The Social Justice Center analyzed the pre-election programs of the ruling party and five opposition coalitions/parties regarding conflict resolution and peace policy, focusing on the protection of the rights of conflict-affected populations. The analysis covers:

• Georgian Dream
• Unity (comprising United National Movement, Strategy Aghmashenebeli, and European Georgia)
• Coalition for Change (including Droa, Girchi - More Freedom, Akhali (New), Activists for the Future – Oktay Kazumov, and the Republican Party – Khatuna Samnidze)
• Strong Georgia (featuring Lelo, For the People, Citizens, and Liberty Square)
• For Georgia
• Girchi

The analysis focuses on how these political entities participating in the 2024 parliamentary elections address de-occupation, peace policy, and the protection of conflict-affected populations' rights. Among these groups, only three present specific visions and plans, while others either omit the topic (such as Georgian Dream) or offer fragmented views based on interviews (e.g., United National Movement and Coalition for Change).

Contextual Analysis

The paradigm for Georgia’s conflict-related policies has been shaped by the political context and agreements established after the 2008 war. These approaches are reflected in both national (such as the 2010 State Strategy on Occupied Territories – Engagement through Cooperation) and international (like the 2009 EU Strategy on Non-Recognition and Engagement Policy, NREP) policy documents. These frameworks aim to uphold Georgia’s territorial integrity, suggest resolving conflicts peacefully and diplomatically, and maintain a non-recognition policy toward de facto states while allowing certain humanitarian aid. The goal was to create development opportunities for conflict regions to introduce constructive dynamics into the peace process. The EU believed this approach would enhance its influence in these regions and present new political alternatives, drawing local populations toward Europe.

The primary international organization acting as a peacekeeper in Georgia is the European Union (EU). The EU operates through 1) The office of the EU Special Representative (EUSR) for the South Caucasus and Georgia. 2) The EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM). 3) The Geneva International Discussions (GID), where it serves as one of the three co-chairs. GID is the sole platform where all conflict parties meet to address unresolved issues, focusing on the 2008 ceasefire agreement, though it does not actively foster trust or dialogue.

The EU viewed Abkhazia as a test case for the “non-recognition and engagement policy,” hoping its success could serve as a model for other Eurasian de facto states. However, the engagement component proved insufficiently effective, leading to a diminished EU presence and influence in Abkhazia.

Since 2008, Georgia’s conflict-related policy has largely focused on the geopolitical dimension, overlooking the internal political aspects and the significance of conflict transformation. This is also evident in the country’s institutional infrastructure. For over 16 years, there has been no political peacebuilding process, and Tbilisi lacks a direct dialogue format with de facto authorities, even on status-neutral issues such as human security, human rights, and well-being.

Although the discourse on peaceful conflict resolution strengthened after 2012, and the state increased its engagement with and support for conflict regions, the efforts remain fragmented and limited. Official state policy toward conflict regions remains unchanged, still based on the same narratives as before. The post-2008 status quo, supported by Russian military and security guarantees, has been largely accepted by South Ossetian and Abkhazian elites and communities.

However, after the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War between Armenia and Azerbaijan and, more notably, the full-scale war in Ukraine, it became evident that the existing conflict paradigm no longer aligns with the new political realities in the region. Abkhazian society, in particular, faces growing fears of accelerated annexation by Russia and repressive policies against local resistance. Russia’s aggressive push for control over the Black Sea and peripheral markets, driven by the war in Ukraine and economic sanctions, has made it harder for Abkhazia to protect its economic system and resources with conservative policies, leading to rising resistance and public protests. Tbilisi currently lacks a clear vision for responding to these changes.

In the past 30 years, there has been little positive momentum in Georgia’s conflict policy. Alienation between the state and the conflict regions has deepened, especially after the 2008 war, both politically and socially. Despite this, there was a period of "radical hope" when various political groups promoted reintegration efforts for these regions. However, these sentiments have faded since 2008, and in recent years, political groups have largely avoided discussing conflict issues altogether. No political group has taken responsibility for creating new alternatives for conflict resolution.

In this context, the Georgian Dream government has begun instrumentalizing the idea of peace, making pre-election promises about the potential restoration of territorial integrity. However, monitoring official statements from Georgian, Russian, and de facto authorities, as well as reviewing policy documents, reveals that these promises are largely populist and lack real initiatives or processes to support them.

Georgian Dream

The presentation of Georgian Dream’s pre-election program[1], which lasted over an hour, completely omitted topics related to peace policy and conflict resolution. As in its 2020 election platform, Georgian Dream has once again failed to present clear visions or action plans that could introduce new dynamics to peace policy or ensure progress in protecting the rights of conflict-affected populations.

The government may justify this omission by citing its intent to continue the implementation of the existing engagement strategy, which it considers successful. However, the 2010 strategy and the peace initiatives derived from it are outdated and do not address the new challenges and realities in the region, such as the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia’s waning influence in the South Caucasus, and new opportunities for EU membership for Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia. These developments have reshaped the security landscape and created new possibilities for key actors.

In practice, the government primarily follows the "A Step to a Better Future" initiative, which, despite its symbolic value, does not offer a comprehensive vision for de-occupation or meaningful progress in peace policy.

Notably, the government began working on a new strategy for de-occupation and peace policy three years ago. However, the public has yet to receive any information about this process. According to government officials, they do not plan to finalize the new strategy until the war in Ukraine ends, as forecasting the future under the current crisis is difficult. This approach is problematic since regional crises, including the war in Ukraine, have opened new opportunities for Georgia and other Eastern Partnership countries in the context of EU membership. These opportunities could become powerful tools for offering new guarantees and alternatives to divided communities and initiating dialogue processes.

It is also critical that the government develop peace policy and action plans without consultations or dialogue with representatives of civil society on the other side of the conflict. In light of the political crisis in Abkhazia, where Russia seeks to appropriate strategic and economic resources, the Georgian Dream offers no alternative vision that would address both the containment of these developments and opportunities within the EU framework for international mobility, education, internet access, electricity, and banking services for the populations in the conflict regions.

Moreover, the government has instrumentalized the idea of peace for electoral purposes, which devalues the concept of peace and erodes public trust. While the government frequently speaks about sustainable peace and the abstract possibility of restoring territorial integrity, it lacks a new framework, goals, and tools for peace policy, demonstrating that these statements are primarily populist, lacking real substance or processes.

Unity – United National Movement

The "Unity" coalition has not yet published its pre-election platform, and peace policy is not among the five key priorities they have announced[2]. However, based on an interview with one of the coalition's leaders[3], it is evident that the coalition envisions the EU as the primary framework for conflict resolution and peace policy.

Giorgi Vashadze suggests that a European passport could offer Abkhazian and South Ossetian residents access to benefits provided by a Georgian-European passport, such as quality education, mobility, employment, and development opportunities. In contrast, these populations currently possess isolated Russian passports, which do not offer such prospects. Additionally, the coalition believes that internally displaced persons (IDPs) in government-controlled territories should serve as a positive example for those in occupied regions, with improved pensions of 300 GEL and enhanced social and economic conditions.

Coalition for Change

According to a leader of the "Coalition for Change," time is not on Georgia’s side[4], and steps toward restoring relationships with the Abkhazians and Ossetians need to start promptly. Otherwise, with time, neither side nor future generations will be motivated to resolve the issue, confining it to a purely legal framework.

Nika Gvaramia believes that the government should focus on free trade and mobility to rebuild relationships and cooperation between people. He sees the EU as the only viable framework for addressing these issues. Gvaramia argues that if Georgia joins the EU, it would increase the interest of Abkhazian and Ossetian communities in cooperating with Georgia, drawing a parallel with the example of Turkish Cypriots, where 83% voted for a united Cyprus to join the EU.

The coalition also emphasizes that deepening trade relations can help rebuild trust between divided communities. Gvaramia suggests the construction of a deep-sea port in Ochamchire, similar to the Anaklia port project, as a way to foster cooperation between Georgians and Abkhazians. He believes that such relationships can be rebuilt within a decade.

Coalition Strong Georgia

The "Strong Georgia" coalition, comprising Lelo, Citizens, For the People, and Liberty Square, has introduced a peacebuilding and de-occupation policy within its "Ilia's Path" [5]program.

The coalition intends to develop a national plan for de-occupation and peaceful conflict resolution, based on political consensus, with a long-term approach. It also plans to continue supporting the non-recognition policy.

In addition, the coalition’s platform addresses the socio-economic needs of various conflict-affected groups, including the creation of educational and employment opportunities for residents in occupied territories. Like other opposition parties, they see the EU framework as essential to these efforts.

To improve the socio-economic conditions of residents near the conflict lines, the coalition proposes establishing free economic and trade zones, launching large-scale infrastructure projects, and enhancing security mechanisms with surveillance systems. They also advocate for thematic dialogue platforms with Abkhazians and Ossetians in parallel with the Geneva format.

For Georgia

The "For Georgia" party presents a complex action plan for peace policy in the 2024 elections. [6]Similar to other opposition parties, it views de-occupation and peace policy as achievable within the EU framework and through close cooperation with Western partners. The party advocates for the development of a national strategy for de-occupation and reunification, based on consensus, and plans to finalize the strategy within a year of the elections.

Their platform includes initiatives to improve the rights and social conditions of conflict-affected groups, such as strengthening security mechanisms and introducing early warning systems near the occupation lines. They also plan to develop a special law addressing the needs of residents in 116 villages near the conflict lines.

The party aims to enhance access to Georgian citizenship and simplify related procedures. To promote freedom of movement, they propose expanding the use of neutral documents and enabling vehicles with Abkhazian and Ossetian license plates to move freely. They also emphasize liberalizing trade and movement regulations along the administrative boundaries.

The platform highlights the importance of expanding access to higher education in cooperation with Western partners and preserving Abkhazian, Ossetian, and Georgian identities in occupied territories. It also includes plans to enhance services for female victims of violence and increase access to sexual and reproductive health services.

Girchi

The Girchi party frames the resolution of conflicts within the context of reclaiming Abkhazia and believes that de-occupation is achievable through close cooperation with the West, particularly the EU and the United States. They emphasize that a strong military is essential for ensuring stability and facilitating peaceful negotiations while ruling out the possibility of resolving conflicts through violent means.

Girchi argues that Georgia’s internal economic and political development should be attractive to Abkhazian society. This includes reforms to improve the economy, judiciary, and political systems.

The party has also proposed a plan for the return of IDPs to Abkhazia, based on traditional Svan law. According to this plan, a Georgian would indicate which state-owned property would be acceptable as compensation for their original home, while an Abkhazian resident would choose whether to stay in their current residence or accept the compensation. The outcome would ensure satisfaction for both sides, regardless of the decision made[7].

Social Justice Center’s Theory of Change on Peace Policy

The Social Justice Center’s theory of change regarding peace policy is based on several key assumptions, which were also shared with political parties before they developed their programs.

Radical Pessimism vs. Radical Optimism: Georgia’s conflict-related policies over the past few decades have shown no positive momentum. Instead, political crises, alienation, and related human, social, and political losses have increased. The growing alienation and isolation between people complicates the chances of peaceful conflict resolution. This situation should prompt local communities and political elites to seek new, innovative political alternatives and compromises. This approach needs to address the geopolitical, Russo-Georgian, and ethnopolitical dimensions of conflicts while balancing the existing asymmetries.

Fragile Reality and Emerging Fears in Abkhazian Society: Since the outbreak of the full-scale war in Ukraine, Russia has accelerated its annexationist military and economic policies in the conflict regions. To strengthen its strategic control over the Black Sea, Russia has initiated the development of military infrastructure in Ochamchire, increasing the risk of military escalation in Abkhazia. Meanwhile, under the pressure of international sanctions, Russia has intensified efforts to exploit peripheral markets, properties, and resources. Over the past two years, Russia has actively lobbied Abkhazian political elites to revoke local protectionist laws that regulate and restrict the sale of strategic assets, real estate, and natural resources. These developments have generated anxiety and fears about the future among the Abkhazian population. Although the Abkhazian community is trying to resist these processes, it is becoming increasingly clear to them that, if left alone against the “Russian world,” halting these trends may become impossible. In this context, it is crucial for Georgian political and civic actors to acknowledge the concerns and fears of Abkhazian society and to offer new alternatives, providing high guarantees for the protection of their security, identity, and political and economic rights.

Brussels Instead of Moscow -  Georgia must leverage the EU’s experience and resources to accelerate Europeanization as a new phase in its peace policy. Now, Georgia has the opportunity to offer the Abkhazian and South Ossetian communities an alternative to Moscow: a Europeanized, democratic, and secure Tbilisi in partnership with Brussels. Proposals from Tbilisi and Brussels to these regions could include visa-free movement within the EU and opportunities for local youth to study at European universities.

Easing Abkhazia’s Isolation to Reduce Dependence on Russia - The full-scale war in Ukraine has made it clear that the international recognition of de facto states poses minimal risk. Under these conditions, Georgia must recognize the importance of creating bold alternatives for these regions. New educational, developmental, social, and economic opportunities would reduce Abkhazia’s dependency on Russia and promote local well-being.

Positive Peace vs. Negative Peace - Georgia must embrace a progressive concept of peace that prioritizes human security, justice, and the protection of rights. This approach should aim to benefit all conflict-affected groups, including displaced persons, residents of villages near the conflict lines, and communities in Gali, Akhalgori, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. Restoring trust between people on both sides of the conflict is possible only by addressing their common needs and concerns. Achieving this goal requires the implementation of a multidimensional concept of human security at both policy and action-plan levels. Human rights must become an integral part of peace policy. We believe that building positive peace amid ongoing conflict should become

the main conceptual framework for the development of peace policy. This approach involves addressing the socio-economic and security challenges of all conflict-affected groups and actively involving them in the peace process.

Conflict Regions as Weak Points in Georgia’s Security and Sovereignty - Protracted conflicts serve as tools in Russia’s hands to influence Georgia’s sovereignty, security, and future. In recent months, pro-government platforms have actively discussed how pragmatic foreign policy could enable positive developments in conflict resolution. The political opposition needs to present a European model of conflict resolution, contrasting with expectations of resolving conflicts under Russian influence. This model should address both security and human rights issues.

The Importance of Direct Dialogue with Local Civil Societies and Political Elites - Since the August 2008 war, there has been no direct dialogue between Tbilisi and Sukhumi, or Tbilisi and Tskhinvali, even on status-neutral issues related to rights and social concerns. Without political processes or formats, civil society dialogue initiatives supported by the international community have not achieved meaningful results. Georgia, with EU support, must explore ways to establish direct dialogue platforms and practices. Such dialogue could have a direct impact on security concerns and prospects, fostering trust between the sides and reducing the use of war-related fears as political tools. In such a context, both societies would feel more secure and open to cooperation.

The Inherent Value of Conflict Transformation as a Process

Developing new visions, policies, and action plans for peace must be a democratic process involving various social groups, especially conflict-affected communities. Issues of war and peace are complex, historical, and often traumatic, making it essential for policies in this area to be transformative and focused on building consensus. There is a common perception that conflict-affected populations are more inclined toward political revenge than peace. This belief often leads to their exclusion from peace policy discussions, under the assumption that they are not rational participants in shaping future changes. However, our research shows that conflict-affected communities are deeply invested in the idea of peace, as they understand its value more acutely and maintain stronger connections with people on the other side of the conflict. For these reasons, the development of peace policy must be based on deliberative principles and consensus-building, giving intrinsic value to the process itself. While conflict transformation may not always yield immediate, tangible results, it reshapes people’s perspectives and creates new opportunities and future possibilities.

Considering the above:

• Develop a Comprehensive Action Plan -The plan should focus on the protection of the security, rights, and well-being of all conflict-affected groups (IDPs, residents near the conflict lines, and populations in Gali, Akhalgori, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia) as a shared public good. Peace policy must be grounded in humanitarian and emancipatory principles. This action plan should be developed through democratic consultations with local communities and include mechanisms for accountability and monitoring.
• Create a New Vision for Peace Policy
  The new vision must respond to the evolving geopolitical and regional contexts and leverage the unique opportunities offered by Georgia’s EU integration process. It is essential to begin building this vision "here and now" rather than waiting for the war in Ukraine to end and a new reality to emerge. In the current context of an unfinished war, Georgia must address the accumulated fears, concerns, and existential interests of the Abkhazian community and build narratives and hopes for a future rooted in European peace and development. This approach would demonstrate to the Abkhazian community that Tbilisi respects and acknowledges their interests and agency.
• Mobilize Programs and Resources for Conflict Transformation
  As part of Georgia’s EU integration efforts, it is necessary to adopt a new conflict transformation paradigm. This would increase the EU’s support and involvement in developing conflict regions and ensuring the well-being, security, and protection of rights for all conflict-affected groups.
• Develop De-Occupation and De-Annexation Plans
  Alongside peace policy, Georgia must formulate de-occupation and de-annexation strategies aimed at reducing the region's and the country’s dependence on Russia. For conflict regions, this involves easing isolation, while for Georgia, it requires building resilient economic, security, and information systems. Additionally, Georgia must actively advocate for its national interests in the global agenda and push for long-term, sustainable peace guarantees, regardless of the outcome of relations between Russia and the West (whether conflict, normalization, or Russia’s decline).
• Establish Direct and Regular Dialogue Platforms with De Facto Administrations
  With EU support, Georgia should create platforms for direct and regular dialogue between the Georgian government and the de facto administrations of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The goal of these platforms would be to negotiate and address the security and rights of all conflict-affected groups, including IDPs, residents near the conflict lines, and communities in Gali, Akhalgori, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia.

Summary

Since the 2020 parliamentary elections, political parties pre-election programs have shown some improvement and greater complexity in terms of conflict resolution and peace policy. This development is driven, on the one hand, by the ruling party’s instrumentalization of peace policy and the opposition’s need to offer alternative political visions, and on the other hand, by ongoing political crises and new geopolitical opportunities that may arise for the country in the future. Evidence of this trend can be seen in the inclusion of issues related to improving the human rights and social conditions of residents in the occupied territories within several political platforms.

Political parties appear to have recognized the challenges posed by isolationist policies and alienation, which significantly hinder the peacebuilding process. They are trying to develop new political alternatives and explore compromises. In their efforts to ease isolation, opposition parties emphasize the importance of freedom of movement and free trade, which they see as achievable within the framework of European integration.

A particularly positive aspect is that all political parties stress the importance of peaceful conflict resolution, which sends a timely and necessary message to the populations living in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region. Furthermore, opposition parties have acknowledged the EU’s role and potential in peace policy, which is reflected in their desire to implement peace initiatives within the EU framework. In this context, they present Europe as an alternative to Russia, offering the populations in conflict regions opportunities for development, education, and employment. However, the parties lack detailed plans on how to engage the EU in conflict regions amidst increasing annexation processes. They also do not have a strategic vision or theory of change regarding what institutional and political reforms are needed as the foundation for de-occupation strategies and peace policy.

It is worth noting that the proposed visions aimed at alleviating the conditions of conflict-affected populations align with the conflict transformation paradigm. However, these proposals do not address the root causes of the conflicts or offer policies that encompass the various dimensions of these issues.

Additionally, political parties have not formulated dialogue formats for engaging with conflict regions or managing relations with Russia. There are also no proposals regarding the preservation, renewal, or creation of alternative formats to the Geneva Discussions.

Some opposition parties (e.g., For Georgia and Strong Georgia) have realized the need to develop a new national strategy and vision. Importantly, they emphasize the necessity of building national consensus on these issues. However, most opposition parties have not adequately addressed the problems faced by internally displaced persons (IDPs). The state strategy for IDPs has not been updated since 2007, and the existing document fails to properly address the integration of IDPs and their political participation.

As for the ruling party, Georgian Dream’s program fails to recognize the genuine needs of conflict-affected populations and does not offer a concrete new vision for the development of peace policy. According to their platform, Georgian Dream’s peace policy is limited to supporting the policy of non-recognition and improving relations with Russia. However, the essence of these approaches and specific steps are not elaborated in the program. Even if the government continues peace policy within the framework of the current engagement strategy, it is clear that this approach is outdated and insufficient, failing to respond to regional crises or capitalize on the critical new opportunities for Georgia’s EU integration.

In the context of the government’s anti-Western policies, the use of European opportunities, methodologies, and support for conflict resolution appears inadequate. As a result, the government’s rhetoric on peace policy seems populist and superficial. An analysis of Georgian Dream’s programs and statements reveals that beyond the general messages expressed during the election campaign, there is no practical vision for introducing new dynamics in peace policy.

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