Giorgi Kipiani - Bachelor of Political Science, School of Public Affairs in Georgia

It is a common practice for countries involved in the EU enlargement process to seek a supporters within the Union. By doing this, countries aspiring for membership aim to make their accession a active issue on the European Union's agenda. The member states themselves have different interests and approaches to providing such support. For example, Sweden is known for its broadly positive attitude towards enlargement and actively engages with nearly all countries involved in this process. Austria is particularly interested in its immediate neighborhood—the Western Balkan countries. While Romania supports Moldova due to the language and cultural proximity. Obviously, such support does not guarantee unconditional success of the states participating in enlargement process and progress of each applicant state is defined by merit-based approach[i].

Despite the diverse grounds of support described above (ethnic proximity, geopolitics, etc.), until 2022, in the long history of the enlargement process, there had never been a case where member and applicant countries supported by them disregarded the common Copenhagen criteria.

In 2022, Georgia's first attempt to obtain candidate status was unsuccessful. The Georgian government considered the decision unfair, despite the stagnation and, in some cases, regression of democratic reforms in the country in recent years. At the end of the year, Hungarian leader Viktor Orbán, during a meeting with Irakli Garibashvili where a strategic partnership between the two countries was signed, called the refusal to grant candidate status "discriminatory" and "immoral." In 2023, Hungary's Foreign Minister, in an interview with Forbes[ii], spoke more specifically about Hungary's perspective on the matter. Peter Szijjarto described the 12 priorities set by the European Commission for Georgia, which were steps towards meeting the criteria for membership, as insignificant and madness. Georgia found its supporter.

To understand the problematic nature of Orban's radically different approach to enlargement compared to traditional ones, it's important to examine events from 20 years ago. The 2004 enlargement of the European Union was a significant achievement for the bloc. Ten countries from Central and Eastern Europe[iii] became part of the record-setting and one of the final enlargements. This wave of enlargement presented several challenges for the European Union, including the ineffectiveness of the conditionality mechanisms at the time for ensuring the sustainability of democratic institutions.

Viktor Orbán first came to power in 1998, just a few months after the start of Hungary's EU accession negotiations. Over the next four years, Orbán was known for his pro-European positioning: In addition to supporting the accession process through public campaigns, his government actively worked on meeting the Copenhagen criteria. The reforms implemented from 1998 to 2002 in the areas of judiciary and rule of law were crucial, even critical, for the process that culminated in Hungary's accession in the following two years.

The reforms implemented from 1998 to 2002 in the areas of judiciary and rule of law were critical for the process that culminated in Hungary's accession in two years.

Significant drawback of democracy started in 2010 in Hungary, after the return of Victor Orban in power.  In 2011, urgent constitutional and electoral changes were implemented. The main target of these reforms was primarily the Constitutional Court. The number of judges was increased, and to facilitate the appointment of judges favorable to the government, the nomination process was altered. The following year, the retirement age for judges was reduced, which led to many judges unexpectedly being removed from the court, and their positions were filled by judges loyal to the government. The European Court of Justice found this to be a violation and ordered Hungary to pay compensation to the former judges, but did not mandate their reinstatement. Election system was also changed in 2012, coverage of election districts was altered, which resulted in the ruling party, Fidesz, gaining an advantageous position for its majoritarian candidates (gerrymandering). In the majoritarian part of the elections, instead of requiring an absolute majority of votes in two rounds, a simple majority in a single round became sufficient. These changes allowed Fidesz to maintain a constitutional majority over the past 14 years—holding 2/3 of parliamentary seats with approximately 50% voter support. In 2017, the Hungarian Parliament passed a law on the transparency of foreign-supported organizations. The European Court of Justice ordered Hungary to repeal this law, citing violations of the freedoms of capital movement and freedom of association.

Orban himself explains these changes as the building of an illiberal democracy. The conceptualization of illiberal democracy as a political system is challenging due to its general, evolving, and inconsistent nature over time.  According to Orbán, the main goals of illiberal democracy are to protect Christian and traditional identity and values and to strengthen sovereignty. To achieve these stated objectives, he centralized power, weakened the independence of the judiciary, usurped the media, imposed censorship on the LGBTQ+ community, and so on. The issue of sovereignty is particularly interesting. Orban criticized Brussels for interfering in Hungary's sovereignty, but at the same time, he has no problem accepting billions of euros from Brussels, provided by European taxpayers[iv].

The European Parliament accuses Hungary of violating the values outlined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union in twelve areas of political and social life, including: 1. Constitutional and electoral system; 2. Judicial independence and the rights of judges; 3. Corruption and conflict of interest; 4. Protection of private life and data; 5. Freedom of expression; 6. Academic freedom; 7. Freedom of religion; 8. Freedom of association; 9. Right to equal treatment; 10. Rights and protection of minorities; 11. Rights of migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees; 12. Economic and social rights.

Currently, approximately €11.5 billion allocated for Hungary is frozen by the European Commission due to violations of the rule of law, judicial independence, and other democratic standards, while €10.4 billion is frozen due to issues related to corruption, public procurement, academic freedom, and other problematic areas.

In 2018, the European Parliament activated Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union, which addresses ongoing violations of EU values by Hungary and involves the European Council in discussing the issue. However, due to the lack of consensus against Hungary, no sanctions of any kind foreseen under this article have been implemented so far[v]. In the case of continuous violations being established (which requires the agreement of 26 member states), the suspension of the voting rights of the member country is possible^[vi]. According to the EU Parliament Resolution of 2022, Hungary is no longer considered as full-fledged democracy and it turned out “hybrid regime of elective autocracy”.

Apart from procedural disputes, hungary’s democracy backsliding has often become object of criticism from EU and member state leaders: According to the Vice President of EU commissio, Orban is not building illiberal democracy, nbut sick democracy[1]. Mark Rutte, Prime Minister of Netherlands think that there is no longer place for Hungary in EU[2].

Georgia’s bet on Hungary?

In December of the previous year, during the European Council summit, the European Commission supported the transfer of 10 billion euros frozen for Hungary. The official reason cited was Hungary's fulfillment of the conditions related to judicial independence, while unofficially, the funds were provided to avoid Orbán blocking Ukraine's accession negotiations."

Orbán's blackmail did not go unanswered: the European Parliament is suing the European Commission in the EU Court of Justice over the decision to release the funds. If the court finds a violation in the interinstitutional dispute, the European Commission will be obligated to reclaim the funds provided. In the case of Hungarian resistance, it will be possible to recover these 10 billion euros from other disbursed funds (including those unrelated to the rule of law issues).

Before the same Summit, there was also discussion about the possibility of Hungary to use its veto power to secure candidate status for Georgia. This meant that Orbán's condition was that he would block the opening of negotiations for Ukraine^[vii] if Georgia's status was not granted.

Hungary's use of its veto power is often described as a leverage of blackmail. By using this lever, Hungary tries to obtain various concessions, which often contradict the positions of the other 26 member states (for example, the start of negotiations with Ukraine), and significantly complicates the decision-making process in the European Union, damaging one of its most important values—unity.

The failure of relevant institutions to adequately address Hungary's disregard for EU values also highlights the weakness of the conditionality mechanism in ensuring sustainable liberal democracy in candidate countries after their accession.

This has been reflected in the ongoing and future enlargement processes, specifically in the significant changes in the nature of the progress indicators (i.e., Benchmarks) for the negotiation chapters. If in previous waves of enlargement the main indicator of compliance with conditions was legislative harmonization with EU regulations, now the indicators are much more complex. For example, in the case of Serbia, only one-third of the progress indicators for Chapters 23 and 24[viii] are related to legislative activities. Other indicators include: track record/data, increasing institutional capacity (such as budget increases, staff retraining, and growth), and so on.^[ix]   Although such types of indicators are much more outcome-oriented than merely assessing legislative activities, their implementation is also more complex. The Western Balkans and the Associated Trio countries, including Georgia, face a more challenging negotiation process than the members of previous waves of enlargement.

Georgian Dream seems to plan to leave unfulfilled the 9 steps outlined by the European Union or any other condition that would reduce its power, while satisfying pro-European integration voters with the support received from Hungary. Apart from this paradox, Georgia's biggest supporter in the enlargement process is the EU's most problematic member, such a strategy is also pragmatically unjustifiable in the long term.^[x]

This paradoxical alliance clearly shows the necessity for Georgia to implement genuine democratic reforms, rather than seeking success in the enlargement process through non-existent shortcuts with the help of a problematic partner. In the long run, creating a basis for genuine progress and the legitimacy of Georgia's accession can only be achieved by adhering to the principles of democracy and the rule of law.

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