Russia's full-scale aggression against Ukraine has put Georgia's security, domestic and foreign policy, economy and social environment under acute pressure. Against the background of these challenges, the discrepant diplomatic and political steps taken by the Georgian authorities call into question the country's security and Euro-Atlantic perspectives.

In the context of unjustified disagreements with strategic partners, heterogeneous foreign policy orientation, and growing populism and authoritarianism, Georgia's security is increasingly losing its place in the European security agenda and moving away from the newly emerging possibility of joining the European Union.

On the one hand, the authorities point that they join dozens of international resolutions or statements in support of Ukraine, and, on the other hand, Georgia's compliance with EU foreign and security policy decisions has dropped from an already low 44% to 31% in 2022.[1] In 2022, Georgia supported only 3 out of 26 EU declarations on sanctions against Russia.[2]  The resumption of direct flights with Russia further reduced this compliance level, which is a direct blow to Georgia's EU integration process.[3] It is clear that the "declared" policy of Georgian government vis-à-vis the EU integration remains only on paper, that too in expired strategic documents.

It is also clear that the Georgian government uses foreign policy for narrow party interests. It manipulates with the topic of "Ukrainization", uses foreign and security issues to intimidate the society already traumatized by wars and to payback political opponents. Georgian Dream brands the opposition and all persons and organizations with divergent opinions as the representatives of the "war party" and accuses them of trying to drag Georgia into a war with Russia.

This dynamic has become particularly alarming since the issue of EU candidate status came under question. Georgian Dream accused the Western partners of trying to drag Georgia into the war. Moreover, in July 2022, Irakli Kobakhidze stated: "Theoretically, if a war starts in Georgia at the end of December, of course, in this case, we will be guaranteed the status of a candidate [for EU membership], although you will probably agree with me that receiving the such a candidate status, of course is not worth it.“[4] It is from this period that the representatives of the Georgian Dream government and the experts affiliated to them actively began to attack the EU ambassador, European parliamentarians and institutions. Such aggressive rhetoric contributed to foregoing the chances of obtaining candidate status.

In order to find out what motives and logic can drive the Georgian government when defining the country's foreign policy and the results such a policy can bring to the country, we asked questions to the following experts working on security and foreign affairs:

Natalia Sabanadze - former Head of the Mission of Georgia to the European Union, Visiting Professor of International Relations at Mount Holyoke College

Kakha Gogolashvili - Director of the Rondel Foundation Center for European Studies;

Shorena Lortkipanidze - co-founder and board member of the Civil Council on Defense and Security;

Paata Zakareishvili - Conflict Analyst/ Political Scientist, the State Minister for Reconciliation and Civil Equality in years 2012-2016

This article combines the opinions and views presented by them.

• How would you characterize the foreign policy of Georgia during the last period of Georgian Dream rule? Especially in the last year, after the war in Ukraine?

Natalia Sabanadze

Over the years, indeed, Georgia has taken many serious steps to get closer to the European Union. Just a couple of years ago, during my ambassadorship in Brussels, we had to push for each semicolon, in order to make a little hopeful note in the declarations and to be able to talk about the perspective.

All of a sudden, a new geopolitical opportunity appears for Georgia. The commencing talks about the status, giving perspective to Georgia, and giving status to Ukraine and Moldova was a geopolitical step on the part of the European Union. It is obvious that now the EU is becoming a geopolitical actor and its geopolitical interests are being articulated. Interest has arisen in terms of expansion in our region as well, and this, of course, will have a direct geopolitical impact on Georgia, Russia, Armenia, and Armenia-Azerbaijan relations.

It is at this time that the government of Georgia is doing something that would have been unthinkable a few years ago. If this opportunity had arisen two or three years ago, Georgia would definitely have the status of a candidate, because then we were considered the leading country of the Eastern Partnership, and our actions would have been different.

In my observation, the change in attitude, discourse and relations towards the European Union begins around the time of Irakli Gharibashvili's return as Prime Minister.

It is difficult for me to explain exactly why this change is happening, but I have a feeling that the instructions have changed and it has been decided in the official hierarchy that they should enter into arguments with their European partners, not accept criticism, speak aggressively and strain relations.

Charles Michel's involvement is a very interesting and clear example of this. For a country that wants to get closer to the European Union, Charles Michel's unprecedented involvement in the political process and internal party mediation was an opportunity that we missed, and we did everything we could to not use this opportunity. At this time, there is increasing irritation in the official hierarchy towards the excessive involvement of the European Union. There was no such thing before, on the contrary, we made every effort to ensure the maximum involvement and support of the European Union.

We always wanted to create and wrestled with the idea of a trio - Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, in order to take Georgia out of the context of the South Caucasus and present it as part of a region that is politically closer to the European Union. Today, this trio is breaking up. The Ukrainian-Georgian political tandem also dissolved.

It is extremely disturbing that during the recent period, Georgia not only did not acquire new friends, but also lost those who were great supporters of Georgia's European and Euro-Atlantic integration. Specifically, the relations with the Baltic states, Poland, and the Scandinavian countries went cold, and it seems that new supporters and partners are not pursued on purpose.

Kakha Gogolashvili

The governance of the Georgian Dream in the last two years is characterized by the extreme concentration of power in the hands of the so-called leaders of Georgian Dream. The result of this is the disappearance of any form of pluralism in the ruling team and in the Parliament as a whole (an example of this is the case of the initiation and recall of the law on "Agents of Influence of a Foreign Country"). In the foreign arena, the ruling team rightly lost confidence and maintains contacts and communication formats only through inertia and at the expense of the international situation. In relation to Ukraine, the ruling power has acquired the image of a fickle and unreliable partner with defiant rhetoric and incorrect diplomacy.

Against this background, economic relations with the Russian Federation have increased, political consultations have become more frequent (including on the issues of visa-free travel or resumption of flights), which harms the country's pro-Western course.

Because of the mistakes made in relation to the European Union, it was not possible to obtain the status of a candidate for the European Union, and even now the reforms necessary to obtain this status continue to be torpedoed. Numerous representatives of the ruling power in the country make statements damaging to the European Union and deepen the polarization in the society by brutally attacking and trying to demonize civil society. All these actions prevent the interaction of Georgia in the Euro-Atlantic structures.

Shorena Lortkipanidze

During the last one year, Georgia has been losing its foreign policy: no orientation, political determinant of foreign policy is to be found; The positioning of politicians and the government representing the Georgian Dream in the foreign arena is becoming blurred; Georgia is nowhere to be seen in bilateral or multilateral formats. There is no visible active position of Georgia in relation to Ukraine, Georgia's bilateral relations with Ukraine have actually been terminated and there is no indication that the ruling political party is thinking of moving relations with Ukraine into a constructive format.

Even before the Russian war in Ukraine, we can recall several facts that show us that Georgia was not very enthusiastic about deepening cooperation even with the associated trio of the Eastern Partnership. At the Eastern Partnership Conference in Batumi in the summer of 2021, there was absolutely no desire on the part of Georgia to deepen relations and move to a new stage. Although a number of documents were signed.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine accelerated certain processes and the foreign policy of the Georgian dream was unveiled more quickly by "fear of war" and "threat of Ukrainization". Although this process had clearly begun earlier, it was just moving at a slow pace, and the lockdown during the Covid period slowed down its pace.

The Georgian Dream labels its vague and unethical foreign policy as a pragmatic one. As a result of this positioning, Georgia is losing supporters, partners and friends in the West.

The Law on Agents can be seen as a continuation of this confusing foreign policy. The authors of the law and the supporter of the law, the Georgian Dream, knew very well that the foreign political image would be significantly damaged not only by not withdrawing the mentioned initiative, but even by bringing it up for discussion.

Detaching Georgia from the orbit of the West means getting closer to Russia, as well as constant criticism and attacks on European and American politicians and diplomats can be aimed at creating a context for distancing from the West.

Ambiguity of foreign policy and at the same time "aggressive and assertive" national self-expression by targeting the West complicates Georgia's chances of getting candidate status. It also creates the background for the criticism and demonization of the West, which until now was done by marginal groups, to become a mainstream action.

Paata Zakareishvili

Georgia's foreign policy changed significantly after Russia's aggression in Ukraine in February 2022. Before that, the Georgian Dream government was more or less critical of Russia's policy in relation to Georgia, and this criticism was expressed in various statements. A prime example is the parliamentary resolution: the resolution adopted on August 3, 2021 clearly states that Russia is an aggressor against Georgia, has occupied territories, and needs to fulfill its obligations and withdraw its troops from the territory of Georgia. However, the same Parliament passed a resolution after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, which practically excluded all the phrases that were mentioned in the resolution of a year ago. With the post-war resolution, it became impossible to understand who carried out the aggression against Ukraine and which country's Parliament passed this resolution. Against this background, it is clear that the situation has changed, taking into account the Ukrainian factor.

It seems that there is some instruction that Georgia should minimize its statements towards Russia. Today, the main task of the Georgian government is to under no circumstances make certain statements against Russia, including the fact that Georgia is the victim of same Russian imperialist aggression as Ukraine is experiencing today. The Georgian government should not say that Russia's policy is an imperialist policy that has been coming since 2008.

Why does it do this? In my view, foreign policy is influenced by the domestic context. The main task for Georgian Dream is to maintain power even after the 2024 parliamentary elections.

• What can explain the non-uniformity/ambiguity of the recent foreign course of the Georgian dream? The growing anti-Western rhetoric, the weakness of the implementation process of the EU recommendations and the decisions clearly damaging this process - is this the mudos operandi of maintaining power or does it signal a change in foreign policy?

Natalia Sabanadze

We should start with the question: who makes the foreign policy in Georgia? Who determines the interests that the foreign policy should serve to protect? What values are the foreign policy based on?

Georgia, the European and Euro-Atlantic integration is defined by the constitution, and the occupation of Georgian territories by Russia defined the country's enemy and a friend. Facadeically or sincerely, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs continues the European and Euro-Atlantic course and the dissemination of relevant messages at the international level. But, on the other hand, the rest of the government hierarchy does everything to prevent this from happening. As a result, we get conflicting messages and steps. Accordingly, our partners also have a vague perception of Georgia's inconsistent foreign policy.

It is clear that the cost of the apparent destruction of the western democratic facade will be quite high for the government, but on the other hand, everything is being done to prevent European integration. Significant energy is being spent on fixing relations with Russia and establishing a friendly relationship against the backdrop of losing friends in the West.

In Georgia, there is an ultra-majoritarian model, when one party holds the constitutional majority and other parties are not allowed to develop. Similar things can hardly be found in any continental European country. Maintaining power in Georgia is of existential importance for political parties, because if they lose it, they will be expelled from the political scene. Except for the National Movement, none of the parties survived after the loss of power. The National Movement was also disbanded. In Georgia, we have no experience of any party returning to power. In fact, we have an underdeveloped democratic system, and one of the reasons for this is the ultra-majoritarian model.

In recent period, the Georgian government has developed an ideological and foreign policy image that closely resembles Russian populist conservativism. This ideology has its base not only in Russia and its neighborhood, but also in Hungary, Serbia and other European western countries. Several European leaders appear to be speaking in line with a conversation scripted in the Kremlin, there is a striking similarity in the messages they use in relation to Ukraine, in their criticism against partners and so on.

One of the characteristics of this ideology, which has gained a foothold in the political elite of the Georgian dream, is the idea of sovereign democracy. The upper echelons of the Georgian dream even repeat that such a sovereign Georgia has never existed before. According to their new narrative, internal affairs should not be interfered with from the outside, "we are better", "no one has the legitimate right to teach us anything", etc. This is a very typical Russian narrative and is more associated with the ultra-right in Western countries. Here we are talking about traditional values, the church, and the "corrupted West" and "Georgian values." This is not surprising in Russia. This is an old Slavophile tradition. And the Georgian dream translated that into: we are sovereign, we don't want to stand on one foot, we respect our values and protect ourselves from foreign influence. In this foreign influence, we mean the Western influence as containing danger and risk. This is an absolutely new topic in Georgian politics.

In general, conservatism and populism are not foreign to Georgian politics, but what is foreign and a new phenomenon is the anti-Western part. All this is happening against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine, while the progressive West is on one side and these populist Russian-influenced political forces are on the other. Georgia found itself on the side of the latter.

Kakha Gogolashvili

The change in the foreign course of the Georgian Dream can be explained by two reasons: first, the dream aims to win the next elections as its primary task. It is trying to use to its advantage the pro-Russian and Eurosceptic part of the population, strengthened and activated by Russian propaganda. It also tries to undermine public interest in the opposition (which positions itself as pro-Western) by instilling scepticism towards the EU itself and the West. The Georgian Dream is trying to create the image of the West as an actor with its own narrow interests, and that the Georgian Dream alone can maintain such relations that ensure the maximum sovereignty of Georgia.

Second, the ruling elite of the Georgian Dream is on the orbit of Russian interests. Has corporate interests with Russia and appears to be genuinely interested in Russia winning the war with Ukraine. However, it cannot reveal this openly, because it is not sure of the victory and does not want to destroy the bridges with the West.     

The result of the actions of the Georgian government does not bring anything positive for the country, because it only serves the corporate interests of the Georgian dream itself. The risks are quite high. The immediate threat is to our Western choices and, first of all, to the progress towards the European integration. Secondly, the anti-European and pro-Prussian wing is getting stronger in the country, which the government considers an ally. The degree of economic and political dependence on Russia is increasing, which can turn into influences and force Georgia to change its formally declared foreign policy.

Shorena Lortkipanidze

Today, the main foreign orientations of Georgia are muddled by the new discourse created by the Georgian Dream, which is based on the demand for dignity and equality from partners. It is trying to influence public opinion and convince the population that the West is limiting Georgia's sovereignty and right to a free choice.

What explains the attempt to create and strengthen such a discourse? The political narrative of countries with certain ties to Russia is saturated with such criticism of the West. That is, Russian traces are easily identified here.

We see an attempt by the Georgian Dream to maintain power at the cost of everything, including at the cost of significantly damaging relations with the West. An important part of power is control over resources, control over finances, which is very important to maintain for the Georgian dream.

The main question is, what is happening in the institutions behind the rhetoric of the Georgian dream, do they continue to work in a cooperative and partnership mode with Western colleagues and institutions? To some extent this work is maintained by inertia. Georgia still follows the existing political partnership mechanisms.

It is clear that the task of the Georgian dream is not to receive the candidature of the European Union. Against this background, it is quite possible that very soon, under the influence of the Georgian Dream, Georgia will adopt political framework documents, where integration into NATO and the European Union will no longer be declared as a direct goal.

Paata Zakareishvili

The Georgian dream, as a political unity, does not represent practically anything today, it does not carry out reforms, there is no visible policy of where Georgia is being led. Therefore, it is clear that maintaining power is the position of only one person - Bidzina Ivanishvili. He wants to strengthen his positions and be at the top of the pyramid that controls the situation in Georgia. 

In my opinion, Russia knows very well that the largest part of the population of Georgia does not want to get closer to Russia, and the same largest part wants to join the European Union and NATO, especially the European Union. For Russia, at the moment, it is not very important for Georgia to become pro-Russian and to fall into the Russian camp, as, for example, Belarus or the Central Asian republics. It is important for Russia that Georgia does not move in the direction of European and Euro-Atlantic institutions. The main task of the Georgian government is this: today, the Georgian government should not have a clearly defined pro-Russian force, because this will cause turmoil in the society, and on the other hand, it should do everything to prevent the country from moving towards the European Union. All the actions of the Georgian authorities, including the April 30 rally, which was held in Tbilisi at the initiative of the Georgian Dream authorities, as well as the initiated Russia-inspired bill on agents of foreign countries, are an attempt by the authorities to cast doubt on the prospects and values of Georgia's accession to the European Union. Their goal is to make the policy of the Georgian Dream so unacceptable that the European Union has no choice but to refuse Georgia's candidacy status. Then, this will be blamed on the EU. This will be blamed on the opposition.

We can say that Georgia is not moving towards the European Union, it is not moving towards Russia, and it will remain in this supposedly pseudo-neutral position as long as they are able to form the next political step.

• Taking into account the security risks arising after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, what 5 specific steps should the Georgian government take that are not being taken, although they would be important to ensure the country's sovereignty, security and European integration?

Kakha Gogolashvili

1. Visa-free travel to Russia should be terminated and direct flights should not be restored under any circumstances. Russian citizens should no longer be allowed to stay in the country for more than three months, except in special cases (humanitarian, asylum request);
2. The granting of Georgian citizenship to Russian representatives should be suspended, except in cases where the applicant was a citizen of Georgia and officially denied Russian citizenship and also objects to Russia's invasion of Ukraine;
3. Reorientation of our business from Russia to other markets should be promoted, especially import substitution with other countries. Should also facilitate the use of free trade opportunities with the European Union and the European orientation of exports;
4. Relations with Ukraine should be restored. We should also cooperate with the Ukrainian special services to identify the companies that have been found to be circumventing the sanctions imposed on Russia through Georgia;
5. The security services of Georgia should refrain from spending resources on the political tasks from the government and more actively monitor the Russian citizens settled here, including in order to identify existing agents and prevent damage to the country.

Shorena Lortkipanidze

1. Starting a political dialogue within the country and a process that ensures discussion between the opposing parties;
2. Ensuring an inclusive process for working on 12 steps should become part of the dialogue;
3. Restoration and warming of relations with Kyiv, which should be manifested by the visit of a high-ranking official, including the Prime Minister, to Ukraine. Questions in Georgia-Ukraine relations should be minimized. Resolving the issue of Mikheil Saakashvili should also become part of this dialogue;
4. There is a need to prepare a vision of peace that will convince internal and external audiences that Georgia has an idea of what it is talking about and understands the importance of peace in the context of the environment and the challenges facing our region today.
5. More engagement with civil society is needed. In this regard, the work should be intensified, the processes and formats that existed and were the best means of information exchange between the government and the civil society should be restored. This process will also help reduce tension and promote depolarization.

Paata Zakareishvili

1. First of all, the government of Georgia must clearly and unambiguously state that Georgia is a victim of Russian aggression and that what Russia is doing against Ukraine is what it is doing permanently against Georgia as well. Georgia's number one daily demand at the international level should be for Russia to withdraw its armed forces in accordance with the 6-point peace agreement signed by it.
2. Georgia should create a guaranteed feeling for the Abkhazian and Ossetian population that Georgia is not going to retaliate. For this, Georgia should start working with the European Union so that the EU monitoring mission, which operates along the dividing line in the territory of Georgia, is strengthened, acquires more functions, takes a solid mandate of the peacekeeping mission, and in the wake of the withdrawal of the Russian army, the peacekeeping functions are entrusted to the EU monitoring mission. This should be a subject of constant negotiations with the European Union and Georgia should have a clear answer as to how ready the European Union will be to provide a peacekeeping mission on the dividing lines related to the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian conflicts. This would be a guarantee to some extent for the Abkhaz and Ossetian communities.
3. Georgia should unequivocally and clearly inform the Abkhazian and Ossetian parties that immediately after the withdrawal of the Russian armed forces, it is ready to negotiate with them on bilateral agreements on the non-use of force.
4. Georgia should start negotiations with Turkey, and determine how ready Turkey is to ensure the territorial integrity of Georgia at the diplomatic and political level, and also to stand as a guarantor in Georgia's peace policy. Russia should feel that Turkey supports not only Azerbaijan but also Georgia, and this should be a clearly defined position in this direction.
5. Georgia must fulfill the 12 recommendations of the European Union in order to obtain candidacy status. The government should stop aggressive rhetoric against the West and Western values. To include the civil sector and the opposition in a cooperative format in the fulfillment of all conditions.

These five steps would be enough to start a real movement towards Europe, towards the European Union and also towards the implementation of a peaceful policy.

This material is completed within the project supported by the Swedish International Development aid (SIDA) and the Kvinna till Kvinna Foundation "Promote conflict transformation by critical rethinking of conflict-related history and reinforcing women’s perspectives". The SIDA and Kvinna till Kvinna do not necessarily agree with the opinions expressed within. The author alone is responsible for the content.