Introduction

On 16 February 2026, at the session of the Legal Issues Committee of the Parliament of Georgia, a package of amendments to the Law of Georgia “On Grants,” the Criminal Code, and other legislative acts, initiated by Georgian Dream at the end of January, was considered in the second reading.

The version of the amendments discussed in the second reading contains several significant updates, among which the most alarming are the planned changes to the Criminal Code. These changes incorporate proposals voiced by members of Georgian Dream during the first reading concerning the criminalization of the non-recognition of the Georgian Dream government. In particular:

A new Article 316¹ is added to the Criminal Code entitled “Extremism against the Constitutional Order of Georgia.” Under this provision, a citizen of Georgia or a stateless person holding status in Georgia may be punished by a fine, community service (from 400 to 600 hours), or imprisonment for up to 3 years for systematically and publicly calling for the mass violation of legislation, mass disobedience to state authorities of Georgia, or the creation of alternative authorities to those bodies; for arbitrarily and systematically presenting oneself or another person publicly as a representative of the Georgian authorities; or for committing other systematic acts, if any of the above actions are aimed at establishing the perception that the constitutional order or constitutional bodies of Georgia are illegitimate and harm the interests of Georgia or create a real threat of such harm. A legal entity committing so-called “extremism” will be punished by a fine or by liquidation and a fine. In addition, a new aggravating circumstance for criminal liability is introduced - commission of a crime motivated by the non-recognition of the constitutional order or constitutional bodies of Georgia. In such a case, the sentence must exceed the minimum penalty prescribed for the relevant offence by at least 1 year.

According to the Chair of the Legal Issues Committee, Archil Gorduladze, “unfortunately, there are individuals who systematically refuse to recognize the Constitution and the constitutional order and through their actions endanger sovereignty and refuse to recognize the fundamental principle of democracy - that in Georgia the Georgian people make decisions.” Gorduladze also noted that “in the Federal Republic of Germany one organization was banned, and its self-proclaimed king, who did not recognize state institutions, was prosecuted under criminal law.”

According to Social Justice Center, the above amendments to the Criminal Code represent yet another extremely serious step in Georgian Dream’s authoritarian turn, which unequivocally violates the Constitution of Georgia and international human rights law and closely resembles legislation adopted by other authoritarian states in the region. The amendments disregard the principles of the rule of law, legal certainty, and foreseeability, and violate the freedoms of association, expression, and thought and belief. The legislative path chosen by Georgian Dream clearly indicates an intention to misuse and politicize criminal legislation and creates a high risk of arbitrary punishment of individuals holding differing political views.

Moreover, Georgian Dream’s attempt to link the proposed amendments to the Criminal Code to the 2024 banning in the Federal Republic of Germany of a specific organization, the so-called “Kingdom of Germany,” is entirely manipulative. Both the factual and legal circumstances of that case differ fundamentally from the substance of the amendments proposed to the Criminal Code of Georgia.[1]

Amendments to the Criminal Code and the Principle of Legal Certainty

According to the draft laws discussed at the session of the Legal Issues Committee of the Parliament of Georgia, as noted above, amendments are introduced to Article 53¹ of the Criminal Code of Georgia, which generally defines aggravating circumstances for sentencing and, among other things, provides the legal basis for imposing stricter criminal liability for hate-motivated crimes.

In the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) guide “Investigating Hate Crimes,” a hate crime is defined as an act committed because the victim actually or presumably belongs to a particular group, most defined by race, religion, sexual orientation/gender, ethnic origin, nationality, disability, political opinion, or other characteristics. [2] An analogous attempt to define hate motivation is found in Article 53¹(1) of the Criminal Code of Georgia, which establishes that committing a crime motivated by intolerance on grounds such as race, skin color, language, sex, sexual orientation, intolerance toward gender equality, age, religion, political or other opinion, disability, citizenship, national, ethnic or social origin, descent, property or social status, place of residence, or other discriminatory characteristics constitutes an aggravating circumstance for all relevant crimes under the Code.

Accordingly, under Georgian legislation the commission of a crime motivated by intolerance toward political or other opinions is already punishable, and there is no need for additional regulation. At the same time, it remains unclear what is meant by the “motive of non-recognition of the authorities” and how such a motive could be identified without restricting freedom of expression. Therefore, the proposed amendment is fundamentally vague and indeterminate and creates a high risk of arbitrary imposition of criminal liability.

The content of Article 316¹ of the Criminal Code is likewise vague and indeterminate, since the concepts contained in the disposition of the provision allow for broad interpretation and effectively transform it into what is commonly referred to as a “rubber provision.” As noted above, the proposed amendments criminalize calls made by a citizen of Georgia or a stateless person if such calls are directed toward:

• the mass violation of Georgian legislation;
• mass disobedience to the authorities of Georgia;
• the creation of alternative authorities to those of Georgia.

At the same time, the draft amendments specify that such calls must be made “systematically” and “publicly.” However, the draft law does not indicate whether such calls must produce any result. In practice, it declares criminal, even without the occurrence of any consequence, for example any call directed toward violating Georgian legislation.

It should also be noted that, according to the proposed amendments, Article 316¹ will also punish “the arbitrary, public and systematic presentation by a person of oneself or another person as a representative of the Georgian authorities,” as well as “other systematic acts” committed by that person which:

• are aimed at establishing the perception that the constitutional order or constitutional bodies of Georgia are illegitimate and harm the interests of Georgia; or
• create a real threat of harm to those interests.

In this case as well, actions of entirely vague and indeterminate content are criminalized. In particular, it is unclear how an act that may establish a perception of the illegitimacy of the constitutional order or constitutional bodies is to be identified; how its systematic nature is to be determined—for example, whether an act committed twice constitutes systematic behavior; or what space (including how many people) may qualify as satisfying the criterion of publicity. It must also be considered that the provision does not specify which interests of Georgia are harmed by such actions or how a real threat of harm to these interests is to be determined.

Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights requires certainty in criminal law. This means that any legal basis for interference with Convention rights must be adequately accessible and formulated with sufficient precision to enable individuals to regulate their conduct. A person “must be able-if necessary, with appropriate advice-to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail.”[3] Accordingly, the requirement of legality not only demands the existence of a legal rule or regime permitting interference but also extends to the quality of the domestic law itself. When domestic law provides discretion, it must also establish the limits of that discretion. [4]

Respect for the rule of law and the principle of legality constitutes a precondition for the legitimate exercise of state power. The idea of the rule of law—without which modern constitutional states cannot exist—even in its narrower interpretation carries the moral purpose of preventing arbitrary and biased use of power. [5]

The European Court of Human Rights likewise refers to the aim of preventing arbitrariness when assessing the quality of a law restricting rights. According to even the most minimalist theories of the rule of law, a law must satisfy several requirements: it must be general in the sense that it addresses an indeterminate circle of persons (impartial and not targeted ad hominem); publicly adopted; oriented toward future conduct; foreseeable; free from internal contradictions; relatively stable (for example, not subject to daily changes); capable of being complied with; and its enforcement must not diverge significantly from a good-faith interpretation of the law. [6]

Within the context of criminal law, the principle of the rule of law finds a more precise and stringent expression in the principle of legality, which incorporates several guarantees. According to the principle of legality, norms establishing criminal liability must be adopted by the Parliament of Georgia through legislation. However, the principle of legality is not limited to determining the competent authority and imposes certain qualitative requirements on norms establishing liability. In particular, the establishment of criminal liability through retroactive legislation, vague (unforeseeable) provisions, customary law, or analogy is impermissible. The principle of legality also differs from general rule-of-law standards in that it is absolute. While there may be exceptions allowing new laws to sanction acts committed in the past, establishing liability without a clear legal basis is an absolute guarantee that admits no exceptions and cannot be derogated from even during a state of emergency. [7]

In the present case, the amendments introduced to the Criminal Code of Georgia contain essentially vague concepts belonging to evaluative categories, which render the specific criminal provision unforeseeable.

According to the interpretation of the Constitutional Court of Georgia and international legal standards, when there is a risk of restricting rights, the legislator or norm-setting authority is obliged to adopt precise, clear, unambiguous, and foreseeable legislation (norms) which, under conditions of good-faith interpretation, excludes the possibility of interpretations incompatible with the right concerned. [8] A norm must be sufficiently precise not only in terms of its content but also regarding its regulatory subject, purpose, and scope.[9] The Constitutional Court further establishes that the legislator must provide public authorities with guiding directions that render foreseeable the possibility, necessity, inevitability, correctness, and legality of a particular decision.[10]

The standard of foreseeability is even stricter with respect to norms establishing liability. According to the Constitutional Court, when defining criminal legislation, the legislator must adopt provisions that minimize, as much as possible, the possibility that courts could reach different legal outcomes through interpretation.[11] In the Court’s words, the legislator must exercise its exclusive power to criminalize conduct in such a way that law-enforcement bodies are not allowed, on the basis of judicial practice, to themselves create the elements of a criminal offence.[12] In this way, the foreseeability standard serves to prevent the risk of arbitrary prosecution and conviction.[13]

The European Court of Human Rights also links the standard of foreseeability to the prevention of arbitrariness,[14] particularly in relation to provisions that may form the basis for criminal liability[15] and/or deprivation of liberty.[16]

It must also be considered that the legislative amendments in question do not correspond to any significant public interest that would justify the need to criminalize the conduct indicated. As the Constitutional Court of Georgia has explained, an offence is an act committed by an individual that contradicts the fundamental values of society and the established public order, without the protection of which a pluralistic, democratic, and free society cannot exist.[17] According to the Court, criminalization in the absence of a real and objective necessity to protect relevant public goods or legitimate aims removes the constitutional basis for governmental action.[18] The Court recognizes punishment as justified only for the purposes of restoring justice, preventing new crimes, and achieving the resocialization of the offender.[19] Punishment cannot exist without the establishment of an offence/crime, and logically the imposition of criminal liability must ultimately serve the purposes of punishment. The European Court of Human Rights also strictly reviews instances of criminalization and explains that such provisions must be narrowly formulated and leave no room for broad interpretation.[20]

Taking all the above into account, the introduction by Georgian Dream of an unnecessary and unforeseeable criminal provision into the Criminal Code creates a substantial risk that it will be applied in bad faith, abusively, and arbitrarily.

Amendments to the Criminal Code and Restrictions on Political Expression

In interpreting freedom of expression protected by Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the European Court of Human Rights has consistently emphasized that political expression enjoys the highest level of protection. The protection afforded by this article extends even to expression that “offends, shocks or disturbs” society.[21] At the same time, the limits of acceptable criticism are considerably wider regarding the state than with respect to private individuals.[22] Most relevant to the present case, calls for constitutional change or the questioning of the legitimacy of authorities fall within the protection of freedom of expression, provided that they are not accompanied by violence or an immediate incitement to violence.[23]

In contrast, the proposed amendments criminalize, under criminal law: (a) calls for mass disobedience; (b) public statements about the illegitimacy of institutions; (c) the creation of “alternative bodies”; and (d) other systematic actions aimed at establishing perceptions of illegitimacy. These actions are directly linked to political debate and the exchange of views regarding the constitutional legitimacy of the authorities-expression that lies at the very core of the values protected by Article 10 of the Convention. According to the Convention, freedom of expression does not protect political expression that constitutes incitement to violence, armed confrontation, or that creates a clear and immediate threat to the democratic order. However, the “offence” defined in the amendments initiated by Georgian Dream does not require the presence of any of these circumstances. Instead, it relies only on the vague notions of “publicity” and “systematicity,” thereby violating Article 10 of the Convention.

The automatic criminalization of “mass disobedience,” without assessing proportionality, also contradicts the freedom of assembly protected by Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly developed by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) state that:

• peaceful civil disobedience may fall within the scope of protection of freedom of assembly;
• the state is obliged to tolerate a certain degree of disruption;
• criminal sanctions must be proportionate.[24]

Civil disobedience, by its nature, involves the intentional and public violation of certain legal obligations motivated by political opposition. It may manifest itself through non-compliance with specific administrative measures or through public calls for boycotts, strikes, blockades, or campaigns of refusal to cooperate.

The established case-law of the European Court of Human Rights indicates that peaceful protest cannot be restricted solely because it questions state policies. Accordingly, acts of disobedience are not automatically excluded from the scope of protection under Article 11 of the Convention. If civil disobedience-absent violence-is automatically criminalized as extremism, it conflicts with Article 11 of the Convention. In such cases, the key factor is the proportionality of the restriction imposed by the state rather than automatic criminalization.[25]

Moreover, restrictions of such severity produce a chilling effect on civic engagement and participation, on the expression of dissenting views, and on members of society holding oppositional political positions.

Criminalization of Political Motive

The legislative initiative introduces an aggravating circumstance to be considered during sentencing: when a crime is motivated by the non-recognition of the constitutional order and constitutional bodies. As noted above, motive-based aggravating circumstances are known in the context of hate crimes; however, while the purpose of identifying motive in such crimes is to protect vulnerable groups from violence and discrimination, in this case the protected “interest” is the power of the authorities themselves.

International human rights law does not recognize the protection of state institutions from criticism or ideological opposition as a legitimate aim for increasing punishment, except in cases involving imminent violence, incitement to such violence, or an actual coup d’état.[26][27] Any other approach directly interferes with the freedom of thought and belief protected by Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights, as it effectively criminalizes an individual’s political views in the absence of an immediate risk of violence. When a person is punished under criminal law and the severity of the sentence is increased not because of the objective harm caused but because of their political views, the state is punishing not an act but the individual’s beliefs and opinions. Moreover, the criminalization of political motive fundamentally reverses the logic of human rights law, according to which the state is the bearer of obligations rather than a subject entitled to heightened protection from criticism by society.

The European Court of Human Rights has repeatedly emphasized that democratic societies must tolerate sharp political opposition. Otherwise, restrictions will conflict with Articles 9, 10, and 11 of the Convention and the principle of proportionality. It must also be considered that increasing the statutory minimum sentence limits judicial discretion and may result in the imposition of disproportionate punishment, thereby creating additional violations of the Convention.

Finally, it must be emphasized that, given the severe social and political context in the country both prior to and during the initiation of these amendments, it is evident that the objective of Georgian Dream in this case is not the protection of the constitutional and democratic order in general, but rather the use of the law as a tool in the context of a crisis of its own domestic and international legitimacy. Public perceptions in Georgian society and at the international level regarding the legitimacy crisis of Georgian Dream’s governance are not related to opposition to the democratic or constitutional order as such. The interest articulated by Georgian Dream in protecting the constitutional order presents society with a false dilemma, because the oppositional segment of society challenges the power of a particular political party rather than the constitutional order itself.

So-called “Anti-Extremism” Legislation in Comparative Perspective

The use of criminal law to protect the “constitutional order” from ideological challenges is not characteristic of consolidated democracies. However, such regulations are common in authoritarian states and, as enforcement practice demonstrates, they are frequently used against dissenting opinions, political opposition, civil society organizations, and independent media. The adoption and enforcement of “anti-extremism” legislation is particularly common in authoritarian states within the region.

The Law on Combating Extremism in the Russian Federation

The so-called “anti-extremism” law in the Russian Federation was adopted in 2002. Over time, however, the law was amended several times and was critically assessed in a 2012 opinion of the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), as this period marked the beginning of its widespread use against non-governmental organizations, journalists, human rights defenders, and various religious groups. [28]

A central element of the Commission’s criticism concerned the vague terminology of the law. According to the Commission’s assessment, the law had a negative impact on fundamental rights protected under Articles 9, 10, and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights. In assessing compatibility with these rights, it was important not only that restrictions were prescribed by law but also that the law itself met the standard of foreseeability. In addition, the Commission noted that the law should be analyzed in conjunction with the Criminal Code, the Code of Administrative Offences, and the Law on the Federal Security Service, although it ultimately did not undertake such a comprehensive analysis.

Article 1 of Russia’s anti-extremism law contains an extensive list of actions classified as extremism. [29] Some of these elements include acts committed through violence or threats of violence. However, the list also includes other actions which, even as of 2012, were considered by the Venice Commission to be overly broad, lacking clarity and allowing for multiple interpretations. The Commission identified particularly problematic vague terminology such as “extremist organization,” “extremist activities,” and “extremist materials.” Because these terms were not clearly defined and did not necessarily involve violence or an immediate threat of violence, the Commission concluded that they granted broad discretion to courts and law-enforcement authorities and created a high risk of arbitrary enforcement.

Specific enforcement mechanisms under the law-including preventive warnings, administrative liability for repeated violations, and, in cases of criminal liability, the banning or liquidation of organizations (including religious groups, public associations, human rights organizations, and media outlets)-were also considered problematic in relation to freedom of association and freedom of expression. The Commission emphasized that legislation addressing such a sensitive issue as extremism-particularly when it affects freedoms of expression, association, and thought and introduces severe forms of liability-must strictly comply with the requirements of foreseeability and proportionality and must not violate the principles of legality, necessity, and proportionality.

It is also noteworthy that, during its review of the law, the Venice Commission referred to information available to it indicating that, even during the preparation of the opinion, there were already cases of arbitrary and overly broad interpretation of the law based on the vague terminology mentioned above. In these cases, individuals, organizations, and media outlets critical of the authorities became the targets of prosecution.[30]

In its 2022 report on Russia, the United States Department of State also pointed to the use of “anti-extremism” legislation for political purposes against individuals and organizations. Individuals convicted under these provisions were often placed in prisons with particularly harsh conditions. According to data from 2020, for example, more than 145 people were convicted under this legislation, even though their actions were related to peaceful protests, freedom of expression on social networks, or other forms of public expression.[31] Numerous organizations and media outlets were also designated as extremist and subsequently closed. According to a 2022 assessment by OSCE/ODIHR, the original version of the extremism law contained two concurrent elements-“violent change of the foundations of the constitutional order” and “violation of the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation.” In the 2022 version of the law these elements were separated, and the requirement of violent change was removed from the provision. [32]

Following the invasion of Ukraine in 2023–2024, the scope and application of Russia’s “anti-extremism” legislation expanded even further. Among other measures, access to materials deemed “extremist” was blocked online and a list of blocked websites was created. For example, in March 2024 several journalists and photographers covering the court proceedings, imprisonment, and subsequent funeral of Alexei Navalny were arrested as participants in an “extremist association,” on the grounds that they were allegedly involved in the activities of Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation. Foreign journalists also became victims of intimidation and harassment on similar charges.[33]

Restrictions on the “Discrediting of the State” and Anti-Extremism Legislation in Belarus

The 2023 report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Belarus, endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly, examines the use of anti-terrorism and anti-extremism legislation in the country as a tool to silence dissent and opposition-minded individuals and organizations. [34]

First, it should be noted that Belarus’s “anti-extremism” legislation currently allows law-enforcement authorities to pursue policies and practices of intimidation, punishment, and dissolution against individuals and organizations critical of the authorities-actors whom the government and state-controlled media have for years consistently targeted for alleged “anti-state actions and rhetoric.” In Belarus, questioning the legitimacy of the authorities or criticizing state policy, including in the field of human rights, has long been regarded as a threat to the state. Even attempts by opposition leaders to mobilize supporters are treated as attacks on state interests and as attempts to “violently change the constitutional system.”

The law on combating extremism in Belarus, like the Russian model, was adopted in 2002. The definition of “extremism” lists up to 18 categories of conduct that differ significantly from one another but are described in the language of the law as threatening “the independence, territorial integrity, sovereignty, and foundations of the constitutional order of Belarus.” Alongside conventional offences (such as participation in illegal armed formations or the rehabilitation of Nazism), the law also includes a number of broadly and vaguely formulated acts. In practice, these provisions have increasingly been used selectively to suppress dissent, particularly since 2020. The list portrays peaceful protest as “mass unrest,” challenges to election results as “obstruction of the lawful activities of the Central Election Commission,” and, most notably, allows the designation of a person as an “extremist” retroactively.

The list of punishable acts under this law-including the unconstitutional seizure of state power; the creation of extremist associations and participation in them; the organization of extremist activities and participation therein; undergoing training for such activities; the dissemination of extremist information or information “discrediting Belarus”; insulting public officials; and similar conduct-has become the basis for widespread human rights violations and the suppression of peaceful protest and dissent in the country.

According to the UN Special Rapporteur, these legal provisions are so vague that they conflict with international human rights standards, particularly the principles of foreseeability and proportionality. In practice, the extremely broad interpretation of “extremism” can be applied to virtually any aspect of an individual’s conduct and may restrict not only the freedoms of assembly, association, expression, and opinion but also virtually any civic activity. For example, as the report notes, criticism of unlawful actions by law-enforcement authorities may be classified in judicial practice as “extremism,” while collecting donations to finance the legal defense of an independent journalist may be treated as “financing extremist activity.”

In 2021, Alexander Lukashenko signed further amendments to the law which removed key procedural safeguards for those accused under the legislation. Individuals designated as “extremists” are no longer protected by the presumption of innocence, adversarial proceedings, or the right to a fair trial. Moreover, a person may be labeled an “extremist” directly by the Minister of Internal Affairs or the State Security Committee (KGB) outside judicial procedures. A resolution of the Council of Ministers established procedures for compiling and publishing lists of “extremist” organizations, associations, individual entrepreneurs, and individuals. As of 1 July 2023, more than 3,000 entities had been included on these lists.

Of particular relevance to the Georgian context is the fact that the list includes not only persons convicted of “extremist” crimes under the criminal code but also individuals convicted of other offences considered “related to extremism,” such as:

• discrediting Belarus;
• defamation of the President of Belarus;
• insulting a representative of state authority;
• mass disobedience;
• facilitating the application of restrictive measures (sanctions);
• other acts directed against the national security of Belarus.

In addition to individuals, the Minister of Internal Affairs maintains a list of “extremist materials,” accessible only within the territory of Belarus. This list has expanded significantly since 2015 and especially after 2020. It currently includes Telegram chats, YouTube channels, websites of human rights organizations, independent associations, media outlets, books, songs, and slogans. Materials are designated as “extremist” through a special closed judicial procedure, following an assessment by a commission composed of representatives of legislative, executive, and law-enforcement bodies.

The dissemination of such materials entails administrative liability. Dissemination is broadly defined and includes sharing materials in group chats, private correspondence, through “likes,” comments, hyperlinks, or other forms of online interaction. Even wearing clothing displaying symbols associated with “extremist materials,” or displaying such materials in one’s private home, can expose individuals to criminal prosecution. Finally, persons designated as “extremists” are prohibited from engaging in teaching activities, implementing educational programs, publishing materials, or holding various public positions.

Ultimately, the suppression of any dissent under the quasi-legal labels of “extremism” or “terrorism” has become one of the most widespread tactics of repression in contemporary Belarus.[35] The criminal prosecution of individuals under “anti-extremism” legislation has become a kind of “conveyor belt,” supported by an extensive ecosystem of repression-comprising anti-extremism legislation, related administrative and criminal offences, extensive “extremist” lists, and even the possibility of revoking citizenship for extremist crimes. This system has been widely criticized internationally[36] as a state-driven, large-scale, and systematic policy aimed at eliminating civic space and suppressing dissent in the country.

Turkey’s Anti-Terrorism Legal Framework and the Protection of the Constitutional Order as a Tool for Suppressing Dissent

Unlike many post-Soviet states, the legislation of Turkey does not contain a legal category of “extremism.” Instead, restrictions affecting critical opinion and civil society operate within the legal framework of protecting the constitutional order and combating terrorism. This framework includes Articles 309–314 of the Turkish Penal Code (attempts to overthrow the constitutional order, offences against the constitutional system, membership in armed organizations, etc.) and the Anti-Terror Law.

These legal provisions were originally introduced in response to violent acts against the state. However, due to their vague wording and overly broad interpretation and enforcement, they have been widely criticized by international organizations, including the European Court of Human Rights.

For example, the Venice Commission assessed this legislation several times after 2016 (following the declaration of the state of emergency) and concluded that it fails to satisfy the principle of legal certainty enshrined in Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Terms such as “propaganda,” “membership,” and “assistance” are interpreted so broadly that individuals cannot reasonably foresee whether their conduct complies with the law.[37] According to the Commission, vaguely formulated norms-particularly in circumstances where effective independent judicial review is lacking-create fertile ground for politically motivated prosecution of dissenting voices and opposition actors.

The 2021 report of Amnesty International, “Weaponizing Counterterrorism in Turkey,” provides a detailed analysis of how this legislation has expanded beyond targeting violent actors and has come to encompass civil society organizations, human rights defenders, journalists, and opposition representatives.[38] This has occurred through the criminalization of lawful assemblies and associations, the criminalization of links with such organizations, disproportionate criminal penalties, and the resulting chilling effect on public participation. Framing dissent as a security threat not only erases the boundary between legitimate opposition and criminal conduct but also systematically undermines pluralism and effectively excludes democratic governance.

In relation to Turkey, it is also important to consider the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, which has assessed the practical application of legislation justified by the protection of the constitutional order and the fight against terrorism, particularly in politically sensitive human rights cases.

In one landmark case, the Court held that the detention of a civil society leader on charges of attempting to overthrow the constitutional order lacked reasonable suspicion and pursued political objectives.[39] According to the Court, the relevant criminal law mechanisms in Turkey had been instrumentalized to weaken civil society and silence human rights defenders. Importantly, the Court emphasized that invoking the protection of the constitutional order does not relieve authorities of the obligation to present concrete evidence of criminal conduct. The mere existence of political mobilization, criticism of the authorities, or active participation in protest movements cannot reasonably be interpreted as indicating a serious security threat.

Similarly, in another case examined by the Grand Chamber, concerning the criminal prosecution of an opposition leader, the Court stressed that democratic societies must tolerate even harsh, severe, or shocking political criticism.[40] The use of vaguely formulated anti-terrorism legislation to suppress dissenting political views does not meet the requirements of the Convention and indicates a violation of Article 18-where criminal law is used not to protect national security but to neutralize political opponents, thereby fundamentally undermining the guarantees and protection mechanisms of the Convention.

Ultimately, the adoption of extremely vague anti-extremism legislation and related criminal law amendments justified by the need to protect the constitutional order has become a well-established practice in authoritarian states in recent years. In the absence of immediate violence or a real and imminent risk thereof, such legislation punishes critical expression rather than genuine security threats. By contrast, democratic states generally impose criminal liability only for:

• attempts to violently overthrow the constitutional order;
• acts of terrorism;
• direct incitement to imminent violence.

In democratic systems, rhetoric delegitimizing state authorities does not constitute a criminal offence in the absence of violent intent.

Conclusion

The proposed legislative amendments, both in their substance and formulation, go beyond the legitimate aim of protecting the democratic order and create a significant risk of controlling the political sphere and criminalizing political expression. The vague and evaluative categories employed in the proposed legislation fail to meet the requirements of legal certainty and foreseeability and increase the likelihood of arbitrary and abusive enforcement. In addition to introducing a new offence of extremism against the constitutional order of Georgia, the particularly problematic element is the recognition of the “motive of non-recognition of authority” as an aggravating circumstance, which effectively amounts to the criminalization of political opinion and contradicts the freedom of thought and belief.

The analysis of the experiences of Russia, Belarus, and Turkey presented above demonstrates that such legal transformations often mark the beginning of the systematic closure of the political sphere. Over time, vague “anti-extremism” or “anti-terrorism” provisions are used not against violent threats but against political opponents, media outlets, and civil society organizations to weaken, silence, and criminalize them. In the context of the current political developments in Georgia, the risk that the proposed amendments could lead to a similar trajectory is particularly high.

It is also important to emphasize that such legal changes affect not only individual rights but also the overall nature of the legal system itself. Criminal law begins to function not as a tool for protecting public order and human rights but as an instrument of political struggle. In such circumstances, the principle of separation of powers is also undermined, as broad and vague norms significantly expand the discretion of prosecutors and the executive branch, while courts are compelled to resolve political conflicts within the framework of criminal law. If the application of the law depends on the assessment of the political context rather than on clear legal criteria, the law can no longer fulfill its function of stability and predictability. Instead, it becomes an instrument of selective enforcement, ultimately undermining the very foundations of the constitutional order.

This process of hollowing out the legal system is characteristic of new autocracies, where the institutions of democracy and the rule of law formally remain in place-parliaments continue to adopt laws, courts operate, and elections are held-but legal instruments are systematically used to restrict political competition and control the public sphere. In such regimes repression is often no longer overtly mass based. Rather, through the gradual introduction of authoritarian legal mechanisms, the political space and competition are steadily narrowed, producing an environment of self-censorship and fear.

Accordingly, the proposed legislative amendments indicate not only their substantive incompatibility with constitutional principles and fundamental human rights standards but also a functional transformation of the legal system. In this process, law gradually loses its character as an instrument of a rights-based constitutional state and instead acquires the features of a mechanism for consolidating power. Such a transformation threatens the neutrality and foreseeability of the law and the structural foundations of the democratic order.

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