Interview with Humbert Faustmann

The Social Justice Center presents an interview with Hubert Faustmann, professor of History and Internal Relations at the University of Nicosia and the head of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Cyprus office. Hubert Faustmann is also an expert on the history of colonial British Cyprus and post-independence Cyprus, with a focus on international relations.

In the interview, Professor Faustmann evaluates the Cypriot experience on its path to European integration and conflict transformation and shares his perspective on how relevant and applicable this experience is in the context of Georgia.

Let’s begin with a brief analysis of the history of the Cyprus conflict. As a historian, how would you assess it? Was this conflict mainly between political elites and leaders, which then encouraged the divisions between the communities, or did it begin from the grassroots level, with tensions between the communities?

In my opinion, it is evident that it was primarily a conflict between political elites, but the situation is not that simple. The dynamics kept changing at different stages of the conflict, particularly under British rule. For example, there were tensions and conflicts between communities following Italy’s defeat of the Ottomans in 1911. However, these were isolated incidents. Generally, relations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots were not marked by significant discord. Another key factor to highlight is that most of the island's inhabitants were illiterate at that time, which continued throughout the first decades of British rule. As a result, we have very limited information about what the general population wanted or what their sentiments were. We only know what the elites wanted.

Both positions—support for Enosis (union with Greece) and opposition to it by the Turkish Cypriots—were clearly articulated by the elites. But we do not know how much of this was shared by ordinary people or what their identity was like. The divide between the communities deepened through the promotion of education. The British took to taking care of education on the island but left the local population with the choice to bring in textbooks and teachers from Greece or Turkey. This played a big role in the adaption of identity but imported the conflictual history between Greeks and Turks to the minds of ordinary people who in ever larger numbers obtained at least a basic education in the later decades of British rule. Thus, the conflict that began among the elites, “trickled down” to the common people of the island.

If we look at instances of violent conflict in the 1950s, we can see that it mainly involved young people... This indicates that the elites were quite successful in indoctrinating society. However, the situation was not that simple, as the elites themselves did not have a unified approach. Political lefts and rights pursued different agendas: while leftists leaned toward peaceful protest, the more radical opted for a confrontational stand that included an armed insurrection. After the beginning of the armed struggle in 1955, the relations between both sides dramatically deteriorated. From 1957 onwards, we see cases of ethnic cleansing, where Turkish Cypriots expelled Greek Cypriots from their homes. Hatred spreads like a disease through communities and neighborhoods. Initially, the conflicts were limited in scope. For example, people from the same village rarely attacked each other. However, over time, the scale of the intercommunal conflict grew. Civil war-like violence between members of both communities in 1963 and 1964 and increased ethnic separation and suppression of Turkish Cypriots in this context culminated in the complete ethnic separation of both communities as a consequence of the invasion and ethnic cleansing of the north from Greek Cypriots in 1974by Turkish troops in response to the Greek coup against the Greek Cypriot government. Some individuals managed to maintain their dignity and humanity during this period. The more people were affected by the violence, the more hatred grew. By 1974, the number of people directly impacted by the conflict and violence had significantly increased—many had lost family members, relatives, and friends, and thousands had lost their homes or suffered other forms of damage.

When we look at the conflicts in Georgia, we can also conclude that they began at the level of political elites, escalated during the dissolution of the Soviet Union when the future of an independent Georgia was uncertain, and then “trickled down” to communities. More than 30 years have passed since these conflicts, and we still cannot say that the relationships between the people have been transformed. These relationships have not yet been restored. For Abkhazians and Ossetians, Georgians are still enemies, while for Georgians, they are separatists and puppets of Russia. In Cyprus, however, the situation is different—there is a peace movement, and cooperation between communities exists. Can we say that Cyprus has reached a stage where the formerly opposing communities no longer view each other as enemies and have achieved a level of transformation that allows them to peacefully coexist?

I believe we need to distinguish two dimensions here. Very soon after the events of 1974, a narrative emerged among Greek Cypriots that referred to Turkish Cypriots as “brothers” and to Turkey as the enemy. It was as if this part of society developed a kind of collective amnesia and forgot about the crimes and violence committed to and by Turkish Cypriots. This official narrative of the Greeks opposed the official Turkish narrative, which denied the possibility of peaceful coexistence between the two communities to justify and maintain their separatist entity. The Greek narrative responded that, yes, reunification and peaceful coexistence are possible because we used to live peacefully side by side and what happened to us was only because of the actions of outside powers and in particular Turkey's intervention. The Greek Cypriots hoped that by reconciling with the Turkish Cypriots and resolving the conflict, they could weaken and eventually eliminate Turkey's influence on the island. Initially, the narrative of the Turks as brothers was popular mainly among left-wing political forces, but later it was adopted by the right as well.

One of the few things that are currently hopeful in the context of the dormant efforts to resolve the Cyprus dispute and what sets it apart from other cases is the consensus between the two communities on not allowing violence. Both societies are deeply traumatized by the waves of violence and bloody conflict that took place over almost 20 years—from 1955 to 1974—which claimed many lives. In this context, it is also important to note that Cypriots, by nature and temperament, are not aggressive or violent people. Even in bars, it is rare to see a fight or a commotion. The same goes for demonstrations—demonstrations in Cyprus are very different from those in Greece or Turkey. This is a very peaceful former colony that endured 20 terrible years of violent and bloody conflict, with no one ever being punished for the crimes committed. Despite the dissenting narratives, both societies reached a consensus that they no longer need conflict or violence. Therefore, they approach interactions with each other with great caution, which I think is a very healthy attitude.

Most Greek Cypriots are extremely polite and cautious toward Turkish Cypriots when they ask for directions or help in the southern part of the island, and the same happens in the northern part. This is a kind of self-censorship. The anger toward Turkish Cypriots has not disappeared within the Greek population, especially given that they cannot officially say that this person, for example, is living in a house that was taken from my family, or that this group wants 50% of the political power, which in the minds of many Greek Cypriots is unfair given that they are a numerical minority of about 20% on the island. What makes reconciliation easier, and also quite strange, is the suppression of certain discourses and grievances, as well as the idealization of the other side in the official Greek Cypriot discourse: they received free healthcare, they are called brothers, and they are rarely mentioned negatively as a group – in contrast to their leaders though. So, we are dealing with a rather unusual process of post-conflict societal reconstruction, where hatred and aggression are directed toward Turkey, which is portrayed as the barbarian and the perpetrator.

So, are you saying that the trauma experienced during those 20 years of violence and bloody conflict has not been processed or rethought?

Yes, it’s a taboo topic for both sides of the conflict. No one talks about it, as if nothing happened. Besides the ethnic rivalry, one should not forget that they were also killing each other. Between 1968 and 1974, many people were killed in the Greek Cypriot part of the island due to conflicts between the right wing and the left wing, particularly at the hands of the right-wing. Everyone knows about this, but no one talks about it—it’s a taboo. No one went to prison for the crimes committed. No one speaks openly about it, and they do not even mention the names of those involved. It is as if the events never happened, without anyone being implicated or blamed for them. This is a kind of suppressed knowledge and discourse. On the surface, there appears to be social harmony, but it is superficial. It’s like a volcano slumbering beneath the earth’s crust.

Do you think this volcano will erupt at some point?

I don't think this will happen because time is passing, and it is not working in the volcano's favor. The violence ended in 1974, and many of those responsible are no longer alive. In other words, the older generation is fading away, and, ironically enough, this makes it easier to talk about the past. I am saying this to you now as a German. When someone's grandfather is no longer alive, it is much easier to talk about the crimes they committed than it would have been during their lifetime. In this case, acknowledging the crime does not lead to criminal prosecution or imprisonment. So, it becomes easier to talk about these facts. It is easier to talk about and acknowledge the crimes when there is no one left to convict or punish. As a result, justice has not yet been served. Work is being done on these issues, and various projects are being implemented. Generally, when it comes to such projects, there is always a demand and expectation that we should follow the South African model and go down the path of a truth and reconciliation commission. However, no concrete steps have been taken in this direction. Interestingly, the demand for a truth commission is currently gaining momentum and there were rumors that President Nikos Christodoulides suggested this in his informal meeting at the last UN General Assembly.

Now, when we talk about conflict transformation, could you recall the key historical milestones that had a decisive impact on shaping the reality we have on the island today?

First, it is the internationalization of events in the 1950s. When the conflict was brought to the United Nations by Greece in 1954 the conflict was transformed from a local conflict between a colonial people and their colonial ruler to an international dispute. Great Britain had to explain to the United Nations why it was trying to maintain its colony in Cyprus. They argued that if Britain left the island, a war between Greece and Turkey would be inevitable, as well as between the Greeks and Turks living on the island. However, the British made great efforts to increase the likelihood of both scenarios: they exploited the natural conflict of interest for their benefit. Muslim Cypriots, of course, had no interest in the island becoming part of Greece and themselves being reduced to a minority status. The British helped escalate the situation on the island—they sent letters to Turkey, created a Turkish Cypriot special police unit to fight the Greek Cypriot underground organization EOKA, and played classic divide-and-rule policies.

However, it was the right-wing Greek Cypriots, backed by the Orthodox Church of Cyprus, who internationalized the conflict starting in 1950. Losing out in local elections to the communist left, they decided that being the leaders in pursuing the course of Enosis (union with Greece) was the best thing they could offer the electorate. Meanwhile, the idea of Enosis was also embraced by the left wing in the 1940s, who saw how quickly it was gaining popularity. At this time, Greece was engulfed in a civil war, and there was a campaign of persecution against communists. The Greek Cypriot left and right organized a plebiscite on the question of enosis to use the outcome as the starting point for an internationalization campaign conducted by Greece in the UN. However, the Greek government at that time had no desire to take this step, as it did not want to confront Great Britain. Greek Cypriots called on the Orthodox Church and started organizing protests in Greece. They also threatened that if Greece refused to raise the issue of Enosis at the UN, they would seek help from the Arabs. Finally, Greece gave in and decided to raise the issue of Cyprus in terms of the people's right to self-determination in 1954. This move confused the newly liberated colonies—if one ruler was to be replaced by another, what was the point of independence? Against this backdrop, Britain had to justify itself. The Americans, who tried to avoid the impending misunderstanding, blocked the first attempt in 1954, but by 1956 the issue of Cypriot self-determination was on the UN agenda until the end of the EOKA struggle.

The Greek Cypriots decided to do something that would draw international attention and force the UN General Assembly to address their issue. To achieve this, they came up with the idea of reigniting armed conflict so that the world would realize that their issue deserved attention and that Britain needed to leave the island. This strategy proved to be disastrous. What did the British do at this time? In 1955, shortly before the General Assembly session, they organized a conference and invited Greece and Turkey to discuss the problems. By doing this, they made Turkey an accepted interested party. Turkey had already declared its claims in 1954. In the running up of the UN General Assembly in 1954 the British sent a letter to Turkey and, in effect, ensured its involvement as a stakeholder with the clear objective to remain on the island indefinitely.

A decisive moment in the dispute occurred in December 1956, when the British decided that the right to self-determination should not be granted to the island's population as a whole, as one society, but separately to the Greeks and Turks. In this way, two referendums would be required, not just one. This meant that Enosis would be taken off the agenda, as the Turkish Cypriots would never support it. Thus, three alternatives remained: the continuation of British colonial rule, partition, or independence. With this step, the possibility of Enosis effectively died in December 1956, when the British granted the Turks the right to self-determination as a distinct community.

This move also implied the recognition of the Turkish community on the island as a distinct second community with equal political rights with the Greek Cypriots, rather than being treated as a minority whose rights needed protection. It should be noted that the Greek Cypriots had never questioned the rights of the Turkish Cypriots as a minority. But from December 1956 on the Turks were not considered a minority anymore. In 1960, they were recognized as a co-founding community of the Republic of Cyprus, with numerous privileges s: As an 18% numerical minority they obtained 30% of public service positions and 40% in the armed forces. The Greek Cypriots held the presidency, and the Turkish Cypriots the vice presidency with far-reaching veto rights. Greeks were allocated 35 seats in parliament, while Turks received 15. However, any decision required a separate majority of Turkish Cypriot votes i.e. the approval of at least 8 Turkish votes. By granting the Turkish population the right to self-determination, the British effectively also set the stage for the island's division since the Turkish side adopted after 1956 the position that the island should be divided should the British ever leave. This is why this event is so significant.

To summarize, when the dust finally settled, the outcome was a compromise where nobody got what they had wanted: the British the continuation of their rule, the Greek Cypriots enosis and the Turkish Cypriots Taskim, the partitioning of the island. So initially the Republic of Cyprus was a state that no one truly wanted, based on a power-sharing agreement detested by the Greek Cypriot majority. The British had achieved their minimum objective: to maintain sovereign military bases on the island. Neither Greece nor Turkey wanted war with each other so both also agreed to this unwanted compromise.

Chronologically speaking, after 1956, from 1963 to 1964, the Turkish Cypriots lost their political rights granted to them in 1960, when the Greek Cypriots attempted to establish majority rule by making suggestions to change the constitution which resulted in a civil war. From 1974 onwards, the island was divided, when a Greek-engineered coup against President Makarios was followed by a Turkish invasion of the island ethnically cleansing the north of the island from its Greek Cypriot inhabitants. This gave the Turkish Cypriot community a strategic victory—the acquisition of territory—allowing them to control the northern part of the island, which they still hold today. In 1983 this entity unilaterally declared independence as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, a de facto state that is so far only recognised by Turkey.

The next significant event was the Annan Plan, which proposed the reunification of the island under a federal arrangement in the running up of the EU membership of the Republic of Cyprus in 2004. However, this proposal was ultimately rejected by the Greek Cypriots. As a result, the island remains divided. A steady influx of Turkish migrants is transforming the demographics in the north gradually turning the north into a de facto and possibly one day also de jure province of Turkey. But also the number of Russians and other immigrants in the northern part of Cyprus is growing rapidly. This significantly complicates the situation, as the northern Cypriot elite is quickly selling property to Russians, much of which originally belonged to the Greek Cypriots. Foreign investors are profiting, and the Russians are successfully laundering money on the island. By turning the northern part of Cyprus into a money-laundering haven, a new interest has emerged, along with a group of defenders of the status quo who naturally oppose any conflict resolution or reunification efforts. As mentioned, local elites benefit greatly from this situation.

Thus, the prospect of reunification has become even more uncertain. Time is working in favor of maintaining the division. Rationally minded Greek Cypriots realize the benefits of living in a wealthy and developed EU member state and fear that reunification could endanger that. Memories of living together are slowly fading after more than 50 years of separation. The situation is different in Georgia: it is a young state. Only 30 years have passed since the conflict began, and there are still memories of cohabitation. In Cyprus, the generation that still holds these memories is now retired or close to retirement age—over 60 years old. Moreover, the northern part of Cyprus is not under the control of international institutions, which benefits various groups profiting from the situation. So, time does not favor reunification.

Returning to the European Union and its involvement in peacebuilding and conflict transformation in Cyprus, based on your analysis, what was the EU's vision for peacebuilding and conflict transformation? Was there a conceptual framework or value system guiding the EU's intervention?

In the context of the Cyprus conflict, the European Union (EU) consistently supported efforts to reach an agreement that would be acceptable to both sides and then worked to align that agreement with the EU framework. Essentially, the EU was open to any peaceful solution that both parties could agree on, as long as it respected basic human rights. But even this knew exceptions. The authorities in northern Cyprus wanted the power to restrict the percentage of non-Turkish-speaking residents to 30% and thus limit people's right to settle in the area, the EU accommodated this in the Annan Plan. The EU accommodated this before 2004 because its top priority was resolving the conflict to prevent Cyprus’s unresolved problems from being "imported" into the EU. The EU's approach was heavily influenced by the timing: the enlargement process was underway, and it was clear that Cyprus would join the EU on May 1, regardless of the conflict's status. However, there were still questions about what kind of Cyprus would enter the EU. Therefore, the EU's main objective was to avoid importing the unresolved conflict into its space, leading to its flexible stance on conflict resolution.

As later became known, EU representatives provided feedback to the negotiating parties about how compatible various conditions were with EU principles and their practical implementation. This meant that significant decisions about the future of life on the island were often influenced by behind-the-scenes processes. That said, the EU refrained from intervening in issues critical to the parties, such as security. For instance, the EU did not express an opinion on whether Turkish military forces should remain on the island after the conflict was resolved. I am confident the EU would have taken a similar stance regarding any other military force, whether American or British, stationed on the island, provided that the deployment did not contradict EU interests.

For the EU, peace in Cyprus meant reunification based on power-sharing principles that would, in turn, be grounded in political equality. The EU's vision of peace was therefore shaped by prior agreements between the parties, such as the principle of political equality, which was recognized as fundamental long before the EU became involved in the process.

For the EU, peace did not simply mean the absence of war—it meant resolving the conflict. In this case, it involved a unique solution where a minority comprising only 18% of the population would be granted 50% of political power. This model was unprecedented in democratic states, including within the EU itself, highlighting its uniqueness.

Despite this understanding of peace, the unresolved conflict did not prevent Cyprus from joining the European Union, is not that so?

Yes, at the Copenhagen summit, Cyprus received a guarantee of membership regardless of whether the conflict was resolved. In other words, they were guaranteed that the island, in its divided state, would join the EU. This was the main turning point in the development of events. The Turkish residents of the island did not like the prospect of finding themselves in a status like that of Palestine. They wanted to be part of the membership process. However, on the other hand, Cyprus's accession to the EU seemingly contributed to the lack of resolution of the problem, as there was no longer any incentive or precondition for resolving the conflict in the Greek part. Tassos Papadopoulos, the then-president, stated in a television interview that there was no need to resolve the conflict at that time because Cyprus, as a member of the EU, would receive a much more favorable solution to the Cyprus dispute given Turkey’s ambitions to join the EU. This assertion resonated convincingly with many Greek Cypriots, and accordingly, support for rejecting the Annan Plan increased.

From the perspective of Cyprus’s experience, what lessons can you tell us for the context of Georgia that we should consider in the path of conflict transformation, the protection of human rights in the context of conflict, and Euro integration?

Of course, the protection of human rights is a challenging task under these conditions. This particularly relates to the right of return, as in Abkhazia this is perceived as a threat—returnees might outnumber Abkhazians and the latter are afraid of finding themselves in the minority. They might not agree to the full return of displaced persons. This is also the case in Cyprus: Turkish and Turkish Cypriot leaders sometimes talk about the return of 30%, sometimes 40%. Now, regarding what can be done: establishing contact between communities means a lot. Contact reduces the risks of demonization and dehumanization of the other side, while the absence of contact increases these risks. In the case of Cyprus, contact has not resulted in serious consequences. Moreover, contact reduces prejudice and creates trust. There have been no serious incidents between the two communities in the last 20 years. Daily life proceeds peacefully. Despite this peaceful coexistence for almost 50 years, joint projects and common initiatives remain very rare. Intermarriages are also uncommon. Turkish Cypriots come to work, shop, and obtain public services in the Greek Cypriot part, and that is about it. Students from both communities study in English language schools like the English School, but most do not interact much with each other and seem to have little interest in doing so. I believe that given the current absence of sincere efforts by the elites, the only way to stop both communities from drifting further apart has to come from the people, from the communities. They need to develop a desire for unification and keep it alive. Against the backdrop of a fading desire for unification, what I would do, for example, is to revive this desire and start with children and students. I would implement activities where children play together and complete tasks together regularly, growing up with each other and building friendships across ethnic lines. The Americans have an interesting initiative with a limited scope, but it works well: they send Greek and Turkish Cypriots to host families in the United States to live together for several weeks, thus promoting friendly relationships among participants in the program. Greeks realize that Turks are not very different from them.

This is precisely what Cyprus lacks—high-quality contact. Committees are trying to do their work, but they have to operate in a hostile environment. For example, the cultural heritage committee works very effectively because the preservation and restoration of cultural heritage are in the interest of both communities. However, this does not lead to systematic interaction and engagement—only a few individuals have regular communication and collaboration. Interestingly, during the negotiations from 2008 to 2017, the idea of cross-voting was discussed, which was ultimately not approved, but I believe its implementation would have been beneficial for building bridges and restoring trust. The idea was as follows: for example, a Turkish Cypriot politician runs for election not only in the northern part but also in the Greek part, where all Greek Cypriot votes cast for the Turkish Cypriot politicians would count as 30% of the votes he received and vice versa. This approach helps to marginalize radical groups and forces politicians to consider the interests of the "other" community during their electoral campaigns and activities since 30% of the votes for officeholders would come from voters of the other community. It is a kind of demand and supply system. If the votes I, as a politician, gather need to come from the second community as well, I will have to show at least some respect for these people. Imagine if the de facto authorities in Abkhazia allowed displaced Georgians to participate in their elections, and their votes would constitute 1/3, while the votes of residents in Abkhazia would make up 2/3 of the total votes. In such a case, the de facto authorities of Abkhazia would have to consider their interests and needs, which could be expressed, for example, by granting them certain rights without giving up control of their community over their elected representatives. This might not include the right of return—why this is so, we mentioned above—but in return, they could have the right to move freely, visit family members and relatives, and so on. This creates a structural interest. This is the experience I wanted to share. The problem of frozen conflict is that the incentives for reconciliation and unification gradually diminish.

The case of Cyprus is indeed astonishing because, despite so many years of communication, exchange, and contact, relationships between the communities have not been restored.

That is indeed the case. They live peacefully next to each other but by far too little with each other. Of course, there are exceptions, but for instance, half of Greek Cypriots never or only once or twice crossed over to the north. However, when northerners meet Southerners, there is no conflict between them. Perhaps only about 10-20% of the population is motivated to have relationships; they have friends among Turkish Cypriots, but these people are not part of the problem—they are part of the solution. However, as we said, most do not have the desire for this. In the south hard-liners opposed to any feasible solution make up about 20-30% of the population. While around 40% are undecided individuals who, if persuaded, could support relationships with Turkish Cypriots. "How do we cultivate the interest in relationships among this 40%?"—this is an important but challenging question. I think the lessons from Cyprus may not fully apply to Georgia. In the case of Georgia, the lack of contact is terrible and kills everything. In such conditions, it is even impossible to think of any positive dynamics. In Georgia's case, this further empowers Russia with stronger leverage of influence over the separatist groups.

Another lesson that Georgia can learn from Cyprus is that the Greek resistance to the recognition of the Turkish Cypriot separatist part for very understandable reasons was so significant that they eventually had no choice but to interact with the outside world via Turkey. This is part of the policy of Greek Cypriots. They brought the situation to the point where they left the Turkish Cypriots no other platform through which they could communicate and position themselves. Therefore, by increasing dependence on external forces, the influence of the external force grows stronger.

This scenario unfolded in northern Cyprus. After yet another failure of the unification agenda due to the Greek refusal, Turkish Cypriots opted for a policy of improved ties and further integration with Turkey, as they were already financially dependent on Turkey. "Why should we bite the hand that feeds us when the Greek Cypriots don’t want us”—this can be roughly summed up in one sentence regarding northern Cyprus's policy towards Turkey. Consequently, Turkey's influence has increased and continues to grow. This has been particularly noticeable since 2017 when yet another hope for unification was buried. At various times, the hopes of those desiring unification were high. However, after the failure of the last attempt in 2017, only those who were extremely optimistic or idealistic have not given up. The general expectation was that if 50 years of effort yielded no results, any new initiative would not succeed now either.

Now, the narrative has changed, and the international mediators from the UN or the EU speak about the importance of citizen engagement, as the elites and the principle that nothing is agreed until everything is agreed have led nowhere. Citizen engagement means that they will be allowed to propose ideas through public assemblies or some other mechanisms. This plan follows the Irish peace plan and resembles Colombia's peace process. Against this backdrop, the role of track II diplomacy and civil society is gaining increasing significance.

What is the European Union's stance and approach towards Turkish Cypriots? What principles underlie their engagement in the northern part of Cyprus? Does it treat Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots equally?

It is important to differentiate between the approach towards individuals and institutions. Holders of the Republic of Cyprus passport, and it should be noted that all Turkish Cypriots who have this passport or are at least entitled to it, are considered full-fledged citizens of the European Union and therefore enjoy all rights—freedom of residence, work, movement, and so on. However, at the community and societal level, the situation is more complicated because the factor of recognition comes into play. Since 2004, the EU has spent only 700 million on economic development, which is not a large amount of money when distributed over 20 years. Part of the decision regarding the allocation of these funds has been made by Greek Cypriots as well. The EU has a support office in the north, where it attempts to improve the local standard of living and prepare the local community for EU citizenship. The implementation of regulations occurs through the Green Line. Turkish Cypriots can export their products through the south, as demanded by the Greeks; however, in this case, the products must meet EU standards and requirements, whether in safety, health, or other areas. This means the EU treats local entrepreneurs as if they were entrepreneurs from an EU country. Additionally, EU representatives cannot hold official meetings with officials of the north in their official capacity. For example, as the president of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus but can meet him as an elected representative of the Turkish Cypriot community. They are obliged to adhere to the international legal reality and therefore official narrative of the non-recognition of the north. This also raises the issue of diplomats and diplomatic relations: the Greek government openly protests the visits of representatives of the diplomatic corps of EU countries to the north. There is also no unified approach from the latter. For example, German diplomats often go to the north, while the French do not. Britain, which is no longer an EU member, occasionally sends diplomats. However, we should not forget Britain's special status on the island. Russians also enjoy privileges. Their community has grown considerably in both parts of the island. They even established mobile consular services in the north. Germans behave similarly. Americans also have an office. Thus, the Russians were not the first to offer consular services to the northerners without the recognition of their republic.

Thank you very much for the interesting discussion and for sharing the nuances of the history of the Cyprus conflict and peace policy.