The present paper aims to analyze perceptions and prejudices about the North Caucasus observed in the Russian media. A phenomenon of stereotyping on the ground of ethnicity is manifested at three following levels of Russia’s information field: official discourse, alternative discourse, and liberal discourse. Based on the analysis of these three levels, it is safe to assume that the consent existing in relation to the North Caucasus as ‘different’ and somewhat ‘dangerous’ depersonalized unity, is vital to a vertical power structure characterizing the Russian state which has been perpetually nurtured by this consent.

Introduction

Conquest of  the North Caucasus, with its geographical as well as ideological dimensions, has a special place in the Russian empirial memory. However, Russian geopolitics in relation to the Caucasus has been limited to mainly ideological substances. This is a space of the Russian horizon, an imaginary boundary line between the civilized and the barbarian. The classical Russian literature played an immense role in creating a myth about the Caucasus and the Caucasian. Along with the imperial army, writers, poets, and artists relayed their personal impressions and carved the first contours about the ‘Caucasian savage’. They are stunned with the beauty of landscapes on the one hand, and petrified by the character of highlander, their strangeness. The Russian literature put the veil of mysticism around the Caucasus that had lasted for a very long period of time.[1]

The contours to shape political and cultural communication between the two spaces had been drawn at an early stage of Russia’s closing in on the Caucasus. Culturally advanced and civilized Russia conquests the Caucasus, the space that is inferior, passive, far from civilization and therefore, primitive and dangerous.

The ‘highlander’ with a dagger in his hand and the spirit of the worrior had become an image of the Caucasian in the Russian culture. The irrational hatred of the Caucasians toward Russians and the imaginary idea of the Russian as the European and civilized, is one of the main themes of the Russian Romantic narrative. ‘They hate us’, - wrote Pushkin about Circassians. ‘What every Chechen – young or elderly, experiences is stronger than hatred’ – these are the words of Lev Tolstoy.

Historian Cathérine Gary notes that the geographical factor played in important role in shaping Russian’s perception of the Caucasus: the romantic space of the Caucasus is vertical and strikingly different from Russia’s horizontal space.[2] The notion of a ‘highlander’ (Горец), denoting not only a geographic difference but that of related to culture, originates from this factor. The term ‘highlander’ grew to stand for someone who is uncivilized.

The notion of the ‘highlander’ underwent several transformations throughout the 20th century. In February 1944, mass deportation of the Chechen and Ingush to the Central Asia was preceded by their framing as ‘people’s enemies’. During the first Russian-Chechen war, the word ‘bandit’ was actively used by the Russian media in relation to Chechen fighters. With a statement made by Vladimir Putin in 1999, the term ‘bandits’ was replaced with ideologically charged ‘terrorists’.[3]

With the wars in the Caucasus drawing to their end, Russia effectively turned the Caucasus’ Russian future into reality. The period following the end of these wars had been marked with several pivotal historical dates which had further cemented prejudices about the North Caucasians and their irreconcilable and dangerous psychological protrait. Together with the analysis of the Nakh Peoples deportation and tragic events associated with the Russian-Chechen wars, it is interesting to look at the stereotypization phenomenon from the perspective of three ruling groups of the 21-century Russia and analyze the place of the discourse manufactured with regard to the North Caucasus in the Russian information field.

The Context: White Christian Russia and Islam

Officially, racist and xenophobic attitudes are qualified as a crime in the Russian Federation. However, both are a widespread phenomenon in the country. The Russian media and cultural discourses portray racism, xenophobia and anti-Islamic sentiments as a western phenomenon which is out of place in the Russian multi-confessional and multi-ethnic harmonious federation.

However, a veil of tolerance hides tangible and solid evidence of racism and xenophobia, strikingly manifested in the everyday use of the Russian language saturated with derogatory and humiliating expressions concerning appearance, features, traditions and lore of the North Caucasians (SOVA Centre, Xenophobia, Freedom of Conscience and Anti-Extremism in Russia, Moscou, 2009).

The official discourse about Islam and Muslims in Russia is multi-faced. In a speech made at the Youth Forum held in 2017 in Sochi, President Putin extensively talked about the role of Russia in protecting white, Christian peoples:

 ‘Look at what is going on in the world (…) White Christian population of the United States have turned into a minority (…) As we know Russia stretches over a huge territory. This is a Eurasian space. However, from a cultural and linguistic perspective, all this (…) is unquestionably European, people living here carry European culture. The reason I am saying this is that we have the responsibility to preserve all this if we desire so, to maintain a central position in the world. I do not necessarily mean armed conflict. We can find other means as well.’[4] 

In this, rather long speech, one can read many interesting statements in between the lines. However, the cultural and religious context in which the president of the Russian Federation portrays non-Christian population as culturally homogenous, stands out with its importance. Discriminative content of Putin’s discourse which is, at the same time, messianic in its nature, does not only exemplify the official Russian rhetoric but also relays perceptions and fears of Russian society with regard to Islam in general and Muslim Caucasians in particular.

Content wise, the official Russian discourse, labelled as ‘Russialization of Islam’ by Tlostanova, does not differ much from the Tsarist or Communist vision.[5] In the 19th century the word ‘Tatar’ was used in reference to Muslims of any ethnicity and denominations. At the present time, ‘black’ (черный) is a collective name for the North Caucasians.

It should be noted that there are two, formally conflicting views about Muslims and Islam in the modern Russia. However, content wise, these views are almost identical. On the one hand, there is an organized movement whose followers are openly hostile towards socially visible Islam. They argue that Russian, Slavic, European and Christian values in general have nothing in common with followers of Islam and the idea of peaceful cohabitation is not only utopic but altogether dangerous.

Violent acts committed by ultra-nationalist groups tend to hit headlines of the capital-based media outlets.[6] On the other hand, the official discourse of the Kremlin about ‘taming’ Islam and Muslims, is often articulated by Putin himself. In 2017, Russian President, attending the opening ceremony of the largest mosque in Russia and entire Europe, made the following statement:

‘It is important that every Muslim receive education in line with traditional values of Islam so that any attempt to impose ideas alien to the true Islam, is countered and eliminated’.[7]

The idea of subjugating Islam and Muslims is a phenomenon familiar to the Russian politics all too well. However, a vision of Putin’s as a head of the state, who must ‘protect’ up to 20 million Russian Muslims’ native to the North Caucasus, is a modern variant of this phenomenon. Just like objects of the former Russian Empire, modern-day Muslims are ‘in need’ of being ‘instructed’ from above and ‘proper’ orientation. Imagining Muslims as a monolith community is a cornerstone and backbone of the official discourse while In the ‘Russian world’ their hierarchical integration is a logical consequence of this discourse.

Official discourse: the state and younger "brothers"

The modern-day official discourse portrays the North Caucasus as an integral part of the Russian state as exemplified in Vladimir Putin’s speech at the Caucasus People Forum of 2004:[8]

‘The North Caucasus – united if multi-ethnic, is the center of Russia’s spiritual culture. And every attempt to disband this unit, has always come face to face with staunch resistance, including on part of the Caucasians themselves. The fate of the Russian peoples and those of the Caucasus is one and the same.’

The same spirit is felt in a speech pronounced by Vladislav Surkov, a former head of presidential administration, during the meeting with youth of Grozny: [9]

‘The Caucasus - is a fundamental part of the Russian statehood. The Caucasus is a cornerstone and a pillar of all Russia [...] Today, there are people who raise questions as to whether or not Russia needs the Caucasus. The government of the state has an unwavering stance on this question – the North Caucasus is an inseparable part of Russia”.

The above quotes resonate with the dominant historical vision about the resistance of the Caucasian peoples and its remaining legacy. Out of troubled past, full of controversies, that Russia and the North Caucasus share, only the words of Shamil, disarmed and rendered defenseless imam, has been preserved by the modernity: ‘Be loyal to the Russian state; live peacefully with its peoples’.[10]

Those, who ask the question – whether or not Russia needs the Caucasus, in part, belong to two different ideological camps which can roughly be divided into conservatives and liberals. In spite of ideological differences, they share certain concerns with regard to the North Caucasus. These concerns include:

• Disproportional distribution of financial resources from the Center to the periphery: ‘Enough of feeding the Caucasus’ (‘Хватит кормить Кавказ’)
• Growing migration of the North Caucasus youth from the periphery to the Center (‘Понаехали’)

Unlike the two camps mentioned above, whose stance on these issues are inclined towards negative stereotypization of the North Caucasians, the official discourse aims to positively stereotype the people of the North Caucasus. Here is an extract from Putin’s address:

‘Let’s discuss what ‘enough of feeding the Caucasus’ stands for. What does it mean? Can it mean that we should not invest in developing the North Caucasus? […] What else should we do? Should we expel them?[11] Where will they go? They will join criminal gangs. What else can we do after this happen? According to this scenario, young men of large Russian cities and young men from the North Caucasus will be forced to wage war and kill each other. It will be a fratricidal war in its full meaning.’ This speech allows us to make some interesting observations. First and foremost, Putin’s tone is prompted by paternalism: Russia, as an elder brother is responsible for ‘taking care’ of younger and numerous North Caucasian ‘brothers. Otherwise, the latter may get derailed from their track and wage a war likely to turn out as tragic for Russia. In addition to containing irrational threats, the fratricidal war highlighted in his speech by the president of Russia, also encompasses an element of rationality. The memories of long-standing and staunch resistance of the North Caucasians against Russian imperial conquests, and the Chechen Wars of the recent past, have not yet faded away. However, one has to pay close attention to threat in the irreal time as perceived by Putin. He believes that young people of the North Caucasus have just two ways to go: either living in Russia in subordination to Russians or living a life of a thug. Such fatalism feeds on real and imaginary fears of Russian society while ‘North Caucasian brothers’ return to a socially and geographically determined place.

Alternative discourse: myths which consolidate domination

Unlike the official discourse, which is limited to electoral and geopolitical factors, an alternative discourse in Russia is indicative of negative sentiments towards the North Caucasus and its inhabitants.

Late Vladimir Zhirinovsky, a long-standing leader of the liberal-democratic party was someone who had been articulating these sentiments for a long while. Zhirinovsky’s uncompromising statements accused the North Caucasians of hatred towards Russia believing a financial factor to be the only deterrent of the hatred:

‘So far Caucasians do not touch us since they are interested only in our money and capabilities. They have built themselves palaces and resorts – they spend our money to the best possible extent. However, they have planned to organize ‘an orange revolution in the Caucasus. They want to conquer the Caucasus.’[12]

Over the course of several decades, Zhirinovsky, who was a main opposition figure and an opponent of Russia’s ruling party, positioned as a ‘politician-prophet’: he is the one who proclaims the truth to the Russian people about ‘conspiracies’:

‘Their time has not yet come. Currently, they are busy with buying lands from the Caspian to Azov Seas and whenever they are finished with this business, they will appeal to the West for their independence. Muslims are therefore close to Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Iran […] What is Dagestan? The majority of its population originated from Turkic people: Avars, Kumyks, Nogais; and what about Karachay-Cherkessia? – the Karachays are also Turks. The Chechens, Adyighe, Kabardians who are Turks, not the Caucasians […] will soon demand independence and establish the Caucasian Emirates. We will lose the south of Russia.’

In addition to factual superficiality and shallowness, the discourse above draws a solid line between ‘us’ and ‘them’ as perceived in the modern Russia. In spite of demonstrated loyalty of the North Caucasian republics towards the Russian ruling elite, the North Caucasian, as an individual as well as a community, are never self-sufficient for existing as equals to Russian society. In the Russian information field, the North Caucasian never lives in the presence. They are brought to life in horrifying battles of the past, and in the future dominated by fantasies that are yet to come to fruition.  

Side by side with Zhirinovsky, Alexander Prokhanov, a journalist and one of the supporters of the Imperial Russia, was also considered one of the dominant figures of the Russian media over the course of decades. Here is what he said in his 2017 televised interview with a Russian TV channel:

‘Chechens are passive in their nature. However, we have been witnessing an unprecedented transformation of the Chechens and the birth of a new generation of the Chechen. They are better than their predecessors. They have to defeat their own demons - transformations taking places inside of Chechen society. It is only with Russia that they are able to turn themselves into a nation’.[13]

In spite of the abovementioned differences between the official and alternative discourses, looking at their content makes one think that these are two sides of the same coin. Ideological origins of the North Caucasian culture are irreconcilable with the ‘western, civilized and Christian Russia’. The difference lies only in the mechanisms for overcoming these imagined differences.

Liberal Russia and the North Caucasus: isolation in the name of progress

The Russian liberal wing, one of the outstanding actors in Russia’s information landscape deserves particular attention. The liberal discourse in the Russian-language context brings together a myriad of paradoxical views, including ultra-nationalist and xenophobic sentiments.

The narrative of the liberal Russia can be characterized in the following way: ethnic and cultural differences between Russia’s ‘European’ and ‘Asian’ parts are irreconcilable and incompatible. The main objective pursued by liberal and progressive forces is to achieve full integration of Russian society in a construct of ‘European Russia’. In this idealistic scenario, the future of the ‘Asian Russia’, in other words that of religious and ethnic minorities, seems rather bleak.

The Russian liberal discourse concerning the North Caucasus became particularly prominent at the pinnacle of Alexey Navalny’s political career. In addition, Navalny was one of the lead media figures amidst protest rallies during which, standing side by side with ultra-nationalists, participants of the rallies demanded the termination of financial allocations to the North Caucasus republics with a slogan ‘Enough of feeding the Caucasus’!’

One of the fine examples of attitudes of liberal Russia towards the North Caucasians that can be read in between lines, is a talk show in the runup to the 2012 presidential elections, aired through a platform run by a liberal media holding Snob. The talk show featured Ksenija Sobchak as a host, and guests including Alexey Navalny, Maxim Shevchenko, Boris Nemtsov, Anton Krasovsky, Genady Gudkov and others.[14]

Episode 1:

Sobchak:  Which of the regions, do you think, will be most active during the elections?

Nemtsov: Chechnya - 120% (applauses and exclamations in the studio)

 Episode 2:

Navalny: Enough of Feeding the Caucasus’ is a logical slogan. ‘Of course, it is not the key point of our election program, but this is something that should be told […] I believe in this slogan and openly take responsibility for it since it comes to strategic collaboration – there is a party of crooks and thieves on the one side and, the tribal tyrants on the other, who we have vested in unlimited power. We provide to them unbelievably vast financial assistance. They steal this money from us. […] they use this money as savages in exchange of the United Russia party collecting 90% of votes.

 Episode 3:

Shevckenko: I will explain what is going on in the North Caucasus in reality, since there are people here who will never dare to step their feet in the Caucasus.

 Episode 4:

Navalny:  Nobody is going to put up with local authorities – subjects of the Russian Federation -be surrounded by people in police uniforms, who are in fact robbers in the woods. Chechnya is not part of the Russian Federation. There is neither law nor order there.

Sobchak: But what do you suggest – a full separation?

Navalny: It is necessary that Chechnya return to us

Shevchenko: Alexey, tell me, when was the last time you were in Chechnya? You have already been there, haven’t you?

Navalny: I have never been to Chechnya.

The analysis of the talk show can be built around the following points:

• ‘Us’ and ‘them’: these pronounces in the political discourse describe the difference between the acceptable and unacceptable. The line is drawn between actors, and morally ‘good’ and ‘bad’ roles are prescribed. Verbal efforts to develop, subordinate the North Caucasus are evident – We feed the Caucasus – therefore we must stop. Viewed through these lenses, the Caucasians are perceived as banal users of Russia’s political and economic achievements, groups of parasites who have no uniqueness or skills and agency to forge changes independently.
• The focus on Chechnya: in spite of religious and ethnic diversity of the North Caucasus, the discussion centers around Chechnya, as a particularly sensitive part of the memory of imperial, Soviet and post-Soviet Russia.
• Oriental tropes: thieves of the woods, savages etc – spectators are always exposed to immutable protagonists of the North Caucasus. Evidently, an archetype of the highlander created as a result of joint efforts of Russian writers, artists and ethnographers has not gone far: their image is revived by an unchangeable portrait of the Chechen or Dagestani of the 21^st century.
• Dramatization: From the talk show, which was aired in 2012, we find out that Chechnya remains a high-risk zone. Such discourse contributes to constructing prejudices about the entire region, and at the same time, makes the population of the North Caucasus, especially youth, the target for negative sentiments. For quite a large part of young people a label of ‘dangerous folks’ and ‘dangerous place’ is rather attractive and represents one of the sources for indirect internalization of the above mentioned stereotypes.
• Superficial reasoning: An overwhelming majority of Russian liberal elites (except for Boris Nemtsov who was actively involved in Russian-Chechen negotiations) do not trust first-hand information and experience. Navalny admits to never being in Chechnya.

Even though Navalny’s rhetoric in relation to the North Caucasus had eventually become softer, he remained true to his suspicions and mistrust over the course of many years.[15] In his 2017 interview with Yuri Dud, when asked about his plans with regard to resolving the Caucasian question, Navalny, speaking slightly softly but firmly, focused on authorities of the North Caucasian republics and their corrupt nature:[16]

‘I do not differentiate between the Caucasian republics and Caucasian question, on the one hand, and the Russian question on the other. Simply, everything is much worse there. Their salaries are lower, and corruption more pervasive. […] The Caucasus needs what Russia needs, but even more’.

The focus on corrupt leaders is not new. However, the part of Navalny’s statement where he puts an equation mark between the ‘Caucasian question’ and ‘Russian question’. It is clear that the liberal part of Russian society the question of the uniqueness of the North Caucasus is beyond revision. This discourse shares a remarkable unity with the state and alternative discourses – gaze from top to down – attempts to resolve the issue by thoroughly adhering to all the rules of subordination.

A character of Ksenija Sobchak deserves special attention. Sobchak, Putin’s rival on behalf of the liberal wing at the 2018 presidential campaign, is a relative newcomer to Russia’s political scene. From a journalist (mostly involved in Russian replicas of Western reality shows) she emerged as an unexpected leader of the Russian fragmented opposition. Sobchak’s visit to Grozny, Chechnya’s capital city, led to controversies among local population, which, in part, might have been caused by Sobchak’s criticism towards Chechnya’s president Ramzan Kadyrov. However, such an assumption might be superficial and out of context. Discursive practices of the liberal opposition draws an indirect equation between the North Caucasus leaders on the one hand and the North Caucasus culture in general and population on the other. Therefore, heartfelt aversion of local communities towards Sobchak, Navalny and others cannot be described as a politically motivated reaction. Together with the advancement in digital media, Sobchak moved to the internet space. Her interview with the Dagestani sisters who had escaped from harsh traditions and religious restrictions collected more than million views.[17] At the same time, she visited Dagestan in last September and performed Lezginka dance to a song This is Caucasus («Это Кавказ»).

The case of three ideologically dissenting groups described above suggests that the information about the North Caucasus circulating in the Russian media brings together the two extremes concerning the North Caucasus: masked/naked paternalism on the one hand, and ethnic-cultural stereotypization on the other. The two poles create a phenomenon which is brilliantly explored by Noam Chomsky in his seminal work Manufacturing Consent: the Political Economy of the Mass Media.[18] The Russian media, by means of official, alternative and liberal discourses, bring forward stereotypes and prejudices about the collective identity of the federal subjects to manufacture consent about the past, present, and future of the North Caucasian peoples in the Russian Federation.