Russia continues to advance its annexation policy in Georgia’s occupied regions, most recently demonstrated by the introduction of simplified procedures for granting Russian citizenship.

On May 17, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree significantly easing the process for residents of the occupied regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali (so-called South Ossetia) to obtain Russian passports. Under the new regulations, individuals residing in these territories may now acquire Russian citizenship without fulfilling three previously mandatory requirements. Specifically, under the new regulations, residents of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali:

• Are no longer required to have had lived in Russia for the past five years;
• Can obtain a Russian passport without physically entering Russian territory;
• Are not obligated to demonstrate knowledge of the Russian language, history, or legal system.

It is important to note that until 2009, residents of South Ossetia and Abkhazia were eligible to obtain Russian citizenship through a simplified process. Nevertheless, this benefit was automatically revoked after Russia recognized the independence of both entities, with the premise that they could apply for citizenship through the standard procedure as "foreign nationals.

As of now, residents of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region will be able to submit their applications at the so-called Russian diplomatic missions operating locally.

In the context of non-recognition, a Russian passport offers residents of the Abkhazia and Tskhinvali regions a means to mitigate the effects of isolation and provides an opportunity for international mobility. According to Freedom House's 2024 report, more than 70% of Abkhazia's population holds Russian passports. Russian citizenship and passports provide the local population with a restricted means of mobility, as travel with the so-called Abkhazian and South Ossetian passports is restricted to the Russian Federation and a few countries that recognize their “independence.” The international mobility of Abkhaz and Ossetian residents, however, appears to be quite different in practice. Russian passports issued to Abkhaz and South Ossetians through "embassies" in the occupied territories are not completely valid for international travel. This is due to the fact that these passports are either issued in the Abkhazia/Tskhinvali region or have serial numbers that are uniquely designated for the region. To be eligible for a visa and to be recognized for international travel, a passport must have a serial number assigned by the Russian Federation. ^[1] Thus, a visa is virtually impossible to be obtained with a Russian passport issued in Abkhazia or South Ossetia. These passports are often blocked during international travel by countries that do not recognize the independence of these entities.

Furthermore, the European Union's decision in 2022 to not recognize passports issued by Russia in the occupied territories of Georgia and Ukraine renders these documents ineligible for visa applications or border crossings within the Schengen area. Nonetheless, the EU decree grants individual EU member states the discretion to issue visas on humanitarian grounds in exceptional cases.^[2] The EU adopted this measure as part of extensive sanctions imposed against Russia. According to experts, the decision effectively formalized an already existing practice, as EU member states had not been accepting passports issued in the occupied territories even prior to 2022. ^[3]

According to the 2024 study conducted by the Social Justice Center, a large proportion of the Abkhazian population holds Russian passports that were issued within the confines of Abkhazia, as the process of procuring them in the Russian Federation entails substantial financial costs. As a result, the simplified process for obtaining Russian passports does not effectively achieve the stated humanitarian objective of reducing isolation. Instead, it is evident that this measure is part of Russia’s broader annexationist policy, aligning with other actions implemented in the occupied regions following the outbreak of the war in Ukraine—policies that Russia continues to pursue to this day.

It is also important to note that the process of obtaining Georgian citizenship for individuals residing in the conflict regions is complex and, in most cases, unsuccessful. Furthermore, nearly half of all citizenship applications are rejected based on the mandatory recommendation of the State Security Service of Georgia. In a context where acquiring Georgian citizenship is often seen as a socially frowned-upon decision (from the side of the residents of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region), a small number still attempt to obtain it—primarily due to the access it provides to social benefits and international mobility. Against this backdrop, the high rejection rate by the Georgian state appears unjustified, illegitimate, and incomprehensible.

It also should be noted that the neutral travel document, which was introduced by the Georgian government (the document can be obtained by any person, or their descendant, who resided in Abkhazia or the Tskhinvali region as of December 31, 1992, and do not hold Georgian citizenship) with the intention of facilitating international mobility for individuals residing in the conflict regions, has remained an unappealing mechanism for the majority of Abkhaz and Ossetians. Thus, the document has received limited traction among residents of these regions, as evidenced by the low issuance statistics, due to the clear ties that exist between the document and the Georgian state. Unfortunately, Georgia has yet to develop alternative mechanisms that would be more acceptable to Abkhaz and Ossetians—tools that could facilitate their mobility and de-isolation while also strengthening their physical ties and connections with the rest of Georgia.

Ultimately, it can be asserted that the dependency of the population residing in the conflict regions on Russia has been exacerbated by Tbilisi's strict policy of non-recognition and isolation, which has not only geopolitical and political implications but also social and human dimensions. As a result, they have become even further detached from Georgia’s legal and social spheres.

Unfortunately, Georgia’s relevant state institutions have responded with virtual silence to Russia’s policy of granting simplified citizenship to residents of the occupied territories. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has not issued any statement on the matter—reflecting a trend of recent years and signaling a stark shift in the country’s approach to the policy of de-occupation. In the absence of a clear de-occupation strategy or policy, this silence appears to mark a tangible institutional shift in Georgia’s stance toward Russia.

At the same time, Tbilisi is doing virtually nothing to offer meaningful and dignified social alternatives to people living in the conflict regions—alternatives that could foster greater interest in and connection to Georgia. Despite the ruling party, “Georgian Dream” aggressively promoting and instrumentalizing the rhetoric of peace, it lacks a long-term policy or vision for engaging with the conflict regions, even within a 10–15-year framework. There is also no clear strategy outlining the approaches that could genuinely contribute to the transformation of the conflicts.

The ruling party, “Georgian Dream’s” overt pursuit of a de-Europeanization agenda further alienates people residing in the conflict regions from Tbilisi and Georgia at large, reinforcing the perception of the country as remote and irrelevant. By actively undermining the idea of European integration, the government diminishes the possibility of presenting Sokhumi and Tskhinvali with a credible alternative—one that envisions a democratic, rights-oriented, and prosperous Georgia integrated with the European Union, rather than aligned with Moscow or shaped by the legacy of a weak and undemocratic past.

Under these circumstances, the dependence of people living in the conflict regions on Russia continues to grow and is becoming virtually irreversible. The erosion of trust, the weakening of ties, and the loss of interest in and expectations from Tbilisi’s political, economic, and social offers ultimately lead to complete political alienation. These approaches—whether directly or indirectly—only serve to deepen these regions' reliance on Russia and significantly undermine the prospects for meaningful conflict transformation.

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