Interviewer: Nargiza Arjevanidze

The Social Justice Center presents the interview with the historian Stephen Jones. Professor Jones is an expert on post-communist societies in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. For decades, his research has focused on Georgia, Russia and the South Caucasus in general. Professor Jones served as the founding director of the Davis Center's Program on Georgian Studies until summer of 2024 and chairs the program's Advisory Board.

His books include Socialism in Georgian Colors: The European Road to Social Democracy, 1883-1917 (Harvard University, 2005), War and Revolution in the Caucasus: Georgia Ablaze (ed., Routledge, 2010), Georgia: A Political History Since Independence (I.B. Tauris, 2012), and The Birth of Modern Georgia: The First Georgian Republic and Its Successors, 1918-2010 (ed., Routledge, 2013).

In a series of interviews “Political crisis in Georgia and its solutions”, we spoke with foreign scholars and experts with in-depth knowledge of the Georgian context and the broader region.

The interview questions addressed, on one hand, the anxieties surrounding Georgia's path to European integration and the risks and threats posed by the Georgian government’s open confrontation with the West. On the other hand, they focused on the youth at the center of ongoing social protests in Georgia, exploring the reasons for and significance of their involvement in the current resistance movement. This series of interviews also aims to seek possible solutions to the crisis by collecting perspectives from experts and scholars.

Q: In your opinion, what are the geopolitical factors underlying the current crisis in Georgia and what can be the potential geopolitical consequences of it?

A: Georgia has always been in a difficult geopolitical position since it is a small state located between great empires. The current dilemmas it faces in international politics are nothing new. It has always been a strategically important country because of its position between Central Asia and Europe, or between Russia and the Middle East. Trade routes and armies marching across Georgia are central to its history and its development as a multinational state.

Russia has not always been the dominant regional power in the South Caucasus. In fact, it is only the last and newest empire – in either Russian or Soviet form – which has taken an interest in Georgia. Before that it was the Romans, Arabs, Safavids, Byzantines, Ottomans and others. Historically Georgia had been part of the Middle East far longer than it has been in the Russian sphere. And just like, one after the other, surrounding empires lost their grip in the South Caucasus, Russia will too. Not since the challenge of Shamil and the Murids in the 1840-50s, and briefly between 1918-21 when the Russian civil war raged, has Russia been so weak in the Caucasus as it is today. Turkey is now a major power in the region, Armenia is shifting its gaze to the EU, and China is growing its economic power and building its Middle Corridor across Kakheti and Imereti. What happens in the South Caucasus today is no longer just a Russian affair.

Vladimir Putin is in an unenviable position – he will never win in Ukraine (unless the West buckles), the Russian economy is on a war-footing and in decline globally, the best and the brightest Russians are leaving, China is now Russia’s senior partner, and NATO has two new members. The war against Ukraine has also changed the security architecture of the Black Sea. The Russian Black Sea navy has practically disappeared and the notion of safety for the Black Sea fleet in Ochamchire is a fantasy. Russia still has powerful levers in the South Caucasus (Abkhazia and South Osetia) but the region is beginning to uncouple from two centuries of imperial control. With the war in Nagorno-Karabakh at an end and a peace treaty between Azerbaijan and Armenia in the offing, the opportunities for regional cooperation are growing. The absence of cooperation between the three South Caucasian states has always been an invitation for outside interference. This was demonstrated in 1918-21 when Soviet Russia picked off independent Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia one by one. But today, the economic incentives for collaboration between the three states are increasingly powerful. This is despite the anti-Western government in Georgia which is attempting to slow down integration with the EU.

But to go back to your question, this is not just about geopolitics. Its also about Georgians’ long-standing aspiration since the mid-19th century, to become part of Europe. Originally, Russia fulfilled that role as a “European” power against Georgia’s southern Muslim neighbors. Russian language, manners, and great power status – all had a powerful impact on Georgian cultural development in the 19^th and 20^th centuries. But that has gone in the last three decades and it is very unlikely to return. Now Russia is allied with anti-Western powers like China, North Korea, Iran and Syria. Russia’s policies both domestically and externally have shown Georgians – especially among the younger generation - that this is a cultural and civilizational choice, as well as a geopolitical one.

Having said all that, and even though Georgia has gained global recognition through its use of soft power (sport, music, cuisine), it remains a small state that must adapt to global forces outside of its control. The current government has essentially abandoned the resources it has as a small state to exert influence in the international community. It has lost Georgia’s favorable relationship with the EU and USA which gave it a creditable voice at international meetings and fora among Western states. It has in addition lost its network of allies which provided crucial support to Georgia in 2008, and which augment its ability to rally collective support at times of threat. I am thinking here of Poland, Ukraine, and the Baltic republics. Georgia now has a smaller voice abroad, and what happens in Ukraine or in the November elections in the USA, will have a dramatic effect on its future. Without further European integration, Georgia is more vulnerable to Russian manipulation.

Q: How can we explain this gradual geopolitical shift, which, over the past year and months, has been occurring in a rather accelerated manner, considering the recent legislative initiatives?

A: Yes, this is an interesting phenomenon. The goal of European integration is in the Georgian constitution. The constitutional amendment (article 78) was agreed to by Georgian Dream as recently as 2018. Georgian Dream’s current anti-EU position demonstrates the evolution of a political coalition which in 2012 was genuinely seeking to get closer to Europe. After shedding its allies, such as the Free Democrats and the Republicans, GD shifted decisively to the right. This new conservative ideology is holding Georgian Dream together, which otherwise given its members’ lack of personality or distinctiveness, would almost certainly fall apart. Georgian Dream seeks a European connection, but it is a very particular one. Its vision is of an illiberal Europe. Georgian Dream has aligned itself with the old European tradition of right-wing populism and joined the cohort of Viktor Orban, Robert Fico, Marine Le Pen, and Giorgia Meloni. They are also Europe. But it is a closed Europe, an intolerant Europe based on the preservation of a self-perceived civilizational superiority rooted in Western Christianity. Europe does not have a good history when it comes to tolerance of minorities or outsiders.

We thought we had escaped this older version of Europe after WWII. The European Community, which evolved into the EU, represented a new direction – one of cooperation, consensus, openness and a peaceful foreign policy. The EU defended all the features we include in modern democracy - freedom of speech, party pluralism, free and fair elections, and civic equality. Georgian Dream is ideologically opposed to this type of Europe. EU liberalism is dangerous for Georgian Dream. It challenges its opaque and secretive system of government and will open the national elections in October to public and international scrutiny. EU norms provide the sustenance for forms of counter-power, whether it is civil society, an independent judiciary, a free press, autonomous universities, self-governing cities, or trade unions. Unfortunately, Georgia’s political parties are unreliable sources of counter-power. They are fractured, and the president is politically too weak despite her strong pro-European voice. So, who can oppose this government? Much of it comes from civil society organizations funded by European foundations and grants. This is the context for the introduction of the so-called Foreign Agents’ law (On Transparency of Foreign Influence).

Q: There is a significant distrust toward the country's political parties, both ruling and opposition. Many Georgians feel that no political party truly represents them. The opposition is quite weak and unable to effectively challenge the ruling party, which has consolidated considerable economic and political power. This profound distrust, coupled with political and social divisions, has worked in favor of Georgian Dream, enabling it to retain its grip on power.

Considering the persistent societal polarization and deep mistrust towards political opposition, what can be the solution to navigating out of this crisis and alleviating the present situation?

A: Let’s start with the question of trust. This is not new. Georgian citizens, given their experience with authoritarian governments and the lack of representation in democratic institutions, have always shown distrust of the government. It was a logical position to take in the Soviet period, and a healthy one. But if you are going to establish a stable, democratic state, trust is its very foundation. Mistrust is part of democracy too, but without a basic belief in the honesty of your government, - confidence in your public institutions, in your fellow citizens, and in the efficacy of civic participation, will decline. Civic activity will be replaced by public cynicism, driven by the visible influence of powerful individuals and groups. A poll by IRI last year suggested over 60 per cent of Georgian citizens believed that ‘no party” represented them. This is a serious challenge to any democracy. It shows a serious lack of trust. This is the point at which democracies begin to fail and demagogues promising to save the people will appear.

Georgians are committed to the idea of democracy, but what sort of democracy is it? The democratic system as we know it in Georgia is parliamentary; it is characterized by an electoral system which sends party representatives to parliament every four years. But is this a democracy that is working for Georgians? There have been multiple amendments to the constitution and to the electoral law over the last three decades to try and refine governance. There has been no electoral law, as far as I know, which has remained unchanged from one election to another. This is confusing for the electors. If democracy is to be effective in Georgia, it must go beyond elections and political parties. There must be a serious rethinking of Georgia’s political system to ensure government is accountable, and to sustain popular support for democratic institutions. Georgia needs an open democracy which provides multiple and transparent ways to control the executive, because neither the parliament nor the opposition are representative bodies. There should be institutions which sustain popular trust and popular participation between elections. Going to elections every four years and voting for a party is not enough. There are many ways of doing this. There are different structures and methods of ensuring accountability and popular power alongside parties and parliaments. Georgia between 1918-1921, during the period of the first republic, was a pioneer in this regard. The Georgian government, inspired by the ideas of Rousseau and Marx, and based on the experience of the Gurian Republic in 1905, argued parliament was at best, representative of a small section of the people. The 1921 constitution called the new state the Georgian Democratic Republic. Noe Jordania and his colleagues insisted that parliament alone was insufficient for a functioning democracy. This led to the foundation of the eroba (self-governing institutions at the local and regional level), elected judges, juries, cooperatives, people’s universities, and referenda, all of which were designed to promote financial, economic, and political powers among ordinary citizens. The goal was citizen participation at the grassroots level. The experiment was ended by the Red Army in February 1921. But there is a precedent that Georgians should look to – look to the first republic, think about what its leaders were trying to do, what their philosophy and practice was. Other countries, such as Brazil, Iceland and France have also tried to bring the public into the political process in novel ways. We need more meaningful discussions over the issue of what Georgian democracy means and how it works (or does not work).

Q: For the first time in the history of independent Georgia, we are witnessing a large-scale pro-EU rally led by young people that has lasted over a month. The mass mobilization of youth in 2023 and 2024 represents a completely new phenomenon in Georgia's politics of resistance.

In your opinion, what is the main motivator for youth’s involvement in politics in current resistance movement in Georgia? What has caused this significant shift in political thinking of the young people protesting today?

A: A new generation brings new experiences and ideas. This generation, which was out in the streets at the beginning of the summer has not been influenced by Russia in any way. They don’t know the language; they are not interested in the northern neighbor’s cultural achievements or its historical relationship with Georgia. Georgia’s older generations, despite their aspirations for a European future, still retain cultural and psychological links to a Soviet understanding of political power. This is particularly evident to me in the Georgian academic world (though it is changing). I think for the first time, Georgia has a European generation. This generation belongs to Europe in a way that previous generations cannot. It is connected through the internet and social media to European trends, music, values, and ideas. And they are hopeful because they have not experienced the political disappointments of Georgia’s previous generations.

Let’s think about popular movements and democratic change. In many cases it is led by students and by youth, who adopt peaceful methods - what we might call civil resistance. The Arab Spring of 2011 was an example. Let’s go further back to the 1980s when Corazon Aquino led the people’s power movement in the Philippines, or Serbia in 2000, when Slobodan Milosevic was overthrown by a peaceful movement headed by the younger generation. Youth is central to these political movements. Many political revolutions of our time have been successful precisely because they have been peaceful. Mahatma Gandhi showed what was possible against the powerful British empire - oppressive regimes can be removed with massive numbers, protests and civil disobedience. The problem, of course, is organization and leadership. One of the weaknesses in Georgia currently is a movement which lacks organizational capacity. The Maidan movement in 2013-2014 was better organized and created power which by-passed the Ukrainian government.

Q: Thank you, Professor Jones, for taking the time to share your insights. Do you have any final thoughts you’d like to add?

A: Yes, this is a historic moment for Georgia. Georgia’s future is at stake. But beware. Georgian politics since independence in 1991, has been replete with political saviors, be it Gamsakhurdia, Shevardnadze or Saakashvili, who promise change, accountability, and democracy for the people. But popular government has never survived under Georgia’s presidents, and governments simply do everything they can to stay in power. Popular resistance is important. People come out on the streets and governments fall. But then the popular voice fades because all power is handed over to parliament, parties and the presidential office. There is a deep malaise in the Georgian political and economic system. You have weak institutions that do not represent the people. Parliament does not represent the people. The deputies sitting there are different from the vast majority of Georgian citizens. The system, whoever leads it, does not provide opportunities for people to control their own destinies and their own lives. That is why some fundamental rethinking about democracy is needed, one that ceases to rely on western electoral models, and looks to new forms of public participation and control over Georgia’s political elites.