Introduction

On January 29, the “Georgian Dream” party initiated an expedited review of legislative amendments that unjustifiably restrict spaces for protest and freedom of expression while increasing criminal and administrative liability for violating these restrictions. On February 6, the ruling party adopted these amendments in a single-party parliament. By doing so, the “Georgian Dream”, in complete disregard for the principles of democratic lawmaking, approved the amendments just three days after submitting the legislative package to the Bureau, without waiting for the OSCE/ODIHR opinion, which will be prepared at the request of the Public Defender.[1]

On February 3, the leader of the parliamentary majority, Mamuka Mdinaradze, stated at a briefing that the legislative amendments aim to combat “the core of well-trained agents by foreign forces”, as well as to protect police officers, civil servants, and the government and equipping them with the necessary tools for this fight.[2] According to him, the legislative amendments already introduced in parliament represent only the first phase of this plan.

It should be noted that after the start of mass protests, the “Georgian Dream” resorted to multiple methods to suppress them. Following the systemic practices of torture and inhumane treatment of peaceful demonstrators - intended to intimidate and terrorize the population - the “Georgian Dream” decided to tighten legislation. As a result, administrative penalties were increased for violating the rules on holding and organizing assemblies, blocking highways. The wearing of masks and use of lasers at protests were prohibited, while the grounds for inspections of belongings and detentions were expanded.[3] Despite these arbitrary and repressive changes, civil resistance against the establishment of authoritarianism remains unwavering. Accordingly, the adopted legislative package represents yet another attempt by the ruling party to suppress peaceful protests.

In general, any interference with the freedom of assembly must comply with the requirements of Article 21 of the Constitution of Georgia, Article 16 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights. More specifically, any restriction must be prescribed by law, serve legitimate aims that justify limiting the freedom of assembly, and be necessary in a democratic society in accordance with the principle of proportionality. In turn, exercising the right to disobedience and protest is made possible precisely through the freedoms of assembly and expression.

Contrary to the principles of the Constitution and international legal norms, the expeditiously adopted legislative amendments impose censorship, grossly violate the freedoms of assembly and expression guaranteed by the Constitution of Georgia, and were passed with one-party support through an undemocratic process. These amendments are aimed at suppressing ongoing civil protests and consolidating authoritarianism. The imposition of disproportionately high administrative fines and prison terms, along with the criminalization of peaceful forms of expression, will have a chilling effect on citizens’ enjoyment of civil and political rights - especially in the context of the complete seizure of the Constitutional Court and common courts, which now fully serve the interests of the ruling political party.

On February 6, legislative amendments were introduced to the Criminal Code, the Administrative Offences Code, the Law “on the Police”, and the Law “on Assemblies and Demonstrations”, all discussed in detail below.

1. Amendments to the Criminal Code

The punishment for the crime outlined in Article 239¹ of the Criminal Code, which involves public incitement to acts of violence, has been aggravated. Specifically, in addition to a fine and community service, the new amendments allow for an additional sentence of imprisonment for up to three years.[4]

Additionally, the punishment for the crime outlined in Article 353 of the Criminal Code (resistance, threat, or violence against a defender of public order or other representative of the authorities) has been aggravated. The maximum sentence will now be imprisonment for up to 6 years, instead of 5 years. An aggravating circumstance has been added to the second part of the same article, specifically for committing the same crime “repeatedly”. This offence, when committed under aggravating circumstances, now carries a sentence of imprisonment from 5 to 8 years, whereas the previous version provided for imprisonment from 4 to 7 years.

Aggravating circumstances are added to the crime outlined in Article 353¹, which involves an attack on a police officer, an employee of the Special Penitentiary Service, or another representative of authority or a public institution (before the amendments, this crime did not include aggravating circumstances). These aggravating circumstances are: the same act committed “by a group of persons”, “repeatedly”, and/or “in the presence of a minor”. The penalties for committing this crime under aggravating circumstances have been increased. For instance, committing this crime by a group of persons, repeatedly, in the presence of a minor, and/or by explosion, arson, or other dangerous means will result in imprisonment for a term of 5 to 8 years. The commission of the act outlined in part 2 of the same article (harming the health of the same group of persons) under aggravating circumstances - specifically, by a group of persons, repeatedly, in the presence of a minor, and/or by explosion - will be punishable by imprisonment for 9 to 13 years.[5]

In addition, Article 353² has been added to the Criminal Code, which defines the threat of violence, assault, or other such actions against a public political official, political official, state servant, person equated with a state servant, and/or public servant as a crime. In the case of a threat of violence, the person will be punished with a fine or imprisonment for up to 3 years, and in the case of an assault, with a fine or imprisonment for 4 to 7 years. Aggravating circumstances have also been added to this article, including the same act committed: “repeatedly”, “by a group of people”, “in the presence of a minor”, and/or “by the explosion, arson, or other dangerous means”.

Criminalizing this act, despite the existence of Article 151 of the Criminal Code, which already criminalizes threats, is completely unjustified due to the duplication of offences. Furthermore, Article 151 punishes threats of killing, causing harm to health, and/or destroying property, where the person being threatened has a reasonable fear that the threat will be carried out. In contrast, Article 353² criminalizes threats of violence, a term that can be interpreted more broadly. The arbitrary interpretation could, in some cases, cover harsh criticism of officials, which fully falls under the scope of freedom of expression.

The amendments to the Criminal Code are particularly concerning in light of the context in which, in response to ongoing civil protests, the ruling party has explicitly stated that the purpose of the amendments is to empower law enforcement agencies to combat the “core of agents.” This indicates that rather than protecting public order, these provisions are intended as a tool for political persecution. These concerns are further intensified by the vague wording of the elements of these crimes and the disproportionately harsh penalties.

Additionally, since November 28, 2024, more than 60 peaceful demonstrators have been prosecuted on political grounds under the above-mentioned and other problematic criminal law provisions.[6] Among them, Mzia Amaglobeli, the founder of “Netgazeti” and a journalist, against whom charges under Article 353¹ have been brought.[7] This confirms the use of politically motivated prosecution through particularly harsh criminal law measures, which undermines the principles of a democratic and legal state and contradicts Article 18 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which prohibits interference with human rights for purposes not allowed by the Convention.

2. Amendments to the Administrative Offences Code

• Disproportionately Increased Measures of Administrative Liability

Based on the amendments to Article 32 of the Administrative Offences Code of Georgia, the term of administrative detention as a sanction for violations has been increased from 15 to 60 days. It is noteworthy, that this disproportionate increase in administrative detention applies only to violations related to the freedoms of assembly and expression, which further confirms the ruling party’s declared goal of restricting the right to assembly through the use of a chilling effect.

Along with the disproportionate increase in the duration of administrative detention, the amount of fines has also been increased disproportionately. For example,

• In the case of committing petty hooliganism as provided for in Article 166 of the Code, the maximum fine increases from 1 000 GEL to 3 000 GEL, and the maximum term of administrative detention increases from 15 to 20 days. For the repeated commission of this offence, the maximum fine increases to 5 000 GEL, while the detention term is extended to up to 60 days.
• In the case of repeated committing vandalism under Article 166² of the Code, the maximum term of administrative detention has been increased from 5 days to 60 days.
• In the case of disobedience of a lawful demand of a law enforcement official, as provided by Article 173 (1) of the Code, the maximum fine has been increased from 3 000 GEL to 5 000 GEL, while the maximum term of administrative detention has been increased from 15 days to 60 days.
• According to Article 173 (2) of the Code, verbal insult, cursing, harassment, and/or other offensive actions against law enforcement officers during the performance of official duties or in connection with the performance of official duties will be punished by a fine ranging from 2 000 to 5 000 GEL or up to 60 days of detention. In the case of repeated commission of an act prescribed by Article 173, the fine will be 6 000 GEL, and the duration of detention will range from 7 to 60 days.

Additionally, a verbal warning will no longer be an option for individuals violating Article 173 of the Code,[8] which is expected to increase the number of people subject to punishment under this article. This change is particularly important since, in some cases, common courts had applied verbal warnings to individuals detained during protests when the evidence clearly showed there was no violation of the law.[9]

In situations where the elements of the above-mentioned offences are interpreted very broadly by the courts in practice, potentially covering spheres protected by freedom of expression, the further tightening of administrative sanctions makes this Code an even more powerful tool of repression in the hands of the ruling party.[10]

The issue of harsh administrative sanctions is especially significant given that the above-mentioned administrative offences are related to the right to protest and freedom of assembly and expression. According to the UN Human Rights Committee, administrative detention imposed in the context of peaceful assembly is particularly important and it carries the risk of unlawful deprivation of liberty.[11] Additionally, the European Court of Human Rights scrutinizes the imposition of custodial sanctions for peaceful actions with great scrutiny.[12]

Moreover, according to the OSCE/ODIHR, such sanctions create a need to protect the right to a fair trial, while also having a chilling effect on the enjoyment of the freedom of peaceful assembly.[13] Given that the amount of the above-mentioned administrative fines exceeds the minimum sentence for committing a crime under the Criminal Code by more than two times for much less serious acts, these administrative penalties essentially take on the character of a criminal sanction. This requires the existence of guarantees provided for the accused in the Criminal Code (for example, the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt for the establishment of the culpability).

• New Administrative Offence

A new offence prescribed by Article 173¹⁶ is being added to the Code, which involves verbal insult, cursing, harassment, and/or other offensive actions against a public political official, political official, state servant, person equated with a state servant, and/or public servant during the performance of official duties or in connection with the performance of official duties. This offence is punishable by a fine ranging from 1 500 to 4 000 GEL or administrative detention for up to 45 days. In the case of repeated commission, the fine increases to 2 500 - 6 000 GEL, and the administrative detention term is extended to 5 - 60 days. Additionally, the person will be deprived of the right to carry arms for up to 3 years. Furthermore, a verbal warning is prohibited for individuals violating this article.

One of the issues with this norm is that it equates public political officials (such as the president, prime minister, ministers, and members of parliament)[14] with ordinary civil servants, who have less public responsibility and visibility due to the nature of their functions. According to the European Court of Human Rights, the scope of permissible criticism of public figures is broader than that for private individuals. However, this does not imply that every word or action of public figures should be scrutinized in the same way as the actions of politicians, as politicians consciously place their personalities at the center of public attention.[15] For instance, the European Court of Human Rights deemed it unjustified to require compensation to be paid by a journalist under civil law (even though this liability was not criminal in its essence) for harsh remarks directed at the Turkish Prime Minister.[16]

According to the European Court of Human Rights, public servants are subject to a broad and acceptable range of criticism in the performance of their duties, and within this range, a certain degree of excessiveness may be involved. For instance, in the case of Chkhartishvili v. Georgia, the European Court found the 8-day administrative detention imposed on the applicant for throwing beans at police officers and saying “gruel for slaves” to be unjustified. According to the court’s assessment, the applicant’s actions constituted opposition to the authorities expressed within the framework of a demonstration and fell within the scope of freedom of expression. Therefore, the imposition of administrative detention for this action, regardless of its perceived lightness, was deemed unjustified.[17]

According to the European Court of Human Rights, for a measure of deprivation of liberty to be considered lawful, the law must meet the requirements of the quality of the law. This means that the law must be sufficiently accessible, precise, and foreseeable to prevent risks of arbitrariness.[18] “Legality” also requires that the applicable law be sufficiently precise to enable a person to foresee with adequate clarity the likely consequences of a particular action.[19] The wording in Article 173¹⁶ of the Code is so vague that it could potentially cover harsh criticism of politicians (who are under a high obligation of tolerance) concerning their public activities, thus fostering debate on issues of public importance.

It is also unclear whether this norm applies solely to words spoken in physical space, face-to-face, or extends to opinions expressed online or on television. The general and vague nature of this norm allows for broad interpretation, and its extension to the online space - given the specific characteristics of this space - would constitute a particularly severe interference with freedom of expression. As a result, this prohibition essentially undermines the core purpose of freedom of expression in a democratic society.

• A Broad List of Aggravating Circumstances of the Offence

Under Article 35 (b) of the Code, the repeated commission of a similar administrative offence within a year, for which a person has already been given a verbal warning, shall be considered an aggravating circumstance.[20] According to Paragraph “e” of the same article, an aggravating circumstance is the commission of an offence against or in the presence of a minor. Additionally, under Paragraph “g”, an aggravating circumstance includes the insult to the personal dignity of the victim, while Paragraph “j” introduces a new aggravating circumstance, which foresees the commission of an offence in connection with the victim’s official or public activities.

This expansion of aggravating circumstances for administrative offences further illustrates the essentially criminal nature of the liability regime established by this Code, which is entirely inappropriate for minor unlawful acts.

• Increased Period for the Imposition and Expungement of Administrative Sanctions

Based on Article 38 (2) of the Administrative Offences Code, the period within which a person may be fined for a court-ordered offence is increased from 4 to 6 months from the date of its commission, and in the case of a continuous administrative offence, from the date of its detection.

According to Article 39 of the Code, in cases of violations under Articles 150 (distortion of the appearance of a territory within the administrative boundaries of a municipality), 150² (distortion of the appearance of the Tbilisi municipality), 166 (petty hooliganism), 166² (vandalism), 173 (non-compliance with a police demand), 173¹⁶ (insulting an official or public servant), and 174¹ (violation of the rules for organizing and holding assemblies or demonstrations), a person will only have their offence expunged one year after paying the fine.

Thus, the above-mentioned changes - disproportionately increased administrative sanctions, the introduction of a new offence that declares political expression a violation of the law, an expanded list of aggravating circumstances, and an extended period for imposing and expunging fines - collectively represent a response to minor violations and misdemeanors with the severity of criminal liability.

Although Article 233¹ was added to the Code to introduce the principle of adversarial proceedings, and the new wording of Article 234 states that doubts arising during the assessment of evidence that are not proven must be resolved in favor of the accused, these changes are merely formal. The Parliament appears to be creating the illusion of balancing individual rights under the guise of an improved standard of proof. In reality, however, in the vast majority of cases against protest participants since November 28, 2024, courts have overwhelmingly sided with the Ministry of Internal Affairs in protest-related offences. Case analysis reveals that courts routinely disregard video evidence presented by defendants, which contradicts police testimony.[21] Consequently, given the highly formalistic judicial oversight, these provisions will not enhance individuals’ procedural guarantees in the slightest.

3. Amendments to the Law “on Assemblies and Demonstrations”

In accordance with the amendments to the Law “on Assemblies and Demonstrations” (hereinafter referred to as the “Law”), the concepts of “principal” and “trustee” are to be abolished, and the initiator and the person responsible for an assembly or manifestation will be redefined as the “organizer.” Additionally, the authority to manage assemblies and manifestations (except for the recipient of the assembly’s warning) will shift from local self-government to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. For instance, in the case of a highway blockage, the responsibility for determining an alternative transport route will move from the municipality to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Additionally, under Article 14 of the Law, the Ministry will have the authority to make decisions on prohibiting assemblies, instead of the municipality. Similarly, the Ministry will now be responsible for balancing the rights of assembly participants and societal interests, a duty previously held by the municipality.[22] In reality, what may seem like a formal change transforms the exercise of the freedoms of assembly and expression into a police measure by the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

The most concerning changes to the law include the requirement to provide notice for spontaneous and traffic-blocking protests, the prohibition of assemblies in enclosed spaces without the owner’s consent, the significant reduction of permissible locations for protests and picketing, the ban on tents and other structures, the participation in a protest terminated by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the disproportionately increased sanctions.

• Obligation to Provide a Notice

According to Article 5 (2) of the Law, it is mandatory to submit a notice to the executive body of the municipality (City Hall or district administration office) if the assembly is held on a transport route or if it will obstruct the movement of transport. This obligation means that the participants of the assembly at the unchanged location of the current protest - Rustaveli Avenue - must notify the City Hall in advance about holding the assembly, as the gathering of protesters disrupts the transport route.

Although, according to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, the obligation to notify the authorities about an assembly is considered a regulation in line with the Convention, its purpose should be to ensure the safe conduct of the assembly and not to create a hidden barrier to the exercise of the freedom of assembly. Additionally, the European Court explicitly states that a violation of this rule should not be used as grounds to restrict the freedom of assembly or impose sanctions, provided that the assembly is peaceful.[23]

It also becomes mandatory to provide a notice to the municipal executive body before holding a spontaneous assembly or demonstration, immediately and within a reasonable time, after the organizer becomes aware of the information about the spontaneous assembly.[24] Such a regulation contradicts the Venice Commission’s position that the existence of an obligation to notify about a spontaneous assembly is unacceptable.[25] At the same time, it practically and imperatively requires the presence of an organizer for the assembly, even in cases where such a person may not exist due to the nature of the assembly.

• Prohibition of Gathering in Closed Spaces without the Owner’s Prior Permission

The legislative amendments prohibit holding assemblies in closed spaces/buildings without the prior written consent of the owner.[26] It is noteworthy, that some closed buildings, due to their function and public accessibility, are of significant value for the exercise of the freedoms of expression and assembly.[27] For example, institutions such as universities, shopping malls, other entertainment centers, and privately owned parks, where large numbers of people gather, may be important platforms for freedom of expression and assembly. This is especially true when the gathering consists of only a few people and does not disrupt the normal functioning of the institution.

This particularly concerns the cases where a few people are exercising their freedom of expression, which is why it cannot be considered an assembly. For example, according to the European Court of Human Rights, a political performance, although held in a public space, was not considered an assembly because its purpose was not to attract attention and communicate ideas among the people gathered there.[28]

• Unjustified Restriction of Spaces for Protests and Picketing

A list of locations where gatherings and demonstrations are prohibited is added to Article 9 (3) of the Law. Specifically, it is prohibited to block entrances to buildings, highways, bridges, tunnels, overpasses, railways, as well as transport hubs determined by the municipality, where disruption could cause significant damage to the normal functioning of enterprises, institutions, and organizations, and/or significantly impede the movement of traffic flows.

Additionally, the previous version of Article 9 (4) of the Law allowed an administrative body to impose restrictions on holding a gathering or demonstration within a distance of no more than twenty meters from a building, to prevent the blocking of the building and disruption of the institution’s operations.[29] However, the new amendments extend this authority, allowing the administrative body to impose such restrictions even within its building, making it nearly impossible to express protest within administrative buildings. Public institutions, particularly those providing services like the Public Service Hall, often attract large crowds and function as public spaces, and create an opportunity to attract public attention.[30] Such buildings are legitimate spaces for expressing protest, especially in cases where only a few individuals are protesting and do not disturb the institution’s activities, a preventive demand to leave the protest site should be considered as an unjustified, blanket restriction on freedom of assembly.

The Venice Commission previously assessed even the earlier version of the provisions in Article 9 of the Law “on Assemblies and Demonstrations” as disproportionate back in 2009. The Commission argued that imposing blanket bans on the location and timing of assemblies requires stronger justification than restrictions on specific gatherings. Given that it is difficult to account for the unique circumstances of each case, such broad restrictions may be considered disproportionate unless there is clear evidence of a pressing public need.[31] Therefore, in a democratic society, there should be a presumption in favor of freedom of assembly and expression, even in cases where the assembly may disrupt transport or inconvenience to the public.

• The Prohibition of Tents and Other Structures

According to Article 11 (2) (f) of the Law, the temporary structure is prohibited if its arrangement poses a threat to the participants of the assembly or demonstration, or others, hinders the police in maintaining public order and safety, disrupts the normal operations of enterprise, institution, or organization, does not significantly obstruct the assembly or demonstration without its presence, and/or is not directly related to the assembly or demonstration itself.[32]

Article 11 (2) (f) of the Law, while outlining various grounds for restricting temporary structures, is primarily focused on permitting such structures only when absolutely necessary. The determination of whether holding an assembly without a structure is significantly impeded is left to the discretion of the police, granting law enforcement agencies excessive authority.

In general, the freedom of assembly covers not only large-scale protests that are planned in advance at a specific location, but also spontaneous gatherings, marches, demonstrations, picketing, flash mobs, static protests, and sit-in protests.[33] Additionally, freedom of assembly protects long-term protests, which may necessitate the construction of temporary structures within the assembly area. Furthermore, the freedom extends to the form of the assembly itself, meaning that participants should have the autonomy to decide whether to use a microphone, stage, or other technical means to effectively communicate their message to the audience. International human rights law recognizes that the freedom of assembly also includes the right to arrange temporary structures.[34]

Furthermore, the European Court of Human Rights has established that the form of assembly itself constitutes a form of political expression under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which safeguards freedom of expression.[35] For instance, a prolonged protest and the arrangement of tents can serve to attract public attention and may carry a symbolic significance that is closely tied to the purpose and essence of the assembly.[36]

It is important to note that the initiative to prohibit the placement of temporary structures was critically evaluated by the OSCE/ODIHR in 2023. The assessment highlighted that the proposed wording did not meet the requirements of the quality of law, is not sufficiently clear, and grants law enforcement agencies unlimited discretion in interpreting the norm, creating a significant risk of discriminatory and arbitrary application of this regulation. Furthermore, the restriction does not serve a legitimate purpose that justifies limitations on the freedom of assembly. According to the same opinion, the blanket prohibition imposed by this provision has a chilling effect on assembly participants, undermining the core principle of freedom of assembly.[37]

For this violation, under Article 174 of the Administrative Offences Code, the offender will face a fine of 5 000 GEL, while the organizer will be fined 15 000 GEL. Additionally, this temporary structure used in the protest will be confiscated.[38] According to the OSCE/ODIHR assessment, the indiscriminate confiscation of all structures, without distinguishing the purpose of these items, is considered disproportionate.[39] According to the same assessment, the confiscation of the item and even the 15-day imprisonment, which was the maximum term of imprisonment under the previous version of the Code, were deemed disproportionate and excessive.[40]

• Prohibition of Participation in an Assembly Terminated by the Ministry of Internal Affairs

Article 11 (2) (g) of the law prohibits participation in an assembly that was terminated at the request of the Ministry of Internal Affairs under Article 13 (1) of the law (i.e. when a decision to terminate the assembly is made due to mass violations of the prohibitions on the use of firearms, pyrotechnics, laser, or wearing masks).[41]

First of all, it should be noted that a blanket ban on the wearing of masks and using lasers blatantly violates the freedom of assembly and expression, as these are forms of exercising and expressing these rights. Accordingly, the decision to immediately disperse a gathering due to the mass wearing of masks and lasers by protest participants does not serve a legitimate aim and is not a proportionate and necessary measure in a democratic society. Therefore, the decision to disperse a protest that falls within the framework of the constitutionally protected freedom of assembly is doubly unconstitutional.[42]

Furthermore, even in cases where an assembly has been dispersed due to its violent nature, peaceful protesters should retain the right to continue participating in the protest after such actions have ceased. This is especially relevant in the context of mass protests, where the decision to disperse the assembly is often based solely on the actions of individual protesters. Therefore, such a blanket ban, which applies uniformly to all participants regardless of their individual actions, does not meet the requirements of the quality of the law, fails to serve any permissible, legitimate aim, and is not necessary in a democratic society.

• Disproportionately High Sanctions for Violating Assembly Rules and the Restriction of the Right to a Fair Trial

Article 174¹ of the Administrative Offences Code significantly increases administrative sanctions for violations of the rules governing assemblies and demonstrations. For instance,

• If the obligation to notify the municipality about the gathering is violated, the individual will be fined 2 000 GEL, and the organizer will face a fine of 5 000 GEL.
• The maximum detention term for blocking the entrance to the court, holding a gathering at the place of residence of a judge, or in the courthouse has been increased from 15 to 60 days, with a fine set at 5 000 GEL.
• Holding a gathering within the premises of the prosecutor’s office, law enforcement agencies, railway station, airport, or port, or within a 20-meter radius of the entrance to these buildings, will result in a fine of 5 000 GEL or up to 15 days of detention. The organizer will face a fine of 15 000 GEL and up to 20 days of detention.
• Using a laser or wearing a mask during a protest will result in a fine of 2 000 GEL or detention for up to 7 days;
• Participation in a gathering that has been dispersed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs will result in a fine of 5 000 GEL or up to 60 days of administrative detention.
• Artificially blocking a transport route, as well as obstructing it with vehicles or other objects, will result in a fine of 5 000 GEL or up to 15 days of detention. In the case of the organizer, the penalty will be a fine of 15 000 GEL and up to 20 days of detention.

Additionally, the repeated commission of any violation outlined in Article 174¹ of the Code results in an increased fine and longer term of administrative detention, with penalties potentially rising to 20 000 GEL and up to 60 days of detention. Furthermore, the option to issue a verbal warning for violations outlined in this article is abolished.

In addition to the excessively high fines for violating assembly and demonstration rules, the law fails to provide judges with the discretion to adjust the amount of fines based on the personal characteristics of the offender and the specifics of the case. This lack of flexibility also infringes on the right to a fair trial.

The Venice Commission and the OSCE/ODIHR recommend that the liability imposed on participants and organizers of assemblies should correspond to the nature of their actions, and be necessary, proportionate, and non-discriminatory. Disproportionate or unnecessary sanctions can discourage participation in assemblies and demonstrations due to their chilling effect.[43] The same documents suggest that violations such as failure to notify authorities in advance about an assembly or not adhering to requirements related to the location and timing of the assembly should not result in prison sentences or heavy fines, as these are considered indirect violations of the freedom of assembly.[44]

The European Court of Human Rights places significant emphasis on the principle of proportionality when assessing interference with the freedom of assembly and stresses the importance of maintaining a balance between the interference with the right and the nature and severity of the imposed sanctions. In this context, criminal sanctions on demonstrators require strong justification. The Court has held that peaceful demonstrations should not face the threat of criminal punishment, especially deprivation of liberty.[45]

• Abolition of Justiciability for Violations of Certain Assembly Rules

The new wording of Article 208 of the Administrative Offences Code removes common court jurisdiction over certain offences outlined in Article 174¹. These offences include failing to notify the municipality concerning an assembly, participating in an assembly terminated by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, organizing an assembly in a closed space without the property owner’s consent, holding a demonstration near a prosecutor’s office, penitentiary facility, or law enforcement building, artificially obstructing transport routes, using a laser or wearing the mask, blocking entrances to buildings, highways, bridges, tunnels, overpasses, and railways, as well as disrupting designated transport hubs whose obstruction could significantly impact the normal functioning of enterprises, institutions, and organizations or severely hinder traffic flow.[46]

As a result of this change, a representative of the Ministry of Internal Affairs issues an administrative offence report on the spot, which the citizens should appeal in court if they dispute its validity. Consequently, an individual is deemed a violator of the law without the opportunity to present evidence on equal terms or provide testimony. The burden then falls on the accused to present evidence in court and prove that they did not commit the alleged violation. This shift in the burden of proof and the criminal nature of administrative sanctions constitute a severe violation of Article 31 (6) of the Constitution prescribing the right to a fair trial (no one is required to prove their innocence, the burden of proof lies with the accuser).

Summary

The above-mentioned legislative amendments blatantly violate the freedoms of expression and assembly, the right to personal security and liberty, and the right to a fair trial. These amendments were adopted without adherence to the principles of democratic lawmaking, fail to serve any legitimate objectives, and are not necessary in a democratic society.

By legalizing political repression, the “Georgian Dream” regime seeks to create a facade of legality and a pretext for legitimizing violence against civil protests. While the use of brutal force may spark public outrage and escalate demonstrations, based on repressive laws, the government can suppress dissent even through nonviolent means by leveraging their slow-acting yet chilling effect.

It is evident that the “Georgian Dream” is following the path of authoritarian regimes by legalizing repression to suppress civil society and tighten its grip on power. In a system where state institutions - most notably the judiciary - are fully captured and serve the party’s interests rather than acting as check and balance, repressive laws pose an even greater threat to citizens engaged in resistance.

[1] Statement of the Public Defender of Georgia, 05.02.2024, https://www.facebook.com/photo?fbid=1164955961665642&set=a.251767382984509.

[2] Briefing of the Leader of the Parliamentary Majority, Mamuka Mdinaradze, 03.02.2024, https://www.facebook.com/@GDMamukaMdinaradze/?locale=ka_GE.

[3] Social Justice Center “Systemic Analysis of Legislative Amendments Adopted against Protests”, 27.12.2024, https://socialjustice.org.ge/en/products/protestebis-tsinaaghmdeg-mighebuli-sakanonmdeblo-tsvlilebebis-sistemuri-analizi.

[4] Georgian Law “on Amendments to the Criminal Code of Georgia”, https://info.parliament.ge/file/1/BillReviewContent/378777.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Georgian Democracy Initiative, Political Prisoners of the Regime in Georgia, 2025, p. 4, https://gdi.ge/storage/files/doc/Political%20Prisoners%20of%20the%20Regime%20-%20Georgia.pdf.

[7] Social Justice Center “The Use of Imprisonment against Mzia Amaghlobeli is Unlawful, and the Decision Must be Changed”, 20.01.2025, https://socialjustice.org.ge/en/products/mzia-amaghlobelis-mimart-patimrobis-gamoqeneba-ukanonoa-da-gadatsqvetileba-unda-sheitsvalos.

[8] Article 173 of the Administrative Offences Code of Georgia.

[9] Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association, Results of the Activities of the Legal Aid Network as of December 9, 17.12.2024, https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1A8tUwvkR7/.

[10] Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association, “Protest Considered as an Offence”, 2017, p. 5, https://gyla.ge/files/news/2008/geo.pdf.

[11] Joint Report of UN Special Rapporteurs (2016), A/HRC/31/66, para. 48, https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/31/66.

[12] ECtHR, Peradze and Others v. Georgia, no. 5631/16, 2022, https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-221542.

[13] OSCE/ODIHR, Urgent Opinion on Proposed Amendments to the Law of Georgia on Assemblies and Demonstrations and to the Administrative Offences Code, 2023, p. 21.

[14] Law of Georgia “on Public Service”, Article 3 (h).

[15] ECtHR, Chkhartishvili v. Georgia (application no. 31349/20) 2023, para. 53 https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/?i=001-224577.

[16] ECtHR, Tuşalp v. Turkey (applications nos. 32131/08 and 41617/08), 2012, para. 50 https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-109189.

[17] ECtHR, Chkhartishvili v. Georgia (application no. 31349/20) 2023, para. 56, https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/?i=001-224577.

[18] Nasrulloyev v. Russia, no. 656/06, para. 71, 2007, and Mooren v. Germany [GC], no. 11364/03, para. 76, 2009.

[19] Baranowski v. Poland, no. 28358/95, para. 52, ECHR 2000 III.

[20] Georgian Law “On Amending the Administrative Offences Code of Georgia”, https://info.parliament.ge/file/1/BillReviewContent/378775?.

[21] Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association, Civil Rights Facing Increased Police Terror, 2024, p. 29, https://gyla.ge/en/post/mzardi-sapolicio-terori.

[22] Articles 11¹ and 11² of the Law of Georgia “on Assemblies and Demonstrations”.

[23] Akgöl and Göl v. Turkey (applications nos. 28495/06 and 28516/06), 2011, para. 41 https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-104794.

[24] Article 8 (1¹) of the Law of Georgia “on Assemblies and Demonstrations”.

[25] Venice Commission comments on the Law on Assemblies and Manifestations of the Republic of Georgia, 2009, pp. 4-5, https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL(2009)153-e.

[26] Article 9 (1²) of the Law of Georgia “on Assemblies and Demonstrations”.

[27] https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2019)017rev-e, p. 7.

[28] ECtHR, https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-111421.

[29] Article 9 (4) of the Law of Georgia “on Assemblies and Demonstrations”.

[30] Venice Commission, Compilation of Venice Commission Opinions Concerning Freedom of Assembly, 2014, p.19, https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-PI(2014)003-e.

[31] Venice Commission comments on the Law on Assemblies and Manifestations of the Republic of Georgia, 2009, p. 2, https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL(2009)153-e.

[32] Article 11 (2) (f) of the Law of Georgia “on Assemblies and Demonstrations”.

[33] Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly, 2020 p. 13, https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2019)017rev-e.

[34] UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 37 (2020) on the right of peaceful assembly, para. 58, https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR/C/GC/37&Lang=en.

[35] Ezelin v. France, (Application no. 11800/85), 1991, para. 37, https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57675.

[36] Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly, 2020, pp. 54-55.

[37] OSCE/ODIHR, Urgent Opinion on Proposed Amendments to the Law of Georgia on Assemblies and Demonstrations and to the Administrative Offences Code, 2023, p. 13, https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/7/a/557847_0.pdf.

[38] Article 174¹(5) of the Administrative Offences Code of Georgia.

[39] OSCE/ODIHR, Urgent Opinion on Proposed Amendments to the Law of Georgia on Assemblies and Demonstrations and to the Administrative Offences Code, 2023, pp. 19-20.

[40] Ibid, 21.

[41] Article 11 (2) (g) of the Law of Georgia “on Assemblies and Demonstrations”.

[42] Social Justice Center “Systemic Analysis of Legislative Amendments Adopted against Protests”, 27.12.2024, https://socialjustice.org.ge/en/products/protestebis-tsinaaghmdeg-mighebuli-sakanonmdeblo-tsvlilebebis-sistemuri-analizi.

[43] Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly, 2020, pp. 83-84.

[44] Ibid, p. 12.

[45] ECtHR, Peradze and Others v. Georgia (5631/16), 2022 para. 35, https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/?i=001-221542.

[46] Georgian Law “On Amending the Administrative Offences Code of Georgia”, http://info.parliament.ge/file/1/BillReviewContent/378775?.

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