A few days ago, the Social Justice Center published a report analyzing the context of the ongoing de facto presidential elections in Abkhazia. The report demonstrates that, despite Russia's declarations of willingness to cooperate with any victorious candidate, it openly and unequivocally supported the candidate of Aslan Bzhania’s political team, Badra Gunba, who ultimately secured victory following the second round of elections on March 1. Russian influence on the elections was evident not only through official meetings with Gunba and the use of administrative resources to his advantage but also in the content of the pre-election campaign, which took on a distinctly anti-Turkish tone and even fostered ethnic tensions. The present document examines these processes in detail.

Regrettably, the de facto pre-election period in Abkhazia was marked by attempts to incite ethnic discord. On one hand, Russian television channels and subsequently Telegram channels actively disseminated propaganda portraying Adgur Ardzinba as pro-Turkish and harboring anti-Armenian and anti-Russian sentiments. On the other hand, Ardzinba's supporters pointed to alleged bribery and pressure exerted on ethnic Armenians residing in Abkhazia, questioning their unusually active support for Gunba without clarifying the underlying reasons for such behavior. This included speculation on how the introduction of the Turkish factor into political discourse could impact the local Armenian community and its historical traumas.

More specifically, the opposition asserted that bribery and coercion influenced the "election" outcomes. Additionally, pre-election propaganda played a role in shaping public perception, portraying Ardzinba as a pro-Turkish and anti-Armenian candidate. Sources cited his education at a Turkish college in Abkhazia and his proficiency in the Turkish language as evidence of his "pro-Turkish" stance. Furthermore, Russian media actively propagated claims that the opposition candidate was a "Turkish agent."

Suspicions that Ardzinba enjoyed greater support among Abkhazians living in Turkey may have contributed to the decision by Abkhazia’s de facto Central Election Commission (CEC) to close the Sakaria polling station. The official justification for this decision was a letter from Abkhazia’s de facto representative in Turkey, Ibrahim Avidzba, to the de facto CEC, stating that opening the polling station was unfeasible, despite the CEC's earlier approval in January. No explanation was provided for why the station could not be opened. Two days before the election, the Ankara district polling station was also shut down. On election day, it was revealed that "Abkhazian citizens" traveling from Turkey to Sochi to participate in the "elections" were denied entry into Abkhazia due to the closure of the polling station in Turkey. They were also subjected to a ten-year ban from entering Russia, without any official explanation. Although the number of ethnic Abkhazians living in Turkey who manage to participate in Abkhazia’s de facto elections is relatively small (around 1,000 people), restricting their voting rights appeared to hold more symbolic and political significance.

Against this tense backdrop, on February 20, opposition candidate Ardzinba appealed to the de facto security services, requesting an investigation into the disinformation campaign against him during the pre-election period. He argued that accusations of being a "Turkish agent" insulted his dignity, damaged his political reputation, and constituted a punishable offense under Abkhazia’s de facto Criminal Code (defamation). That same day, Ardzinba’s supporters gathered at the Philharmonic Hall, demanding an end to allegations of pro-Turkish affiliations and voter intimidation. On 20 February, political parties and civil society organizations also appealed to Putin, urging him to address the dangers posed by the dissemination of propaganda in Abkhazia. They noted that similar tactics had been observed in the 2020 elections, when candidates were accused of harboring "pro-Western" sentiments, whereas now, the pro-Turkish factor had emerged, aiming to influence the free choice of the Abkhazian people.

Simultaneously, attempts to incite anti-Armenian sentiment were also apparent in the pre-election period. For instance, Telegram channels “re-activated” footage from several months prior, in which opposition leaders, including Ardzinba, engaged in a debate with de facto MP Galust Trapizonyan, pressuring him to publicly renounce an investment agreement. Such discussions were common during protests against the legislation, and Trapizonyan’s case was not an exception. The apparent intent behind the intensified circulation of these videos on Telegram was to portray Ardzinba as an anti-Armenian candidate and provoke discontent among Armenian voters.

In the first round of elections, Badra Gunba, the candidate from the ruling team, won by an overwhelming margin in villages predominantly inhabited by ethnic Armenians. Ardzinba found this result suspicious, as previous elections had seen votes in these areas more evenly distributed. Armenian community leader Alik Minosyan also stated that local Armenians had faced pressure in the context of the presidential elections.

It is evident that anti-Turkish and anti-Armenian narratives in Abkhazia have their own historical context. For Abkhazians, who have experienced the traumatic history of Muhajirism, the Turkish factor remains historically significant. Despite Turkey’s non-recognition of Abkhazia and its strong strategic alliance with Georgia, hundreds of thousands of Abkhazians (at least 300,000) who were forcibly displaced during Muhajirism still reside in Turkey. The restriction of their participation in the elections has emerged as a new trend. Moreover, the introduction of the pro-Turkish factor into the pre-election discourse may also be seen as an attempt to manipulate the sentiments of ethnic Armenians living in Abkhazia, considering the historical trauma of the Armenian Genocide.

In general, ethnic and nationalist accusations are not new to Abkhazian elections. Years ago, Alexander Ankvab was accused of being pro-Georgian due to an ethnic Georgian background of his wife. During the previous "elections," a key compromising issue against former de facto president Aslan Bzhania was his non-participation in the 1992–93 war, leading many opponents to label him a deserter.

Notably, on February 22, after hours of negotiations between Ardzinba and Gunba, a so-called six-point truce agreement was reached. In this agreement, the two de facto presidential candidates agreed on the main rules governing the pre-election process until March 1. Among other commitments, they pledged to halt the dissemination of defamatory and false information and condemned any attempts to incite ethnic discord among Abkhazia’s multiethnic population. They also committed to preventing violence and destabilization and urged their supporters not to fall for provocations that could fuel ethnic tensions.

Ethnic nationalism and ethnically driven democracy in Abkhazia, which emphasize the cultural and political uniqueness of the Abkhaz people while continuously reinforcing a hierarchical view of other ethnic groups, often create the imagge of an "enemy." In previous years, such ethnocentric policies and tendencies were primarily targeterd ethnic Georgians, effectively excluding the Georgian population in Gali from participating in the electoral process. The current elections marked the first time in Abkhazia’s de facto electoral history that the Georgian ethnic factor was not a dominant theme in political propaganda, instead introducing a new layer of ethnic tension. It is also worth noting that the manipulation of ethnic sentiments, historical traumas, and perceptions is a key aspect of Russian political strategy. Russia traditionally employs this tactic to maintain control over its target territories and disrupt social stability. The use of the anti-Turkish factor is not coincidental, especially in light of Russia’s declining influence in the region (following events in Syria and the Second Karabakh War). Given its strategic interests in maintaining influence in the region, Russia is wary of Turkey emerging as a significant alternative regional political force. Turkey could play a crucial role in Georgia’s conflict transformation process—both by respecting Georgia’s territorial integrity and by strengthening Abkhazia’s economic cooperation with Black Sea countries, primarily Georgia, thereby reducing Abkhazia’s dependence on Russia.

Hopefully, the propagandistic use of ethnic factors during the pre-election period will not ultimately affect the peaceful coexistence of different ethnic groups on the ground, and the trends of ethnic tensions will subside.

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