The latest legislative push by Georgian Dream represents a direct legal assault on freedom of speech and expression in Georgia. If enacted, the proposed changes would institutionalize censorship and impose severe restrictions on free expression—undermining the very foundations of democratic society and stripping away vital protections that safeguard civil liberties.

The ruling party intends to fast-track these amendments to the Law on Freedom of Speech and Expression, bypassing meaningful public debate and scrutiny.

Certainly. Below is a full and professionally translated version of your text in high-quality legal English, preserving the original format and structure:

• Redefinition of Defamation:
  Under the current version of the law, defamation is defined as a statement containing a substantially false fact that causes harm to an individual and damages their reputation. In the proposed version, actual harm to the individual is no longer required for a statement to qualify as defamatory. It is sufficient for the disseminated information or statement to contain a false factual allegation and to be injurious to the person’s name or reputation. Amendments to Article 17 further provide that the claimant is entitled to compensation for pecuniary or non-pecuniary (moral) damages, should the publication of a correction or retraction prove insufficient to remedy the harm. The same amendments also shift the burden of proof in defamation proceedings from the claimant to the defendant.
  
• Substantive Regulation of Insults Extended Beyond Direct Interactions:
  Whereas the existing law permits regulation only of face-to-face insults, the amendment to Article 9, paragraph 1, subparagraph “g” expands the possibility of content-based regulation to include insults expressed in public spaces. This introduces broader state oversight over speech deemed insulting in general, not just in private encounters.
  
• Abolition of Source Protection and Professional Confidentiality Guarantees:
  By repealing Article 7, paragraph 7, the proposal eliminates the current provision under which a respondent’s refusal to disclose a professional secret or source could not, on its own, serve as grounds for an adverse ruling in freedom of expression practices. The removal of this safeguard significantly undermines the ability of journalists and human rights defenders to protect confidential sources and uphold professional secrecy—thereby weakening the broader right to freedom of expression.

• Primacy of the Right to Privacy Over Freedom of Expression:
  The proposed amendments grant precedence to the right to privacy over the right to freedom of expression in a democratic society. Specifically, they repeal Article 12, paragraph 3, which currently states that: “Freedom of expression may not be restricted on the grounds of protecting private life or personal data with respect to events knowledge of which is necessary for a person to exercise public self-governance in a democratic state.” Its removal prioritizes privacy over the public’s right to be informed on matters of public interest.
  
• Repeal of Qualified Privilege in Defamation Cases:
  The draft legislation eliminates Article 15, which provides for qualified privilege in defamation proceedings. That article currently grants a person qualified privilege in cases involving statements containing substantially false facts if:
  a) they took reasonable steps to verify the accuracy of the facts but were unable to avoid the error, and took effective measures to restore the reputation of the defamed individual;
  b) the statement aimed to protect the legitimate interests of the public, and the protected interest outweighed the harm caused;
  c) the statement was made with the claimant’s consent;
  d) the statement constituted a proportionate response to an allegation made by the claimant against the respondent; or
  e) the statement represented a fair and accurate report on an event of legitimate public interest.
  
• Shortening of Judicial Review Deadlines:
  The proposed changes reduce the timeframe for judicial consideration of such cases from one month to ten days, significantly constraining the respondent’s ability to adequately prepare and defend themselves in court.

With this degree of restriction on the guarantees protecting freedom of speech and expression, Georgian Dream is elevating to the level of law a range of repressive and censorious practices already carried out in practice, thereby contributing to the degradation of the legal system. As is known to the public, in recent weeks, a number of citizens and activists have been fined for posts and comments made on social media, while activists have also been sentenced to administrative detention for insulting public servants in public spaces.
Following the proposed legislative amendments, it will become even easier for the regime to punish people for their words and opinions, and citizens will be directly stripped of the fundamental guarantees of freedom of speech and expression.

At the same time, the proposed legislative changes are in contradiction with core principles and standards protected under human rights law. These changes not only call into question the protection of freedom of expression in Georgia but also violate international legal standards that Georgia is obligated to uphold under multiple international commitments.

The Problem of Shifting the Burden of Proof in Defamation Cases

One of the most severe regressions in terms of rights relates to the reversal of the burden of proof in defamation cases. Under the current version of the law, the burden of proof lies with the claimant, and freedom of expression is protected to a high standard. This principle is not accidental — it is a standard upheld by the European Court of Human Rights, which emphasizes the particularly protected status of freedom of expression in public debate. Under the new legal reality, individuals who express critical opinions — whether they are journalists, human rights defenders, researchers, or ordinary citizens — will be required to prove that their statements were truthful. In practice, this means that many will choose to refrain from expressing themselves, since it is not possible to verify every evaluative remark with full factual accuracy — especially when expression is often based on subjective experience, interpretation, and public intuition.

Under human rights law, legal changes that negatively affect freedom of expression cannot be justified if they create what is known as a “chilling effect.” According to the practice law of the European Court of Human Rights, the burden of proof should not create a “chilling effect” on freedom of expression [1], meaning that if a court places the entire burden of proof on the respondent and fails to consider the public interest, this contradicts the right to freedom of speech and expression protected under the European Convention [2]. In addition, human rights law requires public figures to tolerate a higher degree of criticism than private individuals — including in cases involving so-called value judgments, where the expression is based on a subjective assessment, and where there is no obligation to prove the truth of the statement [3].

Amendment to the Regulation of Insults and the Introduction of Censorship

The Law on Freedom of Speech and Expression distinguishes between the concepts of defamation and insult, and in the case of the latter, allows for content-based regulation only in instances of “face-to-face insult.” Unlike defamation, which involves reputational harm through the dissemination of false facts, insult refers to the subjective perception triggered by value judgments. Accordingly, by prohibiting the general regulation of insults, the law prevents arbitrary censorship based on the recipient’s subjective perception of an expression.

In contrast to general regulation of insults, the prevention of face-to-face insult serves a specific legitimate aim: to avoid the risk of violence characteristic of such encounters (just as robbery is punished more severely than theft due to similar risks), without restricting the sharp or even offensive criticism of public servants that is essential to democracy.

The proposed amendments introduce an entirely new ground for restricting freedom of expression by allowing the regulation of insults based on the “subjective perception” inherent in the concept itself, thus effectively legalizing censorship. Specifically, the changes allow for content-based regulation of insults in public spaces. This contradicts the standard established by the European Court of Human Rights as early as 1974, which considers offensive forms of expression to be part of the essence of freedom of expression [4], particularly in the case of public servants—including heads of state—regardless of their symbolic status [5]. When considering the scope of journalists’ freedom of expression, the Court has held that even exaggerated or provocative language is protected [6].

Moreover, under European standards, even in the context of defamation—particularly when it concerns public servants—national courts must determine whether the statement was made with an intent to defame, and must rule out the possibility that the statement was made in good faith based on the information available to the author at the time [7]. According to this standard, when an individual act in line with professional standards and relies on a reliable source (including amateur journalists [8]), they are not obliged to prove the factual accuracy of the statement—especially when engaging in commentary on matters of public interest [9].

In addition to being incompatible with the substantive requirements of freedom of expression, the general regulation of insults also fails to satisfy basic formal criteria of the rule of law, in particular: the principle of legal foreseeability and the requirement that no one should be a judge in their own case. In this context, due to the vagueness of the term “insult” and its inherently subjective nature, individuals exercising their right to freedom of expression are deprived of the ability to foresee in advance what forms of criticism might be deemed insulting and therefore prohibited, and which will be permitted. Meanwhile, the recipient of the expression is granted discretionary authority to determine the outcome of the dispute based solely on their personal, subjective perception.

It is noteworthy that, unlike the regulation of face-to-face insults, the prohibition of insults in public spaces also encompasses social media, which is the primary means of communication in modern society. Given the vital role that social media plays today, the European Court of Human Rights has extended the standards of protection traditionally applied to journalists and NGOs to individuals engaged in political commentary on social networks—so-called “online public watchdogs,” including bloggers [10].

It is significant that, in declaring inadmissible the possibility for a public authority to initiate a defamation claim, the European Court of Human Rights took into account both the chilling effect such actions have on media freedom and the ability of such authorities to respond to allegations publicly, in the court of public opinion. Public servants themselves also have this opportunity, and in addition to a duty of tolerance, they often possess far greater practical means to neutralize any allegations made against them [11].

Accordingly, the adopted amendments distance the law from European standards on freedom of expression to such an extent that it subjects expression to arbitrary, subjective, and unlimited restrictions—that is, to censorship—amounting to the de facto abolition of the right.

The Right to Privacy Elevated Above the Interests of a Democratic Society

In addition, Article 12, paragraph 3 is being repealed. This provision had previously prohibited restricting freedom of expression on the grounds of protecting the inviolability of private life and personal data, where the information in question was necessary for an individual to exercise public self-governance in a democratic state.

By removing Article 12, paragraph 3, the protection of private life and personal data is elevated above the interests of society in a democratic state—an approach that runs counter to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. In 2012, the Court clarified that public interest is decisive in balancing the right to privacy and the right to freedom of expression—that is, how important the information or fact in question is to public debate in a democratic society (Von Hannover v. Germany (No. 2), 2012). In another case against Germany (Axel Springer AG v. Germany, 2012), the Court held that the media has the right to publish information about a person’s private life if the information is of public interest and has been obtained lawfully. While human rights law requires a careful balancing of these two rights—taking into account several factors, with public interest and the core principles of democracy at the forefront—the proposed legislative changes impose a blanket prioritization of privacy from the outset, resolving any potential conflict between these rights in favor of the right to private life.

Liability for Non-Disclosure of Sources or Professional Secrecy

By repealing Article 7, paragraph 7 of the law, the provision is eliminated which previously prohibited a court from issuing a decision against a respondent in a freedom of expression case solely on the grounds that the respondent refused to disclose a source or professional secrecy.

The removal of this provision logically implies that a person may now be held liable without any supporting evidence—based solely on their refusal to reveal the source of information or professional secrecy. The European Court of Human Rights considers the protection of source confidentiality a precondition for the functioning of the press, since the risk of disclosure may have a chilling effect on potential sources and hinder journalistic work [12]. In light of this, the European Court considers it impermissible to compel disclosure of a source’s identity or details of communication with the source (even when the source has publicly revealed their identity), and thus to impose sanctions for exercising this guarantee of press freedom [13], unless there is an overriding public necessity and structural safeguards are in place to prevent arbitrary interference with the right. Clearly, the legislative proposal establishes a legal reality that runs entirely counter to the strict test required for protecting media freedom: it not only completely denies such a guarantee, but also allows for a person to be held liable for defamation solely on the basis of refusing to disclose a source, even in the absence of any additional evidence.

The European Court protects the guarantee of source confidentiality under a strict and exceptional standard—including through interim measures—recognizing the severity of the irreparable consequences resulting from a breach of this privilege. In the case of Sedletska v. Ukraine, the Court prohibited the state from accessing a journalist’s phone data even in the context of a criminal investigation. In this case, the Court explicitly stated that, unlike in other matters, it is not sufficient for the opposing party to claim that source disclosure is necessary to substantiate its legal claim. Instead, there must be an overriding requirement, as otherwise, the interest of safeguarding a free press in a democratic society must prevail. In the Court’s words, the right of journalists not to disclose their sources cannot be regarded as a mere privilege that may be granted or withdrawn depending on the legality of the source; rather, it constitutes an integral part of the right to access information and must be protected accordingly (para. 62). With this ruling, the ECtHR reaffirmed that protection of journalistic sources is not a technical or merely individual right but a fundamental instrument for ensuring press freedom and, more broadly, the functioning of a democratic society.

As previously noted, the European Court of Human Rights interprets broadly the function of both online and offline public watchdogs, encompassing not only media and non-governmental organizations, but also individuals engaged in political criticism at a personal level (e.g. bloggers). The guarantee of source confidentiality, in addition to journalists, is extended to other actors involved in political commentary by the Venice Commission as well (2015 Report of the European Commission for Democracy through Law (“the Venice Commission”) on the Democratic Oversight of Signals Intelligence Agencies, para. 102).

In stark contrast to these standards, the proposed legislative amendments adopt an entirely opposite approach: they deprive the media of one of its core tools—the privilege of protecting sources—and, more than that, create a mechanism for arbitrary punishment of journalists. This not only makes journalistic activity more difficult, but in fact renders it practically impossible, as it introduces an unpredictable and discretionary basis for holding journalists liable. Such a possibility also contradicts the very essence of the right to a fair trial, which requires that any judicial decision be based on evidence and duly reasoned.

The Proposed Amendments Will Have Retroactive Effect for 100 Days

In addition to the above-mentioned substantive issues, Georgian Dream has further exacerbated the harm to rights caused by the substantive degradation of the law by introducing the bill with retroactive force. During the first hearing of the draft law on June 25, it was revealed that the amendments will apply to statements made up to 100 days before the regulation enters into force. Accordingly, a person will have the right to bring a claim against another individual for a statement made 100 days prior to the law’s effective date.

According to Article 31, paragraph 9 of the Constitution of Georgia, no one shall be held liable for an act that did not constitute an offence at the time it was committed. A law that does not mitigate or eliminate liability has no retroactive effect. According to the Constitutional Court’s interpretation, the main goal of this constitutional principle prohibiting retroactivity is to ensure legal certainty, which derives from the principle of legal security and, ultimately, is essential to its realization. At the time of committing a particular act, the law must provide a person with sufficiently clear and unambiguous information as to whether the act constitutes a violation and what the legal consequences will be for performing that act. Furthermore, the person must have a clear understanding of what the expected liability will be in the event of a violation of the law and what burden the state may impose. This is vitally important for enabling the individual to foresee and predict their relationship with the state, and also to prevent any arbitrary interference by the state (Constitutional Court Decision of 2014, No. 1/4/557, 571, 576).

Accordingly, the retroactive application of the draft law constitutes a substantial violation of the constitutional principles of legal certainty and legal security, and once again exposes Georgian Dream’s growing tendency to instrumentalize the law in favor of its own political interests and against freedom of expression.

Conclusion

It is evident that the amendments to the law pursue a single primary objective: to create a chilling effect on critical expression and to suppress dissenting voices. This goal is now being actively advanced not only through legislative efforts but also through the coordinated actions of the executive and judicial branches, raising serious concerns about the emergence of censorship and repressive practices. Ultimately, the legislative amendments discussed above form part of a systemic process through which the government is gradually limiting public oversight, intensifying sanctions, and obstructing the functioning of platforms that are meant to guarantee democracy, transparency, and public accountability.

As a rule, fundamental legislative amendments affecting human rights must not be introduced in an accelerated manner, but rather through broad public debate. In particular, any interference with fundamental rights should be preceded by consultations with authoritative international actors—such as the Venice Commission. However, under conditions of aggressive instrumentalization of legislative power, Georgia’s legal system is being unilaterally and entirely reshaped by a single-party parliament, excluding the voice and interests of the citizenry from the process altogether.

It is clear that these amendments will have a direct impact on citizens, significantly restricting their access to information and truth, as well as their ability to express themselves. In the long term, these developments will destroy the prospects for democratization in Georgia.

Share