates building specific relationships with Russia.

Regrettably, despite Georgia's longstanding efforts, the West has been unable to place the country under its security umbrella. Additionally, since the energy corridor that passes through Georgia was established 20-25 years ago, there have been no substantial American or European investments in the country, which could have served as an additional security guarantee. As a result, Georgia remains perpetually at risk of aggression from Russia. At the same time, the ABC of Geopolitics is that, in such circumstances, small and weak states are often forced to adjust their foreign policies. If they fail to do so, the likelihood of crises similar to that of 2008 increases. In this context, the Georgian Dream government is walking a tightrope: on one hand, it provides political support to Ukraine in collaboration with the international community and aligns with the regime of international sanctions against Russia;[22] on the other hand, it has refrained from imposing bilateral sanctions on Russia. Many argue that strengthening trade relations with Russia, along with the influx of tourists and migrants, has not only stabilized the country's economy but also significantly increased its dependence on the Russian state. This growing reliance may compromise the balance needed to walk a very fine line.  

The "adjustment" paradigm also includes strengthened relations with China. Generally, the inclusion of China in the development of the Middle Corridor represents an attempt to balance the interests of powerful international actors, including Russia. A notable example of this is the selection of a Chinese company for the construction tender of the Anaklia deep-sea port.[23] However, these efforts are perceived as “kissing the ring” of Russia rather than an attempt to balance interests. Given the lessons learned from the 2008 experience and the devastating consequences of the ongoing war in Ukraine, it is easy to envision what Russia might do in the event of conflict with Georgia, as well as how effective Western assistance might be. Therefore, the need to preserve peace at any cost becomes obvious. Obviously, this is also a task of existential importance, both for Ivanishvili and the country. This necessity for peace is reflected in the rhetoric of Georgian Dream representatives during debates with opposition parties and the media. Alongside traditional narratives about “Misha is coming” and the “bloody nine years,” they manipulate the message of “What do you want, war?”

The third task—implementing the necessary reforms for Georgia's EU membership—faces fundamental challenges, as it contradicts “Ivanishvili’s Dream”. As soon as the implementation of the 12-point program began, it became evident that the ruling party lacked the will to thoroughly carry out the required reforms due to fears of weakening its power pillars. This hesitation continues in the fulfillment of the so-called "nine prerequisites," which are crucial for opening up negotiations on EU membership.[24] Moreover, it appears that the political team has decided to do everything possible to increase the Georgian Dream's electoral chances of achieving a constitutional majority in Parliament, even at the cost of damaging the pro-European reform process. Presumably, the preparation of the ground should have been done in anticipation of the next elections (in 2028)[25]. Despite public opinion polls showing around 80% support for EU integration, moving toward the European Union is no longer a top priority for the Georgian Dream.

Thus, the aforementioned trilemma has undergone transformation. It is safe to say that B. Ivanishvili returned to politics with the plan to implement this modified trilemma.

Ivanishvili’s Plan and the „Russian Law“

Mr. Ivanishvili's plan aims to create the most comfortable electoral environment for the Georgian Dream until the weakened and fragmented opposition is engaged in determining the pre-election configuration and has fewer resources for resistance. Furthermore, the Georgian Dream is rushing to implement the plan to present a fait accompli to long-term monitoring missions when they begin to monitor the electoral environment.

The implementation of the plan started with a personnel casting – Prime Minister Gharibashvili and the chairman of the Georgian Dream party, Irakli Kobakhidze, swapped offices, apparently according to B. Ivanishvili's will. At a first glance, Mr. Ivanishvili preferred a legally educated and better rhetor (Kobakhidze) as the head of the government for the upcoming political struggle over a "corrupt" and rigid leader (Gharibashvili). At the same time, to hedge the risks of an expected further deterioration in the shaky relations with European politicians, which is also part of the plan, the new Prime Minister soon embarked on his first official visit to Brussels, thereby emphasizing the priority of the European path for the Georgian Dream government. On the outside, the visit left a positive impression. However, this was only the initial stage of the plan.

It should be stated from the outset that the implementation of the plan did not start out of nowhere. The amendment of electoral legislation began the previous year, which would give the Georgian Dream an advantage during the elections. The changes concerned the election procedure for the chairman and other members of the Central Election Commission (CEC); the abolition of the opposition party representative quota for the CEC deputy, etc. The latest changes were approved in February 2024. These amendments created the risk that the elections would be conducted by a one-party, biased, and government-controlled election administration.

Also, the previous year, amendments to the Law on Political Associations of Citizens were initiated, which continued in the spring of 2024. With these changes, legal entities were prohibited from transfering money to parties in the form of donations.[26] After the oversight of parties fell under the mandate of the Anti-Corruption Bureau, obtaining information on political finance oversight activities became complicated. Critical non-governmental organizations point out that "the process of monitoring on cases of direct and indirect funding of parties by the Anti-Corruption Bureau is not transparent, which poses a threat that the Bureau interprets the law unjustifiably broadly and is politically motivated." [27] Furthermore, gender quotas for party lists were abolished, which primarily benefited the Georgian Dream, especially against the backdrop of the abolition of single-mandate districts. The most important thing that B. Ivanishvili’s plan provides for is the failure to implement one of the EU’s nine prerequisites – strengthening the judicial system. Specifically, this concerns the investigation of the integrity of individuals in leading positions within the judicial system and their ownership of assets incompatible with their official income. This issue became particularly relevant after the U.S. Department of State imposed sanctions on several influential Georgian judges in March 2023. The fact of the sanctions was perceived extremely negatively by the Georgian Dream and may also be considered a starting point for a new phase of deterioration in Georgian-US relations.

According to B. Ivanishvili's plan, the next step is a "cleansing" of the electoral field. At the beginning of April, the state registry canceled the Conservative Movement ("Alt-Info"). It is assumed that Alt-Info in particular, like other groups that have been encouraged in the past, is already perceived by the government as an obstacle in the upcoming elections in order to achieve the goal of maximum voter mobilization. This is evidenced by the fact that, according to the latest polls, only one percent of voters support Alt-Info.[28] Nevertheless, it seems that even this one percent holds significance for the Georgian Dream.[29] Legal experts and political analysts consider the dissolution of the Alt-Info party a dangerous symptom for everyone regardless of a stance toward this pro-Russian, ultra-right group. The logic is as follows: if the government can so easily dissolve one party, it may do the same to others at any time.[30] Western partners have not yet given due attention to this fact.

In general, it is commonly known that the Georgian Dream claims an exclusive choice for conservative-minded voters, not only at the expense of attracting Alt-Info voters. The government primarily hopes for the support of the Church, just like during election periods under previous administrations.[31] Additionally, in this context, the Parliament's adoption of the anti-queer law and the initiation of a package of bills on "Family Values and Protection of Minors" should also be viewed from this angle.

One of the key issues in Mr. Ivanishvili's plan is to "silence" those actors in the civil sector who are most critical of the Georgian Dream government and have a significant influence on shaping public opinion. These are institutionally and financially strong non-governmental organizations, so-called watchdogs, that primarily work on strengthening the electoral system and democratic institutions. The party believes that these organizations use funding received from abroad to foster anti-state and radical sentiments in the country, and therefore are working towards a "revolutionary scenario." These organizations and the groups they support are also referred to as "agentura," – a Soviet cliché for an invisible network of agents. The most frequently named donors of these organizations are the National Endowment for Democracy (USA) and the European Endowment for Democracy, both of which have made invaluable contributions to shaping and developing civil society in the post-Soviet space, including in Georgia. In this context, a significant target of B. Ivanishvili's plan is critical media, which, although biased, plays an extremely important role in balancing pro-government media propaganda and facilitating informed decision-making by voters.

Unexpectedly for many, precisely in order to silence the above-mentioned “inconvenient subjects,” the Georgian Dream in early April once again initiated the law on foreign agents, which was withdrawn previous year. Popularly known as the Russian law, this time it was presented under the name Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence. It was the intent and purpose of silencing critical NGOs and media,[32] rather than any specific clause or provision of the bill, that turned out to be the main reason forthe "Russian Law" label. Although the new version of the draft law does not include the term foreign agent and instead proposes the term "organization promoting the interests of a foreign power," this action immediately provoked public protests that grew increasingly larger every day. The police violently dispersed peaceful demonstrators several times, and there were instances of disproportionate force being used against the protesters. Simultaneously, a campaign of intimidation was underway against opponents of the law, including politicians, activists, and ordinary citizens. This included violent attacks, threatening calls, and abusive messages. It created the impression that the ruling party and government encouraged and incited hatred against opponents, either directly or indirectly supporting many such incidents or simply turning a blind eye.[33]

Soon, Georgia, especially its capital, found itself at the center of widespread attention from political circles and media in the U.S. and Europe. Authoritarian aspirations in the actions and intentions of the Georgian Dream did not go unnoticed by international partners, primarily the U.S. and the European Union. Consequently, critical statements directed at the party's leaders and government officials increased. The reincarnated law was primarily the subject of criticism. Everyone was curious to know why this step was taken now when the victory of the Georgian Dream in the parliamentary elections was hardly questioned. Overall, what was the need for a separate law when ensuring the transparency of foreign funding could have already been achieved under existing legislation? B. Ivanishvili did not delay and, in his public address on April 29, clearly and candidly articulated the purpose and reason for the reincarnation of the draft law: "Let no one have the illusion that we would be left in peace for long without this draft law. Let me remind you how fiercely they have tried to undermine the Central Election Commission and the court during all this time. In court, they still demand so-called vetting, that is, the introduction of foreign management, which should carry out repressions and fill the judicial system with “agentura.” Such a purpose was also served by the demands related to the Central Election Commission, which the Parliament of Georgia rightly did not consider... [Moreover], premature expenditure of the necessary [protest] energy will completely deplete the strength of the already weakened “agentura.” Accordingly, the timing for the initiation of the draft law is perfectly chosen.

It is clear that B. Ivanishvili is extremely cautious with the pillars of power and considers the uncontrollable wave of protests to be the greatest danger. But who is it that is "not letting" the ruling elite, which seeks to consolidate power, breathe easy and aims to muddy the waters to complicate things for the Georgian Dream, despite the opposition's weakness? Apparently, when B. Ivanishvili was developing his plans to return to politics, he already had his own answers to these questions.

The Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence aka the Russian Law has become a symbolic stumbling block between, on one hand, the internally authoritarian political force striving for the consolidation of power and, on the other hand, the society aspiring for Georgia's European future and its geopolitical partners.[34] Despite the fact that the talking heads of the Georgian Dream are trying in every way to justify themselves or evade every new accusation, calls from democratic governments and international organizations for the repeal of the law are becoming increasingly widespread. Among various appeals, it is noteworthy that during the session of the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva, a joint statement from 36 countries called on the Georgian government to “revoke the Law  on Transparency of Foreign Influence”, to end the campaign of intimidation against those objecting to the law and protect freedom of expression, association, and peaceful assembly."[35]

Once Again about the Global War Party

Concurrently with mass protests, the rhetoric of the leaders of the Georgian Dream has become increasingly confrontational towards Georgia’s Western partners. For the first time in modern Georgian history, a government-initiated anti-Western propaganda has emerged and developed. Myths about the so-called Global War Party have spread with renewed energy, claiming that it is desperately trying to drag Georgia into war with Russia. However, unless the naive calls made by a few unexperienced Ukrainian officials towards the Georgian government in the first half of 2022 are considered, there is no open-source information available regarding similar calls from Western partners. If such information was transmitted through closed channels, the government remains silent about it, effectively urging us to take their word for it and believe in its existence.

Presumably,  by introducing the concept of the Global War Party, the government is trying, on the one hand, to argue against Western politicians and institutions that are critically inclined towards the backsliding of Georgian democracy, and on the other hand, to create a sense in society that Georgia's identity and sovereignty are under threat and need protection. Meanwhile, it turns out that protection is needed not from Russia, which has seized 20% of the territories, but from the Global War Party, whose members do not somehow include Russia or Russian politicians. And in general, who is this Global War Party? When did it emerge? Where has it been in previous years? Why have we not heard anything about it until now? Who else, apart from Georgia, is under its threat? Why is no one else complaining about attempts to undermine sovereignty by the Global War Party? It seems that the Georgian Dream has no answers to these questions in its message box. Instead, they tell us that the Global War Party consists of "very dangerous people, to the extent that even mentioning their name is risky”. Like Freemasons, they supposedly have a "critical influence" on the United States and the European Union. This group has been fiercly opposing Bidzina Ivanishvili for years, as he has ended their "agentura rule" in Georgia.[36] The point is that when you don’t dare or can’t bring charges of “war-mongering” against a specific person or institution (the President of a foreign country, the State Department, the White House, a major commercial bank, etc.),  then resorting to conspiracy theories becomes the easiest solution. Thus, the myth of the Global War Party emerged, which is supposedly connected to Western institutions by a thousand invisible threads and deliberately influences the decision-making processes there. For some reason, the "victims" of this influence are sometimes the U.S. ambassador, sometimes European parliamentarians, sometimes a Swiss commercial bank, etc. Moreover, this influence, strangely enough, appears only in connection with issues concerning Georgia. Well, then why don't other governments complain?[37]

Disruption of Strategic Relations

It is unfortunate that the anti-Western propaganda is not an isolated phenomenon in the confrontation with Western partners. The deteriorating rhetoric has also reflected in the actual relationships with both the United States and the European Union. At the beginning of May, an unprecedented event came to light. It became known that the Georgian side refused a proposal from the U.S. side to hold high-level consultations in Washington with the participation of the Prime Minister of Georgia, where, in addition to the developments surrounding the Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence, issues of strategic cooperation between the two countries would also be discussed. For those familiar with planning high-level visits, it is easy to understand that the protocol was intended to hold meetings at the White House, at least at the level of the U.S. Vice President. Given that Vice President Kamala Harris's foreign policy portfolio did not cover the Caucasus region, it is safe to say that the meetings were to take place at the level of President Joe Biden himself. For Georgian diplomacy, contact at the highest level with the U.S. President has always been a remarkable event, as it provides a unique opportunity to address issues of vital importance to our country. Despite the close partnership between the two countries, planning and organizing such meetings is not easy. In this case, the initiative came from the American side, which further increased the significance of the meeting for Georgia.

This strange step was followed by a visit to Georgia by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, James O'Brien, which represented another attempt to resolve the misunderstandings in bilateral relations. During the meeting with the Prime Minister, which was the main event of the visit, the parties "could not understand each other." The Prime Minister spoke on behalf of Bidzina Ivanishvili, as the leader of the Georgian Dream himself refused to meet the US dignitary. The conversation seemingly fell into the framework of the aforementioned conspiracy theory. At his final briefing, flabbergasted O’Brien said that „for such an influential individual [Ivanishvili] to be this badly misinformed is shocking and disappointing. “If the law [on foreign influence] goes forward out of conformity with EU norms and it undermines democracy here, and there is violence against peaceful protesters, then we’ll see restrictions coming from the US, financial and travel restrictions on individuals responsible for these actions, and their families”, he noted further.[38] Later, following the law's second reading, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced a visa restriction policy for undermining democracy in Georgia and a thorough review of U.S.-Georgia cooperation.[39] On the same day, American senators introduced a bill in the Senate called the Georgian People’s Act (GPA) which envisages a series of measures in response to the Georgian government’s recent acts and policies, including sanctions on Georgian officials, a review of foreign assistance, and a reassessment of the existing bilateral relations.[40] A bill of similar content, titled the MEGOBARI Act, was also introduced in the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress.[41] It is noteworthy that these decisions were made before the third reading of the Transparency of Foreign Influence law and had a preventive character, hoping that common sense would prevail within the Georgian Dream and that the law would ultimately not be adopted. In response, the Prime Minister stated: "It is cynical to call a law that is being considered in the Congress a MEGOBARI act when it talks about outright hostility. I would call this law the DAUDZINEBELI (in this context – sworn enemy) Act; it would fit better. This will not be beneficial for the health of Georgian-American relations."[42] Ultimately, despite the street protests of hundreds of thousands of people, the law was adopted by Parliament in the third reading, followed by the first tranche of sanctions announced by the Secretary of State.[43]

For its part, the European Union is also preparing a document on sanctions. According to preliminary information,[44] the document includes, on one hand, short-term measures, and on the other hand, steps that may be taken provided that the situation in Georgia does not improve in the future. The first category includes measures that can be taken immediately by both Brussels and individual member states of the EU.  Among the short-term measures are the cancellation of high-level bilateral visits, meetings, and events by the EU and member states (primarily meetings with heads of state and government, as well as ministers); the cessation of financial assistance directly benefiting the government and the termination of discussions regarding future financial assistance intended for them; a review of the financial assistance portfolio, which involves increasing support for civil society and independent media (not applicable to regional assistance); and the freezing of the €30 million allocated for defense and security under the European Peace Facility.

In the event of further deterioration of the situation, which may involve, on one hand, "violence against peaceful protesters," and on the other hand, "significant violations in the electoral process," more severe measures may be taken: recommending the temporary suspension of the visa-free regime for representatives of the Georgian government and diplomats for member states; imposing restrictive measures (sanctions) on individuals and entities involved in serious human rights violations; further suspension of political dialogue with Georgia; further review of financial assistance, including the suspension of further budgetary aid and the subsequent redirection of funds; and the further suspension of assistance under the Common Security and Defence Policy.

It will become clear over time which specific measures the European Union will take from the mentioned menu and when. In any case, what is happening looks surreal. It is truly hard to imagine that all of this could be happening to our country. Georgia, having undergone many trials, has faced enemies, experienced coups, revolutions, and even civil war, with Georgians opposing each other. However, the choice of the Georgian people to become part of the West's prosperity and security has never been questioned. Yet, if the specific measures listed above become a reality, a dividing wall will rise before us, blocking our path to the cherished Western world.

The label of 'pro-Russian' reiterated

Georgia has been constantly under the influence of anti-Western propaganda stemming from Russia for the past few decades, but it has never been the case that this variety of propaganda was initiated by the Georgian government itself. The distinction between friend and foe has always been clear to Georgians, as expressed in the grandeur of Mother Kartli. Today, however, the propaganda of the Georgian Dream government portrays the traditional ally as an enemy, while the traditional enemy—Russia—seems to have vanished. It has disappeared from the government’s narrative. The “new” enemy is the Global War Party and the Western governments and institutions it controls, along with the “agentura” settled within the country’s civil society. At the same time, the government understands that over 80 percent of the population, including a young and energetic segment of the electorate, supports EU membership. The existence of a window of opportunity for Georgia’s accession to the EU is politically extremely disadvantageous for the Georgian Dream, which seeks further consolidation of power and effectively controls all significant state institutions, except for the institute of president.[45] The very prospect of closing this window carries a serious political cost in the form of daily losses in the electorate. Therefore, in the lead-up to the elections, it desperately tries to maintain the ambiguity of strategic communication and, alongside blaming the EU [and the USA],[46] continues to present EU accession as a priority while professing loyalty to the Western vector in general.  The leaders of the Georgian Dream cynically try to convince the Georgian electorate that the adoption of the Foreign Influence Transparency Law has increased the chances of opening negotiations for EU membership.[47] How successfully they achieve this will be most accurately reflected in the elections. It is likely that the Georgian Dream government has already lost its image as a generally pro-Western and specifically pro-European reformist actor both abroad and in the eyes of the Georgian electorate. This is especially true since it has been once again branded as “pro-Russian,” a label that required extensive and consistent efforts to remove in the past. Now, this label is deeper because it has been stamped on the image of the Georgian Dream by the entire opposition spectrum, a significant part of Georgian society, and Western partners. It is unlikely that the Georgian Dream will easily rebrand itself, and this image will likely follow this political entity in the coming years.

It is also likely that even the loyal electorate of the Georgian Dream, which unconditionally accepts the anti-Western messages of the government’s narrative, does not believe the party leaders’ promise that Georgia will definitely join the EU by 2030. Moreover, they no longer desire this because “Europe wants to drag us into war,” “Europe has experienced spiritual degradation,” and “we must defend our own dignity and sovereignty.” Visually, the “people’s street marches” organized by the government appear large-scale. It is clear that the government propaganda is working. This propaganda is most dangerous because the constant anti-Western rhetoric and the vilification of Europe lead to a loss of the country’s value and foreign policy orientation, our civilizational choice.

Perhaps the damage done to the authority of Western partners and, in general, to Georgia’s European choice by the propaganda carried out by the government in the last year has exceeded the results of the disinformation produced by the Russian propaganda machine over decades within the framework of its anti-Western campaign.

Unlike trade relations, complementarity or multi-vectorism in foreign and security policy is difficult to implement in today’s era of Realpolitik. It is challenging to sit on multiple chairs at once. It becomes clear that the Georgian Dream is struggling with this, and the balance is disrupted at the expense of the European vector. Furthermore, this propaganda is most effective among voters who have a fear mixed with disgust towards the government of Saakashvili and are ready to sacrifice everything, including the country’s European future, just so that “those times don’t return.” At present, it is difficult to accurately determine how many such loyal voters the Georgian Dream has. One thing is clear: the notorious political polarization, which has sharply intensified in recent years and has become a sad business card for our country, has also spread to society, resulting in a very unfavorable situation in the form of societal polarization.

Is the Georgian Dream truly pro-Russian?

The aforementioned trilemma has become an insurmountable challenge for both B. Ivanishvili and the Georgian Dream government in general. A different, more democratic government would not find itself facing such a daunting challenge, as it would not be preoccupied with the task of maintaining power at any cost. Consequently, it would not embark on the path of sabotaging European reforms. It is a fact that no other candidate country's government for EU membership has faced a similar trilemma.[48] However, since the unbridled pursuit of power consolidation is a characteristic of authoritarian regimes, the Georgian Dream has opted to sabotage pro-European reforms. Yes, the governance of the Georgian Dream exhibits authoritarian tendencies, which is not only one-party but also one-man rule. Otherwise, it is difficult to explain the enviable "unanimity" that this government, and above all  the parliamentary majority, demonstrated in the process of adopting so-called Russian Law under unprecedented moral and political pressure.

The opponents of the Georgian Dream, both within the country and in Western governments and institutions, often attribute such authoritarian tendencies of the government to its pro-Russian stance and accuse the Georgian Dream government of pursuing pro-Russian policies. In other words, they see a causal relationship between authoritarian tendencies and a pro-Russian geopolitical choice, considering that the authoritarian inclinations are secondary, while the primary issue is a civilizational choice made in favor of Russia. It is as if this civilizational choice to blame for the deviation from the European and Euro-Atlantic path. This is the perspective wherefrom the label "pro-Russian government" emerged, rather than "authoritarian government," "dictatorship," or "tyranny," or other radical epithets commonly used by the opposition. In opposition rhetoric, you will often hear phrases like "they are dragging us to Russia," "soon we will wake up in Krasnodar," "they are in Putin's service," "they will russify us," and so on.

In reality, the primary driving force behind the "Ivanishvili’s Dream" is an insatiable desire for the preservation of power and its subsequent consolidation. Therefore, the government of the Georgian Dream, at least at this stage, is in no way "pro-Russian" or a "Russian project." This would be true only if its policies were deliberately oriented toward protecting the interests of the Russian state in the first place. While the decisions of the Georgian Dream government may indeed please some in Russia or resemble laws enacted in Russia, this does not mean that these decisions and laws are primarily aimed at bringing Georgia back into Russia’s orbit. More precisely, the refusal to implement pro-European reforms does not automatically equate to pro-Russian sentiment. Thus, a more accurate description for this government would be "Russian-like" (à la russe) or "a mimic of Russian policies," rather than "pro-Russian". Regarding loyalty to (“kissing the ring of”) Russia, this should be explained not by a civilizational choice but by geopolitical necessity. These are two different things. In other words, amid the raging war nearby, maintaining peace requires building pragmatic relations with Russia. However, this circumstance is skillfully used in the power struggle and serves to reverse the causal vector of decisions made by the Georgian Dream in response to authoritarian tendencies, labeling the government as "pro-Russian."  This PR maneuver has worked, as the Georgian Dream faces immense problems in its confrontations with both external and internal opponents: domestically, in the struggle for the consolidation of power, and externally, in clarifying relations with traditional strategic partners. A less informed observer may believe that the Russian origins of B. Ivanishvili's multibillion-dollar fortune, his and his cronies’ current business interests and connections in Russia (so to say, collective Ytvstushenkovs[49]), or even the appointment as Georgia’s chief prosecutor of a person exposedin collaboration with the Russian FSB,[50] is a basis (and at the same time a sufficient condition) for Georgia’s return to Russia’s orbit, which is allegedly already happening.

Some think differently and suggest that the shift from a Western course is not motivated by a voluntary pro-Russian civilizational choice but rather by a geopolitical order or "assignment" from the Kremlin. In return, B. Ivanishvili is reportedly expecting "something significant" before the parliamentary elections. Rumors say that the deviation from the Euro-Atlantic course serves as a bargaining chip for B. Ivanishvili to gain favor from Russia and obtain reciprocal benefits for the country. According to these rumors, there are negotiations behind the closed doors regarding the establishment of confederate relations between Georgia and the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. However, there are objectively no prerequisites for resolving the long-standing fundamental problems between the two countries. For example, there is no format within which negotiations can occur (the so-called "Abashidze-Karasin" format is effectively non-functional). It is also unknown what the price is in exchange for which Russia might be interested in a solution favorable to Georgia. If, conditionally, this involves a refusal to join NATO,[51] it would necessitate corresponding amendments to the constitution? Wouldn’t it? Moreover, public opinion is not prepared for such a deal. By the way, there are no preconditions for resolving the existing conflicts between Georgians and Abkhazians or between Georgians and South Ossetians. And there are only a few months left until the elections.

Is it possible to reset relations?

Relations between the Georgian government and its Western partners has hit rock bottom. Unfortunately, this situation has also affected  relationships towards Georgia as a country. Once exemplary relations with Western partners in the region have become a thing of the past.

One of the factors that has led to this state of affairs is the mistakes made by Western partners in their relations with Georgia over the years. This issue is a separate topic for extensive discussion, but still, several examples can be mentioned. Back in the 1990s, due to the hope of the US and European countries towards Russia during President Yeltsin's time, the post-Soviet space, including Georgia, became Russia's "backyard," where Russia was given a carte blanche in establishing a security system. Georgia, with its outstanding aspirations towards the West, found it extremely difficult to break free from Russia's orbit. This task was complicated by Russia's destructive role in the conflict resolution processes in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which the West did not actively oppose. For instance, it was impossible to internationalize the peacekeeping operation in Abkhazia and conduct it under the auspices of the UN instead of the Russia-led CIS. Second, at the NATO summit in Bucharest in 2008, the granting of a Membership Action Plan to Georgia [and Ukraine] was blocked, and instead, an ambiguous and vague formula for membership was proposed, which gave Russia a free hand for the military adventure against Georgia in 2008, fueled by the irritation and anger caused by the recognition of Kosovo’s independence. Third, the diplomatic efforts of Western partners were insufficient to prevent the Russia-Georgia war in 2008. Although their involvement was effective in stopping the war that had already begun, it did not prevent Russia from occupying 20 percent of Georgia's territories. Fourth, the West practically ceded veto power to Russia in the process of NATO's eastward expansion. Despite Georgia's active participation in peacekeeping and military operations conducted under NATO, Russia's "appeasement" policy always prevailed, and Georgia was continually pointed to "new homework", the fulfillment of which was a prerequisite for further steps on the path to membership. This approach remains in force to this day. Consequently, Georgia is left without security guarantees and is burdened to independently manage the risks emanating from Russia.

In the meantime, as the global geopolitical order undergoes transformation, there has been a new delimitation of spheres of influence. The unipolar world order is being disrupted, and against this backdrop, revisionist Russia is trying to restore its once-imperial glory in the Eurasian space, including through coercive methods. China, for its part, is striving for global hegemony with its powerful financial and economic leverage. As a result, globally, there is an expansion of anti-democratic spaces. In such a situation, the task of building in Georgia a liberal-democratic state of the Western type, a necessary prerequisite for which is fusion with the European and Euro-Atlantic space, becomes tough for weak and small Georgia, historically located at the crossroads of civilizations. Perhaps this is where the key to transforming Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian relations lies. The space of peace, prosperity, order, and progress that the European development model envisions should, in principle, be attractive to the citizens of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. At the same time, any attempt to build an independent, sovereign, neutral, and autarkic state will inevitably prove futile, and may even be catastrophic.

Against this backdrop, the seriously strained relations between the Georgian Dream government and its Western partners are extremely damaging to the country in many respects, and signs of this are already apparent. For example, at the 31st annual session of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, certain new formulations in the resolution, which traditionally expresses support for Georgia's territorial integrity, were deemed unacceptable by the Georgian delegation.[52] Additionally, it is important to note that the U.S. National Defense Authorization Act for 2025 no longer includes provisions for assistance to Georgia.[53] Furthermore, signaling deteriorating relations, the U.S. has indefinitely canceled joint annual military exercises called Noble Partner, [54] and cooperation/support programs in various fields have been suspended. Relations with NATO have also cooled. For the first time since the decision made at the 2008 Bucharest Summit, the declaration from NATO's Washington Summit, adopted by the heads of allied states on 11 July 2024, does not include the phrasing that "Georgia will become a member of the alliance."[55] However, both the U.S. [56] and the European Union [57] as well as NATO, are refraining from completely severing relations with Georgia. There is likely hope that the situation will change in the near future, making it possible to restore and deepen relationships. At the same time, statements regarding the need for a "reset" of relations have been heard sporadically from both the Georgian Dream and international partners, but the content embedded in this concept varies.

The Georgian Dream government has likely realized that it has become overly embroiled in conflicts with its Western partners and wishes to "reset" its relationships, but in a way that will allow them to save the face and fulfill electoral tasks. Saving face means restoring the image of a political force that firmly shares  Euro-Atlantic values and worldview, while constantly delivering messages about defending “sovereignty” and “peace”. The main electoral task is related to legitimizing the votes obtained in the elections. The issue is that some potential international arbiters, such as the Venice Commission, have already expressed criticism regarding the changes made by Georgian Dream to electoral legislation and have urged the government to rectify the identified flaws.[58] Moreover, the Venice Commission has also raised concerns about the Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence and constitutional amendments regarding Family Values and Protection of Minors.[59] These and other laws or decisions, which indicate deviations from democratic standards, are interconnected and will influence the assessment of the elections. The legitimacy problem of the election results is further emphasized by the general circumstance that the situation has qualitatively changed compared to the period of the 2020 elections—relations between the Georgian government and the collective West have deteriorated. As a result, for the first time since the Rose Revolution, the assessment of the elections may be negative, which would pose serious challenges to the stability of the Georgian Dream government.

As for Western partners, they also wish to "reset" relations, but unlike the Georgian Dream, the United States, European Union, and NATO consider the repeal of the Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence and a general return of the government to democratic behavior as necessary conditions. The latter primarily implies conducting elections in a truly free and fair environment. However, due to the aforementioned "undemocratic steps" initiated by the Georgian Dream, a fair environment necessary for the elections no longer exists. Initially, when Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze was invited to Washington for consultations, the situation was more favorable for a reset. The last unsuccessful attempt at a reset was marked by James O'Brien's visit to Tbilisi. Currently, discussions about resetting relations have nearly ceased, as there is a clear disconnect between the parties regarding the goals, conditions, and expectations of a "reset." This was vividly illustrated in the meeting on August 12 between Senator Shaheen, Congressman Turner, and Prime Minister Kobakhidze.[60] The trust built over decades in the Georgian government has been lost. The machinery of sanctions has been set in motion. Although Western partners are hesitant to impose heavier sanctions, the hope that the government will withdraw the law and that further sanctions will no longer be necessary is dwindling. However, time still remains.

Is there a Way Out?

In the current situation, the parliamentary elections serve as a kind of moment of truth. The results will hold critical importance. If the mono-party rule of the Georgian Dream ends, the Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence, along with other legislative acts that are collectively assessed as a regression of democracy, will be repealed, and Georgia will return to the agenda of European and Euro-Atlantic integration. For this to happen, the issue of physical, political-legal, and financial guarantees for Bidzina Ivanishvili (and not so much for the Georgian Dream team) must be resolved in the shortest possible time. In the event of relinquishing power, he will need these guarantees like air. Only with such guarantees in place can he be persuaded, first and foremost, to urgently repeal the Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence, or, in the worst-case scenario, to suspend it until the elections are concluded, and secondly, to ensure that the remaining time allows for truly fair, competitive, and free conduct of the elections. Although the aforementioned delegation from the U.S. Congress was ready to speak personally with B. Ivanishvili, it seems that the leader of the Georgian Dream either questions the communication level with the American side or is not prepared to take on reciprocal obligations.

After the elections, the actions of Western partners towards Georgia will depend on whether the country, primarily its government (regardless of its configuration), returns to the path of European and Euro-Atlantic integration and implements in-depth democratic reforms (such as the nine prerequisites, the Georgian Charter, and others).

If the aforementioned "reset" does not take place, events could unfold in an unfavorable scenario for everyone, specifically:

Despite the already deteriorated electoral environment, if one party wins with a significant advantage, the legitimacy of the election results will not be in question. However, the situation will differ if the electoral process is marred by violations on election day and the preliminary counts yield close results. In such a case, the Georgian Dream government will face challenges. A wave of protests, which Bidzina Ivanishvili fears most, could rise again, and international pressure would increase. The confrontation might turn violent, and at that point, appeals by the government to the Global War Party or "agentura" would no longer hold weight. However, if the Georgian Dream wins "fairly" and convincingly, destabilization is less likely, but the newly elected government would still not have the strategic partnership with Western countries that existed before. The Georgian Dream would struggle to regain trust from Western partners, regardless of its claims of loyalty to the European and Euro-Atlantic course and promises never to question it again. No one would want to see a potential "Orbán’s Hungary" among its ranks. Consequently, Western partners would continue their changed policies toward Georgia: the European and Euro-Atlantic perspective would freeze; already reduced cooperation programs and projects would not be reinstated; rather, they would be further restricted; support within international organizations would decrease. The Georgian Dream government will attempt to cultivate neutrality as a pragmatic ideology, but practically implementing this will be an impossible task for Georgia due to historical and political factors. In the meantime, geopolitical risks for Georgia, which will be isolated and cut off from the West, will increase.

A state of a sort of "cold war" with the West is likely to continue until the next climax, probably until the 2028 elections. In the meantime, the Georgian Dream government, under sanctions, will increasingly struggle to properly manage the country’s economy and maintain political stability. By the end of the next electoral cycle, it will be clear that Georgia will not be included in the next wave of EU enlargement planned for 2030. At the same time, it will become evident that the so-called "sovereign governance," essentially autarkic model, isolated from the West, can no longer justify itself, and consequently, the government will increasingly find itself having to "call Babaia" (a colloquial term for relying on Russian support) to manage rising political and economic risks.[61] In the theoretical case of Georgian Dream securing a constitutional majority in the 2024 elections, it is not excluded that the 78th article of the Constitution might also be abolished as part of kissing the ring measures. This, however, would be unacceptable to the traditionally pro-Western electorate. Against this backdrop, it is expected that decisions made by the Georgian Dream government, both in legislative terms and in terms of political behavior, will increasingly become repressive to control the situation. The law on Transparency of Foreign Influence" will closely resemble Russia's analogous law in its current form and further solidify its assigned name - "the Russian Law." Consequently, Georgia will ultimately cement its image as an authoritarian country, and it will become clear that the government, even if unintentionally, is changing its foreign policy course. In conditions of extremely deepened political polarization and public unrest, the country will face a severe political crisis, and the threat of external intervention will significantly increase. Such a scenario would be disastrous for the historical reputation of any government.

Thus, the aforementioned "reset" formula would be the best solution for everyone. On the one hand, the West would avoid the headache of crisis management in "rebellious and authoritarian" Georgia, while on the other hand, Bidzina Ivanishvili would be given a chance to remain more or less decently in politics with guarantees. As for the Georgian Dream team itself, it would ultimately be up to Bidzina Ivanishvili to decide what place and role it would have in this arrangement.

August 13, 2024