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ჯავახეთში კრიტიკული პოლიტიკის სკოლის მონაწილეების შერჩევა დაიწყო/Ջավախքում մեկնարկել է Քննադատական ​​քաղաքականության դպրոցի մասնակիցների ընտրությունը

 

Տե՛ս հայերեն թարգմանությունը ստորև

სოციალური სამართლიანობის ცენტრი აცხადებს მიღებას ჯავახეთის რეგიონში კრიტიკული პოლიტიკის სკოლის მონაწილეების შესარჩევად. 

კრიტიკული პოლიტიკის სკოლა, ჩვენი ხედვით, ნახევრად აკადემიური და პოლიტიკური სივრცეა, რომელიც მიზნად ისახავს სოციალური სამართლიანობის, თანასწორობის და დემოკრატიის საკითხებით დაინტერესებულ ახალგაზრდა აქტივისტებსა და თემის ლიდერებში კრიტიკული ცოდნის გაზიარებას და კოლექტიური მსჯელობისა და საერთო მოქმედების პლატფორმის შექმნას.

კრიტიკული პოლიტიკის სკოლა თეორიული ცოდნის გაზიარების გარდა, წარმოადგენს მისი მონაწილეების ურთიერთგაძლიერების, შეკავშირებისა და საერთო ბრძოლების გადაკვეთების ძიების ხელშემწყობ სივრცეს.

კრიტიკული პოლიტიკის სკოლის მონაწილეები შეიძლება გახდნენ ჯავახეთის რეგიონში (ახალქალაქის, ნინოწმინდისა და ახალციხის მუნიციპალიტეტებში) მოქმედი ან ამ რეგიონით დაინტერესებული სამოქალაქო აქტივისტები, თემის ლიდერები და ახალგაზრდები, რომლებიც უკვე მონაწილეობენ, ან აქვთ ინტერესი და მზადყოფნა მონაწილეობა მიიღონ დემოკრატიული, თანასწორი და სოლიდარობის იდეებზე დაფუძნებული საზოგადოების მშენებლობაში.  

პლატფორმის ფარგლებში წინასწარ მომზადებული სილაბუსის საფუძველზე ჩატარდება 16 თეორიული ლექცია/დისკუსია სოციალური, პოლიტიკური და ჰუმანიტარული მეცნიერებებიდან, რომელსაც სათანადო აკადემიური გამოცდილების მქონე პირები და აქტივისტები წაიკითხავენ.  პლატფორმის მონაწილეების საჭიროებების გათვალისწინებით, ასევე დაიგეგმება სემინარების ციკლი კოლექტიური მობილიზაციის, სოციალური ცვლილებებისთვის ბრძოლის სტრატეგიებსა და ინსტრუმენტებზე (4 სემინარი).

აღსანიშნავია, რომ სოციალური სამართლიანობის ცენტრს უკვე ჰქონდა ამგვარი კრიტიკული პოლიტიკის სკოლების ორგანიზების კარგი გამოცდილება თბილისში, მარნეულში, აჭარასა  და პანკისში.

კრიტიკული პოლიტიკის სკოლის ფარგლებში დაგეგმილი შეხვედრების ფორმატი:

  • თეორიული ლექცია/დისკუსია
  • გასვლითი ვიზიტები რეგიონებში
  • შერჩეული წიგნის/სტატიის კითხვის წრე
  • პრაქტიკული სემინარები

სკოლის ფარგლებში დაგეგმილ შეხვედრებთან დაკავშირებული ორგანიზაციული დეტალები:

  • სკოლის მონაწილეთა მაქსიმალური რაოდენობა: 25
  • ლექციებისა და სემინარების რაოდენობა: 20
  • სალექციო დროის ხანგრძლივობა: 8 საათი (თვეში 2 შეხვედრა)
  • ლექციათა ციკლის ხანგრძლივობა: 6 თვე (ივლისი-დეკემბერი)
  • ლექციების ჩატარების ძირითადი ადგილი: ნინოწმინდა, თბილისი
  • კრიტიკული სკოლის მონაწილეები უნდა დაესწრონ სალექციო საათების სულ მცირე 80%-ს.

სოციალური სამართლიანობის ცენტრი სრულად დაფარავს  მონაწილეების ტრანსპორტირების ხარჯებს.

შეხვედრებზე უზრუნველყოფილი იქნება სომხურ ენაზე თარგმანიც.

შეხვედრების შინაარსი, გრაფიკი, ხანგრძლივობა და ასევე სხვა ორგანიზაციული დეტალები შეთანხმებული იქნება სკოლის მონაწილეებთან, ადგილობრივი კონტექსტისა და მათი ინტერესების გათვალისწინებით.

მონაწილეთა შერჩევის წესი

პლატფორმაში მონაწილეობის შესაძლებლობა ექნებათ უმაღლესი განათლების მქონე (ან დამამთავრებელი კრუსის) 20 წლიდან 35 წლამდე ასაკის ახალგაზრდებს. 

კრიტიკული პოლიტიკის სკოლაში მონაწილეობის სურვილის შემთხვევაში გთხოვთ, მიმდინარე წლის 30 ივნისამდე გამოგვიგზავნოთ თქვენი ავტობიოგრაფია და საკონტაქტო ინფორმაცია.

დოკუმენტაცია გამოგვიგზავნეთ შემდეგ მისამართზე: [email protected] 

გთხოვთ, სათაურის ველში მიუთითოთ: "კრიტიკული პოლიტიკის სკოლა ჯავახეთში"

ჯავახეთში კრიტიკული პოლიტიკის სკოლის განხორციელება შესაძლებელი გახდა პროექტის „საქართველოში თანასწორობის, სოლიდარობის და სოციალური მშვიდობის მხარდაჭერის“ ფარგლებში, რომელსაც საქართველოში შვეიცარიის საელჩოს მხარდაჭერით სოციალური სამართლიანობის ცენტრი ახორციელებს.

 

Սոցիալական արդարության կենտրոնը հայտարարում է Ջավախքի տարածաշրջանում բնակվող երիտասարդների ընդունելիություն «Քննադատական մտածողության դպրոցում»

Քննադատական մտածողության դպրոցը մեր տեսլականով կիսակադեմիական և քաղաքական տարածք է, որի նպատակն է կիսել քննադատական գիտելիքները երիտասարդ ակտիվիստների և համայնքի լիդեռների հետ, ովքեր հետաքրքրված են սոցիալական արդարությամբ, հավասարությամբ և ժողովրդավարությամբ, և ստեղծել կոլեկտիվ դատողությունների և ընդհանուր գործողությունների հարթակ:

Քննադատական մտածողության դպրոցը, բացի տեսական գիտելիքների տարածումից, ներկայացնում  է որպես տարածք փոխադարձ հնարավորությունների ընդլայնման, մասնակիցների միջև ընդհանուր պայքարի միջոցով խնդիրների հաղթահարման և համախմբման համար։

Քննադատական մտածողության դպրոցի մասնակից կարող են դառնալ Ջավախքի տարածաշրջանի (Նինոծմինդա, Ախալքալաքի, Ախալցիխեի) երտասարդները, ովքեր հետաքրքրված են քաղաքական աքտիվիզմով, գործող ակտիվիստներ, համայնքի լիդեռները և շրջանում բնակվող երտասարդները, ովքեր ունեն շահագրգռվածություն և պատրաստակամություն՝ կառուցելու ժողովրդավարական, հավասարազոր և համերաշխության վրա հիմնված հասարակություն։

Հիմնվելով հարթակի ներսում նախապես պատրաստված ուսումնական ծրագրի վրա՝ 16 տեսական դասախոսություններ/քննարկումներ կկազմակերպվեն սոցիալական, քաղաքական և հումանիտար գիտություններից՝ համապատասխան ակադեմիական փորձ ունեցող անհատների և ակտիվիստների կողմից: Հաշվի առնելով հարթակի մասնակիցների կարիքները՝ նախատեսվում է նաև սեմինարների շարք կոլեկտիվ մոբիլիզացիայի, սոցիալական փոփոխությունների դեմ պայքարի ռազմավարությունների և գործիքների վերաբերյալ  (4 սեմինար):

Հարկ է նշել, որ Սոցիալական արդարության կենտրոնն արդեն ունի նմանատիպ քննադատական քաղաքականության դպրոցներ կազմակերպելու լավ փորձ Թբիլիսիում, Մառնեուլիում, Աջարիայում և Պանկիսիում։

Քննադատական քաղաքականության դպրոցի շրջանակներում նախատեսված հանդիպումների ձևաչափը

  • Տեսական դասախոսություն/քննարկում
  • Այցելություններ/հանդիպումներ տարբեր մարզերում
  • Ընթերցանության գիրք / հոդված ընթերցման շրջանակ
  • Գործնական սեմինարներ

Դպրոցի կողմից ծրագրված հանդիպումների կազմակերպչական մանրամասներ

  • Դպրոցի մասնակիցների առավելագույն թիվը՝ 25
  • Դասախոսությունների և սեմինարների քանակը՝ 20
  • Դասախոսության տևողությունը՝ 8 ժամ (ամսական 2 հանդիպում)
  • Դասախոսությունների տևողությունը՝ 6 ամիս (հուլիս-դեկտեմբեր)
  • Դասախոսությունների հիմնական վայրը՝ Նինոծմինդա, Թբիլիսի
  • Քննադատական դպրոցի մասնակիցները պետք է մասնակցեն դասախոսության ժամերի առնվազն 80%-ին:

Սոցիալական արդարության կենտրոնն ամբողջությամբ կհոգա մասնակիցների տրանսպորտային ծախսերը։

Հանդիպումների ժամանակ կապահովվի հայերեն լզվի թարգմանությունը։

Հանդիպումների բովանդակությունը, ժամանակացույցը, տևողությունը և կազմակերպչական այլ մանրամասներ կհամաձայնեցվեն դպրոցի մասնակիցների հետ՝ հաշվի առնելով տեղական համատեքստը և նրանց հետաքրքրությունները:

Մասնակիցների ընտրության ձևաչափը

Դպրոցում մասնակցելու հնարավորություն կնձեռվի բարձրագույն կրթություն ունեցող կամ ավարտական կուրսի 20-ից-35 տարեկան ուսանողներին/երտասարդներին։ 

Եթե ցանկանում եք մասնակցել քննադատական քաղաքականության դպրոցին, խնդրում ենք ուղարկել մեզ ձեր ինքնակենսագրությունը և կոնտակտային տվյալները մինչև հունիսի 30-ը։

Փաստաթղթերն ուղարկել հետևյալ հասցեով; [email protected]

Խնդրում ենք վերնագրի դաշտում նշել «Քննադատական մտածողության դպրոց Ջավախքում»:

Ջավախքում Քննադատական մտածողության դպրոցի իրականացումը հնարավոր է դարձել «Աջակցություն Վրաստանում հավասարության, համերաշխության և սոցիալական խաղաղության» ծրագրի շրջանակներում, որն իրականացվում է Սոցիալական արդարության կենտրոնի կողմից Վրաստանում Շվեյցարիայի դեսպանատան աջակցությամբ ։

OTHER / Report

Evaluation of human rights as part of the equality policy - 2022

The presented document analyzes significant trends in equality policy in 2022. The report examines issues related to the state's policy towards non-dominant ethnic and religious groups, human rights protection in conflict-affected regions, and state policies towards ultra-conservative groups.

In the current year, no significant positive dynamics have appeared in the state policy in any of the above mentioned directions. Although government efforts to develop and approve human rights documents and action plans are visible at the formal policy level, these documents and related processes do not become the basis for a fundamental change. Although non-dominant ethnic and religious groups show a high interest and willingness to self-organize and participate in public life, institutional policy fields are not open to their actual democratic participation either at the local or central level. In general, this year, the problem of the inaccessibility of state agencies was noticeable. Even the level of those agencies that had active cooperation with civil society organizations during last years, such as the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Government Administration, and the Ministry of Reconciliation and Civic Equality, established weak, fragmented, and insufficient communication and dialogue this year.

  • Legal status of non-dominant ethnic groups

The year 2022 has not brought significant changes in the aspects of protection of the rights of non-dominant ethnic groups, civic equality, and integration. Despite the fact that last year the government adopted the 2021-2030 state Strategy for Civic Equality and Integration and the relevant Action Plan, the state did not present any fundamental reforms and initiatives for change related to the start of this process, nor did it have a proper discussion with civil organizations on this topic. Although the pandemic regulations and related restrictions have been lifted, democratic, inclusive, and regular consultation processes with the state agencies, including with the Office of the Minister of State for Reconciliation and Civic Equality, the Human Rights Secretariat of the Government, have not been resumed/initiated.

Among the challenges faced by ethnic and religious minorities, a special emphasis should be placed on the problem of citizenship, which is a basic right and a guarantor of other rights. Promblems regards the citizenship are particularly acute for more than ten thousand ethnic Armenians living in Javakheti, who lost their Georgian citizenship due to labor migration in the backdrop of the 2008 war; Also for ethnic Ossetians, repatriated Muslim Meskheks, and Chechen refugees (about 100 people) who fled Georgia during the 90s conflict. Existing citizenship laws and policies are less sensitive to the challenges faced by these groups and leave stateless people with strong political, cultural and social ties to Georgia without basic political and social rights. The main difficulties of the law and its implementation are related to the presence of dual citizenship (exceptionally) for groups living in this historical context, the requirement of knowledge of the Georgian language for the process of obtaining/regaining citizenship, and the excessive influence of the security services in this process.

One of the positive events of 2022 can be considered the draft law prepared by the Parliament of Georgia "On the right to change the surname inconsistent with historical-cultural traditions," which was placed on the political agenda after the unprecedented self-organization of non-dominant ethnic groups. Unfortunately, until this day, it is not known what is the plan and timelines for the public review and adoption of the draft law.

This year, the work of the Parliamentary research group on the issues of education of the ethnic minorities was an important development. The group recognized the grave challenges for Armenian-speaking and Azerbaijani-speaking communities at the preschool, high school, and higher education levels, the challenges that had been voiced for years by numerous civil society actors. Among them were the catastrophically low number of kindergartens in the areas inhabited by ethnic minorities[1], the problem of an insufficient number of teachers in schools and drastically low qualifications[2], low quality of bilingual textbooks and inappropriate teaching methodology, dramatical high falls behind in the quality of education[3], unfair funding rules at the higher education level. Unfortunately, the fact that for years, the state did not have a strategy, an action plan, and the institutional infrastructure (with effective coordination and consultation mechanisms) necessary for its effective management aimed at supporting the education of ethnic minorities makes it challenging to implement fundamental changes in this field.

In the current year, as in previous years, the issue of access to agricultural land was acute in areas inhabited by ethnic minorities. In 2022, local residents in Kaurma village of Ninotsminda, Tekalo village of Marneuli, Duzagram village of Sagarejo protested and opposed the practice of unfair and unequal distribution of land in their villages. This makes us think that it is crucial for the state to systematically approach the arbitrary cases of land appropriation by influential political and economic actors in previous years and develop a plan for reform and change that will take into account the social interests of the local peasants.

This year, the problem of the lack of translated resources in a languages understandable to ethnic minorities by the service-providing agencies (House of Justice in Marneuli) was again an issue. It is disappointing that local self-government bodies in more than one municipality and service-providing agencies, do not recognize the right of ethnic minorities to receive vital information and services in a language they understand. The current language policy is the structural cause of political and social exclusion of ethnic minorities that is confirmed by the results of numerous quantitative studies.[4]

In Kirovka village of Marneuli municipality, the population actively demanded the return of the historical name of the village - Mamei; however, the local self-government did not take into account the request of the residents to hold a general assembly meeting in the settlement and made the decision without listening them. From our point of view, this process was related to the recognition of the cultural rights of minorities, especially since there is a negative historical memory of changing the names of minority villages (making them Georgian) in the 90s and 2000s in this region. We believe it was important for the local authorities to show a sensitive approach.

In 2022, a protest of the residents of the village of Mushevani was visible. For six months, the inhabitants expressed dissatisfaction with the mining works planned by the company RMG in the vicinity of their village (about 800 meters away). In this process, non-existence of necessary guarantees for the actual participation of ethnic minorities were once again observed while reviewing the environmental impact assessment document and there was no language assistance provided. The problem for the population was the start of mining works in the vicinity of their residence, which creates high risks and fears among them as the environmental impact assessment documents seem to be flawed and of low-quality. At this stage, there are negotiations between the population and the company regarding the environmental and social guarantees, however, it is a pity that this process did not happen before the environmental decision was made, and now it has a more informal character.

Alt-info and Conservative Party members/supporters openly threatened Marneuli activist Samira Bayramova after the latter painted the facade of the Conservative Movement office in Marneuli in the colors of the Ukrainian flag. In addition to the threats of taking her life, on March 16, 2022, members of the Alt-info and Conservative Party gathered in Marneuli and verbally abused S. Bayramova. They gave her a two-day ultimatum to restore the facade of the Conservative Movement, otherwise they threatened with inciting religious and ethnic strife. The founders of the Alt-info and Conservative Movement commented on the incident and noted that everyone receives a respective punishment. One of the founders, Konstantine Morgoshia, commented on the threats against Samira Bairamova: "she colored our office; what did expect?" Samira Bairamova won't be able to Bairam (aka celebrate)". Alt-info and Conservative Movement representatives emphasized Samira Bayramova's religious affiliation and pointed out that she is fighting against the Christian cross and beliefs. Despite the start of the police investigation on the mentioned incident, on March 20, the representatives of Alt-info and Conservative Movement painted in red the exterior of the office of the United National Movement in Marneuli and again made insulting inscriptions against Samira Bairamova. An investigation started on the mentioned crimes. The prosecutor's office even included Samira Bairamoba in the special protection program; however, the investigation has not revealed any other results, so far. The alleged perpetrators have not been identified and criminal prosecution has not been initiated.

This year, the discriminatory practice of checking North Caucasians at the border crossing, allegedly on ethnic grounds, which meant questioning them in a separate room at the border, with a special and more complicated procedure, was a concern. Checking North Caucasians with a designated and more complicated system that required them to stand in line and go through the checking for days was unacceptable, while other Russian citizens that were avoiding military mobilization, were freely allowed to enter Georgia. Following the public protest, this practice changed in a few weeks, which should be evaluated positively.

It was problematic when the police removed Ichkeria flag drawings in the public spaces in Pankisi valley allegedly due to the context of the war in Ukraine, thus making it a cause of dissatisfaction for the local community. These events were subsequently misinterpreted in the media and problematic prejudices against local activists were spread.

It should be noted that in recent years, civil activism among non-dominant ethnic groups has increased dramatically. In 2022, civil activists spoke in front of thousands of demonstrators, actively appeared in the media, and initiated campaigns. The work of activists against nationalist and violent groups was visible in various regions, including the municipality of Marneuli. As a result of the mentioned developments, the data of 2022 shows that the rate of support for the protection of the rights of ethnic minorities has increased among the population of Georgia. In addition, activists from the minority community received awards for human rights protection, a supporter of tolerance, and others.

  • Non-dominant religious groups, religious freedom and politics

This year, the state has not made any significant decisions regarding freedom of religion. The unequality of religious minorities still remains a significant challenge.

An important challenge for religious organizations and leaders this year is still related to the security of their communication and personal life. In the framework of the ongoing investigation into the so-called SSSG collection of recordings that were made public on September 13-14, 2021, more than one clergyman was given the status of a victim. However, after getting acquainted with the case materials, it became obvious that there are fundamental flaws and challenges in the investigation process. For example: 1. High-ranking officials of the State Security Service have not been interviewed within the scope of the investigation; 2. The employees of the Operative-Technical Agency have not been interviewed and the internal mechanisms and instructions of the Operative-Technical Agency have not been fully checked; 3. The interview process of the rest of the SSSG employees is also erroneous and merely formal - they often declined to answer the fundamental questions of the investigation in the name of protecting state secrets. Even the questions asked to them were only related to communication in the official chat and not related to other contents presented in the collection of recordings and possible violations; 4.The legality of the reasons for putting persons by the organization under surveillance have not been investigated; 5. A number of investigative actions (for example, searches and seizures of telephones and official computers) were initiated late, when it was already possible tampering with evidence. In addition, against the background that the state has not taken serious political and legal responsibility for the mass practice of illegal wiretapping, it is still unclear whether there are legal and institutional guarantees that the State Security Service does not massively listen to and store private communications of citizens.

This year, the European Court of Human Rights made an important decision on the case of deacon Giorgi Mamaladze. The court found a violation of the procedural guarantees of a fair trial in his case, but did not recognize violations during the search and seizure, thus making it not clear if there is a possibility of a retrial at the national level. Despite his poor health, deacon Giorgi Mamaladze remains in prison until now, and despite more than one legal attempt, he has not achieved the postponement of his sentence.We hope that such opportunities will arise for the Deacon in the coming year.

This year, the problem of use of land for the local Adigeni population got back on agenda. The transfer of the non-agricultural and agricultural lands in the villages of Kikibo and Derzeli to the Patriarchate of Georgia by the decree of the Government of Georgia in September 2018, resulted in limiting locals to use the land. In particular, in February 2022, based on the petition of the Prosecutor's Office of Georgia, the Tbilisi City Court seized the plots of land owned by several families living in the villages of Dertsel and of Mokhi, after which the families were restricted to use the land (most of the families are Muslim). According to the Tbilisi City Court, the reason for confiscating the property was the ongoing investigation in the anti-corruption agency of the State Security Service of Georgia, which concerns the official crime allegedly committed by the persons employed in the Adigeni Municipality City Hall in the frame of sporadic land registration. The investigation has not yet revealed any fact of committing any crime by the owners of the confiscated property. Moreover, they have submitted to the investigative body all the legal documents that confirm the rightful ownership of the land by the ancestors and the acquisition of ownership rights based on the law. However, despite this, the property is still subject to seizure and there is a risk of confiscation of the property by the state. Ecomigrant Georgian Muslims living in the villages of Adigeni municipality are mainly cattle herders, and access to hay and pastures is vital for them. Considering the terrain of Adigheni municipality, hay and pasture lands are minimal in the villages; In case of restrictions on access to existing lands, the locals may have to give up cattle breeding and leave their places of residence. In the perception of the population, the restriction of ownership rights to land in the above-mentioned villages is related to the religious persecution observed in the municipality of Adigeni recently.

The issue of building a new mosque in Batumi remains problematic. For years, a significant part of the Muslim population in Batumi continue to pray in the open air due to the lack of a space for a mosque. Despite the historic decisions of the Batumi City Hall and Kutaisi Courts of Appeal, which found discrimination and illegality in the decision of the Batumi City Hall, the Batumi City Hall is trying to delay the process. At this stage the case is being considered in the Supreme Court of Georgia.

On July 1, 2022, the Bolnisi court made a precedent decision. The court declared invalid the norm of the resolution of the municipal council of Marneuli according to which the amount allocated from the municipality's budget for financing religious activities (400,000 GEL) was fully transferred only to the Diocese of Marneuli and Hujab. The City Court of Bolnisi found direct discrimination on the basis of religion and noted that: “Funding of "Marneuli and Hujabi Diocese" with 400,000 GEL for the promotion of its full functioning showed a different treatment to the entity in a similar situation, the Supreme Spiritual Department of All Muslims of Georgia, which is less favorable to the claimant and is, unambiguously disparate treatment based on religious grounds. Also, since the case at issue directly imposed differential treatment of a religious organization, the issue is evaluable on the basis of religion, within the scope of direct discrimination.” The court shared the assessments regarding the principle of secularism and indicated: "Any action of the state should be based on the principle of secularism, should not support any religion, and should not leave the impression of "excessive affiliation with religion". In this case, according to the court, "the principle of secularism and neutrality obliges the state to use a different approach for justifying its legitimacy of its goal through limiting the right to equality. First of all, it should be noted that the constitutional model of the democratic legal state is based on the principle of secularism, which separates the state and religion from each other. Such a model corresponds to the values that are characteristic of a legal state.” However, on December 8, 2022, the above stated decision of the Bolnisi court was annulled by the appeals court after a discussion conducted within the framework of a single session. During the consideration of the case, the judge made problematic explanations and comments about the religious and ethnic affiliations of the plaintiffs. The given decision will be appealed to the Supreme Court. It should be noted that even before the decision of the Court of Appeal, the Marneuli City Hall took into account only the financing needs of the local diocese for the 2023 local budget project, which once again shows the problem of demonstrative disrespect for constitutional principles and standards on the part of the self-government.

On October 4, 2022, the Orthodox clergy forbade the Catholic congregation to enter the historically Catholic church in Kutaisi with the statue of the Virgin Mary. During the procession, the Catholics were met with a barrier from a safety tape around the yard of the cathedral, and the entrance was jammed with cars. The mentioned case once again became the reason for discussing the non-existence of legislation and policy that would regulate the return (restitution) of religious property confiscated during the Soviet period to religious minorities. In this process, the issue of controversial historical monuments is particularly problematic, and the state has never considered solving them in legal ways.

  • Ineffective state response and policy to crimes committed by ultra-nationalist groups

In 2022, the state's inappropriate response to hate crimes committed by ultra-nationalist, extremist groups was still a significant challenge. The state also lacks an effective action plan to deal with and respond to violence from ultra-nationalist groups.

On July 5-6, 2021, members and supporters of ultra-nationalist groups assaulted LGBT activists and journalists during the "Tbilisi Pride" week. Dozens of journalists were injured as a result of the violence. The state did not properly investigate the criminal acts committed against activists and journalists, the Ministry of Internal Affairs/Prosecution did not ensure the detection and punishment of the organizers of the violence, and the punishments applied to the perpetrators did not correspond to the nature and severity of the crime committed by them. As a result, in 2022, "Tbilisi Pride'' refused to hold the "March of Dignity" in view of the threats from far-right groups and the improper response of the state agencies to these threats; However, the organizers of "Pride Week" announced that instead of public events, they would organize Tbilisi Film screening, LGBTQ+ regional conference and music festival (Pride Fest) in the closed space from June 28 to July 2. After the information spread, the far-right groups, including the leaders of "Conservative Movement-Altinfo" openly expressed their rage towards "Pride Week" and announced "full mobilization" against it. Konstantine Morgoshia, one of the leaders of "Conservative Movement-Altinfo", said that they would not allow the conduct of the third event- the festival, while Shota Martynenko pointed out that they would use the time until July 2 to prepare a counterattack and shape the mood of the people. Along with the announcements, the leaders of the movement started mobilizing the public, openly calling on people living in the regions to travel to Tbilisi and chanting that they would "give the necessary and sufficient response" to the participants of the "Pride Week" festival.

Although the threats of the leaders of the "Conservative Movement-Altinfo" were mainly directed against the "Pride Festival" and the threats were real, the state agencies did not provide a legal response to the organizers of the violence. The Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia started an investigation; however, it was only after the leaders and supporters of the violent groups gathered in the vicinity of the festival on July 2 and confronted the mobilized police officers. Two leaders of the group: Zurab Makharadze and Irakli Martinenko, were arrested on administrative charges. The criminal liability of the organizers and participants have not been held yet.

Beyond the violence against LGBT people, in 2022, members and supporters of the ultra-nationalist, extremist group/political party "Conservative Movement-Altinfo" repeatedly assaulted civil activists who were protesting against the opening of offices of "Conservative Movement-Altinfo" in different regions of Georgia, while an active war of Russia in Ukraine.

Violent incidents were recorded in Svaneti, Khulo, Ozurgeti, Kvemo Kartli, and Kobuleti. However, the legal result was reached in only one case, and the Prosecutor's Office of Georgia ensured the identification of the members and supporters of the far-right group involved in the violent incident that took place in Kobuleti on March 22, 2022. At the time of the incident, police officers detained several persons under administrative law (violation of public order and disobedience to the legal request of the policeman), and criminal prosecution was initiated against 5 persons under subsections "b" and "c" of part 1 of Article 126 of the Criminal Code of Georgia (regarding the violence against two or more persons in a group) and the defendants were convicted.

It should be noted that in 2022, information was spread through media, which indicated the role of the State Security Service in the violent actions that took place on July 5-6, 2021. In particular, on June 11 and July 2, 2022, "Nodar Meladze's Saturday" program of Pirveli TV station broadcasted about the possible participation of the employees of the State Security Service of Georgia in the organization of mass violence on July 5, 2021. In the mentioned program, correspondence and audio files were presented of alleged employees of the State Security Service. The close examination of files leads to a reasonable assumption that the employees of the State Security Service were organizing the ongoing processes and mobilizing people involved in violence, distributing them to locations and giving instructions. After the release of the stories, the Social Justice Center prepared a statement and, in August 2022, applied to the Prosecutor's Office of Georgia with a request to start an investigation. Until now, the Prosecutor's Office has not started the investigation and has not clarified the question of the alleged participation of SSS employees in violent actions on July 5.

It should be noted that even at the level of analytical and preventive work, the State Security Service does not provide information on the sources of funding and affiliations of ultra-conservative pro-Russian groups. However, it does not monitor the narratives spread by these groups and develop counter-narratives, which makes our society less resilient to the propaganda emanating from these groups and severely affects the country's information security.

  • Conflict transformation and human rights in conflict regions

This year too, we did not have tangible positive changes in the direction of the transformation of conflicts, as well as the protection of human rights in conflict-affected regions and villages along the so-called border lines. The new geopolitical and political contexts created after Russia’s war in Ukraine did not become the basis for the Georgian authorities to start new policies and initiatives on occupation and conflicts.

It is significant that the work that started in 2021 on developing a state strategy for reconciliation and de-occupation has not yet been completed, and the state still does not have a strategy on issues of critical importance. Along with the lack of strategies, there are no significant changes towards practical implementation of the policy.

The legal and social situation in the conflict regions and the villages along the so-called border lines remains difficult. The state has not developed a unified, coherent approach and strategy to respond to the security, legal, and social concerns of people living along the so-called border lines. The state has no special social programs to compensate for the damage of war and the vulnerable reality of life in a conflict zone. According to a study conducted by the UN Women in 2019, only 33% of the settlements along the administrative dividing line have water supply, and only 73% of them have drinkable water supply; in 38% medical services are not available at all; Only 39% reported that most households have enough food; According to the data of the same study, only 30% of the settlements close to the so-called border have a kindergarten or kindergarten. It is clear that this reality aggravates the social conditions of the local population. This is confirmed by the data of 2014. After 2002, the population living near the so-called border decreased by 33%, which is twice the rate of decline of the total population in Georgia. Importantly, this year the authorities have confirmed that they will restore 28 destroyed houses in the village of Zardiantkari. However, the government made this decision only after the locals had waited for it for several years.

In 2022, Russia continued its annexation policy in Abkhazia, but Georgian authorities did not take a single effective step in response to it. On 11 July 2022, it became publicly known that the parliament of the de-facto Republic of Abkhazia initiated discussions to transfer the complex of state cottages situated in the Bichvinta-Museri natural reserve. The agreement signed between Moscow and Sukhumi on January 19 defines the transfer of all buildings and infrastructure of the state country estate to the Russian Federal Security Service, as well as a 49-year lease on the surrounding 186 hectares. This initiative was followed by protests in Abkhazia, but the Georgian authorities did not even make a statement.

In addition, the situation of international organizations and local civil organizations in Abkhazia has worsened. Adoption of the law on "foreign agent" is envisaged as part of the "process of harmonization of the Abkhazian legislature with Russian legislation". If this law is adopted, the activities and finances of civil organizations will be strictly controlled. De-facto Minister of Foreign Affairs, Inal Ardzinba demands that the activities of international and local organizations do not go beyond the humanitarian sphere, are not connected to political issues, and especially do not include directions for improving Georgian-Abkhazian relations and restoring trust.[5] This initiative was followed by a strong reaction in the Abkhazian society. The Public Defender of Abkhazia stated that this law will increase the isolation of Abkhazia.

The effects of the ongoing war in Ukraine got reflected on South Ossetian society as well. The involvement and use of local military forces in the Russian war in Ukraine caused discontent among the population and created new fears. Given the dire consequences of the ongoing war in Ukraine in general, the Abkhazian and Ossetian communities have grown fears and ambiguities about their future, which gives the Georgian authorities and international organizations the opportunity to use new initiatives in the direction of restoring trust. It is not clear to us what plans and strategies the Georgian government has in these conditions.

The decision taken by the Council of the European Union, which prohibits the movement of Abkhazians and Ossetians in the Schengen countries with Russian passports, was painfully perceived by these people. As they do not have other travel documents necessary for international movement, this increases the risks of their isolation. In this condition, it is important for the government of Georgia to think about supporting alternative ways for local people to move through negotiations with international organizations and de facto administrations. Isolation of these regions and societies increases their dependence on Russia, and, in our opinion, policies aimed at de-isolation have the potential to change this reality. The mentioned approach would create a trust of the communities living beyond the dividing line.

The legal and social conditions of ethnic Georgians in Gali and Akhalgori remain difficult. Restriction of freedom of movement and isolation, problematic access to healthcare, social and other support services, complete prohibition of the right to education in one's native language, difficult social and economic background, challenges related to security - these are the main problems that make daily life difficult for the residents of Gali and Akhalgori and force some of them to to leave their places of residence. It is unfortunate that so far we have not been successful in renewing the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) meetings in Gali.

The Tskhinvali Prosecutor's Office has resumed the investigation against Tamar Mearakishvili, a civil activist from Akhalgori. As it is known, on June 8, 2017, Mearakishvili was kidnapped from the area near her house by the representatives of the de facto security service, and for 15 hours of intimidation and threats, they tried to get a confession from her that she worked with the security services of Georgia. Soon after, the prosecutor's office officially charged Tamar Mearakishvili with slander, as well as forging documents and illegally obtaining a passport of a "citizen" of the Republic of South Ossetia. The investigation confiscated his de facto passport and the court has restricted her from leaving the South Ossetia region. The case against Mearakishvili was going for 5 years and it went through more than one court instance and review. Finally, only on November 9 of this year, the investigation was terminated due to the absence of evidence of crime. However, at the beginning of December, the prosecutor's office suddenly canceled the decision. The ongoing persecution against Tamar Mearakishvili takes a severe form of arbitrariness and illegality, and unfortunately, significant progress has not been made for protecting her rights. The process of investigating the case of the kidnapping of Merakishvili by the Prosecutor's Office of Georgia is also flawed.

Georgian citizens Irakli Bebua and 24-year-old Kristine Takalandze, who was arrested on July 20, are still in custody in Abkhazia, and there is no news on their release from the representatives of the Georgian authorities.

Footnote and Bibliography

[1] საქართველოში ადრეული ასაკის ბავშვთა სკოლამდელ დაწესებულებებში ჩართულობის მაჩვენებელი 69,5%-ია, ეთნიკური უმცირესობებით მჭიდროდ დასახლებულ რეგიონებში - 25,5% (საშუალოდ), რაც ევროპულ სამიზნე ნიშნულზე - 95%-ზე ნაკლებია.

[2] 2014 წლის მონაცემებით, 6830 პედაგოგი სხვადასხვა საგნობრივ ჯგუფში 15375 პედაგოგის მოვალეობას ითავსებს. 400-მდე სკოლაში კი ერთი მასწავლებელი 6 სხვადასხვა საგანს ასწავლის. აღსანიშნავია ისიც, რომ ხშირად ეს საგნები სხვადასხვა დარგობრივი ჯგუფიდანაა (ტაბატაძე და გორგაძე 2015).

2017-2018 წლის მონაცემებით, უმცირესობების თემებში მასწავლებელთა 72%-ზე (885) მეტს პრაქტიკოსის სტატუსი აქვს, რაც, სქემის მიხედვით, ყველაზე დაბალი საფეხურია. 2019 წლის კვლევის თანახმად, არაქართულენოვან სკოლებში მოსწავლეთა მხოლოდ 18%-ს ასწავლის ისეთი მასწავლებელი, რომელსაც ჩაბარებული აქვს პროფესიული უნარების გამოცდა. ქართულის, როგორც მეორე ენის, შემთხვევაში კი, ეს მაჩვენებელი აზერბაიჯანულ სექტორში ყველაზე მაღალია და 39%-ს შეადგენს, სომხურენოვან სკოლებში კი - 30%-ს.

შედეგების თანახმად, ჯავახეთის საჯარო სკოლების დირექტორობის 175 კანდიდატიდან მხოლოდ თერთმეტმა შეძლო გამოცდის ჩაბარება, მათ შორის, რვა ქართული წარმოშობის იყო. საქართველოში საპენსიო ასაკის მასწავლებელთა წილი 20%-ია. აზერბაიჯანულენოვანი სკოლების შემთხვევაში კი ეს მაჩვენებელი ქვეყნის სურათთან შედარებით, უფრო მაღალია და 34.8%-ს შეადგენს, რუსულენოვანი სკოლების შემთხვევაში მათი წილი 28,9%-ია, ხოლო სომხურენოვან სკოლებში - 20.3%.

[3] 2018 წლის PİSA-ს ტესტების მიხედვით, უმცირესობების რეგიონებში სკოლის მოსწავლეების შედეგები 100 ქულით ჩამოვარდება დანარჩენ საქართველოსგან.

[4] ISSA 2019 წლის  კვლევის შესაბამისად, გამოკითხული ეთნიკური უმცირესობების 69,9 % აცხადებს, რომ მათ საკუთარი და მისი ოჯახის საჭიროებების არასდროს მიუმართავს ადგილობრივი ხელისუფლებისთვის. საჯარო ინტერესების შემთხვევაში მიმართვიანობა კიდევ უფრო მაღალია და 76,5 %-ს აღწევს. მკვეთრად სუსტია ეთნიკური უმცირესობების საჯარო სამსახურში დასაქმების მაჩვენებელიც.

[5] ერთიანი, მაგრამ სრულიად რუსული სივრცე აფხაზეთისთვის, რადიო თავისუფლება, 1 დეკემბერი, 2020. ხელმისაწვდომია:  https://www.radiotavisupleba.ge/a/30978724.html

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