The Social Justice Center (formerly EMC) calls on the authorities to ensure that the security of the villages close to the Administrative Border Line (ABL) and their social and economic support are the urgent priority and active efforts are directed at the care for the welfare, well-being, and development vital social infrastructure of war-torn villages.

Thirteen years have passed since the August war. The war has caused significant damage and loss to the country, and the human, political, security-related, and social damages caused by the war require a multi-level response from the state. In this statement, we want to focus on the needs and interests of the villages close to the ABL.  

The analysis of the situation close to the occupation line (116 villages in total, including those in Gori, Kaspi, Kareli, Khashuri, Dusheti, Oni, Sachkhere, Tsalenjikha, and Zugdidi municipalities) shows that part of the war-affected population faces significant security challenges, most of them have limited access to vital resources and basic social infrastructure, such as drinking and irrigation water, pastures, medical facilities, kindergartens.

There are no police posts in some villages close to ABL, and locals who live near occupation forces face a constant security risk. They find it difficult to move freely even in their village, especially in some sections of the land. In the wake of arbitrary borderization, dozens of our citizens have fallen victim to unlawful detentions.[1]

In the villages where part of the rural area is now beyond the occupation line, the population lost access to their pastures and gardens, and the state has not provided them the land resources in exchange. The state does not have additional agricultural support programs for these villages. For the population whose primary source of income is related to agriculture, this situation becomes especially damaging.  

In some war-torn villages, the problem of rehabilitation of houses is problematic, and even 13 years after the war, they still have to live in the ruins of the war. The situation in the villages of Zardiantkari and Gugutiatkari is particularly worrying in this regard.[2] The population of Zardiantkari returned in 2013, and the state did not even help them restore their gardens that have been deserted and enfeebled for five years.  

Some IDP families continue to live in other settlements, and the state does not provide them with the right to adequate housing, even after the wars of the 1990s and 2008.

There is a high wave of migration from these villages, and most young people are leaving the territory. It should be noted that there is no youth policy and the relevant infrastructural and educational programs in the war-affected villages.

The underlying reason for the apparent weakness of the state social policy in these villages is unclear to us. In recent years, positive steps have been taken in these villages, including separate infrastructure projects, exemptions in line with the law on mountainous regions, and general agricultural support programs. However, these are not fundamental interventions that would bring substantial relief to war-torn, vulnerable, and traumatized populations. We fully understand that these support programs and interventions require the mobilization of significant financial resources. However, it is still unclear why, even 13 years after the war, these villages look so underdeveloped, poor, and abandoned. The locals tell us with sadness that they feel that the government has no interest in strengthening these villages.

The August war had dire consequences for our country and the already divided societies of today. The war was followed by significant human casualties, lost territories, exile, and poverty. It further alienated Ossetian and Georgian communities and doubly aggravated the legal and social situation of ethnic Georgians living in the occupied territories in Gali and Akhalgori. Russia's military and, consequently, its political influence and manipulation capabilities have been strengthened in the country. To date, steps towards de-occupation policies have been weak and limited to conventional diplomatic practices of non-recognition, while policies of reconciliation and confidence-building have not yet brought about significant political and social change. Despite many years of conflict experience, we do not have even the slightest achievements in the direction of, for example, freedom of movement, trade, operation of international monitoring mechanism in conflict regions, and the sustainable formats of high-level dialogue with de facto regimes.

However, it is surprising that beyond complex and challenging political and security concerns, even issues that are effectively under the control of our state and involve adequate protection, development, and access to basic infrastructure close to the occupation line remain unresolved.   

The Social Justice Center calls on the government:

Develop an effective, time-bound concrete plan to meet the social and infrastructural needs of the villages close to the Administrative Border Line, and make additional and extraordinary efforts to provide social and economic support to the war-affected population there.

Review security plans in villages around the ABL and align the set-up of police stations, patrolling, and additional security measures with the safety risks and fears of people living there.

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