A few days ago, the Prime Minister and the State Minister for Reconciliation and Civic Equality presented long-term strategic visions for reconciliation and confidence-building. According to the government, the main achievements of the state in the field of reconciliation and confidence building are measured by the success of individual projects. Among them are Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian business projects (11 projects in 2020-2021), confidence building civic projects and the high interest of participants (100 projects in the same period), normalization of ABL crossings to/from Abkhazia in recent months, uninterrupted provision of free health services to people living in the occupied territories (1400 patients in the same period), tripled number of students enrolled in Georgian universities from the occupied regions, growing cases of transferring the bodies of missing persons (27 persons in the same period), aid provided to Abkhazia (4 million in the same period).

According to the State Minister, the policy of reconciliation and engagement will undergo essential innovations in the coming years, including the strengthening inter-community dialogue and activities aimed at building trust, increasing access to services for the citizens of the occupied territories, and provision of EU-provided benefits to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, supporting economic development (before that supporting Gali and Akhalgori development), introducing targeted sectoral cooperation, encouraging joint economic projects, facilitating the export of products produced in these regions to global markets, providing access to education services in Georgia and abroad, and substantially improving the social situation of people living alongside the ABL.

These goals and objectives seem important and viable, but to what extent these tasks can be implemented and whether they can play a fundamental and critical role in conflict transformation is up for a debate.

Conflict transformation is essentially aimed at changing the structural causes of conflict. It seeks to achieve not only the minimum goal of preventing war but to transform systems, structures, relationships, and perceptions that give rise to violence and injustice. This result-oriented approach focuses on peacebuilding opportunities in the local context and not on external, international involvement. It has no political dimension and involves a long-term dialogue, change of attitudes, and building common interests and agendas between communities experiencing conflict. The transformation of the conflict means the transformation of societies with conflict experiences, and its purpose is not only to build trust and reconciliation between these communities but also to ensure their social well-being.

It is essential that we have not experienced new armed conflicts under the Georgian Dream regime, and the government abandoned its policy of resorting to non-peaceful means. It should be noted that the Georgian Dream government has further strengthened the importance of reconciliation and confidence-building policies at the discursive level, however, the work continues in line with the previous government's paradigms, tools, and methods, and these efforts have not had significant political and social consequences. Even such basic and essential achievements as freedom of movement, trade, operation of international monitoring mechanism in conflict regions, and the sustainable formats of high-level dialogue with de facto regimes remain unattainable.

We observe that the harrowing experiences of the arrests for the so-called border crossings, humanitarian crises, and discrimination against ethnic Georgians living in conflict regions remain politically unresolved. Under these conditions, relations with the South Ossetian region are even more isolated and antagonistic. The efforts aimed at the transformation of the conflict in the Georgian society itself are sharply weak – be it the critical assessment of the history of conflicts and its reflection in political rhetoric or formal education and youth policy, institutional support for academic, research, and analytical work on the topic of conflict, working with communities with conflict experiences (IDPs, war-affected population living near the occupation line), empowering and increasing representation of ethnic Ossetian and Abkhazian communities living in Tbilisi controlled areas. Not to mention the challenging social and economic situation in the war-affected villages and the sense of abandonment the locals experience. It can be said that the importance of working within Georgian society has almost disappeared from the vision of a policy of reconciliation and confidence-building.

The Russian factor and the excessive political, military, and financial dependence of the de facto regimes on Russia complicate the Georgian state's ability to work on conflict issues. While we cannot observe the state's effort identifying new steps and attempts to transform the conflict, it is difficult to judge their failures.

We asked Paata Zakareishvili, Natia Chankvetadze, and Giorgi Kanashvili, experts with political and academic backgrounds on conflict, to assess the mentioned issues. In this document, we present the interviews we recorded with them.

1. In your opinion, how should the positive results achieved in the reconciliation and confidence-building policy be measured, and who should measure them (how democratic is the evaluation process )? To what extent are the indicators set by the government substantial and thorough, and where do you see the main problem? We understand that the work of the state authorities in this field is quite nontransparent, and it is even difficult to get hold of some documents at times. Still, you have a long experience working on these topics and are well aware of these internal perspectives.

Paata Zakareishvili:

In my opinion, the new policy of reconciliation and engagement voiced by the State Minister is part of the pre-election campaign. It is not, in principle, focused on substantially changing the situation during the stagnation period. Publicly presented texts are formal, and there is no attempt to preserve at least the general principles of uniformity and consistency established in Georgian politics.

The constant emphasis on the fact that the Georgian government intends to hold a dialogue only at the inter-community level and only relation to access to services for the citizens is worrying. I also consider it a reckless position to produce a separate policy exclusively for the development of the Gali and Akhalgori districts. Such careless support may be counter-productive; in order to prevent the further integration of the Akhalgori and Gali districts with the rest of Georgian society, the de facto authorities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia may further isolate these districts and promote the policy of eviction of residents.

As for measuring the results, I think progress assessment is quite a difficult task in such an artificially sealed topic as resolving the existing conflicts on the territory of Georgia. One of the main criteria should be the transparency and accountability of the implementation of the reconciliation policy. Government officials should regularly report to the expert community on the work conducted over a specific period. In my experience, although such activities do not include the component of secrecy, we can understand the government's wishes for such reports to be presented in a closed format, and the essential parts of the reports not be published in the press. After submitting reports, it would be advisable for the expert community to conduct regular evaluations, which would also be closed to the media and used only for official work purposes by both the government and the expert community. During such regular meetings, the authorities should undertake principal commitment to answer any questions raised by the expert community sincerely and truthfully.

Natia Chankvetadze:

Today, the state operated under the strategy of "engagement through cooperation," its action plan, which has written out criteria. Interestingly, when you look at these criteria, some are indeed implementable and may lead to some concrete progress. However, in reality, if we talk about indicators such as free movement, the safety of people living alongside the occupation lines, access to health care and education, providing housing to IDPs, and/or improvement of their living conditions, we will observe that these indicators are not adequately met. If we are talking about indicators that should reflect a positive change in mutual understanding and interdependence between Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian communities, in that case, the situation is more complex because no progress is seen. We more or less manage to maintain the existing social connections, which, against the background of generational changes in both regions, is no longer enough.

Evaluating the indicators and who should assess them is quite a problematic issue because the indicator of reconciliation and peacebuilding can be “achieving reconciliation” or “reaching a mutually acceptable agreement”, which may not happen for decades. However, the fact that the existing strategy needs to change and respond to the local context is straightforward. Here is the point of indicators; when the strategy is relevant and responsive to the local setting, the action plan is proactively planned, and the indicators are thus realistic. As for the evaluation of the indicators, I think that the assessment by the internal resources of the Minister's Office alone is not enough and does not create the feeling that something is being done and progress is being made. It is important that civil society organizations, experts, and academia are actively involved in developing and evaluating the action plan indicators and that the process is conducted more inclusively and transparently.

Giorgi Kanashvili:

Measuring the effectiveness of reconciliation and confidence-building policies is not an easy task and is often interpreted differently by political forces. The views of expert circles or analytical circles are not homogeneous either. However, both progress and regression are felt most of the time, even without particularly sophisticated tools.

For example, if we go beyond our context, there has been noticeable progress in Transnistria in recent years. People move around entirely freely; everyone has access to the learning process in their language, leaders meet periodically, and NGOs collaborate (and do not hide it). Many more such stories can be told.

Unfortunately, despite the examples cited by the authorities, the progress of this magnitude has not been observed in our conflicts. Perhaps, for a more or less objective assessment, it is necessary to create a balanced, diverse working group that would include a particular mix of state, political actors, and civil society representatives; which would develop criteria by which progress could be measured, which then would be reflected in the policy review.

2. The government often points out that the policy of reconciliation and confidence-building is conducted in parallel with de-occupation. It aims to restore dialogue and trust between communities and create depoliticized, humanitarian processes. The government completely excludes the political dimension in this process (for example, dialogue with de facto governments and local political elites, implementation of major joint social and economic projects). How justified is this approach, and can it be considered a major mistake of the government?

Paata Zakareishvili:

It is completely unjustified for the Georgian Dream government to constantly press on the expediency of a depoliticized dialogue. Such an attitude indicates how unqualified and ignorant the current government is in leading the transformation of conflicts. Tbilisi offers Sukhumi and Tskhinvali well-polished programs and projects, which are unviable and at the same time unacceptable for the Abkhazian and South Ossetian societies as they are incompatible and not so important for the locals. The Georgian side should not blindly offer Abkhazian and Ossetian communities proposals that do not meet their needs but should study in detail the critical challenges and needs of these societies and base its policy on the identified issues. And such matters should be discussed only with representatives of the de facto authorities and not with hypothetical societies, which have no institutional or structural systems. Concerning conflict resolution, one of the most critical issues facing the Abkhaz and South Ossetian sides is the work on bilateral texts on guarantees of non-use of force. I think that the Georgian government should start grasping these issues and work on interests that are equally acceptable to all parties.

Natia Chankvetadze:

The government says it is ready for dialogue with the Abkhaz and Ossetian communities but does not specify with whom / which groups, and this creates a misunderstanding. Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian societies have platforms for dialogue, although only some of them are sustainable, but still. For example, various professional groups, young people, etc., meet each other. The problem is that political elites do not speak. I often hear that we should not talk to Abkhazians and Ossetians because they are occupied and do not have autonomous will; on the other hand, that we should not talk to Russia either, because Russia is an occupier. With this approach, we confuse ourselves, and it becomes difficult to tell who we should talk to, in what formats, and why. However, it should also be noted that creating political dialogue formats is not an easy process, and, of course, the subject of discussion is what specific, the new format should / can be created and who should participate. I think it is necessary to talk to the Abkhaz and Ossetian political elite in the context of Georgia, but we should not fall into the illusion that Russia will distance itself from these processes and will not interfere. The creation of a dialogue format requires the calculation of risks, these risks require a specific plan of guarantees, and these activities take time, energy, human, intellectual, and financial resources.

Giorgi Kanashvili:

This approach is entirely incomprehensible, and time, in my opinion, will show the counter productiveness of this approach. In all other conflicts, we can see that where political elites do not speak, things are bad or terrible, and vice versa.

In this regard, we can look no further than the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. On the other hand, we have different, much more positive examples from Cyprus and Moldova. Here, the parties communicate despite differences of political views, and consequently, the environment is much more positive.

Perhaps it would be naive to assume that dialogue will lead to a speedy resolution of conflicts. However, this process itself may make life much easier for the population in the conflict zones. In principle, our own experience dictates this – however difficult it was, the periods when Georgians and Abkhazians, Georgians and Ossetians, talked to each other (here I mean the leaders), we could see definite results.

Unfortunately, in principle, today, there is no clear reasoning and thinking about these issues. Most Georgian Dream leaders have neither the knowledge nor the political courage to raise these issues.

1. How difficult is it to implement de-occupation policies and reconciliation and confidence-building policies at the same time? Where can the two processes intersect, or intensify/ cause conflict? At first glance, the de-occupation policy lies on the foundation of the non-recognition of de facto regimes and can not go beyond this conventionalism. Do you think the government exercises a real policy of de-occupation, and how does it differ from the previous government's policy?

Paata Zakareishvili:

Although the Georgian Dream formally criticizes the UNM's policy on conflict resolution, it follows the UNM's vision, which is based on the State Strategy for the Occupied Territories - Involvement through Cooperation, adopted on 27 January 2010, without any hesitation. This strategy is also unviable. It is superficial and merely formal. It planned to resolve conflicts only through peaceful means; Ruled out a military solution to the conflict, and aimed to reconcile the population "separated by dividing lines" and restore trust between them. The political status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia was to be considered in parallel with the withdrawal of Russian occupation troops from Georgia and the return of the IDPs.

Simultaneous implementation of de-occupation policies and reconciliation and confidence-building policies is entirely possible. De-occupation concerns Russia's neo-imperial policy, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should work on this with the support of the international community. Reconciliation and confidence-building policies are Georgia's internal state issues and should be worked on by relevant sectoral agencies, primarily the Office of the State Minister for Reconciliation, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and other ministries. The intersection between these two processes can occur where they intersect today, i.e., the whole process is formally managed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, informally in cooperation with the Security authorities. The Office of the State Minister for Reconciliation has now been transformed into one of the departments of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The institutional separation of these two directions is needed.

The government does not have a de-occupation policy. It has been replaced by a policy of non-recognition, successfully pursued by our Western partners, primarily the United States, the European Union, and large regional states that influence neighboring or politically and economically dependent states.

Natia Chankvetadze:

It is often said that we should not separate the work towards de-occupation and conflict transformation, on the contrary, we should align these processes. I agree with this approach, however, when I speak of separation, I do not mean two separate processes that do not intersect. We have to understand that the de-occupation process is not only directed at Russia, it also concerns Abkhazian and Ossetian societies, which not only culturally and socially approximate with Russia but merge with it. Accordingly, de-occupation is not just the withdrawal of Russian military forces from these territories and the abolition of its position as a party to the conflict, de-occupation will inevitably lead to a change in the value system. As for the policy of conflict transformation, it is a direct approach to Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian relations and internal societies. What does the Georgian society know about Abkhazians and Ossetians, who are these societies, what unites us, and what separates us from each other - these are the questions on which the vision of the transformation of the conflict (s) is built. When we talk about the de-occupation strategy, we need to critically assess the extent to which this strategy covers issues that need to be improved in the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian contexts and relations.

Giorgi Kanashvili:

In theory, these two processes should support each other. In practice, one is subordinate to the other; De-occupation is considered to be a greater virtue than reconciliation and confidence building. But, in my opinion, it should be the other way around.

Of course, the Russian factor is of essential importance. However, many do not / cannot think of what made occupation possible. Could it be that Russia found fertile ground for conflict formation?!

The policy of de-occupation of the National Movement and the Georgian Dream is qualitatively the same. It is based on the same opinions. The "drama" of the Georgian Dream is that it could not offer us anything new intellectually (or in any other direction, for that matter).

There is only one difference - the previous government pursued this policy more actively and loudly, while the Georgian Dream - much more passively and cautiously. Often – just to make a show of it.

1. After nine years, what is an essential achievement for you regarding reconciliation and confidence-building in the Georgian Dream policy, and where do you see a significant setback or stagnation?

Paata Zakareishvili

The most important achievement is that there has been no severe escalation of a military nature during this time, which could have had an irreversible consequence in the form of the loss of another territory, the death of military and civilians, destruction, and exile of population. If this period continues, it could contribute to the development of the conflict transformation that took place in the territory of South Ossetia in 1993-2004. The setback is the fact that practically all formats of political dialogue with Sokhumi and Tskhinvali have stopped, and all the attention is shifted to Moscow, where no dynamics can be identified.

Natia Chankvetadze

The absence of an active phase of the conflict, the war, is an achievement, especially against the background of one of the protracted conflicts in the region that erupted last year. However, let's look at other characteristics of human security. We can not say that fewer people are abducted and detained, that moving along the occupation line is not a problem, nor can we say that communication between the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian communities has increased, or that the number of projects and programs that target conflict related issues has increased. The setback is the total misunderstanding of what vision there is for conflict resolution. The Georgian Dream has the same strategy that was created during the National Movement. They do not offer new, justifiable, and people-centered approaches on what needs to change in the direction of conflict transformation or how can the change be achieved. In addition, the idea that the conflict with Abkhazians and Ossetians will be resolved automatically one the conflict with Russia is resolved has become even stronger over the years.

Giorgi Kanashvili

The only achievement is that there is no active war. In the big picture, Georgian and Abkhazian, Georgian and Ossetian societies are disconnecting more and more. Nowadays, I do not see any prospect of restoring territorial or social unity.