Author: Zura Tsurtsumia

Preface

Georgia approached the 2024 parliamentary elections amid growing political polarization and various domestic and foreign challenges. One of the central topics of the pre-election discourse was the issue of restoring the country's territorial integrity. This discussion was initiated by the ruling party and, for several months leading up to the elections, became a key topic of debate among the media, political actors, experts, and researchers. Discussions on this topic were heard not only in Georgia, including the occupied regions, but also in Russia.

The purpose of this document is to review both official and unofficial discussions in Georgian- and Russian-language media, which actively covered developments in both Georgia and the region.

The study is based on the following methodology:

For the analysis, all media platforms popular in the region were selected. This includes television channels, online publications, and social networks such as Telegram and YouTube channels, as well as several online editions of print media influential in the Abkhazian information space. The selection criteria for sources were materials written or published on this topic during the period from May to October 2024. In total, over 50 unique sources were identified, which published more than 800 pieces of content in various formats, including news articles, reports, Telegram posts, and videos.[1]

This study represents a narrative analysis of the gathered information. Before presenting the direct analysis and observations derived from the data, it is important to revisit the political context and preconditions under which the discussion on restoring Georgia’s territorial integrity was reignited within Georgian society and the Caucasus region as a whole.

Political Context

The issue of restoring territorial integrity has rarely been a central part of the political agenda under the rule of the "Georgian Dream" government. Coming to power in a politically tense environment marked by conflict with the United National Movement and the aftermath of the August War, the ruling party’s main rhetoric focused on normalizing relations with Russia. Shortly after winning the 2012 parliamentary elections, in November of the same year, a special representative of the Georgian Prime Minister for relations with Russia was appointed, establishing the so-called Abashidze-Karasin format.

At the formal level, state institutions acknowledged and emphasized the existence of occupation, human rights violations in the occupied territories, and demanded that Russia fulfill the August 2008 agreement and withdraw its occupying forces from Georgian territory. In critical situations [e.g., the murder of Giga Otkhozoria, the detention of Vazha Gaprindashvili, etc.], the government tried to avoid excessive politicization of these issues, ensuring that such events did not affect relations with Russia or escalate into anti-Russian rhetoric. Members and supporters of the "Georgian Dream" described this as a rational and pragmatic policy.

Over time, the topic of occupation gradually disappeared from the rhetoric. However, it reemerged during internal political debates, particularly when confronting the United National Movement. Even then, this rhetoric remained cautious, as discussions on the 2008 war and the occupation problem often placed primary blame on the mistakes or wrongdoings of the previous government, with Russia’s actions receiving secondary emphasis.

The "Georgian Dream’s" policies regarding occupation were characterized by the following features:
a) The confrontational rhetoric about occupation, which was prominent during the United National Movement’s rule, disappeared.
b) Statements on the issue became formal and ceremonial.
c) In internal political discussions about the occupation problem, Russia was increasingly less referred to as the culpable party, while criticism of the former government’s actions grew.
d) The issue of restoring territorial integrity was almost entirely removed from internal political debates, with attention shifting to other topics.

More than half of the analyzed sources were in the Georgian language, with online media outlets dominating in terms of activity, producing and publishing significantly more material than other types of media. Telegram channels emerged as the second most active, while television outlets were the least engaged on this topic.

Official Statements and Positions of the ‘Parties’

This section aims to chronologically highlight the key stages that the "Georgian Dream" government has undergone in recent years concerning de-occupation and the restoration of territorial integrity. The most recent turning point in this process began with the full-scale war between Russia and Ukraine, marking the return of Georgia's territorial integrity issue to political rhetoric.

During the early phase of the war, against the backdrop of Russia's military failures, informal discussions emerged within Georgian society about "historic opportunities" for restoring control over the occupied territories through military means. From this period onward, representatives of "Georgian Dream" increasingly emphasized peace rhetoric, the necessity of avoiding war, and the importance of maintaining peace between Georgians, Abkhazians, and Ossetians. Later that year, during a government report presentation, then-Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili mentioned "national unification" and revealed that the Economic Council had discussed a $10 billion investment plan for Abkhazia.

The restoration of territorial integrity and the search for peaceful solutions have remained unchanged in government programs over the years. Similar texts can be found in government programs presented by Giorgi Gakharia in 2020, Irakli Garibashvili in 2021, and Irakli Kobakhidze in 2024. Responses from Russia and the de facto authorities were typically absent or purely formal, with both parties often urging the Georgian government to acknowledge and accept the geopolitical realities established since 2008—effectively a call to recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. A similar reaction followed the presentation of Irakli Kobakhidze's government program in February 2023 by South Ossetia’s de facto Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Shortly afterward, on March 7, 2023, the party "Droa" released photographic evidence of a meeting between Giorgi Volski, the First Deputy Chairman of the Georgian Parliament and Chair of the Temporary Commission on Restoring Territorial Integrity, and Russian-Georgian Businessman Davit Khidasheli. According to the information, the meeting addressed topics such as confederation, trade with the occupied territories, the restoration of railway links, and direct contact with the de facto governments. While Volski neither denied the meeting nor the topics discussed, he distanced himself from the idea of confederation, stating that given the current circumstances (the war in Ukraine), there were no preconditions for such discussions. Both Sokhumi and Tskhinvali ignored the topic, except for a statement from Abkhazia’s de facto Minister of Internal Affairs, Robert Kiut, who denied any negotiations on railway restoration.

The issue of territorial integrity resurfaced on May 26, 2024, during Georgia's Independence Day celebration. Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze stated:
"Our 'promised land'—our Georgian dream—is to live in a united and strong Georgia by the 40th anniversary of independence in 2030, together with our Abkhazian and Ossetian brothers and sisters. By 2030, a united and strong Georgia must also become a full-fledged member of the European family." The statement was met with reactions from Russian political figures, including Konstantin Zatulin, Deputy Chairman of the Russian Duma’s Committee on CIS Affairs, who described it as a display of patriotism and an attempt to appease the West. Grigory Karasin, Chairman of the Russian Federation Council’s Committee on Foreign Affairs, referred to the discussion of Georgia’s territorial integrity as "delusional" and a part of internal political processes.

Shortly before Kobakhidze's statement, Sergey Shamba, Chairman of Abkhazia’s de facto Security Council, commented on Russian-Georgian relations and the topic of confederation, stating that he saw no realistic scenario in which Russia would revoke its recognition of Abkhazia's independence. However, he did not entirely rule out integration with Georgia, mentioning the possibility of different formats, with a union-state model similar to Russia-Belarus being more acceptable to Sokhumi than confederation. Hours after Kobakhidze's May 26 statement, Shamba took a stance, emphasizing Abkhazia’s goal of strengthening its statehood and rejecting any discussions of confederation or other relations with Georgia. Tskhinvali also reacted, with its de facto Ministry of Foreign Affairs dismissing talks of unification with Georgia as inappropriate.

As of May 2024, the Georgian government had not made any concrete statements regarding confederation or specific plans, other than expressing a desire to restore territorial integrity. The responses from the de facto governments and Russian political circles suggest that they do not take Georgia's discussions on restoring territorial integrity seriously. Instead, they view these discussions as more related to Georgia's domestic politics or its relations with the West than to Georgian-Russian or Georgian-Abkhazian-Ossetian relations.

Over the next two and a half months, the issue of restoring territorial integrity virtually disappeared from the rhetoric of "Georgian Dream." The topic resurfaced in the second half of August, this time clearly tied to the election agenda. "Georgian Dream" stated that they needed to secure victory in the October 26 elections and gain a constitutional majority. Among the four main goals outlined by the party, one was the restoration of territorial integrity. According to their statement: "In the event of restoring Georgia's territorial integrity through peaceful means, it will become necessary to amend the Constitution of Georgia to align the country's governance system and territorial state structure with the new reality." On the same day, the de facto Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Tskhinvali responded to this statement, calling on the Georgian side to accept the new realities and recognize South Ossetia's independence. In this statement, Tskhinvali also associated "Georgian Dream's" position with internal electoral.

In September 2024, Bidzina Ivanishvili made the loudest and, at the same time, the most substantial statement on the matter during an election campaign meeting in Gori. He spoke, on the one hand, about the crimes of the United National Movement and, on the other, about apologizing to the Ossetians. According to him, reconciliation and apology are the pathways to ending the fratricidal conflict between Georgians and Ossetians. Ivanishvili declared reconciliation and rebuilding trust with the Ossetian people, alongside restoring territorial integrity, as the main goals. He attributed equal importance to both objectives and presented his vision/plan, emphasizing that apology and a "Georgian Nuremberg Process" were prerequisites for rebuilding trust.

One of the first responses came from Eduard Kokoity, the former de facto president of South Ossetia. He demanded the recognition of South Ossetia's independence and the return of Ossetian territories, including Truso Valley and Gudauri. Anatoly Bibilov, leader of the opposition party "United Ossetia" in the Tskhinvali region, also welcomed Ivanishvili's statement. According to him, Georgian declarations would be deemed sincere only when Georgia recognized the genocide of the Ossetian people in 1920, 1989, and 1992, acknowledged South Ossetia's independence, admitted responsibility for starting the 2008 war, and recognized war crimes committed in South Ossetia. Yuri Vazagov, head of the analytical department of the de facto president's administration in Tskhinvali, also commented, stating that Ivanishvili's statement was entirely related to the election process, and the sincerity of Georgia's apology would only be believed after concrete actions. The de facto Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Tskhinvali limited its remarks to criticizing the Georgian side, asserting that "Georgian Dream's" leader's words were more connected to domestic politics and elections than to real actions. Their criticism stemmed from inconsistencies between Ivanishvili's and Kobakhidze's statements. The Georgian Prime Minister, commenting on Ivanishvili's speech, added that the apology and guilt were directed at the United National Movement, not the state. The de facto Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Abkhazia also issued an official statement, noting that Georgia also owed an apology to the Abkhazians for its past crimes. Overall, the official statements from both de facto ministries highlighted a similar stance: while they welcomed the desire for an apology, they also outlined specific steps expected from Tbilisi. These included border delimitation/demarcation and signing a peace treaty, which primarily involved an agreement on non-use of force and disarmament.

Comments also came from Russian political circles, including Konstantin Zatulin, chair of the State Duma's Committee on CIS Affairs. He linked Ivanishvili's statement to the election process and reiterated his earlier position regarding Georgia's reunification: "That train has already left. Abkhazia and South Ossetia will not return to Georgia. Russia does not intend to pressure or influence the republics' decisions, as some might hope. Our stance on recognizing the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia is entirely different. There is no plan, nor will there be, to reverse our decision for any ephemeral benefits."

Sergey Lavrov, Russia's Foreign Minister, also addressed "Georgian Dream's" messages. At a press conference on September 28, he stated: "Georgia's current government honestly evaluates the past. They have said, 'We want historical reconciliation.' How and in what form this reconciliation will take place is up to the countries themselves—Abkhazia and South Ossetia. They are neighbors of Georgia, and contacts are inevitable. If all parties desire to normalize relations and sign a non-aggression agreement, we are ready to assist if requested."

On October 4, Lavrov met with the de facto foreign ministers of both occupied regions. During his meeting with Sergey Shamba, he emphasized that Russia would continue to strengthen Abkhazia's international status and support security and stability in the region, alongside recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia's independence. In his meeting with Akhsar Dzhioev, he reiterated that the 2008 decisions—referring to the recognition of both regions' independence—would not be reconsidered.

Two days later, on October 6, Mamuka Mdinaradze, one of the leaders of "Georgian Dream," dedicated a Facebook post to the issue of restoring territorial integrity. He dismissed the idea of a confederation as anti-national, noting that it would involve recognizing the independence of both regions. Mdinaradze reiterated the spirit of the Prime Minister's May 26 address, referring to a united Georgia as "Georgia's dream." He concluded his statement with specific hashtags: #AbkhaziaIsGeorgia and #SouthOssetiaIsGeorgia.

By the end of October 2024, the analysis of official statements provides an opportunity to outline the positions of the parties ("Georgian Dream," Russian authorities, and de facto authorities) regarding the ongoing political process of restoring Georgia's territorial integrity:

• From "Georgian Dream," the topic of confederation first emerged as a political scandal. They dismissed the concept as unserious in follow-up comments. Just weeks before the parliamentary elections, one of the party's leaders, Mamuka Mdinaradze, categorically rejected the idea of a confederation, calling it anti-national.
• During the Independence Day ceremony on May 26, the Prime Minister's statement outlined a general desire and plan to achieve two major political goals by 2030: restoring territorial integrity and joining the European Union.
• Following a pause of several months, the issue of territorial integrity resurfaced in late August, particularly through statements made in September, linking the topic to the pre-election campaign. Winning the elections and gaining a constitutional majority were named as prerequisites for restoring territorial integrity. An additional condition was also voiced: recognizing Georgia's culpability in starting the August war, prosecuting the United National Movement and the former president for initiating the war, and apologizing to the Ossetian side.
• Amid unfavorable reactions from Russia and the de facto authorities, "Georgian Dream" ceased addressing the issues of confederation or restoring territorial integrity during the pre-election period. One of the party's spokespersons even described the confederation as an anti-national option.

It is essential to note that the most substantial and, at the same time, contradictory statements came from Bidzina Ivanishvili, who does not formally hold any state position and is the honorary chairman of "Georgian Dream." The Georgian government, the Prime Minister, and other officials have not yet responded seriously to these statements or new approaches to resolving conflicts and restoring territorial integrity, as evidenced by their actions.

The de facto authorities' high-level statements were issued by their foreign ministries, as well as by the former head of Abkhazia's de facto security service, who was later appointed foreign minister. Statements from the Russian Federation were initially made by State Duma deputies, followed by the Foreign Minister in late September.

The de facto governments' statements often share identical elements:

• The issue of confederation with Georgia is not under discussion;
• The independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia is non-negotiable;
• Georgia must acknowledge its responsibility for starting the war and the crimes committed against the Abkhazian and Ossetian people;
• Georgia must recognize the independence of both regions, begin border delimitation processes, and sign a non-aggression agreement;
• Statements from "Georgian Dream" are tied to internal political processes and pre-election campaigns and may also reflect deteriorated relations between Georgia and the West.

Russian statements reveal the following positions:

• Russia does not intend to reconsider its 2008 decisions or reverse the recognition of independence;
• Russia welcomes Georgia's desire to acknowledge past mistakes and is willing to facilitate normalization of relations among the three countries if requested;
• Restoring Georgia's territorial integrity is considered an illusory issue, and the Kremlin does not intend to pressure the de facto governments to return to Georgia's fold;
• The issues of confederation and territorial integrity are seen as part of the internal electoral process, aimed both at the electorate and the West, to garner greater support.

The statements and processes indicate that "Georgian Dream" is the initiator of discussions on restoring territorial integrity, while the conflict's other side (Russian-Abkhazian-Ossetian) is currently only responding to specific statements. These responses contradict "Georgian Dream's" objectives and dispel the notion that the primary obstacle to restoring Georgia's territorial integrity—Russia—has been overcome.

Public Discourse

The observation of public discourse relies on the narrative analysis of factual and discussion materials published on the aforementioned media platforms. This includes television broadcasts, online media publications, and print and video materials shared on social networks. Discussions within Georgian, Russian, Abkhazian, and Ossetian societies occur in two formats: physical and online. Some physical discussions remain outside media coverage and are therefore difficult to analyze. However, others held in person are covered by the media in various formats. On the other hand, online discussions are readily accessible through open media sources.

The analysis of content from several dozen identified media outlets allows us to review discussions surrounding the research topic and attempt to categorize and qualitatively analyze them.

It is important to consider the political and media environments in which the selected media sources operate. These environments vary significantly in Georgia, the occupied territories, Russia, and the broader Caucasus region. Overall, media freedom in these areas is problematic or limited. However, different platforms create diverse spaces for free expression and critical discussions.

For instance, the online and television media spaces in the occupied territories and Russia are characterized by high levels of political control. In response, media outlets often compensate for this lack of freedom by utilizing social networks, a trend observed on Telegram channels in Abkhazian and Ossetian communities or even in Russian emigrant-run outlets like TV Rain (Dozhd), which has become an alternative voice in the Russian media landscape.

In the case of Georgian media, there is evident political polarization and politicization of the media. Online media partially meets the demand for discourse, but its operations face limitations. Social networks have assumed an alternative role; however, the Georgian segment of YouTube and other social media platforms is not yet developed enough to fully serve as alternative media. Despite this, the Georgian YouTube segment has managed to produce a notable amount of content, represented by several interesting channels.

The analysis of content from such parallel media platforms provides an opportunity to observe and identify the public discussions taking place within local societies and across the region as a whole.

Georgian Public Discourse

The issue of restoring Georgia's territorial integrity has naturally remained part of the country's political agenda since the active military phase of the conflicts ended. However, the lack of prospects following the August War pushed the issue of territorial integrity to the margins of Georgian political discourse or relegated it to a distant future. This shift became particularly noticeable after the change in government in 2012. The restoration of territorial integrity was overshadowed by borderization, detentions, and killings along the dividing lines, effectively removing the issue from the political stage, where it retained only a formal presence in official statements.

In recent years, political polarization, a significant problem in Georgian society, has strongly influenced public and political discussions surrounding conflicts. It is within this polarized environment that the topic of territorial integrity and the idea of confederation, as a possible means to achieve this goal, have been revived.

The politicization of the media and the polarized political landscape are among the primary reasons why nearly all significant political and state issues in Georgian society are viewed through the lens of domestic politics. This, on the one hand, leaves little room for free analysis and, on the other hand, drives political actors to act primarily out of domestic political expediency. Discussions and deliberations are typically conducted during closed meetings organized by civil society, on the pages of a few high-standard online publications, or on social networks (predominantly YouTube). However, the real identities and interests of the authors of some of these sources are often unclear, raising additional doubts.

On social networks, particularly YouTube, some bloggers and channels have, over the past year, discussed the feasibility of the confederation idea. They often create narratives suggesting that closer ties with Russia and distancing from the West by "Georgian Dream" could make the resolution of territorial integrity issues more realistic. These channels are predominantly in Russian, making it difficult to gauge their exact Georgian audience. However, the active participation of Georgian-speaking users in the comments section indicates that part of Georgian society listens to or watches this content. Channels such as Sergei Chichinadze and Caliber Az produce this type of content. These sources are largely marginal and have minimal influence on the broader Georgian informational field. This suggests that the informational support for "Georgian Dream’s" initiatives is primarily generated in physical spaces by party-affiliated individuals or groups, or through individual statements and discussions. For instance, Geno Petriashvili’s comments on the party’s idea of apologizing. Observations show that discussions about the feasibility of restoring territorial integrity and the issue of apologies mainly take place in government-aligned media outlets and only for a few days. The logic underpinning the feasibility of restoring territorial integrity, as derived from these discussions, includes the following narratives:

• The resolution of Georgia's conflicts lies in Moscow, and without Russia’s consent, Tbilisi cannot resolve these issues.
• Russia does not actually need the occupied regions for annexation but uses them as leverage over Tbilisi. If relations with Tbilisi improve, Russia could easily relinquish these territories.
• The escalating conflicts and dissatisfaction between the Abkhazian/Ossetian sides and Russia observed in recent years signal improved Georgian-Russian relations and a potential Kremlin retreat.
• The risks incurred by "Georgian Dream" through the foreign agents' law and distancing from the West could potentially be offset by negotiations and prospects between Tbilisi and Moscow concerning territorial integrity.

Such arguments are bolstered by, on the one hand, the vague promises and hints by "Georgian Dream" about territorial integrity and, on the other hand, criticism from the opposition that the ruling party is deliberately steering Georgia back into Russia’s orbit.

The second group of sources providing platforms for discussion and analysis consists of online media outlets operating through websites, Facebook pages, and YouTube channels. As previously noted, television channels have been the least active in covering this issue, with significant discussions not taking place on these platforms. The main participants in interviews, discussions, and debates have been experts, politicians, and civil society representatives.

It is worth noting that civil society has been actively engaged in the discussion of this topic both as participants and organizers. However, most of these discussions have taken place in physical settings, without media coverage, making it challenging to observe or analyze these meetings.

Online discussions feature several narratives:

• There are unofficial contacts and communication between the Russian and Georgian governments, but no evidence or open processes indicate that the restoration of Georgia’s territorial integrity is being seriously considered.
• There is no clear causal link between "Georgian Dream's" shift in foreign policy direction and the process of restoring territorial integrity. Moreover, Russia’s official statements completely contradict "Georgian Dream’s" rhetoric and dismiss any prospect of restoring territorial integrity or achieving confederation.
• Georgia’s policies of confrontation or distancing from the West, as well as discussions about restoring territorial integrity, are part of domestic political processes aimed at consolidating power and garnering support for the upcoming parliamentary elections. Territorial integrity has become a populist message for "Georgian Dream," which it avoided in previous elections but now sees as necessary due to political expediency.
• Conflicts between Moscow, Sokhumi, and Tskhinvali do not provide grounds to suggest that these processes are related to the return of territories to Georgia. These are internal Russian/Abkhazian or Russian/Ossetian conflicts. Moreover, the dynamics of their relations in recent years and the problematic issues that have arisen make such conflicts predictable. For example, threats from Russia to suspend funding to Sokhumi reflect difficulties in advancing Russian interests in Abkhazia rather than an attempt by the Kremlin to relinquish these regions.

For Georgian society, the restoration of territorial integrity remains a significant issue despite its relegation to the background in recent years. It is also worth noting that the public has accumulated experience from numerous unfulfilled promises and ultimately unsuccessful policies over the past 30 years. This history of disappointment and political polarization fosters ambiguous attitudes toward ongoing processes. On the one hand, facts and reality prevail, but on the other hand, desire and, despite many disappointments, trust in political authorities sustain both skepticism and unfounded optimism.

Perspectives in Ossetian and Abkhazian Societies

Similar to Georgian society, Abkhazian and Ossetian societies approach these processes based on their own experiences, declared political goals, and the current political situation within and outside the region. This complexity is particularly evident in Abkhazia, where, alongside the Georgian-Abkhazian context, there are parallel Russian-Abkhazian relations and internal political disputes between the de facto government and opposition. The loss of independence or sovereignty or changes to Abkhazia's status can easily become a tool for internal political manipulation in Sokhumi. This may be one reason why Sokhumi’s responses to statements from "Georgian Dream" are typically traditional, entirely ruling out any reconsideration of Abkhazia's status (so-called independence) and focusing instead on achieving an agreement with Tbilisi on the non-use of force or, more often, the recognition of independence.

In Abkhazia's official media, both online and on television, the information is generally limited to formal statements and factual reporting. A similar picture exists in South Ossetia. It is worth noting that, in the case of Telegram channels, their administrators in Abkhazia are often anonymous users who primarily use the platform for internal political debates and to criticize or "expose" opponents.

Other platforms, mainly regional or international media, provide a space where Abkhazian and Ossetian authors, benefiting from greater editorial freedom, can organize discussions. Reviewing these varied sources allows for the identification of key perspectives within Abkhazian and Ossetian societies on the possibility of unification with Georgia:

• In both societies, there is a sense that relations between Moscow and Tbilisi have changed and improved, leading to fears that major powers might decide their fate without consulting them. This fear stems from two factors: they do not want unification with Georgia, and even if they did, neither Moscow nor Tbilisi would take their preferences into account. Playing a secondary role is wholly unacceptable to both societies.
• The revival of the topic of confederation or discussions about the restoration of Georgia's territorial integrity is seen as more closely tied to Georgia's parliamentary elections than any real intention by Russia to relinquish their "independence" to Tbilisi.
• It is widely believed that Russia has no interest in returning Sokhumi or Tskhinvali to Tbilisi. Thus, what "Georgian Dream" declares and promises to Georgians is viewed as unrealistic.
• Although Georgia seems to be distancing itself from the West and, on the surface, moving closer to Russia’s orbit, Tbilisi is not pursuing a pro-Russian policy, even regarding these regions. The law on occupation remains in effect, Georgia continues its policy of non-recognition, and it refuses to sign an agreement on the non-use of force.
• Russia's strict policies toward Abkhazia and South Ossetia are less about potential negotiations with Tbilisi on Georgia's territorial integrity and more about Moscow's desire for full access to Abkhazia's resources—a policy that has been ongoing for years. In South Ossetia, actions such as revoking de facto deputies' passports or imposing restrictions during de facto elections are seen as signals of political support for "Georgian Dream" rather than indicators that Moscow intends to relinquish the region.
• Even in the case of a Georgian-Russian agreement, local factors, such as property issues and the return of displaced persons, would need to be addressed—issues for which neither Abkhazian nor Ossetian societies are prepared. Consequently, this process could drag on for years, allowing Sokhumi and Tskhinvali to navigate this crisis period with minimal losses and preserve their sovereignty.

There is widespread distrust of these processes within Abkhazian and Ossetian societies. This uncertainty is primarily driven by the traditionally tense relations between Russia and Georgia and the changes in this dynamic. This longstanding tension had provided guarantees of protection from Tbilisi. However, the changed rhetoric between Tbilisi and Moscow now leaves these regions uncertain about the outcomes they may face, with few exceptions, both societies generally reject the idea of unification with Georgia.

Sentiments in Russia

Insights into the processes and sentiments in Russia can be obtained through observation of both traditional and new Russian media. However, especially under the conditions of the war in Ukraine, both types of media are almost entirely controlled by the Kremlin. Despite this, observations reveal that even within this controlled media space, controversial and contradictory opinions can occasionally be heard. For example, in discussions about the war in Ukraine, popular talk shows and numerous Telegram channels occasionally feature criticism of the government, the military, or specific officials or institutions.

There is also the so-called Russian media operating in exile, most notably TV Rain (Dozhd). Some individual authors and bloggers contribute to this political and informative media space, but their focus is primarily on Russia and the ongoing war.

Regarding Georgia specifically, Russian official circles and media display a clear sense of satisfaction about the deterioration of Georgia-West relations. However, this satisfaction does not extend to fundamental issues such as the occupation of Georgia's regions. The statements by Lavrov, Zatulin, and Karasin mentioned earlier reflect the key political sentiments prevalent in Russia:

• Since 2008, Georgia’s borders have changed, and Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region are no longer part of it. Tbilisi must accept this reality and conduct its foreign policy accordingly.
• Russia may face challenges in fully funding and controlling these regions, but this does not imply their relinquishment or return to Tbilisi.
• It is up to Tbilisi, Sokhumi, and Tskhinvali to decide what kind of relationship they will have with each other. Moscow will support the resolution of their relations.
• There is no behind-the-scenes dialogue regarding the restoration of Georgia's territorial integrity.

Frequent dissatisfaction and criticism of Abkhazia are heard, especially regarding its reluctance to adopt laws favorable to Russia. However, this criticism does not lead to serious discussions about relinquishing the region or returning it to Georgia. Georgia is still viewed through the prism of its historical role during the imperial and Soviet periods, recognizing its significance in the Caucasus. Occasionally, regret about the deterioration of relations with Tbilisi surfaces, but the idea of revisiting the current situation and ending the occupation is not seriously discussed.

Observation of Russian official statements and media discussions indicates that Russian political circles are not currently considering the restoration of Georgia’s territorial integrity, let alone acting in Tbilisi’s favor. This topic is practically absent from discussions.

As for the future of Georgian-Russian relations, it depends on Tbilisi’s pragmatism. Despite frequent praise from Kremlin propagandists for "Georgian Dream," no concrete changes are evident in Russia's state policy. Moreover, this policy not only fails to support "Georgian Dream’s" statements on confederation or the restoration of territorial integrity but actively dispels such notions and sentiments from the outset.

Conclusion

The issue of restoring Georgia’s territorial integrity unexpectedly resurfaced in 2024 Georgian politics, and in the form of a scandal at that. The peak of discussions on the topic occurred in September, but it completely disappeared from the political and media agenda just weeks before the elections.

The statements from "Georgian Dream," particularly those by the party’s honorary chairman in Gori, were entirely tied to electoral themes and did not go beyond political rhetoric. No concrete actions were taken by the government or other official agencies alongside these statements. Furthermore, the restoration of territorial integrity was linked not only to "Georgian Dream’s" electoral victory but also to the party securing a constitutional majority. This further raises suspicions that this process was purely election-oriented and not part of a genuine political plan.

The facts also counter the narratives portraying negotiations between the "Georgian Dream" government and the Kremlin over the occupied territories as realistic. Statements by both the de facto governments and senior Russian officials indicated that any negotiations on this issue were highly improbable.

Following the elections, both Georgian and Abkhazian societies became embroiled in domestic political crises. For these and other reasons, the issue of restoring territorial integrity has disappeared from the political agenda. Notably, "Georgian Dream" itself abandoned the issue weeks before the elections.

The content, format, and circumstances of the statements suggest that this was largely a superficial and insubstantial election campaign rather than a tangible or meaningful process. However, the vagueness and ambiguity of these statements leave room for doubts and speculation that this issue may resurface in the future. Consequently, the groundwork for political manipulation remains intact.