On April 7, the “Georgian Dream” party (hereinafter – “the GD”) announced another set of repressive amendments to the Law of Georgia “On Grants”, targeting civil society and media organisations.[1] Just 9 days later, on April 16, the Parliament of Georgia adopted the proposed legislative package through an expedited procedure, and the GD effectively banned receiving the foreign grants without prior approval from the government.

According to the amendments to the Law of Georgia On Grants, donor organisations must obtain prior approval from the GD government or its designated official/agency in order to issue grants. They are required to submit the grant agreement to the GD government for review. The Anti-corruption Bureau is responsible for conducting administrative proceedings related to the implementation of the powers granted by this law, with a timeframe not exceeding three months. The Head of the Anti-Corruption Bureau may, if necessary, extend this period for an additional three months. The new regulation does not apply to grants issued by international sports associations, federations, and committees, or to individual scholarships granted for pursuing secondary or higher education and scientific research abroad. Under the legislative amendments, the Anti-Corruption Bureau will oversee the monitoring of both the issuance and receipt of prohibited grants. Receiving a grant that is identified as prohibited will result in the recipient being fined an amount equal to twice the value of the grant in question.

Articles 5¹, 6¹, 6², 6³, and 6⁴ introduce a range of new regulations under the amended Law of Georgia On Grants.[2] These include the following provisions:

• Issuing a grant requires prior approval from the government or an authorized official/agency designated by the government;
• The response period for such approval is set at three months. The Head of the Anti-Corruption Bureau has the authority to extend this period by up to an additional three months, if necessary;
• Appealing the government’s decision does not suspend its enforcement;
• Receiving a grant without prior approval is strictly prohibited;
• In order to obtain approval, the grantor must submit a draft grant agreement [containing all relevant details, including timelines and purpose] between the grantor and the grantee to the government [or its designated official/agency];
• Monitoring of unauthorized grant issuance and receipt has been entrusted to the Anti-Corruption Bureau, whose Head is appointed by the Prime Minister;
• Simultaneously with the preparation of an administrative offense report, the Anti-Corruption Bureau is empowered to impose a freeze (seizure) on the property of an offender [including bank accounts] – “proportional to the sanction stipulated for the relevant offense”;
• “The asset seizure is immediately enforced” and must be submitted to the court along with the report; The District (City) Court is given 15 days to make a decision on the matter; The same 15-day timeframe applies to the Appellate Court, whose ruling is final and not subject to further appeal. During pre-election periods, all timelines are significantly shortened;
• In both court instances, a maximum of 48-48 hours is allowed to review the matter of asset seizure;
• Filing an appeal does not suspend the enforcement of the asset seizure.

Additionally, the Anti-Corruption Bureau has the authority to: request financial reports in cases where there is “a reasonable suspicion” of a violation of the law; question individuals – „who may possess information necessary for the Bureau’s monitoring of prohibited grants“ [such questioning is voluntary]. Also interrogate individuals before a magistrate judge in accordance with procedures defined by the Administrative Procedure Code; request “necessary information” from public institutions, individuals, legal entities, or “other subjects” - including personal data of a special category.

Public Political Statements Regarding the Legislative Amendments

Following the initiation of amendments to the Law of Georgia “On Grants”, members of Parliament from the Georgian Dream party made no effort to conceal the political motivations behind the proposed changes. On April 8, MP Levan Machavariani publicly stated that funding should not be provided to what he referred to as “undesirable organizations—collective Giguaris and Lomjarias” [referring to prominent civil society figures’.

He continued: “[Donors] provide funding, and then this money is used to promote “Molotov cocktails”, to carry out fascist campaigns, to incite violent acts. When we ask the donors, they disown responsibility, claiming it is not theirs. This, of course, cannot be allowed and must not be permitted.”

Machavariani explained that “When a donor organization applies to the government regarding the issuance of a grant, and if it convinces the government that the grant serves a useful purpose for the country and its citizens, and then the government will endorse it”. “However, if the government sees signs that the funds are intended for individuals such as [Nino] Lomjaria, [Eka] Gigauri, or [Baia] Pataraia to organize yet another revolutionary scenario, the government will not grant its approval”. He concluded that “these individuals are, of course, undesirable, and such organizations should not be allowed to fund revolutionaries in our country.”

He also emphasized that if a donor nonetheless proceeds with issuing a grant to such organizations, the recipient will be penalized by a fine equal to double the amount of the grant.

Shalva Papuashvili, speaking on April 8 during a visit to Uzbekistan, also defended the need for legislative change, citing well-known accusations that donor funds are used to support political parties and election campaigns.

On April 9, Irakli Kobakhidze asserted that grants and NGOs are being used to “sow hatred in Georgia using Soviet-style methods. This law, therefore, does not oppose grants per se, but rather opposes hatred”.

He added, “The Government of Georgia will examine the purpose of every grant and issue approval accordingly. No one will be given the opportunity to artificially sow hatred or divide society using grants and NGOs. This law is a significant step forward to counter the artificial cultivation of hate within our society”.

Legal Assessment of Amendments to the Law “On Grants”

The newly adopted law presents fundamental issues across several dimensions. The requirement for government approval prior to receiving grants constitutes an interference with the right to freedom of association. Such interference must satisfy the criteria of legitimacy, necessity, and proportionality. However, the law fails to meet any of these standards.

Interference with Freedom of Association

1. Legitimate Aim

The explanatory note accompanying the draft law claims the amendments aim to “protect and further strengthen state sovereignty,” ensure “the realization of the principles of rule of law and social state,” and enable the “uninterrupted implementation of domestic and foreign policy that is clearly articulated and supported by the people (as the source of power)”.[3] While the protection of sovereignty can, in principle, justify interference with freedom of association, this justification must be evident from the provisions of the law itself.

The law relies on an implicit assumption that foreign funding inherently poses a high risk of interference in the country's internal affairs. The requirement for prior governmental approval of grants regardless of the origin, recipient, amount, or specific nature of the grant (with the sole exception of individual grants designated for sports and academic research purposes) cannot be reasonably justified in any other way than by an implicit presumption that foreign funding inherently entails risks of interference. On this point, the Venice Commission has emphasized that the mere fact of foreign funding cannot in itself justify restrictions on civil society organizations, online media, or broadcasters.[4] The European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter – “the ECtHR”), when striking down Hungary's so-called “foreign agent” law, held that “it is unjustified to presume that any financial support from a person or entity registered in another member or third country, and any recipient civil society organization, poses a substantial threat to the political or economic interests of the member state or to its institutional autonomy”.[5]

Therefore, it is clear that the government's consent requirement is grounded purely in executive discretion, with no objective, clear, or generalizable legal criteria. The law does not establish any predefined standard for assessing a grant’s intended purpose. This creates a real risk of arbitrary and politically motivated decisions, which undermines fundamental principles of the rule of law, including legal predictability and transparency. When the legal framework for state interference with the freedom of association is vague and fails to meet the ECtHR's standard that such interference must be based on “relevant and sufficient” reasons,[6] the legislation cannot be considered justified. Much like other recently proposed “Russian-style” laws by the “Georgian Dream”, this law appears manipulative in nature and fails to demonstrate legitimate objectives.

2. Necessity

Even if a legitimate interest were established, interference with the freedom of association must be strictly necessary in a democratic society and rely on proportionate measures. The European Court of Human Rights requires the presence of a “pressing social need” and a “sufficiently imminent threat to democracy.”[7] Similarly, the UN Special Report has stated that evidence must exist to demonstrate that “the adopted measure is necessary to prevent a real, not hypothetical, danger in relation to a legitimate aim”.[8]

In contrast, this law provides no justification for any specific threat or risk that makes prior government consent for grants necessary. The explanatory note fails to explain what circumstances prompted the “Georgian Dream” to adopt such measures, what risk assessment or methodology was used, or what actual harm has been caused to Georgia’s national interests by donors or grantees. As the ECtHR noted in Ecodefence and Others v. Russia (2022), referencing abstract threats is incompatible with the values of the European Convention, public order, and collective security standards.[9]

3. Proportionality

The measures imposed on grant recipients under the law are wholly disproportionate and intrusive. Beyond the requirement for direct government approval, the law assigns broad monitoring powers to the Anti-Corruption Bureau, which in practice could serve as a mechanism for harassment and repression of individuals or legal entities deemed undesirable by the government. The Bureau is empowered to interrogate individuals simply on the basis that they “may possess information necessary for monitoring grants received without approval.” Such vague grounds, especially in the context of the Georgian Dream’s declared policies, raise concerns about sustained pressure and coercion against civil society.

The Anti-Corruption Bureau is vested with the authority to summon individuals for questioning before a magistrate judge, pursuant to Article 21¹¹⁰ of the Administrative Procedure Code. Notably, this provision is specifically intended for the oversight of the financial activities of political parties, electoral subjects, or individuals with declared electoral objectives. In this manner, any grant recipient - whether an individual or an organization is effectively equated with a political party and subjected to comparable regulatory requirements. This equivalence is difficult to justify, given the fundamentally different nature, functions, and scope of these actors. Moreover, the additional enforcement mechanisms envisioned by the Law on Grants impose even stricter measures than those applied to political parties, including asset freezing, expedited judicial proceedings, and disproportionately severe financial penalties.

Seizures, Fines, and Review Proceedings

Under the newly adopted amendments, the Anti-Corruption Bureau is authorized to impose asset freezes on the property of organizations or individuals, including bank accounts, in conjunction with drawing up an administrative offense report. Granting such powers to the Anti-Corruption Bureau is entirely incompatible with fundamental legal principles. Asset freezes constitute a coercive measure under criminal procedure law aimed at securing the potential confiscation of property, and such measures require a court decision.[10] Moreover, Article 123 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which governs searches, seizures, and asset freezes in the premises of media outlets, publishing houses, scientific, educational, religious, civic organizations, and political parties, stipulates that “a court may issue a warrant for search, seizure, and/or asset freeze only where there is clear and convincing justification that the action will not infringe upon the constitutionally protected freedoms of expression, thought, conscience, religion, belief, or association. Such investigative measures must be conducted in the most effective and minimally restrictive manner”.[11] It is noteworthy that the Anti-Corruption Bureau is not granted the power to freeze assets even in the context of monitoring political parties or electoral subjects. Furthermore, the asset-freezing regime introduced in the law does not derive from the Administrative Offences Code of the Georgia. The Administrative Code allows asset freezes only for enforcing an offense report or a court decision. According to the new law, the freeze takes effect immediately and must then be submitted to the court for confirmation, alongside the offense report. This mechanism strongly resembles procedures found in the Criminal Procedure Code—specifically, the authority granted to investigators in emergencies to impose urgent measures. However, such provisions are not contemplated under the Administrative Offenses Code. Additionally, while the Criminal Code sets out strict standards for imposing asset freezes under exigent circumstances, no such safeguards are included in the recent legislative amendments.

Such a regulatory approach poses a serious risk of abuse of power. The extremely expedited timeframes for reviewing asset freezes strongly suggest that the Georgian Dream aims to accelerate the process to such a degree that substantive deliberation and legal argumentation would be virtually impossible. Under conditions of full judicial control by the GD, this could effectively paralyze the operations of affected organizations. Further ambiguity surrounds the rationale behind the even more accelerated timelines for hearings in cases where violations are confirmed during the “pre-election period.” Organizations that receive grants and work across diverse areas and profiles often have no connection whatsoever to electoral objectives. Therefore, this provision appears to serve only one purpose: the swift and effective removal of critical civil society organizations from the public sphere ahead of elections, with the courts merely serving a perfunctory “notary” function.

The provisions on fines also raise two serious concerns. First, as stipulated in the law, the obligation to seek prior approval lies with the grantor, who must submit the required documentation to the government. Nevertheless, it is the grant recipient who is ultimately fined, which contradicts the legal principle of individualized responsibility. Second, the amount of the fines is exceptionally high. Specifically, receiving a grant without prior approval results in a fine equal to twice the value of the grant. This amount may reach tens or even hundreds of thousands of GEL, imposing a financial burden that could make it impossible for an organization to continue its operations.

In addition, during the interview process, the provision of allegedly false information may result in a fine of 2,000 GEL. For comparison, in the context of monitoring political parties or electoral subjects, fines are imposed only for unjustified failure to appear before a magistrate judge, and the fine is limited to 500 GEL.[12]

Freedom of Contract and Protection of Personal Data

Grant acquisition occurs within the framework of private contractual freedom and constitutes a fundamental guarantee for the realization of freedom of association. Financial independence is essential to ensuring the autonomy of organizations and their ability to make decisions free from external interference. The blanket requirement of obtaining prior governmental consent for receiving grants not only constitutes interference with this freedom but also effectively transforms the exercise of such freedom into a conditional right—an approach that cannot be justified in a democratic society, except in narrowly defined cases (e.g., economic activities within the security sector). In this regard, it can be argued that the amendments related to grants are substantially stricter and more alarming than the already adopted so-called "Russian-style laws."

The Council of Europe’s Recommendation on the Legal Status of Non-Governmental Organizations in Europe states that NGOs must be free to engage in any lawful economic, business, or commercial activities in support of their non-profit aims, without any requirement for prior authorization.[13] The document further provides: “NGOs should be free to solicit and receive funding, cash or in-kind, not only from public bodies in their own country but also from institutional or individual donors, other states, or multilateral agencies, subject only to the laws that normally apply to customs, foreign exchange, money laundering, and funding of elections and political parties.”[14] There must be a presumption that NGOs operate lawfully, absent evidence to the contrary.[15]

Similarly, one of the special reports of the United Nations emphasizes that the ability to access human, material, and financial resources from domestic, foreign, and international sources “constitutes an integral part of the right to freedom of association and is essential for any association’s existence and effective functioning.”[16] According to European Union law, restrictions on capital movement must be justified by a clear, tangible, and serious risk to public policy or public security.[17] Based on this principle, the Court of Justice of the European Union annulled Hungary’s so-called “foreign agents law.”[18] Thus, the requirement for prior authorization to receive grants directly contradicts the principles of free movement of capital and freedom of contract.

Additionally, the recent amendments to the Law On Grants gives the Anti-Corruption Bureau the authority to “request necessary information, including special category personal data, other personal data, and information containing secrets (excluding state secrets as defined by Georgian law).” On this matter, the Venice Commission has already issued an opinion, when it reviewed a similar power granted to the Ministry of Justice under Georgia’s previously adopted “foreign agents” law. The Commission noted that this “concept is vague and unclear, as there is no evident link between such information and the objectives of the law.”[19]

Conclusion

It is evident that the proposed legislative changes to the Law of Georgia On Grants cannot be assessed in isolation, they must be understood within the broader legislative trend aimed at restricting civil society freedoms, establishing institutional control, and discrediting independent actors. This trend includes the adoption of the so-called "Russian Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence" in 2024 and the enactment of a FARA-type law in the same year, which establishes criminal liability mechanisms against specific individuals. These legislative developments constitute a well-coordinated and aggressive legal framework with the principal objective of obstructing public oversight and undermining the work of critical civil society institutions. Such measures erode the foundations of democratic governance and pluralism.

These initiatives will have direct and disproportionate impacts on organizations working in the fields of human rights, basic service provision, anti-corruption, public accountability, and resistance to state violence. Under these circumstances, it will become virtually impossible to freely and independently conduct such activities, posing a serious threat not only to the freedom of association and to the work of independent idea-based organizations, but also to broader public interests and the functioning of a democratic public order.

Although authoritarian regimes often frame such laws as tools to promote transparency and protect the public interest, international practice clearly shows that their true purpose is the expansion of state control and the subjugation of civil space.

The most illustrative example of this is Russia, where the 2012 “foreign agents” law, repeatedly expanded over the years, has been used as a tool against NGOs, independent media, civil activists, and academic circles. The law imposes strict registration obligations and enforces public shaming mechanisms by requiring organizations to identify themselves as "foreign agents"—a label that casts them as hostile entities in the eyes of the public. Over time, this practice has not only drastically weakened the capacity of Russia’s civil sector but has effectively eliminated free civic space within the country.

Hungary offers another significant example. The 2017 law requiring special registration and financial disclosure obligations for foreign-funded organizations was ultimately found to violate core principles of the European Union and was deemed discriminatory and restrictive. In Azerbaijan, severe constraints on civic space have been achieved not only through a strict registration regime but also through an extensive system of grant control, making it virtually impossible for organizations to access independent funding. This approach has seriously undermined the sustainability of human rights organizations and has led to the effective capture of civil society by the state.

In this context, Georgia’s adoption of similar legal approaches and their integration into domestic legislation runs contrary to the democratic principles enshrined in the country’s Constitution. Moreover, it poses a real threat that Georgia could align itself with non-free, authoritarian, and isolated states, thereby losing its prospects for European integration. As Vice- President of the European Commission Kaja Kallas noted, Georgia has adopted a law that further restricts civic space: “This law, adopted hastily and without consultation, adds to the recent wave of repressive legislation. These actions undermine Georgia’s EU candidate status and the core democratic principles it rests on.”

Taken together, these developments confirm that the amendments to the Law of Georgia On Grants disregard fundamental legal principles and form part of a complex mechanism for persecuting, harassing, and constraining the activities of critical organizations and individuals. There are no established legal standards or criteria for how the government will assess grant approval or denial, creating a fertile ground for selective application. In other words, the requirement for governmental consent is not a legal mechanism, but a political tool. Its implementation will have grave consequences for freedom of expression and democratic processes in Georgia, effectively cementing the authoritarianism of the Georgian Dream party.

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