Introduction

This report presents research assessing the level and intensity of the political instrumentalization of social programs and government expenditures in Georgia. The objective is to determine statistically whether there has been manipulation of social spending during the electoral process to favor incumbents, thus creating unequal ground for political and electoral competition. The empirical evidence from Latin America[1], Africa,[2] and other developing countries[3] indicates that incumbents often politicize social assistance programs to induce voter mobilization. Previous research also suggests that the case of Georgia is no exception[4] with some documentation of electorally motivated social spending in the country.[5]

Politicians utilize various strategies in the design and implementation of social assistance policies to influence voter behavior and secure electoral support. The theory and evidence on this topic provide a diverse menu of the strategies that are used by political actors, especially incumbents, to tilt the balance in their favor. Among these tactics, the most used are the following:

• Targeted distribution of resources: Incumbents can selectively target welfare benefits to specific demographic groups or regions that are key to their electoral success, thereby incentivizing support from these groups.
• Timing of benefits: Social assistance programs or payments can be timed to coincide with elections to create a positive perception of the ruling party or candidate, thereby fostering goodwill among voters.
• Political patronage: Political parties can use social welfare programs to reward loyal supporters, effectively creating a system of patronage in which political loyalty is rewarded with an increase in government benefits.
• Propaganda, communication, and messaging: Political actors can use social assistance programs to convey a message that they are personally responsible for the existence and continued subsistence of those programs, thereby increasing their appeal in the electoral process.
• Electoral Bribery: In extreme cases, officials may trade social services directly for votes, engaging in illegal and/or unethical practices to secure an election victory.

The use of social support programs in electoral manipulation tactics poses significant threats to democratic governance and the rule of law. Such practices can erode the integrity of electoral processes, perpetuate corruption, and impose unsustainable fiscal burdens on governments. Addressing these challenges requires reforms that ensure the fair and transparent administration of social assistance programs, devoid of political interference.

The research that is carried out in this study seeks to show whether or not political manipulation of elections exists in Georgia. However, the scope of the study is constrained by the availability of data and the limitations of resources, which prevent carrying out more extensive causal data analysis, such as quasi-experimental methods. As a result, the study focuses on analyzing the targeting of public resources and the timing of social assistance benefits using publicly accessible administrative data. The statistical analysis employs correlational and regression analysis.

To comprehensively explore the phenomenon of the manipulation of social programs for political purposes, the initial phase of the research delves into the existing literature dedicated to the nexus between conditional cash transfers, targeted social assistance, and election outcomes. The review shows the variety of strategies adopted worldwide in the political manipulation of social and other government programs. This includes an analysis of the political economy of clientelism, a practice where incumbents in emerging democracies or authoritarian regimes cultivate political support and legitimacy through the strategic allocation of public funds or privileges. By analyzing diverse theoretical models of clientelism and manipulations within social assistance programs, the report aims to establish a theoretical framework for understanding electorally motivated social spending.

In the second part of this report, we present the results of our research using secondary administrative data to investigate potential correlations between conditional and other forms of social spending and electoral outcomes at the municipal level. The data is analyzed using different regression models, with electoral outcome as the dependent variables, social spending independent one, with a controlling number of social, economic, and geographic variables. This empirical analysis seeks to uncover any empirical links between these variables, thereby enriching our understanding of the practical implications of social assistance on electoral dynamics.

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