When I was asked to write an opinion article about Azerbaijan for a Georgian audience, I was perplexed at first. What aspects of Azerbaijan’s contemporary life and politics —particularly in light of the upcoming elections—would resonate most with Georgians? The answer, it soon became clear, revolved around a central theme: the erosion of the limits of possible politics.

Freedom for people in Azerbaijan was lost gradually - something that became a stark reality in Georgia every day over the last decade. Somehow, Georgia became a textbook case of sliding into illiberalism, while Azerbaijan was deemed authoritarian from the beginning, although I will argue here that this was not particularly true.This characterisation oversimplifies the nuanced evolution of political space in Azerbaijan. The loss of freedom and shrinking political space in Azerbaijan was a gradual development, which we can reconstruct by looking back historically as far as 20-30 years ago. Even 15 years ago, the situation was radically different.

One lesson that Georgians can learn from the oversights of their fellow Azerbaijanis is the importance of resilience in the face of rising authoritative power. In this piece, I would like to highlight the similarities of the gradual erosion of freedoms in Azerbaijan and Georgia, hoping that fellow Georgians will not take the developments in their country for granted but will critically examine and acknowledge the fact of sliding into the abyss and start acting.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Azerbaijan found itself in a very chaotic situation: war with Armenia, occupation, internally displaced people, coups, political uprisings among ethnic minorities (Talysh and Lezgins), organised crime, the erosion of the state institutions, and poverty, to name just a few.

This period of instability paved the way for former President Heydar Aliyev, a former KGB chief and Soviet Politburo member, whose rise to power signalled the beginning of the end for Azerbaijan's brief, albeit turbulent, era of relative freedom. His reign was signified by the gradual erosion of the freedoms gained after Perestroika and the Soviet Union collapse. Under the guise of ensuring stability and security — a mantra that continues under his son, president Ilham Aliyev — civil liberties were systematically curtailed.

This narrative bears a striking resemblance to the recent rhetoric of Bidzina Ivanishvili in Georgia, where today's electoral debates are dominated by discussions of maintaining stability, positioning the Georgian Dream against what they call the "Global War Party." This attempt to weaponise securitisation discourse and present itself as the only guarantor of peace and stability is a classic tactic in authoritarian regimes. Laws against foreign agents are justified by alleged threats to peace, border closures^[1] are touted as necessary for stability (in the case of Azerbaijan), and anti-LGBT laws are portrayed as protecting traditional values and, with them, the endangered world order while actually concealing increased political homophobia. What we witness in today's politics is attempts to securitise almost every single aspect of our everyday life.

Along with maintaining peace and stability, another important factor giving rise to authoritarianism was the economic backdrop. Azerbaijan's reliance on oil revenues has significantly shaped its political landscape. The gradual erosion of liberties in Azerbaijan started as soon as the central state apparatus received enough funds from oil rents. This coincided to the early 2010s.

The "Contract of the Century," signed in 1994, began to generate significant returns when the Baku-Tbilisi-Jeyhan pipeline became operational in 2006. Since then, Azerbaijan’s economy has relied heavily on rent from the oil and gas trade. The European Union (EU) is its largest trading partner, accounting for more than 50% of its total trade and 64% of its exports, primarily in oil and gas. This surge of oil revenue is centralised and controlled by one particular leader, who redistributes the wealth. Such a position allowed Aliyev to become a real dictator and create practically a dynasty with loyal and consolidated but fully dependent elites supporting his regime.

Similarly, favouring an economy reliant on revenue from the transit of fossil fuels, energy, and cargo will further enhance Ivanishvili's access to quick and substantial financial resources. Investments in projects such as the Poti and Anaklia ports, which will facilitate the transportation of goods from China to Europe via the Middle Corridor; the Southern Gas Corridor, enabling the transit of fossil fuels from the Caspian Sea basin to Europe; and the submarine electricity cable project, which will allow the delivery of green energy from the South Caucasus to Europe, are examples of an economy built around easily accessible rents.

There are notable similarities in these developments as well. The concept of one oligarch controlling an entire country is not unfamiliar to Georgians. According to 2015 data from Radio Liberty, Ivanishvili is reported to own 35% of Georgia's GDP. Despite Georgia’s political landscape suggesting the presence of multiple oligarchs or key players, recent years have shown Ivanishvili and a compliant elite under the Georgian Dream banner consolidating power around him. Unlike Azerbaijan, which amassed substantial wealth from oil—much of it siphoned off through corruption—Georgia has pursued a different trajectory toward becoming a rule-of-law state. Nevertheless, it has arrived at a similar conclusion/outcome: the state being exploited as a personal treasury.

In Georgia, the governance favouring the rich over the poor model is a legacy left by previous administrations. Economic policies favourable to oligarchs, such as flat taxation and a liberal economy, were implemented under the Saakashvili government. However, during the 2017 constitutional amendments, when Georgian Dream had the opportunity to revise these policies, they chose to maintain them. Over time, we have observed how legislative measures that benefit oligarchs, particularly Ivanishvili, have been enacted by parliament—the most recent being a law that transformed Georgia into a tax haven, assisting Ivanishvili in evading sanctions. Such policies have only served to reinforce the power of the oligarch and rich elites while diminishing the welfare of the general populace.

Despite these similarities, there are crucial differences in the state structures of Georgia and Azerbaijan, particularly in their capacities for repression. Azerbaijan's oil wealth has bolstered a robust state apparatus capable of suppressing opposition, a capacity that the Georgian government lacks.

The decline in global oil prices in the early 2010s led to a harsh crackdown on civil society in Azerbaijan. This loss of oil revenues happened in the wake of the Arab uprisings and Euromaidan when civil societies globally were accused of participating in so-called ‘coloured revolutions’. The relatively free and competitive political sphere immediately became a threat to a regime that /sustained its strength through oil revenues.

The backsliding of political freedoms in Azerbaijan was also mirrored by constitutional changes. The first amendment to the Azerbaijani constitution occurred in 2002, replacing the proportional electoral system with a majoritarian one. Additionally, a significant alteration stipulated that the Prime Minister, rather than the head of the parliament, would assume presidential duties in the event of the president's incapacity. This change was implemented while the late President Heydar Aliyev was in office (he passed away in 2003), with his son Ilham Aliyev serving as Prime Minister. Such measures required the backing and support of the elites at the time. Subsequent amendments in 2009 and 2016 further concentrated power in the presidency, including the removal of the presidential two-term limit and the introduction of a vice-presidential role, which was filled by Mehriban Aliyeva, the president's wife. These changes progressively transformed Azerbaijan from a semi-presidential system to a super-presidential republic.

Georgia also experienced a gradual erosion of its checks and balances system. With the adoption of a new constitution in 2018, the Supreme Court was packed; the number of justices increased from 16 to 28, with Georgian Dream appointing 20 new members, as there were only eight sitting justices. Additionally, various tactics were used to dominate the Constitutional Court and undermine its independence. Furthermore, the unchecked majority in the parliament allowed Georgian Dream to eliminate virtually all mechanisms of checks and balances from other branches, thus taking full control over legislative decisions through a simple majority voting system.

The comparative overview of these developments presents an obvious picture, a phenomenon referred to in academic literature as democratic decay. The literature distinguishes two types of decay: autocratic reversion and constitutional retrogression. The current situation of Azerbaijan and its historic path should be a good example for Georgia of where it is heading - towards an autocratic reversion, where changes might soon get rapid and even lead to the near-complete collapse of democratic institutions. For the decade, Georgia has experienced a decline in political competitiveness and the rule of law, both administrative and adjudicative, as well as in freedoms related to political speech and association - which are indicators of slow but steady constitutional retrogression. The next targets are already political speech and association. The first steps towards curbing these freedoms have been taken by adopting the "Foreign Agents Law", and should Georgian Dream triumph in the upcoming elections, they are poised to further tighten their grip on political discourse and associations.

This pivot toward authoritarian domestic policies has been paralleled by transformations in foreign policy. Azerbaijan, for instance, has maintained a balanced approach to foreign relations for decades, carefully navigating between alignment with Russia and the West. However, this strategy has markedly shifted following the 2020 conflict in Karabakh and the subsequent Russian invasion of Ukraine. Subsequently, anti-Western rhetoric has become increasingly prominent, despite Azerbaijan's economic reliance on oil trade with the European Union and minimal economic dependence on Russia. Nonetheless, a symbolic alignment with authoritarian regimes appears to be instrumental in this noticeable shift in foreign policy orientation.

It appears that Georgia is embarking on a similar trajectory. Historically, unlike Azerbaijan, Georgia has maintained a strong orientation towards the West, culminating in the achievement of EU candidate status. However, contrary to expectations, including those of observers like myself, the ruling party, Georgian Dream, has risked this status through pronounced anti-Western rhetoric. This includes the invention and even an obsession with a conspiracy theory about the so-called “Global War Party”, which controls politicians across the globe and the Georgian opposition in particular. This “party” and not Russia is supposedly responsible for the war in Ukraine and tries to drag Georgia into terrors of war through the “opening of a second front”. Gradually, Georgian Dream has also displayed various indications of a thaw in relations with Russia, such as the resumption of direct flights, a de-escalation in aggressive rhetoric, and a significant increase in trade. However, Georgia's pivot is not solely towards Russia but extends more broadly towards authoritarian states, symbolically significant for maintaining a firm hold on power, such as strengthening its economic connections with China.

In this context, it is also pertinent to highlight Azerbaijan's ongoing support for the Georgian Dream. Recent developments have included articles targeting ethnic Azerbaijanis in Georgia to influence their vote in favour of the Georgian Dream, complemented by circulated videos on social media featuring Azerbaijani officials advocating for the party in public speeches in Bolnisi. It is becoming evident that Azerbaijan needs Georgia to be authoritarian as much as Ivanashvili and the Georgian Dream needs such authoritarian regimes as Azerbaijan, Russia, China and Tükiye.

Nevertheless, the ultimate decision rests with the Georgian people, the last and often overlooked pillar of democracy. Yet, the challenge remains: the people of Georgia are swayed by the Georgian Dream's populist rhetoric, which focuses on the so-called Global War Party and traditional values. This mirrors the situation in Azerbaijan, where, for decades, citizens have been influenced by nationalistic and revanchist rhetoric. Such influences led to the Second Karabakh War in 2020 and persist today in a form of discourse ensuring stability and fighting enemies. As a result, freedom is in decline, and the socio-economic situation is in decline, but the warm lies of the greatness of the nation are on the rise, poisoning our lives and minds.

^[1] Azerbaijani land borders are closed since 2020 COVID-19 pandemic.