The Social Justice Center continues the series of interviews with politicians, public officials, and diplomats who were part of the coalition government in previous years and played an active role in policymaking. As part of this series of interviews, they will share their insights on the transformation of foreign policy course of the Georgian Dream government.

In this interview, which we present opinions and observations of Natalia Sabanadze, the former Ambassador of Georgia to the European Union. Natalia Sabanadze was appointed as the Ambassador of Georgia to the Kingdom of Belgium and the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, and as the Head of the Mission of Georgia to the European Union in May 2013, and she held this position until March 2021. In the interview, Natalia Sabanadze explains the reasons for the transformation of Georgian Dream's foreign policy in relation to domestic politics.

1. Since when has the radical anti-Western turn in Georgian Dream's foreign policy been observed, and what systemic reasons would you attribute to this transformation?

Georgian Dream, as a party, has undergone an interesting transformation in both its political identity and its foreign policy course. Obviously, from the beginning, there were discussions about the fact that Bidzina Ivanishvili was connected to Russia, that he might be a Russian project, and so on. This was mainly a subject of speculation, as at that time there was no tangible ground for such discussions. We could have focused on several factors—such as his activities in Russia, the money he earned there, the way he left Russia. However, these discussions still remained speculative and did not go beyond that.

In reality, Georgian Dream came to power with a clearly defined foreign policy. It had a clearly defined political position that it would continue the country's pro-Western policy. In Georgian politics, if there was anything unchanging and the most stable, it was the foreign policy course. Since the restoration of independence, we have seen several changes in government, each with its serious flaws, but there was an unchanging belief that the country's security, the preservation of independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity—all of this was connected to Georgia's accession to institutional West. For that, NATO's security umbrella should have extended over Georgia. To become part of the European Union's structures—this is about a civilizational choice, identity, and the country's return to the European family and space—a democratic space. This was a key line for all governments of independent Georgia.

Georgian Dream also continued this line. If we look at the main documents of foreign policy, Euro-Atlantic integration is marked as one of the main priorities everywhere. Interestingly, undertaking of constitutional obligations with regard to EU integration (namely Article 78 of the constitution of Georgia) happened under GD’s government.

It is difficult to pinpoint exactly when this transformation occurs. Of course, there were preconditions. If we take one measure, which may not be precise but for analytically convenience—it could be linked to the war in Ukraine. These processes started before. I left my position when Gharibashvili returned on the position of Prime-Minister second time and when Charles Michel was involved in Georgian political processes. At that time, it became apparent that Georgian Dream was uncomfortable with such engagement from the European Union and perceived it as a challenge to its governance and power, rather than as assistance. In other conditions, even a few years ago, such engagement by the highest representative of the European Union in internal—let's be direct—provincial disputes would have been perceived as an opportunity to leverage this interest to advance towards the major goal we have (integration into the EU).

In this case, it became apparent that this was not perceived by GD in that way at all, but rather as an obstructive factor. Later, we also saw that Georgian Dream initially signed the political document negotiated with the participation of Charles Michel and then withdrew that consent. Perhaps this moment is a more precise reference point when the transformation of Georgian Dream's foreign policy course became evident.

However, after the start of the war in Ukraine, foreign policy transformation takes on a more pronounced form, and both the political and ideological as well as discursive transformations become more noticeable. There are probably many reasons, but I would highlight a few factors. Domestic political factor is still main in that regard, in my opinion. If you remember, the issue of proportional elections—first it was accepted, then it was rejected, and then it passed again. At that moment, it became more difficult to reject the proportional system a second time. Therefore, at this point, Georgian Dream realizes that the next elections must be held under a proportional system, which takes away their systemic advantage. What was always a significant addition under all governments through the mixed election system and majoritarian seats, they are losing this. Therefore, it becomes relatively clear that their positions are weakening.

Additionally, Georgian Dream did not turn out to be the political force it initially appeared to be. It came to power with the promise of creating more democracy in the country and strengthening human rights standards. However, relinquishing power, like for all previous governments in Georgia, turned out to be a serious challenge for them as well. Accordingly, the concept whihc is one of the main characteristics of democracy—the change of power through democratic means, and that losing power should not mean extinction and disappearance from the political space for a party—this awareness has not been established in Georgia. Every political party that loses power in Georgia is actually on the verge of extinction, either has become extinct or disintegrated, and in the case of the United National Movement, they faced serious problems.

Georgian Dream probably also thinks that they are facing systemically difficult elections; winning a fourth time is, in itself, very challenging. If they lose power, neither the party nor the individuals have a good fate awaiting them. Therefore, the power-maintaining issue, I think, is a very significant factor."

Why is it connected to the foreign direction? I have said or written frequently, that in Georgia, or in countries like Georgia, foreign policy is firmly connected to the domestic processes, internal policy and there is feedback between this two. If in other cases, internal policy determines foreign policy, in our case we had a consensus on foreign priorities, which determined internatl dimacis and reforms. The democracy level, free media and speech, freedom of expression and some space of libery that is still left, this is the result of our western priorities and that was the request from West as well. We could not integrate into west if we did not implement relevant reforms. Thus, there was always a link between foreign and interal policy. What we see today is an evident example of this, since foreing policy is changing and consequently, internal situation is also altering.

Upholding of power became problematic, since what is the request from west and required by democratic rule, by foreign partners and EU integration process- for example, free media, free functioning of opposition, transparency, equal political rule- if you do not satisfy the, means that you have lesser chances of maintaining the power. Therefore, Georgian Deam who wants to continue governance, is not happy to meet up the requirements of West, which causes change of foreign policy.

Clearly, Georgian Dream cannot openly declare this because they know the population will not support it. Therefore, the European facade is maintained, but the trajectory has changed—warming relations with Russia, seeking other partners, which is very evident, such as the strategic partnership with China. This, in itself, is not a crime; however, the glorification of the Chinese model is very problematic, as well as the the lack of criticism of Russia. This, in itself, is not a crime, but it is a sign that you are looking for other partners—those who won't interfere in your internal affairs, who don't care whether civil society and the media are free, or what you do and who you imprison. They don't care because they do the same themselves. The point here is that there may be economic benefits, that more development projects might come in, and so on.

Additionally, we also understand that the government is offering the population a certain deal, which is a very Russian-type deal, where they tell the people that the government is theirs—it stays here, don't interfere too much, and in return, they won't put you in prison. We see that, the government is suggesting to the population certain agreement, which is very Russian agreement, where it says to people that our mission is to remain here, in power, they must not interfere in that regard, however they will not be imprisoned. Unlike UNM, they give them opportunity to deal their business, to make money, they will bring investments, it does not matter wheter it will be Arab or Chinese, the government will be its.

I have emphasized on war, since the war opened real chances for Ukraine for EU integration, while before war, it had no such opportunity. Therefore, before war, they could maintain the façade, becase there was no opportunity to move forward. When I was in Brussels, it was even difficult to think about European Perspective. Today we have a candidate status, and accordingly, a real opportunity has emerged for us. The nine or twelve preconditions that the European Union sets for the government to fulfill as required from the government actually means “Harakiri” (cutting the belly in Japanese) for them. They must create conditions that do not guarantee them remaining in power. This is interconnected.

2. Why did Georgian Dream believe that by changing foreign policy and demonstrating loyalty towards Russia, they could remain in power, especially when Russia is associated with severe historical traumas and public sentiment is very negative?

That's a good question. On the one hand, we have a pro-Western inclination among the population and the steps the government is taking. The part of this agreement which I have mentioned – “mind your business, I will take care of mine” – which is also very interesting from political technology perspective, is the confrontation between peace and European and Euroatlantic course. Georgian Dream raised the question: if this comes at the cost of peace, is it worth it? They have questioned the consensus achieved over the years and played on the fears that genuinely exist after the 2008 War. This has been a rather benefitial strategy for internal communication.

Such choice is also influenced by sharply changed international context, in my opinion. I have thought much about it and I can say that, 20 years ago, or even 10 years ago, Georgia cannot do what they are doing now, neither Hungary could do that, nor Serbia, etc. In other words, the international backdrop, with players like China and Russia coming to the forefront—China is a much more systemic player, but very strong in its own part—presents a serious challenge to the West not only as a competitor and a potential future security threat but also as an alternative model. The rise and development of China have created an alternative development model. The countries that needed development, their governments, whether they wanted to or not, were playing by democratic rules because playing otherwise was very costly—back then, you had to be either Iran or North Korea, completely isolated and under sanctions, which required paying a serious price. Now, this price has decreased. Now, there is China, which says, 'I will come with investments, I will build roads for you, and I will show you that development and prosperity are not necessarily related to democracy. After the end of the Cold War, the connection between democratic systems and development was very strong. Developed countries were democratic countries. Rich countries were democratic countries. Today China shows that it is not necessary and not only China; Here are some arab countries as well, where authoritarian governance system is established, but the business is flourishing, they are developed, investments are flooding in. This is primarily happening at the expense of serious resources—Azerbaijan is an example of this—but there are alternatives. Additionally, their political weight was also increasing in the international system. What Russia did—Russia behaved in the same way, with its weight increasing at the expense of resources. This is essentially a hybrid challenge for the West and a traditional challenge in the form of war in the neighborhood.

This challenge has begun to erode the system established after the Cold War. I don’t know if this is perceived and analyzed in such depth within Georgian Dream, but for any politician who, instinctively, wants to maintain power and has authoritarian tendencies, the democratic, Western, liberal order is restrictive, and this restriction has diminished. It may not have been completely removed, but it has seriously diminished. Therefore, the opportunity for maneuvering has arisen as well.

3. If we retrospectively evaluate Georgian Dream’s foreign policy, where do you see the most significant mistakes? If you can recall specific history or observations, please share your reasoning

Georgian Dream has undergone not only a political but also an ideological transformation. In 2012, it stated governace with a major social agenda, as a centrist-left power, a member of the socialist progressive family. It was expelled from that group, underwent political migration, and ended up aligning with the far right, euroskeptics, and so on. I found those old values much more acceptable, and accordingly, the political choices they made seemed more correct to me. In my view, the main mistake is that they cannot and do not use the opportunity that is currently available in terms of European and Euro-Atlantic integration. Relations with Russia are also quite problematic.

On the one hand, the Abashidze-Karasini format was not a bad idea in its conception. I believe that a communication channel with Russia was necessary and not pointless. This informal dialogue initially had a limited mandate. This informal dialogue initially had a limited mandate. It was about restoring certain connections, economic cooperation, market access, and so on, but it had no political agenda. Zura Abashidze clearly stated that in the bilateral format, we were neither discussing the conflict nor any political issues, as they were unacceptable to us. But the main foreign policy challenge for the Georgian state, for a small state that is in its current environment, is to weaken the influence and pressure leverage of unfriendly states.

Therefore, in my opinion, our relationship with Russia was mismanaged because we allowed them to restore the lost leverage. In 2012, Russia had no leverage over Georgia except for the occupied territories and “bordering” dividing lines. It had no economic, tourist, political, or other forms of pressure leverage. They often asked me in Brussels why Russia remained silent in our case, while Moldova signed the Association Agreement and Ukraine's association was followed by a severe reaction from Russia. What it could have done? Moldova and Ukraine were subjected to economic pressure, and in our case, starting a war a second time would not have made sense at that time. Now, the government is trying to restore Russia's leverage over Georgia, and this is evident in several ways. Behind this are primarily economic interests. However, for any state, including the European Union, the agendas of prosperity and security should not come into conflict, but in our case, they are directly at odds. If your prosperity depends on Russia and Russia is the main security risk, then the policy you are pursuing is risky and will inevitably cost you dearly at some point. This, in my opinion, is the biggest problem.

Of course, there are other problems. For example, that the Georgian Dream has not improved relations with friendly European states. EU integration dinamics require so called “sponsor states”. Everyone has “Patron”: Moldova has Romania, Ukraine has Poland, etc; We do not have such; Our main friends were the Baltic countries, which, of course, have limited weight, and we made them adversaries as well. Bilateral relations also have not deepened, which would have undoubtedly helped us in multilateral formats, both in the direction of the European Union and NATO.

4. Georgian Dream openly and explicitly began its foreign policy with the policy of not irritating Russia. This was a declared position. In your opinion, has this policy evolved?

Yes, it has evolved. In my opinion, the policy of not irritating Russia has effectively transformed into a political position that sides with Russia. So we appeared at the side of Russia. The matter has progressed from not irritating to friendship, despite the lack of institutional or diplomatic form. Ideologically, we stand so much on the same side that we speak with the same message box. This is a issue of sovereignty, sovereign democracy, traditional values and their protection, the idea that the West is satanic and imposes everything on us that is culturally unacceptable and risky for our identity, and so on.

With the government’s rhethorics, ideologically we appeared in populist conservative framework. One of the vivid examples of this is antiliberal discourse and this antiliberalism is reflected in Anti-Westernism. We can even name it nationalism, but nationalism is not unfamiliar for Georgia. However, Georgian nationalism has never been Anti-Western, not in 19^th Century, not in Gamsakhurdia’s times. Anti-Western aspects of Georgian nationalism is imported from Russia. Therefore, ideologically and politically we are in Russia’s camp.

If the pay attention to the China’s rise – whose first partner is China? – Russia. Chinese import in reality means: “if I cannot bring Russian investor, - which will be too much for now, I can bring Chinese investors”. The policy of not irritating Russia has not been expensive in terms of Western direction. On the contrary, those who stood behind this policy believed it would help us in the Western direction, because, in fact, struggles with Russia complicated matters for the West as well, and created problems for us in the Western direction. These were interconnected. But now, by having such positions, that we today have, has its price and we need to pay this price by weakening our positions in Western direction. Especially now, when there is an open war between Russia and West.

5. Today, for Georgia and for the Georgian Dream government, what opportunities are on the table in terms of foreign policy and security? You mentioned that especially after the war in Ukraine, new opportunities have opened up. What specific opportunities have emerged for us, and what is Georgian Dream not taking advantage of with such a radical policy shift?

The biggest opportunity that this war created (unfortunately the war created) is to return EU englargement in the Agenda. It was not like that before. Enlargement was frozen for Balkans as well. It has returned now and we are also part of this package. But as time goes, there are more talks on Moldova and Ukraine and mentioning Georgia becomes lesser and lesser. The notion is being established that these are separate scenarios and much more distant issue. If we align ourselves on this trajectory and detach from Ukraine-Moldova, it will be the biggest problem.

We are not advancing towards NATO. In fact, what we used to do – constantly knocking on NATO's door – hasn't been happening for a long time. Basically, it wouldn't be accurate to say that there are serious breakthroughs regarding NATO, that we have opportunities and are not taking them; that wouldn't be correct either. Because the problems that existed, the obstacles that we and Ukraine faced, have become even more aggravated in the context of NATO. But now, in case of Ukraine, there is active discussion about finding some transitional solution towards NATO. That is, not a comprehensive security umbrella like NATO, but rather a smaller-scale mechanism—a coalition of willing countries, offering security guarantees that a group of nations can provide. Ukraine is now signing security agreements with several countries, including the US and the UK. From Ukraine's perspective, this is a more long-term strategy—it may not provide immediate assistance in the current war, but the process is ongoing because they believe that some level of security cooperation guarantees must be established.

We are not involved in the process of guaranteeing security mechanisms. However, we can be part of it, in fact we could have done many more, but deriving from the interal political context and foreign policy choice, we decided to be antagonists of Ukraine. This is the choice. Many countries who historically had tense relationship with Ukraine, like Romania, like Moldova who also had not easy relations with Ukraine, Poland as well, - now they are one team and go in one direction. We, historically, had good relationship with Ukraine and destroyed it in the moment, when it was most crucial. Therefore, one of the challenge and mistake is the spoiling of relationship with Ukraine, which is a long-term mistake, because if Ukraine survives from the war in the way we hope, Ukraine will be a very serious power in the region -both militarily and politically, and we have damaged our connections.