On October 8, 2025, a package of legislative amendments was initiated by members of the Georgian Dream parliament to be considered under an expedited procedure. The proposed amendments envisage restricting the core rights of individuals affiliated with a political party that has been declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court. Specifically, such persons would be prohibited from establishing new political associations, engaging in or joining political parties in any capacity, exercising passive electoral rights, or holding public office. In addition, the amendments foresee the termination of their mandates in relevant representative bodies. According to Shalva Papuashvili, the purpose of these changes and the related constitutional appeal under preparation is primarily to ensure accountability for former and current members of the United National Movement who, as he claims, have had and continue to have decisive influence over the political decisions and activities of political parties. The basis for this initiative is said to be, among other sources, the conclusions of the temporary parliamentary investigative commission established by Georgian Dream to examine the activities of the political regime and officeholders in power between 2003 and 2012. As is publicly known, the mandate of this commission was later expanded[1] to include the examination of the activities of current and former officials affiliated with political parties from 2003 to the present day. However, from the outset, the commission’s work was problematic in multiple respects, including concerns regarding its establishment, legitimacy, and the lawfulness of its activities[2].

According to Social Justice Center, within the existing political context—where Georgian Dream’s authoritarian, one-party rule is facing a crisis of legitimacy, becoming increasingly repressive, and where democratic institutions have been captured and the space for exercising fundamental rights is shrinking daily—it is evident that the real purpose of these amendments is the total exclusion of political opponents from the political arena and the restriction of political pluralism and freedom of choice for society at large. Furthermore, Georgian Dream fails to provide a substantiated justification for the application of such a prohibition mechanism as an extreme measure that should only be employed in the face of immediate and genuine threats. Instead, the ruling party frames the process as a necessary step toward the “cleansing” or “rehabilitation” of the political field—a rationale that cannot constitute a legitimate objective for the activation of party-banning mechanisms. Given that the judiciary has also been fully captured, it is unrealistic to expect that these concerns will be addressed in any corresponding court decisions.

It should also be noted that the prohibition of political activities of parties and individuals associated with them represents a continuation of Georgian Dream’s authoritarian legislative trajectory. Over the past two years—since the introduction of the so-called “first Russian law”—this process has assumed increasingly repressive features, severely restricting fundamental rights and weakening or even abolishing several democratic institutions. The repressive legislative agenda of Georgian Dream has already targeted many civil society organizations, independent media outlets, opposition party leaders, activists, and socially engaged professionals from various fields. However, the formal, legislative-level, indefinite ban on expressing and exercising differing political opinions—whether individually or through organizational forms—marks an especially grave regression in the protection of democratic values and fundamental human rights. This development underscores the urgent need for immediate response and intervention both domestically and internationally.

According to the proposed package of legislative amendments, changes are to be introduced to the Organic Law on the Constitutional Court of Georgia and the Organic Law on Political Associations of Citizens, as well as to the Election Code of Georgia and the Criminal Code of Georgia. The amendments provide the following:

1. Article 23, paragraph 3 of the Organic Law on the Constitutional Court of Georgia, which currently defines the legal consequences of prohibiting a political party’s activities (namely, the annulment of the party’s registration), is to be supplemented with additional restrictions applying to “relevant persons” affiliated with a prohibited political party. Specifically, such individuals would be prohibited from founding a political party, holding membership in a political party, being a member of a party’s governing body, occupying a party position, exercising passive electoral rights in general elections, acquiring the mandate of an elected member or officeholder of a representative body, or holding a state-political, political, or constitutional leadership position. During the second reading of the bill, an additional clause was introduced granting the court the authority, in cases where a party is banned, to terminate the mandate of any member of the Parliament of Georgia or other representative body elected under the nomination of that party, as well as to remove specific individuals from the party lists submitted for general elections. The right to request such prohibitions is granted to the claimant in the relevant constitutional proceedings[3]. Moreover, the amendment stipulates that in the operative part of a Constitutional Court decision banning a political party, the name, surname, and personal identification number—or any other information necessary for clear identification—of the relevant person must be indicated[4].
2. Amendments of similar substance are also being introduced to the Organic Law on Political Associations of Citizensand to the relevant provisions of the Election Code of Georgia. Additionally, individuals affiliated with a prohibited political party are to be banned from making donations in favor of other political parties[5].
3. Article 381 of the Criminal Code of Georgia, which establishes criminal liability for non-compliance with or obstruction of the execution of a court judgment or decision, is to be amended with a new clause stipulating that a political party shall be fined if it fails to comply with, or obstructs the execution of, a Constitutional Court decision that prohibits an individual from engaging in political activities or holding public office.

The explanatory note accompanying the draft law refers to the concept of a “militant democracy,” according to which the legal framework of a democratic state may provide mechanisms to prevent the abuse of democratic processes for anti-democratic purposes or to avert threats to the democratic order itself. The explanatory note also cites relevant decisions of the Constitutional Court of Georgia and the European Court of Human Rights. In this context, representatives of Georgian Dream claim that the initiated amendments merely regulate “procedural aspects of restricting passive electoral rights,” the constitutional basis for which, they argue, lies in Article 23 of the Georgian Constitution, allowing for the prohibition of certain political or public associations. According to Georgian Dream representatives, the absence of a “legislative framework ensuring the accountability of politicians engaged in unconstitutional activities” constituted a “legal gap” that this initiative seeks to address. They further argue that “if parties and political actors engaged in destructive activities, sabotage against the country, or unconstitutional behavior disappear from the political scene, the political field will be liberated and, hopefully, filled with healthy young people who currently avoid politics because radical parties receive substantial funding from abroad.” As stated by Irakli Kobakhidze, the constitutional claim of Georgian Dream rests on two key principles: first, that the demand for prohibition should apply to all parties predominantly composed of individuals who represented the United National Movement during its rule (for example, the United National Movement itself and the party Akhali); and second, that it should extend to parties whose members have, together with the United National Movement, been actively engaged in “sabotage against the country” in recent years. According to Kobakhidze, in total, this initiative could affect up to ten political parties, both major and minor, although he did not specify their exact names or the number of individuals involved[6].

The following section outlines the principal arguments demonstrating that the initiated draft laws contradict the Georgian Constitution and international human rights standards.

1. The Political Instrumentalization of the “Defensive Democracy” Concept by Georgian Dream.

Generally, the prohibition of political parties whose declared objectives or actions are directed against democratic governance indeed forms part of the concept of Militant Democracy[7]. This concept entails a certain paradox: in order to protect democracy, democratic mechanisms themselves may, in some instances, be restricted. However, the banning of a political party requires particular caution and must, in each case, be subject to a scrupulous factual and legal examination. This is because the right to form a political party, to join one, and to act under its name constitutes one of the most essential instruments of citizens’ political association and self-organization, as well as a key foundation of democracy that enables citizens to influence state governance. Therefore, in those countries and legal systems where such mechanisms exist, they are typically enshrined in the highest legal act — the constitution — and are subject to assessment by an independent judicial body exercising constitutional review. In the process of such assessment, all relevant factors must be taken into account: the seriousness and immediacy of the threats arising from the party’s activities, the foreseeability of the legal consequences of the prohibition, and, most importantly, the necessity and proportionality of the interference with fundamental human rights.

In its comparative study on the prohibition of political parties, the Venice Commission notes that there is no unified European model in this regard but rather “significant diversity,” reflecting the differing constitutional traditions, historical experiences, and socio-political contexts of individual states[8]. Some countries do not include any mechanism for banning political parties in their national legislation, while others regulate the matter differently, both substantively and procedurally.

Nevertheless, the Commission emphasizes that a common European approach does exist — one rooted in Europe’s shared democratic heritage — namely, that political parties should neither be prohibited nor dissolved. Even in those countries where such mechanisms formally exist, they are applied with extreme restraint. The actual use (or even initiation) of such measures requires the satisfaction of a very high evidentiary and procedural threshold, with only rare exceptions[9]. Consequently, the legislation and practice of member states reflect a general European approach to addressing forces that threaten democracy — namely, through open debate and democratic channels rather than through prohibition or dissolution. Censorship of political opinions does not occur through banning parties; instead, individual responsibility is imposed on members who engage in unlawful conduct, in accordance with ordinary criminal law[10]. In states where party-banning mechanisms and practices do exist, their presence is typically explained by specific historical factors. Even then, the mere existence of such rules serves primarily a preventive rather than a practical function, and they are invoked only in exceptional circumstances[11].

Germany, which has had rare but well-documented cases of political party bans, provides a paradigmatic example. The conditions for prohibiting a party are set forth in the country’s Basic Law (Constitution), and the authority to issue such a decision lies exclusively with the Federal Constitutional Court[12]. In the Court’s decision-making process, the primary factors assessed are the anti-constitutional objectives and activities of the political party, as well as the immediacy and reality of the threats posed by such actions. A party ban therefore requires meeting a high evidentiary standard — namely, proof of a declared and consistent objective to fight against the democratic order, manifested through continuous, unambiguous political actions carried out in accordance with a concrete plan[13].

Over the past 70 years, the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany has banned only two political parties — the Socialist Reich Party (1952) and the Communist Party of Germany (1956). Subsequent proceedings initiated against the National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD) in 2003 and 2017 were dismissed, as the factual circumstances failed to meet the aforementioned legal criteria. In particular, the Court determined that the party’s rhetoric did not pose a substantial or imminent threat to democracy, taking into account its minimal level of public support[14]. It is also noteworthy that the legal consequences accompanying a party ban in Germany do not include restrictions on the individual rights of the party’s members — such as the right to political association, passive suffrage, or public office. The consequences are directed exclusively at the organizational form itself. These may include, for example, the prohibition of a “substitute party,” the transfer of the banned party’s assets to charitable purposes, or the criminal liability of specific individuals for illegal acts committed in connection with the party’s activities[15].

The legislative frameworks and practices of Spain and Greece — both democratic states and members of the European Union and the Council of Europe — also recognize the possibility of political party prohibition. However, in these systems, individual accountability of party members primarily takes the form of administrative or criminal measures and does not involve the restriction of their fundamental rights as such[16].

A contrasting legal framework can be observed in Turkey, which does not qualify as a consolidated democracy. Indeed, Turkey is among the leading states within the Council of Europe in terms of the number of applications filed before the European Court of Human Rights concerning party bans. Under the Turkish Constitution, the Constitutional Court has the authority to prohibit political parties. Unlike Germany, however, the Turkish Constitution itself stipulates that the founders and members of a banned party — those whose actions or statements contributed to the prohibition — may not found, join, or lead another political party for a period of five years following the publication of the court’s decision. The Constitutional Court decides on such matters individually, based on motions submitted by the Prosecutor General[17].

According to the Venice Commission, the Turkish model of party prohibition is both distinct and problematic, as it combines overly broad substantive criteria with very low procedural safeguards. Moreover, it allows bans to be based not only on actions but even on ideological positions or statements[18]. This approach is inconsistent with Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights — which guarantees freedom of assembly and association — as well as with the standards developed by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the Venice Commission itself[19].

Turkey’s frequent use of party-banning mechanisms effectively transforms this instrument from an exceptional constitutional safeguard into an operational component of its constitutional system. This practice unjustifiably restricts the space for democratic politics and amplifies the influence of constitutional adjudication over the political sphere and public debate[20].

2. The Unconstitutional Expansion of the Constitutional Court’s Powers and Its Political Instrumentalization

It must first be emphasized that the Constitutional Court of Georgia exercises only those powers expressly granted to it by the Constitution and therefore operates strictly within the limits of constitutional competence as defined by Article 60 of the supreme law. According to this article, one of the Court’s competences is to consider, upon the application of the President of Georgia, at least one-fifth of the Members of Parliament, or the Government, the issue of the constitutionality of a political party’s activities, as well as the termination of the mandate of a member of a representative body elected under the nomination of that political party[21]. This competence, in turn, is substantively defined by Article 23, paragraph 3 of the Constitution, which prohibits the creation or operation of a political party “whose aim is the overthrow or violent change of the constitutional order of Georgia, the infringement of the country’s independence, the violation of its territorial integrity, or which propagates war or violence, or incites national, ethnic, regional, religious, or social strife. The creation of a political party on a territorial basis is inadmissible.” It is evident that the Constitution allows for the use of this exceptionally sensitive and potentially dangerous instrument of militant democracy only in strictly defined cases, and exclusively with respect to already existing and operating political parties whose declared objectives and activities provide an objective basis to conclude that they act against the constitutional order and pose a genuine threat to the democratic system. However, the Constitution makes no mention of imposing individual liability or restrictions on the members of such parties. Consequently, the Constitutional Court has no constitutional authority to decide on any limitations of individual rights beyond the prohibition of the party itself. Any attempt to grant the Court additional powers through ordinary legislation — powers not prescribed by the Constitution — would therefore be incompatible with constitutional principles and amount to an unconstitutional expansion of the Court’s competence.

3. Broad, Vague, and Arbitrary Legislative Regulations

From the perspective of rights restrictions, serious concerns arise regarding the notion of a “person associated with a prohibited political party,” which was later modified to the term “relevant associated person” in the second reading of the bill. This term remains extremely vague — especially given that, under the existing legal framework, only state institutions are authorized to apply to the Constitutional Court with a request to ban a political party.

The concept of a “relevant associated person” is so broadly defined that it fails to distinguish between individuals who may have a genuinely significant influence on the party’s activities and decisions, and those who are merely nominal or passive affiliates — such as individuals without internal party roles, or even mere supporters or donors.

As previously discussed, even in those countries where legal mechanisms exist to impose individual responsibility following the prohibition of a political party, such liability is always individualized, and proportionate to, as well as necessary in light of, the specific actions undertaken by each person.

4. The Intensity and De FactoPermanent Nature of Rights Restrictions

Particular attention must be drawn to the fact that the proposed restrictions would effectively impose permanent deprivation of essential civil and political rights on persons connected with a banned political party. These include the rights to political association, passive electoral participation, and eligibility for public office — all of which are fundamental democratic entitlements. By imposing such indefinite restrictions without meeting the constitutional criteria of individualization, proportionality, or necessity, these individuals would be permanently excluded from participating in the political and public life of the country, irrespective of whether they might in the future alter their views or political positions.

In its 2015 judgment concerning the Law on the Charter of Freedom, which imposed indefinite bans on individuals who had held certain positions within the Communist Party from occupying specific public offices, the Constitutional Court of Georgia observed that: “The legislator fails to consider the capacity of a human being, as a free individual, to change their views and, after the passage of time or upon the fulfillment of certain conditions, to hold public office. Under the disputed norms, individuals are deprived of the right to hold public positions permanently and unconditionally.”[22]

Thus, the de facto indefinite deprivation of political rights for a wide and indeterminate circle of persons represents one of the gravest and most unprecedented forms of rights violations in Georgia’s constitutional order. Such measures are incompatible with both the principles of human dignity and the core tenets of a democratic state governed by the rule of law.

5. Review of Legal Standards and Their Complete Disregard in the Present Case

The general European legal standards concerning the protection of political parties’ rights are primarily developed through the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) under Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights (freedom of assembly and association). It is noteworthy that the majority of these cases have been adjudicated against Turkey. However, it should also be emphasized that the Convention establishes only minimum legal guarantees for the protection of political parties, while the vast majority of European democracies provide significantly higher levels of protection within their national legal systems.

Given that political parties constitute an essential element for the proper functioning of democracy — and that democratic governance itself is recognized under the Convention as the only legitimate form of government — the Court requires particularly compelling justification for the dissolution of political parties and allows member states only narrow margins of appreciation in this area[23]. At the same time, political parties may not invoke the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention in order to undermine those very values or to damage democratic governance.

With respect to the substantive standards for assessing party prohibitions, the Court considers it essential that the following elements be convincingly demonstrated: a) whether there exists sufficient and imminent evidence of a real threat to democracy; b) whether the concrete actions and statements of party leaders and members genuinely reflect the position of the party as a whole; and c) whether such actions and statements clearly reveal a model of state and social order advocated by the party that is fundamentally incompatible with the concept of a democratic society. Furthermore, the Court requires that any party dissolution be evaluated for proportionality — that is, whether such a drastic measure is truly necessary and proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued by the state[24]. As the Court has underscored, “although democracies have the right to protect themselves from extremist parties, measures as severe as the dissolution of a political party and the restriction of its leaders’ political rights may be justified only in the most serious cases.”[25]

Conclusion

It is therefore evident that the adoption of this legislative package may become a powerful political weapon for discrediting and eliminating opponents from the political arena — a development that endangers not merely individual parties, but the overall stability of the political system and the foundations of pluralist democracy.

In the current Georgian political context — where the rule of the “Georgian Dream” party has taken on increasingly consolidated authoritarian features, democratic institutions have been captured, the justice system is degrading and acquiring an overtly political character, opposition parties and their members face constant pressure, and the media and civil society are confronted with numerous legal, financial, and substantive restrictions — the proposed legislative changes clearly reflect a political objective: the complete expulsion of political opponents from the public sphere. Such a process not only erodes political pluralism and citizens’ capacity for participation but also entrenches a political environment in which judicial and legal mechanisms are instrumentalized for partisan ends.

According to the ECtHR’s jurisprudence, the restriction of passive electoral rights (the right to stand for election) is permissible only in exceptional circumstances — where the threat to democratic governance is real, grave, and temporary in nature. The proposed legislation, however, introduces general and permanent restrictions, amounting to the de facto deprivation of political rights for an indefinite period — one of the most severe forms of rights violation imaginable.

Finally, under the conditions of a single-party parliament, it has become a recurring practice for “Georgian Dream” to adopt legislative amendments — particularly those of an anti-democratic or rights-restrictive nature — through accelerated procedures. Such an approach directly contradicts the fundamental principles of democracy and lawmaking, which presuppose public participation, broad deliberation, and a transparent, inclusive process. The draft law in question was likewise considered under an expedited procedure and was adopted in all three readings within just two days.

As for the announced constitutional claim by representatives of “Georgian Dream,” under existing legislation, the adjudication of such a dispute falls within the competence of a panel (collegium) of the Constitutional Court[26]. However, if the panel or any of its members determines that their position in the pending case diverges from the Court’s prior case law, or that the case raises a rare or particularly significant constitutional issue concerning the interpretation or application of the Constitution, they are authorized — at any stage of the proceedings — to submit a reasoned motion for the case to be referred to the Plenum of the Constitutional Court. The same right is vested in the President of the Court when distributing cases. The Plenum must decide on whether to accept the case for consideration within seven days.

Based on recent practice — including the referral of several major cases involving restrictive legislation (such as the so-called “first Russian law”) from panel to Plenum review — it is expected that the forthcoming constitutional case concerning the prohibition of political parties, which would be an unprecedented first for the Constitutional Court, will follow a similar procedural path[27]. The Court is required to examine such a case within nine months[28], although no specific legal deadline is set for the adoption of a final judgment.

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