Keti Epadze, Collective Memory and Identity Researcher, TSU

National identity, like other forms of identity, is subject to construction. During the development of a nation, it can manifest itself in various ways. Creating an identity is important; on one hand, it involves shaping society members' perception as part of a 'we' group and establishing internal boundaries within shared culture. On the other hand, it entails confronting the 'other' group or groups and delineating external boundaries.[1] The formation of national identity is orchestrated by national elites, including intellectuals and politicians. They foster a sense of unity among community members through diverse methods: crafting canonical narratives, commemorating ritual dates, conducting memorial ceremonies, and engaging in public discourse through speeches.

The construction of national identity in multi-ethnic societies can become a contentious issue. When it is not possible to agree on national borders between different ethnic groups within a single state, competitive and parallel processes may emerge.

A particularly acute situation in this regard is found in the post-Soviet republics, including in Georgia. Historical narratives have played a significant role in the emergence and deepening of conflicts in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region (so-called South Ossetia).Abkhazian and Ossetian historical narratives were shaped within the context of Soviet national policy. They delineated their group's identity and autochthonous rights on the territory, often in contradiction with the Georgian texts. National projects in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region during the perestroika period were founded on historical narratives, which played a crucial role in the escalation of conflicts after the collapse of the Soviet Union.[2] The resistance of ethnic minorities commenced with the indigenization (corenization) of the Georgian national project during the Soviet period. In this article, I will examine the periods that contributed to the escalation of conflicts in the post-Soviet era.

Specifically, I will elucidate the process by which Georgian and Abkhazian conflict identities were shaped within the context of Soviet national policy. To address this inquiry, I will scrutinize the historical narratives that emerged within these two groups. This examination aims to highlight areas of consensus and contention among the authors, shedding light on issues that provoke conflicting viewpoints and the divergent trajectories that emerged regarding the shared past.

I will employ the method of deconstruction to analyze the selected historical texts. Deconstruction is a widely employed approach in the examination of written texts within the realms of the social sciences and humanities. It allows us to discern the underlying ideas guiding the narrative's structure and content[3]. The narratives will be deconstructed with a focus on key markers of Soviet national identity, including territorial belonging, ethnicity, and cultural identity.

For our analysis, we have chosen texts authored by both Georgians and Abkhazians that pertain to the medieval period, as they served as influential mediums in shaping identity within Soviet Georgia. These texts encompass Marxist-Leninist history textbooks (1940, 1943, 1946, 1958, 1961, 1967), as well as the four volumes within the eight-volume history of Georgia (1970-1979). Additionally, we will examine works by historians of Abkhaz origin, including Giorgi Anchabadze (1959, 1976) and Shalva Inal Ifa (1960, 1965, 1975).

Theoretical framework

The emergence of conflicting identities between Georgians and Abkhazians can be examined within the contemporary framework of nationalist theory. Unlike earlier paradigms such as primordialism and perennialism, the modern theory posits that nationalism is rooted in the notion that the concept of a nation is not an objective category; rather, it is subject to creation and recreation.[4]

Prominent figures within the modernist school of nationalism, frequently cited in this context, include Ernst Gellner, Eric Hobsbawm, and Benedict Anderson. Anthony Smith also contributes to this discussion with his ethno-symbolic approaches.

Gellner asserted that the presence of a "high culture," one shared not only by the elite minority but also by the entire society, serves as a necessary condition for nation building. This higher culture typically spreads within the confines of a specific state, gains legitimacy through educational institutions, and is safeguarded by political authority.[5] Hobsbawm views traditions as vital components, comprised of repeated rituals and symbolic complexes. These traditions, acting as a unifying bridge among the nation's members, are often created and formalized by political institutions. The process of inventing traditions is not without challenges; It is an integral part of the transition from older, traditional societies to the creation of a new society. This transformation necessitates the abandonment of traditional norms in favor of adapting to new ones.[6]  Benedict Anderson proposed that a nation is an "imaginary community,"[7] formed as a consequence of the rise of print capitalism. In this context, the rapid exchange of narratives between elites and the general populace accelerated the formation of this imaginary community.[8]

Anthony Smith, known for his ethno-symbolic paradigm, deviated from the conventional framework of modern nationalist paradigms by exploring instances of nations that existed as ethnic entities in the pre-modern era. Smith proposed that, in certain cases, the predecessors of nations can be traced back to ethnic groups that have maintained stability over time. However, he also made a clear distinction between these entities and modern nations that emerged during the nationalist era.[9] According to Smith, modern nations come into existence through deliberate policies enacted by national elites, involving the incorporation of myths and symbols to connect members of society. In Smith's view, the sharing and transmission of these elements serve to rekindle ancient ethnic societies and form modern nations upon their foundation.[10]

The authors mentioned here collectively emphasize that the construction of national identities hinges on communication between the elite minority and society. However, their approaches to communication differ. Hobsbawm and Smith emphasize the significance of symbol complexes, while Anderson and Gellner place importance on educational practices. Through the process of communication, a sense of unity is cultivated among society's members, fostering a shared culture and awareness. The existence of nations is inconceivable without this imaginative space. Every national project is embedded in the collective imagination, and society rallies around this vision, guided by intellectuals and politicians. To comprehend the formation of national identity, it is essential to grasp the theories of nationalism, as they enable us to observe and deconstruct identity discourses.

Discourses are crafted through various means, including the content found in history textbooks and the writings of historians. These mediums wield substantial influence in shaping collective perceptions and serve as reflections of how intellectuals view the nation's identity. These perceptions permeate the collective consciousness and play a pivotal role in molding national identity.Soviet leaders were acutely aware of the power of this chain of influence, which prompted them to instrumentalize history, using it to serve their political interests. The deconstruction of Soviet texts offers valuable insights into how the Stalinist government endeavored to mold primordial identities within the modern socialist state, facilitating their control over the masses, garnering popular support, and legitimizing their political agendas. This manipulation further exacerbated conflicts among the various Soviet peoples and contributed to disputes over ancestral origins, territorial claims, and identity, which became deeply entrenched and increasingly uncontrollable in the post-Stalin period. 

Soviet National Politics

Soviet leaders were acutely aware of the potential for nation-building, given that their guiding ideology, Marxism, was rooted in modern theory and recognized the concept of constructing social groups. However, Marxism did not recognize the influence of nationalism,[11]  and the Bolsheviks' primary aim was not the creation of distinct Soviet nations but rather the establishment of a unified socialist society. The Soviet leaders could not carry out the experiment of the disappearance of nations at once because they had seen in practice the political power of national sentiments. They used the idea of self-determination of minorities to unite the peoples living in the Russian Empire. Initially, this motto was used to mobilize ethnic groups around socialist ideology and, following the revolution, to combat "Russian chauvinism.".[12]  Lenin, a pragmatic revolutionary, had to not only engage in theoretical work but also translate communist ideas into a language that could be understood by the people of the Russian Empire. Consequently, the Bolshevik Marxist program included an aspect that Marxism itself did not encompass: the right of nations to self-determination. Lenin clearly delineated the goals of the Bolshevik Marxist program for the nations residing in the Russian Empire: once national self-determination was achieved and equality among nations was established, the peoples of the former Russian Empire would intermingle and forge an international community.[13]

To mitigate the rise of protective nationalisms, the authorities began a deliberate effort to promote four key national elements: territory, language, elites, and cultures. This approach was termed the "policy of indigenization” (corenization).[14] Through indigenization, the Bolsheviks sought to consciously satisfy national sentiments while infusing them with socialist content. The objective of the indigenization policy was to prepare diverse Soviet peoples for harmonious coexistence within a multiethnic state, with the additional aim of bolstering the party's legitimacy through the education of local cadres.[15]

Sovietization, coupled with the initiation of the indigenization policy, had significant ramifications for Georgians. Soviet national policies suppressed the Georgian national aspirations that had taken shape in the latter half of the 19th century, molding them into the Soviet framework and stripping Georgian nationalism of its political ambition to establish an independent nation-state.

Following Georgia's Sovietization, the nation experienced territorial fragmentation as Bolshevik authorities delineated borders within the country along different identity lines, leading to the creation of three autonomous regions. Among these, Abkhazia was granted the status of a socialist republic, placing it on an equal footing with Soviet Georgia. In 1922, a treaty of alliance was signed between the Soviet Socialist Republics of Abkhazia and Georgia. This accord facilitated Abkhazia's entry into the Transcaucasian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics through Georgia.[16]

The demarcation of borders along ethnic lines served as a primary tool in winning the support of smaller ethnic groups. Such an arrangement allowed the central authority to effectively administer ethno-federal institutions and mobilize party cadres as necessary. These cadres could then foster solidarity among various ethnic communities and cultivate loyalty to Soviet political programs.[17]

A different dynamic unfolded in Abkhazia, where the slogan of self-determination for minorities found success, particularly among the Abkhazian population. Corey Welty's research highlights that for Abkhazians, self-determination primarily revolved around safeguarding property rights to land rather than being associated with national ideals.[18] In the 19th century, Abkhazia's political landscape was not conducive to the development of a national project. By the late 1860s, Abkhazians had experienced several waves of emigration, leading to a depletion of the intelligentsia, who would have otherwise played a role in nurturing and strengthening Abkhazian national identity. This is evident in the limited presence of national narratives, literary and historical texts produced by Abkhaz intellectuals toward the end of the 19th and early 20th centuries, materials that were disseminated among the Abkhaz people, helping to delineate who should be considered Abkhazian and who should not.

To foster the national project, the proportion of Abkhaz members in the Communist Party of Abkhazia increased from 10% to 24.5% between 1923 and 1926,[19] and by 1929, this figure reached 32%[20]. In 1925, the Department of Abkhazian Language and Literature was established, delving into various facets of the Abkhazian language alongside ethnographic and folklore materials.[21] Simultaneously, Abkhazian-language books and print media emerged.[22] Starting in 1928, the Abkhazian language, alongside other Soviet languages, transitioned to the Latin script for modernization. An Institute of Regional Studies was founded.[23]  and the Abkhaz Association of Proletarian Writers was established, later evolving into the Union of Abkhaz Writers.[24]

During the early 1930s, film studios, music production facilities, and a symphony orchestra functioned in Abkhazia. According to data from 1934, the region had 15 secondary schools (including 5 Georgian, 4 Russian, 3 Abkhazian, 1 Greek, and 1 Armenian) and 70 primary secondary schools (comprising 25 Georgian, 15 Armenian, 11 Abkhazian, 10 Greek, 7 Russian, and 2 mixed schools). These institutions provided education in students' native languages[25].

Members of the Georgian intelligentsia protested the policy of indigenization in Abkhazia. They wrote appeals in the name of the Communist Party, asserting that Georgia differed from other Soviet republics because it had already represented an established state during the revolution. Therefore, they argued that the Soviet government needed to adopt a distinct policy towards Georgia.[26] Nevertheless, these appeals went unanswered.

The situation has changed since the 1930s. The phenomenon of Stalinism, often referred to as Stalin's rise to power in the 1930s, is interesting because on many issues (national self-determination, class identity, national differences, etc.), Stalin went beyond Marxism. Socialist nation-building ended not by preparing the ground for the natural mixing of nations but by changing the modernization project and constructing dual identities, one based on class and the other on nationality.

Several signals indicate a change in the Bolshevik modernization project. Institutions that promoted indigenization were closed. As a result, the general program of national strengthening lost its political relevance and began to fade. The focus of the Soviet government shifted from smaller nations to strengthening larger ones[27]. The concept of "Soviet patriotism" emerged in the Soviet press, signifying the emotional and cultural attachment of Soviet nations not to their own territories but to the common Soviet homeland.[28] Calls for the "friendship of peoples" became more frequent, embodying the idea of creating a multinational Soviet state.[29] The myth of friendship served to promote peaceful coexistence among Soviet peoples and emphasized the cooperation of non-Russian nations with the Great Russian nation,[30] which the Communist Party considered the leader of the Soviet nations since the late 1930s.

Additionally, during the same period, ethnic histories were revived and instrumentalized to legitimize Soviet programs.[31] Starting in the second half of the 1930s, historians were tasked with writing about the distant past of their respective ethnic groups. The political context led to an interest in historical roots and contributed to the formation of primordial identities, connecting them with the socialist state[32].Under the influence of Soviet national policy, Soviet citizens developed the perception that they had continuously lived in the same territory, often forgetting about their ancestors and national culture. Simultaneously, the Soviet ethno-federal arrangement created competition among different groups on historical territories. Consequently, the representation of national projects in the historical texts of one group was often unacceptable to another group because they had different ideas about their place in history.

Strengthening of centralization has manifested itself in Abkhazia through various reforms. In 1931, the Councils of Georgia issued a resolution according to which Abkhazia joined Georgia as an autonomous republic.[33] This was followed by a strong wave of protests in Abkhazia,[34] however, this protest did not have any practical results.

During the population census conducted from 1935 to 1939, individuals of Abkhazian descent residing in the Gali region, alongside Magrelians, Svanetians, and Adjarians, were officially classified as Georgians. It is worth highlighting that this particular subset of Abkhazians was part of a bilingual community, proficient in both the Abkhaz and Megrelian languages.[35] When considering this historical context, it is essential to acknowledge that during the era of the Russian Empire, there were opposite trends, and instances were frequent in which individuals of Georgian ethnicity were registered as Abkhazians[36]. Therefore, when discussing changes in nationality, it remains uncertain which specific groups underwent identity transformations. To attain a more comprehensive understanding of this issue, additional sources and research are necessary to provide a more definitive perspective.

The demise of Nestor Lakoba, who served as the chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia, in 1936, under suspicious circumstances, also suggested the presence of anti-corenization tendencies. Lakoba was a curious person, and it can be asserted that he and his team played a pivotal role in spearheading the corenization project. Leveraging his Moscow connections, he effectively circumvented Tbilisi, both in the corenization process and even after Abkhazia's integration into Georgia as an autonomous region, thereby disrupting the established hierarchy within the Soviet Union.[37] This stance by Lakoba meant that he neither recognized the altered status of Abkhazia nor its subordination to Georgia. Furthermore, he endeavored to forestall ethnic changes within the autonomous region and extended support to protests against collectivization among Abkhazian peasants for an extended period.[38] Following Lakoba's passing, a personnel restructuring took place in Abkhazia. This process led to the replacement of a significant portion of Abkhazian party cadres, including with Georgian cadres. The emergence of this new personnel landscape resulted from repressive measures that saw the termination of numerous Abkhazian Bolsheviks, including Lakoba's supporters.[39]

In addition, from the end of the 1930s, other ethnic groups began to settle in Abkhazia. A special department was also created, which worked on the organization of settlements.[40] Due to new residents, the demographic picture has changed. The number of Abkhazians in the total population has decreased. It is interesting to evaluate this fact in Abkhazian sources. They only talk about the facts of the settlement of Georgians while Beria demanded the settlement of Russians, Armenians and Georgians in Abkhazia.[41] How the migration process was carried out in practice, the expression of opinions on this issue requires additional sources, including archival materials from the archive of the Communist Party of Abkhazia, in order to complete the data and evaluate the existing opinions.

In 1939, the Abkhazian language underwent a transition to the Georgian script. This script change took place on a widespread scale throughout the Soviet Union between 1936 and 1941. Notably, this transition to the Georgian script distinguished it from the languages of nations that, due to their territorial and economic considerations, were not favored by the Soviet government.[42] These less-favored nations were compelled to adopt the Russian script, as per the Russification language policy. However, there were exceptions to this policy, primarily involving nations whose republics had their own established writing systems.

Additionally, the reform of Abkhazian schools commenced in 1945. The instruction in the Abkhazian language was discontinued, and local educational establishments were converted into Georgian-language schools.[43] This educational reform began at a juncture when remnants of World War II propaganda remained significant, and the central government was reinforcing the concept of a uniform Soviet nationhood origin. During this period, the trend of centralization gained momentum, providing fresh momentum to the policy of fostering closer ties between Abkhazians and Georgians, which was directed from the central authority.

The assessment of the reforms in the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s reveals that the Soviet government initially intended to fortify the various nationalities for their economic and cultural advancement. This endeavor aimed to lay the groundwork for the socialist equality of diverse peoples and their peaceful coexistence within the multinational Soviet state. However, as practical outcomes fell considerably short of the theoretical expectations—many Soviet nationalities did not attain satisfactory standards in areas such as the economy, agriculture, education, and culture— the number of nationalities declined significantly, from 190 to 99, in the late 1930s. It's noteworthy that during this period, ethnicity became an immutable categorization and an integral component of a Soviet citizen's social identity. It could determine an individual's career progression, university admission, and priority in accessing various social services, among other things.[44]

For those groups who, according to the Soviet assessment, were "going on the right path" in national and socialist development, but could not reach a high level, the problem was easily solved. After counting the results of the population census, they were mixed with the big nations. And for those peoples who more or less conformed to Stalin's 1913 definition of a nation, had their own territory, a developed economy, and were satisfied with the achievements of the Soviet Socialist Revolution, the authorities began to encourage ethnic and territorial consolidation.[45]

The ongoing changes within the Soviet system were also evident in Abkhazia at two distinct levels. On one hand, the emergence of national-Bolshevik identities began to take shape, while on the other, the closer relationship between Abkhazians and Georgians, the rationale for which was never officially elucidated, was observed. However, it became evident that Abkhazians were falling behind in the collectivization reforms, and perhaps more significantly, public resistance to these reforms was widespread.[46] Furthermore, party leaders in Abkhazia discussed the malfunctioning of the Abkhazian school system. They pointed out that the Abkhazian language was not integrated into the school curriculum, with students receiving education in Abkhazian only at the primary level, after which their studies continued in Russian.[47]

In 1947, Abkhazian historian Giorgi Dzidzaria and philologists Bagrat Shinkuba and Konstantin Shakril addressed a letter to Alexei Kuznetsov, the secretary of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party. In their letter, the authors expressed concerns about the distortion of national policy in Abkhazia and the deviation from the Leninist-Stalinist course.[48] Of particular significance is the last sentence in this letter, where the authors noted, "Since around 1940, the combination of words 'Abkhaz nation' has fallen out of official use. Abkhazians are no longer considered a nation."[49] It is important to note that the grievances of the Abkhazians were known in Moscow, but no action was taken, as the changes implemented in Soviet Georgia aligned with the Soviet political paradigm. Moscow dispatched Petre Sharia, the ideological secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia, to Abkhazia. In his report after assessing the situation, Sharia observed that the authors of the letter, Dzidzaria, Shinkuba, and Shakril, had drawn incorrect conclusions based on selectively chosen facts, thus tarnishing the reputation of the Communist Party of Abkhazia.[50]

The protests of the 1940s ended in this way, but in the following decades, the accumulated grievances of Soviet national politics manifested themselves in a different way.

Debate on the past and conflict between identities

The bolstering of the Abkhazian narrative, which emerged in the late 1940s, was facilitated by the fact that certain Georgian intellectuals began to embrace the notion of a unified entity and started crafting alternative narratives. Among them, Pavle Ingorokva's work, "Giorgi Merchule," gained recognition. It was initially published as a series of articles between 1949 and 1951 and later as a book in 1954. In 1950, an article discussing the Kingdom of Abkhazia appeared in the "Mnatobi" magazine. Within it, the issue of the medieval Abkhazians' identity was explored through the lens of linguistic, territorial, and religious affiliations. The author asserted that "Abkhazians were the same Georgian tribes as Karts, Megrelians, and Svanetians, which accounted for their active involvement in the unification of Georgia."[51]However, this perspective left two questions unanswered: whether the Abkhazian language was a Georgian dialect, and if medieval Abkhazians and Georgians shared a common linguistic identity, why couldn't modern Abkhazians speak Georgian? It's important to note that during this era, there existed a notion of genetic connections between the Georgian and Abkhazian languages, but linguists were unable to find sufficient evidence to substantiate this thesis. As a result, it remained more a matter of belief than of established knowledge.[52]

Ingorokva's narrative is interesting from another point of view. He questioned the narrative of the Marxist-Leninist textbooks of Georgian history published in 1940, 1943 and 1946, which were created by famous Georgian historians Ivane Javakhishvili, Simon Janashia and Niko Berdzenishvili. The textbooks recognized the individuality of Abkhazians and presented them as a culturally-historically connected unit living together with Georgians, sharing a common state and political course with Georgians.[53]

The article concerning Abkhazia only received a response following Stalin's death. In 1953, materials obtained from historical archives in Moscow and Leningrad were published in the "Historical Reporter" magazine. While the exact date of publication is not specified, the content strongly suggests that it was printed after Stalin's passing. Historians Giorgi Dzidzaria and Irakli Antelava presented the reports of  A. Pakhomov (steward of Dimitri Shervashidze) in 1868. According to the text, in the 18th century, the Georgian-Dadian dynasty attempted to appropriate the estates of the Abkhazian princes, which led to a rebellion by the Abkhazian people against them.[54] The magazine's format focused on publishing archival materials, and Dzidzaria and Antelava did not provide an interpretation of the text. However, it can be inferred that Pakhomov's letter was not chosen arbitrarily, and the authors aimed to fortify Abkhazian legitimacy in the territory of Abkhazia.

With Khrushchev assuming power, a shift in the national policy occurred. To consolidate their authority, the new elite prioritized the restoration of the rights of people who had been oppressed by the previous elite. Evidently, the rights of these people had not been respected by the system, and the emphasis was placed on winning the people's trust and building a new foundation within the masses. During this period, Abkhazians were granted national privileges and attained a dominant position in their autonomy, which manifested in various ways.[55]The Soviet authorities acknowledged the errors in their national policy in Abkhazia and took steps to reinstate Abkhazian publications, establish scientific institutions, promote the Abkhazian language, and foster Abkhazian leadership.[56]

In the altered political landscape, Ingorokva released the book "Giorgi Merchule," an expanded and revised version of his earlier articles. Within this work, he asserted that the medieval Abkhazian tribes had their origins in the Meskhians, Kolkhians, and Svanetians[57]Furthermore, the author provided readers with a "special excursion," demonstrating that the origins of 136 toponyms in Abkhazia, including names of rivers, mountains, settlements, and other designations, were of Georgian origin. These ideas prompted the question: who were the contemporary Abkhazians with their distinct language, customs, and historical memory? Ingorokva succinctly answered this question, noting that an ethnic transformation occurred in Western Georgia in the 17th century.[58]

In his 1954 thesis, the literary critic addressed the questions he had left unresolved in 1950. The book closely aligned with the historical narrative of both medieval and contemporary Abkhazians. It portrayed medieval Abkhazians as Georgian tribes who spoke the Georgian dialect, and modern Abkhazians as newcomers to the Abkhazia region.

The book garnered significant attention from both Georgians and Abkhazians. It was positively received by a segment of the Georgian intelligentsia, while it faced criticism from another faction.[59] Scholars expressed diverse viewpoints on the book during the discussion conducted in the "Mnatobi" magazine.[60] This underscores that, in the post-Stalin era, a portion of the Georgian elite held an ethno-national perspective on the past, although it was not universally embraced and did not enjoy unanimous support from the intelligentsia.

The book on Soviet Abkhazia elicited a predominantly negative response. Local residents linked the creation of "Giorgi Merchule" to Stalin's name and believed that the theory was crafted with the intent of deporting Abkhazians.[61] In his article titled "On Pavle Ingorokva's book 'Giorgi Merchule,'" Niko Berdzenishvili emphasized that Ingorokva distanced himself from the subject of his research during the course of his work and delved into issues not originally covered in the book. The historian contested Ingorokva's incorrect usage of historical facts and the non-Marxist style of his work.[62] In an article titled "About some issues of identity and the location of Abkhazians," linguist Ketevan Lomtatidze criticized Pavle Ingorokva using several arguments. Firstly, Lomtatidze attempted to demonstrate that the sources employed in "Giorgi Merchule" contained factual inaccuracies, while Ingorokva misinterpreted them. Additionally, Lomtatidze pointed out that the literary critic made an "unforgivable" mistake by omitting data from historical chronicles.[63]

This concept was linked to early instances of deportations that coincided with the emergence of ethnogenetic myths in the Caucasus. Such occurrences were not uncommon in the aftermath of the Second World War.

The intensification of the de-Stalinization wave created a conducive environment for the articulation of Abkhazian grievances. During this time, the "unmasking of errors" committed by the Stalinist elite in the Soviet national policy commenced. Following the official criticism of the cult of Stalin, the Abkhazian elite openly addressed the issue of national discrimination perpetrated by Georgians in Abkhazia.[64]

Amidst these developments, the content of the new history textbook, which was presented as a draft to historians and party members in 1956 and subsequently published in 1958, stirred significant controversy. We will delve into this topic later. Notably, upon examining the manual's contents, members of the Communist Party of Abkhazia openly criticized both the representatives of the Georgian cultural elite and the Communist Party. They contended that the new textbook echoed the "deviant notions" put forth by Pavle Ingorokva, and failed to acknowledge Abkhazians as an independent ethnic group prior to the 17th century.[65]

In 1958, a new history textbook titled "History of Georgia from Ancient Times to the End of the 19th Century" was published, with Niko Berdzenishvili being the sole surviving member of the authoring team. Georgian historians, on one hand, upheld the narrative from the previous textbook regarding the shared statehood, cultural affinity, and political trajectory of Georgians and Abkhazians. However, they introduced new hypotheses, asserting that the central regions of Abkhazia were inhabited by Georgian tribes, while the forebears of contemporary Abkhazians resided in the northern, mountainous part of the kingdom.[66] Within the textbook, the notion of North Caucasian tribes settling in Georgia was introduced, likely influenced by Ingorokva's thesis. Yet, unlike literary scholars, historians linked the migration process to the Golden Horde's invasion of the Caucasus. According to their account, Cherkez-Abkhazian tribes, Alans, and others started migrating southward, intermingling with South Caucasian tribes. The textbook also underscored that the mixing process varied, occurring gradually and peacefully in some areas while being swift and tumultuous in others, leading to tension among the local population.[67]

The text indicated that as the Soviet national policy evolved and Abkhazian grievances were promoted, Georgian historians sought to affirm the indigenous status of Georgians within the territory of Abkhazia. Following the publication of this text, criticism of Ingorokva's work intensified, and in 1959, Abkhazians responded to the new theory of Abkhazian ethnogenesis through a book. In that same year, Zurab Anchabadze, a prominent Abkhazian historian, published "From the History of Medieval Abkhazia," a methodologically rigorous work grounded in various sources and critical analysis. It's worth noting that the author had close ties to Georgian academic circles and enjoyed a strong reputation. This marked the inception of Abkhazian historiography and the establishment of the master narrative.

The Abkhazian author contested Ingorokva's theory regarding the migration of Abkhazian tribes from the North Caucasus to the Georgian territory. Drawing on Russian historians, he asserted that the migration process unfolded from the south to the north.[68] Furthermore, the historian defended the ethnic distinctiveness of the Abkhazians, emphasizing that "the Abkhazians constituted an independent ethnic group, differing from other Caucasus peoples[69], including the Georgians as a whole and its various ethnicities, such as the Kartlians, Megrelians, and Svanetians."[70] Nevertheless, Anchabadze also expressed the concept of a shared cultural unity with Georgians and Abkhazians' pro-Georgian policy. Towards the end of the book, he affirmed that despite the waning political connections, the preservation of cultural relations between Georgians and Abkhazians was still feasible. He underscored this by pointing out that Abkhazian feudal lords continued to employ the Georgian written language in the first half of the 19th century. In addition, Anchabadze delved into the historical memory of the Georgians, noting that "prominent segments of Georgian society retained the idea of Georgia as a once unified and culturally strong political entity, and this notion included the Abkhazians." [71] In this context, the author opposed Pavle Ingorokva's thesis, contending that the Abkhazians were a distinct ethnic group that had occupied the entire territory of Abkhazia throughout its historical development.[72] It's worth mentioning that in 1965, Inal Ifa published a revised and expanded edition of the book, where the central narrative remained unchanged, although individual sections were revised and extended. Two specific episodes are of note. The first episode pertained to the relations between Abkhazians and Georgians within the unified Georgian state. The author highlighted the significant role played by Abkhazians in Georgia's political, military, diplomatic, and cultural life, reflected in the titles of Georgian kings that included the name of Abkhazia.[73] The second episode concerned the issue of Abkhazian migration. While discussing the ethnographic makeup of Abkhazia, Inal Ifa concurred with Anchabadze's view and noted that a portion of the Abkhazians migrated to the North Caucasus in the 14th century, and prior to that, they resided in their "native land" - Abkhazia.[74]

In the 1960s, alongside the publication of Abkhazian narratives, Georgian history textbooks underwent alterations, involving the removal of content. Vital historical landmarks, figures, and periods were excised from the text.[75] These modifications in content were also evident in the book's reduced and streamlined volume. The reason for these changes in Inal Ifa’s narrative was that, despite the revision of the official narrative within the Georgian history textbook, the Abkhaz intelligentsia and members of the Communist Party persisted in expressing their dissatisfaction with the distortion of Abkhazian history. They remained skeptical of all historical works published in Georgia that pertained to the history of the Middle Ages.[76]

During this period, the situation in Abkhazia grew increasingly tense. Abkhazian national sentiments became so conspicuous among the populace that on April 14, 1967, the Communist Party of the Georgian SSR cautiously addressed the ongoing protests in Abkhazia during a meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia. Participants in the session observed that Abkhazian society was "expressing unlawful demands [for the separation of Abkhazia from Georgia], capitalizing on nationalist emotions, and inciting some individuals to provoke disturbances, thereby disrupting public order."[77]

As tensions continued to mount, the competition between narratives rekindled. In 1975, Abkhazian historian Shalva Inal-Ifa's book, "Issues of Ethnocultural History of Abkhazians," was published. Within its pages, the author asserted, "Contemporary Abkhazians are direct descendants of the early and medieval Abkhazians, and they did not share ethnic predominance over the core of their homeland with any other group." [78] In conclusion, he noted that the Abkhazians represented an independent nation, connected to each other by "common origin, territory, language, culture".[79]

Prominent Georgian historians and philologists raised concerns about this work, asserting that the author had violated publication protocols by releasing the book through the Georgian Academy of Sciences. Furthermore, they criticized the appointment of a Russian scientist, whose expertise lay in Egyptology and not Abkhazian issues, as the book's editor.[80]In response to the criticism from Georgian historians, some employees of the Museum of Abkhazia defended Abkhazian scientists. They believed that scientific circles in Tbilisi were attempting to exert pressure on Abkhazian researchers who, as per the authors, were engaging in genuine scientific pursuits. The museum's staff attributed the Georgian reaction to Inal-Ifa's work to political motivations and linked this to the historical falsification and distortion of the national policy in Abkhazia by the Communist Party of Georgia in the past.[81]

Against the backdrop of these developments, Zurab Anchabadze's book, "Essays from the Historical Past of the Abkhazian Nation," was published in 1976. Unlike the preceding text, this book made it explicitly clear that the portrayal of the Abkhazians was not linked to the Kartvelian nation but was a separate representation. In the introduction, the author emphasized that the Abkhazian socialist nation "comprised solely of Abkhazians who were citizens of the USSR, with the majority residing in the Abkhazian SSR." [82] The author no longer considered the historical Abkhazians as an ethnic group that shared a common territory with Georgians, but presented them as an independent nation that had its own national territory and independent national culture.[83]

The declaration by two influential Abkhazian authors regarding the existence of an independent Abkhazian nation signified that, by the late 1970s, Abkhazians had codified the outcomes of the corenization policy in their historical works. Abkhazians were no longer viewed as an ethnic minority within Georgia, but as a distinct nation with a recognized claim to national identity and territory.

The work published in 1979, which constituted the third part of an eight-volume series of essays on the history of Georgia, aimed to address this dispute and had a more extended research period than the other volumes. This volume focused on medieval Abkhazian history. Notably, the co-author of this text, alongside the Georgian historian, was Abkhazian historian Zurab Anchabadze. This represented a diplomatic and flexible gesture on the part of Georgian intellectuals, signaling their efforts to craft a balanced history acceptable to both sides. In this new essay, similar to the 1958 publication, geographic boundaries were delineated along ethnic lines. However, the migration of Abkhazian tribes to central Abkhazia was attributed to the ancient period, portraying them as the early inhabitants of historical Egrisi.[84] Concurrently, the authors promoted the idea of cultural affinity between Georgians and Abkhazians, emphasizing their shared history and highlighting the significant role Abkhazians played in the cultural and political life of Georgia.[85]

While the new work aimed to resolve the dispute among historians, it did not yield practical results. Starting in the 1970s, the political situation in Abkhazia became increasingly fraught, and it gradually became apparent to all that negotiations between Abkhazians and Georgians regarding national borders were no longer feasible. Georgians were intent on forging a unified state and emphasizing the culturally and historically intertwined connections. On the other hand, Abkhazians saw themselves as equals to Georgians within a socialist nation, rather than merely as an ethnic group. Additionally, they sought to secure extended autonomy and privileges within the territory of Abkhazia.

Conclusion

The purpose of this article was to elucidate the origins and motivations behind the development of conflicting identities between Georgians and Abkhazians during the period from the 1950s to the 1970s. It illustrated that the groundwork for this process was laid by the policies of the Soviet national government and the various initiatives it set in motion. As part of the Koreaniization process, the scope of the Georgian national project was constricted and conformed to the Soviet framework. Concurrently, the Abkhazian national project gained momentum, evolving into a formidable and self-reliant force by the 1930s.

However, the path for the development of the Abkhazian project was blocked through the implementation of the principle of selectivity in the corenization policy and the reinforcement of centralization. Beginning in the 1930s, the loss of national privileges within autonomy, evident in reforms that Abkhazians found objectionable on multiple levels, along with a policy of drawing closer to Georgians, led to protests among the Abkhazians. They were only able to voice these grievances openly during the de-Stalinization period.

The strengthening of centralization policies and the instrumentalization of history contributed to the reinforcement of ethno-national sentiments in the minds of certain members of the intelligentsia, which was another factor in fueling the protests. An illustrative example in Georgia was "Giorgi Merchule," a text that meticulously conformed to the paradigm of a monolithic origin and the development of nations.

Within this complex political context, Georgians and Abkhazians perceived and envisioned their identity and their place in the region, as well as their political ties, in distinct and contrasting ways. These divergent perspectives led to the formation of irreconcilable projects and the dwindling of opportunities for negotiation. Eventually, what began as a conflict in narratives spilled over into street protests, and the conflict that had initially emerged in written accounts became one of the key drivers of physical confrontations.